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2Abstract
Internal labour market theory states that the administrative rules and customs that 
restrict access and regulate the deployment of labour in craft markets will 
eventually be converted by trade unions into formal collective agreements, 
preferably enforced by closed shops. However there have been few opportunities 
to examine what happens when that process is reversed and the protection of those 
two institutions are removed.
The demise of the closed shop in Britain is generally attributed to Mrs Thatcher’s 
Conservative governments whose successive Employment Acts were intended to 
remove obstacles to the free functioning of the labour market. However, this 
research will argue, using the example of the British film production industry, that 
regardless of the political action it is unlikely that the pre-entry closed shop would 
have survived the technical and social changes of the 1980s. It also shows that 
many of the constraining practices and principles associated with the industry’s 
internal labour market persist.
By tracing the origins of organised labour in the early British film production 
industry, this research considers whether that closed shop, created by unusual war­
time circumstances, merely endorsed the informal rules and customs that 
characterised an established closed craft community. It will demonstrate that 
continuity has been possible because internal labour market practices ensure that 
on-the-job training is only available to those likely to perpetuate the established 
working practices and demarcation. Furthermore, management are complicit 
because the efficiencies in screening and training means that a compatible trained 
workforce is always available.
For contrast, it will be shown that in television and video production, seemingly 
similar sectors, an unrestricted, competitive labour market has been created by the 
demise of the closed shop, the workers’ inability to create a substitute informal 
network, the unbridled influence of capital and government efforts to assist access 
to employment.
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The stimulus for this research was the anecdotal evidence1 that little had changed in 
film production work practices since the demise of the closed shop. Those who 
worked in the industry in the post-war years until the late 1980s remember a rigidly 
enforced, pre-entry closed shop operated by the film sector unions to ensure 
adherence to prescribed crewing levels and remuneration agreements. Yet union 
potency extended far beyond the basic contracts because it maintained, some would 
say imposed, a gamut of peripheral working practices that often had little to do 
with the functional requirements of film production: how many menu options 
should be provided at meal breaks ; the class of aircraft seats acceptable for foreign 
travel; the provision of “wash up” time; and clear demarcation between the various 
grades and unions.
Twenty-five years on, those influential production unions of the 1970s and 1980s 
are no longer extant and their successor has only a nominal presence. The national 
Association of Theatrical, Television and Kine Employees (DATTKE) and the 
Association of Cinematographic, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT), plus 
the BBC’s Association of Broadcasting Staff (ABS), were amalgamated in two 
stages between February 1989 and January 1991 to form the Broadcasting 
Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU). But BECTU has 
never managed to assume the central and influential role achieved by its 
predecessors. As the official BECTU website admits, these have not been happy 
years for the union:
Hostile government legislation, technological and structural changes
in the industries in which they organised, sustained attacks by
1 Evidence collected in unstructured interviews when exploring the prevalence of royalty payment 
systems in the film industry.
2 My first experience of a film production industrial dispute was when the caterer was accused of 
putting margarine and not butter on the breakfast croissants.
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employers on the employment, contractual status, pay and conditions 
of service of union members have left BECTU with a paid-up 
membership (25,000 at December 1999) significantly smaller than the
60,000 or so members collectively claimed by ABS, ACTT and 
□ATTKE in the early 1980s.
(http://www.bectu.org.uk/about/history/hist05.html 12 Sept 2004)
What arouses curiosity, which subsequent chapters will explore, is that while these 
“sustained attacks” may have shattered the cohesiveness between the union and the 
workforce (and the BECTU statement does not acknowledge its own failure to 
organise within the new technologies), the immediate, cursory impression is that 
employment practices for the majority of established film production crew have 
carried on much as before. The decline in union influence was not marked by any 
cataclysmic change such as was imposed on the printers at Wapping (Littlejohn 
1992; Greenslade 2003:476), on the miners in 1984 (Goodman 1985:195) or on the 
film workers’ close cousins, the television workers, at TV-am in 1987 (Maksymiw 
1990:27). While there have been some adjustments (and some skills and trades 
have disappeared) the majority of processes and skills of film production remain 
unchanged - while access to the film industry remains as mysterious as ever. The 
remuneration of feature film production workers may have slipped a little from the 
peaks that they achieved when the closed shop operated, but this remains a sector 
where the primary influences on employment and reward will be always the 
demands of a global market and exchange rate fluctuations. Despite those factors, 
it is a sector where 65% of workers can earn in excess of £1,000 per week and 21% 
more than £1,800 per week (2002 figures from UK Film Council 2005:107). 
However, it will also be shown that while the employment conditions of film 
production workers have been largely preserved, those of other seemingly similar 
workers, in what is now termed the audio-visual industry , have been steadily 
eroded.
3 It is not easy to establish when the term “audio-visual” was first used. It is not defined in the 
Oxford English dictionary of 1970, nor is it used in the Institute o f Manpower study into 
“Television Film and Video Industry Employment Patterns and deeds” (Varlaam et al 1990). 
However, the term was used in 1992 to define the scope of the newly-established Skillset’s 
activities: “Audio visual, in this instance, includes radio, television, film, video and interactive 
media” (Skillset submission to the DCMS/DTI 2002)
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Before identifying the question, it is necessary to clearly define the sectors under 
consideration and the first section will explain the position of the film production 
workforce (approximately 9,700 workers) in the much larger audio-visual 
workforce (approximately 145,000 workers) and cite the preliminary indications 
that they have remained a distinctive and autonomous body. Section 1.2 will 
demonstrate why film production workers are possibly unique amongst the closed 
shop occupations of the 1960s and 1970s in maintaining their distinctive trades. It 
will be shown that the continuity of film trades can be proven since 1938 (and 
probably much earlier) through to the present day and the third section will explain 
the relationship and hierarchy of those trades and the grading within departments. 
Section 1.4 will set out the research questions and section 1.5 the structure of the 
thesis.
1.1 Defining the film production workforce4
Although the detailed examination of the differences in the sectors will be 
explained in later chapters, it is essential to understand at the outset the identity of 
the film production workforce that is the focus of this research. The general term 
‘the film industry’ comprises three distinctive activities, production, distribution 
and exhibition, and these evolved as separate activities before the First World War. 
The pioneers of film made and exhibited their own films, but as the demand for 
film grew the activities separated and eventually the fairground and music hall 
exhibitors began to bid competitively for the most popular films. Because British 
producers could not keep up with demand, or even then match the Hollywood 
product, a system of distribution arose that soon to become “the most crucial 
element of film supply”, brokering the deals and organising the supply chain 
(Street 1997:5). As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, there would be no 
production industry without the financial sponsorship of the distributors and the 
commercial activities of the exhibitors which create consumer demand, however
4 This section, intended to set the scope of the sector under consideration, includes many statements 
which will be justified in later chapters
Iain Reid
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this research will concentrate on the working practices and relationships of those 
who actually make film: the feature film production workforce.
Between the late 1950s and the late 1980s, it would have been reasonable to 
associate the feature film production workforce with three others: terrestrial 
television (BBC and ITV1); commercials; and documentaries. Some overlap 
existed between the workforces because feature film crew also worked on high-end 
television and, from the 1970s onwards, commercials. Similarly, from the 1970s, 
documentary production became synonymous with television as community 
cinema societies and school use of film moved to video5 - but those documentary 
producers could equally adapt to the growing market for corporate or training 
productions. Overall, the whole production industry was small, contained within 
recognisable boundaries and the barrier of union admission kept new entrants to a 
trickle. Production employment was invariably arranged in accordance with the 
appropriate union agreement and indeed it was the authority of those agreements 
that effectively maintained the clear distinctions between the four major sectors. 
As already indicated, it is estimated that the total employment of the industry in 
1979 was 60,000 employees (including the laboratory technicians).
An accurate matrix of how that workforce of the late 1970s was distributed is now 
difficult to reconstruct because they were members of different, now defunct, 
unions whose records are no longer available. And, even if the figures were 
available, they would provide little true indication because many members were 
freelance workers who could move seamlessly between divisions as demand 
required; perhaps starting a week working dailies on a feature or television 
production, and ending that week working on a commercial. The only restriction to 
their employment within the industry was inter-union demarcation - the ACTT 
controlling production and technical staff, and DATTKE controlling art department 
and construction. (The BBC was less accessible because it had its own union 
agreements with the ABS but, as will be shown, inter-union transfers were
5 By the early 1980s, even the famous Shell Film Unit had abandoned film and switched to video 
production.
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possible.) The structure of the late 1970s workforce is shown schematically in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Organisation of the production workforce in the 1970s
Free movement of union members (within limits of union demarcation) 
between the production divisions of the late 1970s
Television
Production
Documentary
Production
Commercial
Production
Film
Production
Admission through the craft qualification unions: ACTT, NATTKE & ABS
Furthermore, within each workforce there existed a natural hierarchy amongst 
production crew which was based upon qualities that even the uninitiated would 
have recognised: in features between a Hammer Horror and Chariots o f  Fire; in 
television between one of the formulaic sit-coms and Brideshead Revisited; in 
commercials between the rough and ready promotion of Allied Carpets and the 
sophistication of Cinzano promoted by Joan Collins and Leonard Rossiter. Anyone 
within the industry would have been instantly able to assess the status, experience 
and probably (given the unions’ comprehensive control of rates, terms and 
conditions) the income of a co-worker by the nature of his or her work, and the 
productions on which they crewed.
However, from the early 1980s, the emergence of video technology, followed soon 
after by computer graphics, meant that there was rapid growth in new audio-visual 
sectors which, by the early 21st century, were numerically far larger than the feature 
film production sector (a fuller explanation appears in Chapter 8). That the latter
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remained a separate and distinctive workforce was acknowledged in the 
introduction to the more general audio-visual workforce survey of 2003 to explain 
why those working in film had been excluded from that first survey:
Previous experience has established that the modus operandi of the 
film industry is sufficiently different from the rest of the audio-visual 
industries to merit a completely different methodology. (Skillset 
2003c: 15)
That different methodology was undertaken in 2004 and focussed on British 
individuals who, in 2002, had worked on productions that lasted eighty minutes or 
longer and that had a budget in excess of £14m6 (Skillset 2005:19), i.e. those films 
invariably made in the “classic” mode, utilising the crewing structure, production 
methods and invariably 35mm equipment, that was largely unchanged since the 
1930s or 1940s. That 2005 survey estimated that there were approximately 9,700 
employed in the feature film sector (Skillset 2005:19) and, as will be demonstrated 
in Chapter 7, they are very distinct in character, work practices and procedures 
from those employed in the other audio-visual sectors.
Thus, by 2005, the total industry encompassed two separate labour markets that 
possessed very different characteristics. Those different characteristics and the 
reason for those differences will be examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, but it will also 
be shown that workers in the primary labour market7 (feature film production) can 
move effortlessly between the two labour markets, often by taking short term 
contracts (days or weeks) in the wider audio-visual sectors to occupy time between 
feature productions. However, movement by those employed in the other, 
secondary, audio-visual labour markets into film production is invariably blocked 
by their lack of the necessary experience, contacts or appropriate skills. The 
contemporary production industry workforce can thus be schematically illustrated 
by Figure 2. (The characteristics of the two labour markets, shown in this figure to 
illustrate the differences, are explored more fully in later chapters)
6 VAai was a low figure but it allowed the survey to include 109 productions, notable UK 
productions of 2002 included Cold Mountain (£48m), Die Another Day (£62m), Calendar Girls 
(£8m), and Girl with a Pearl Earring (£11 Vi) (BFI 2004)
7 The use of Doeringer & Piore’s (1971) terminology, primary and secondary, is useful to 
differentiate the labour markets, although it has to be accepted that not all their criteria (e.g. workers 
in the secondary sector “engage more freely in petty theft and pilferage”(l 971:166)) are implied.
Iain Reid S t  ««K<*
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Figure 2: The two labour markets of the contemporary production industry, 2005
The distinctive features of the contemporary film 
production labour market and other audio-visual sectors
Average
Labour moves only 
one way - and usually 
for short term 
contracts only
Average salary £29.8k
65% younger than 35 yrs
'orkforce
9,700Total Workforce 135,000
Film
Production
Television, radio, animation, commercials, 
Corporate, post production, computer games etc
(Skillset 2003c & Skillset 2005)
This transformation and expansion of the production industry has been effected in a 
period of some fifteen years, although, as will be shown in Chapter 6, the causes 
and roots of the transformation extend back at least a further ten years. However, 
what is significant is that the film production workforce survived the ending of the 
closed shop and the subsequent deregulation as a recognisable sector and that its 
workforce is still employed in the same grades and departments that pre-date the 
closed shop. In this, as the next section shows, the film production sector may be 
unique.
1.2 The unique continuity of film industry trades
“ There is a British film  industry. ” (Department o f  Culture, Media J  
Sport Committee Report 2003:3)
In its Annual Report of 2005, the UK Film Council reported that the British film 
and video industry was employing 46% more workers than it had been in 1994,
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whereas the increase in the national workforce had been only 11% (UK Film 
Council 2005:102) thus demonstrating that the film and video industry survives in 
Britain. That the industry survives and flourishes goes some way in justifying the 
film trades as a suitable longitudinal case study but it is useful to demonstrate why 
the other more conspicuous pre-entry, craft qualification closed shops (McCarthy 
1964:45) of the 1960s and 1970s such as print, textiles, shipbuilding and dock 
labour are not also suitable vehicles for study. In many respects those industries 
may appear more dynamic and colourful examples with far more established 
pedigrees - but they share the common failing that they are sectors that have 
changed so radically in the last twenty years that any longitudinal study is 
meaningless, whereas the majority of film industry trades have survived into the 
twenty-first century. In addition, the hierarchy of skills and grades within film 
remain largely unchanged, so that realistic comparisons can be made between the 
nature of employment that existed before the demise of the closed shop and the 
practices that operated twenty years later in 2005.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the fate of many craft-related closed shops was inevitably 
bound to the fate of their host industries. The reasons for the decline of those 
industries are varied, but an examination of the list of McCarthy’s 
“Comprehensively Closed Trades” of 1964 (Table 1) demonstrates that the 
majority are unsuitable for any longitudinal study because most of these 
occupational groups are defunct, most conspicuously the coal miners who in the 
early 1960s topped McCarthy’s list with 600,000 miners. By March 2006 the 
changed requirements for power, and a disastrous confrontation with the Thatcher 
government in 1984 (Goodman 1985), meant that the British coal industry 
employed just 5,903 workers, (www.coal.gov.uk/services 2 Jun 06)
Iain Reid * M  SC  44K +
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Table 1: The "comprehensively closed trades” of the 1960s
Employees
Coal miners 600,000
Craftsmen and other manual workers in printing 250,000
Process workers in iron & steel 160,000
Craftsmen and other manual workers in commercial shipyards 150,000
Sailors and other deckhands 70,000
Dockers in commercial dockyards 68,000
Bus workers & staff employed by LT 50,000
Craftsmen in cotton & other textiles 45,000
Scottish bakers 14,000
Workers in London’s wholesale markets 10,000
Film production workers 7,000
Hatters 4,000
Draughtsmen in commercial shipyards 4,000
Teleprinters and proof readers 5,000
Musicians 25,000
Trade Union and Labour Party Officers and staff 8,000
TOTAL 1,470,000
(McCarthy 1964:31)
Similarly, another of McCarthy’s categories within the labour supply shop 
(1964:38), the 45,000 textile workers, are long diluted and the cotton industry’s 
tapesizers, warp dressers and chain beamers and their associated practices and 
complex interactions which Turner had described in such detail (1962) have gone.8 
By the late 1970s, the London Docks, which had been the largest and most 
developed centre of the labour pool shop (McCarthy 1964:42), were closed and the 
docks themselves were in the hands of a property development corporation (LDDC 
1982).
The traditional, time-serving craft apprenticeships which had supplied the 
craftsmen for engineering and shipbuilding had been in decline for some decades 
before the 1970s (Williams 1957; Connelly 1960; Donovan 1968; Vickerstaff
8 The General Union of Loom Overlookers still recorded 286 members in 2004 but no new loom 
workers were being trained (Telephone conversation with the General Secretary GULO)
Iain Reid
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2003) but were virtually eliminated by the collapse of those industries in the 1970s 
and 1980s, thereby destroying the accepted means of entry to the engineering craft 
unions and the natural progression on which the closed shop depended. In 1978, 
British shipyards had delivered 1.3 million tonnes of shipping, but by 1988 this had 
been reduced to a mere 32,000 tonnes (Economist 1988) and with a consequent 
decline in the employment and association of shipyard craftsmen, manual workers 
and draughtsmen.9
The promotion veto shops (McCarthy 1964:49), which McCarthy had illustrated 
with the 145,000 workers in iron and steel, were in an industry which reached a 
peak of 165,000 employees in 1978. However, by 2002 British Steel had been 
merged into Corns, which employed only 25,400 UK employees in an industry 
transformed by technology (Blyton & Turnbull 2004:217 & 218).
In 1964, the printing trades had been cited as a prime example of the labour supply 
shop, but there is evidence (Martin 1981; Dunn & Gennard 1984) that the practices 
and skills which marked the demarcation between the trades were already being 
eroded by new technology long before Warrington (1983) and Wapping (1986). 
Thus, while the printing trades may have seemed all powerful until the late 1970s, 
and while anecdotes of the old Fleet Street remain a maxim for closed shop 
practices, the methods within the industry have since changed so radically that one 
would have to search long and hard in 2005 to locate a working compositor, a 
lithographic printer, a linotype operator or any remnant of that formerly much 
valued employment. With the demise of these historic trades went too the 
hierarchies and the training and apprenticeship systems which had been so well 
delineated by their separate unions; DGA, SOGAT, DATSOPA and SLADE.10
There remain some sectors where the nature of employment remains distinctive and 
recognisable, but invariably the sector has changed so radically that it is difficult to
9 There have been some signs o f a revival in shipbuilding. In 2003, the GMB reported that in the 
1990s there had been a mere few hundred people working in shipbuilding on the Tyne, but now this 
had risen to about 5,000 (Economist 1 !Jov 2003). However, it can be assumed that the nature and 
demarcation o f contemporary work is very different to that of the 1970s.
10 So diluted has the print industry become that it can no longer sustain one union. By 1991, all the 
former print unions had merged into the Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU) which was 
then itself merged into Amicus in 2004.
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make comparisons of entry and promotion over the twenty year period. For 
example, sailors and deckhands of the merchant navy still perform the same 
functions. However, the move of British ships to flags of convenience and the 
replacement of British crew with cheaper third world nationals continued after 
Dunn & Gennard’s (1984) study which had shown that by 1982 the Dational Union 
of Seamen’s closed shop membership had already been reduced from McCarthy’s
70.000 to 45,000 (1984:28). The trend continued throughout the 1980s as unions 
and employers alike attempted to contend with competition from international sub­
standard or subsidised shipping until, by the late 1990s, there were fewer than
9.000 British ratings employed worldwide (DoT 1998). A union report of June 
2007, highlighted that the average age of seagoing officers had risen in twenty-five 
years from 34 to 43.5 years and that in the same period the number of cadets in 
training had fallen from 4,259 to 1,050 (Dautilus 2007:4) Thus, this is “a 
diminishing and ageing pool” (DoT 1998) attracting few new entrants and therefore 
the sector is probably unsuitable for comparison or longitudinal study.
Thus, among all these radically changed industries and trades, the film industry 
stands probably unique in being a sector where technological advances, although 
significant, have never changed the nature of employment11. Many of the current 
grades and trades (e.g. property masters, loaders, focus pullers, assistant directors, 
scenic artistes and script continuity) can be traced back to the earliest days of studio 
production12 and yet survive through to the twenty first century in a recognisable 
form.
The consistency of some specific film trades is shown in Table 2 which compares 
the 1938 list used in the Gater Report (1949) with those of the ACTT rate card of 
1978, the Relph Report of 2002 (which tried to demonstrate that crew demarcation 
could be diluted) and the Skillset Feature Film Production Workforce Survey of 
2005.
11 Musicians too remain a distinctive and recognisable category of employment and, unusually, have 
a greater union membership in 2006 (30,000) than McCarthy’s 1964 estimate.
12 Low describes how the crafts had started to emerge before WW1 when there was growing 
specialisation in lighting, photography, set construction, painting and assistant directors. In 
particular, she cites a 1913 reference to “a man ... employed solely to watch the costumes of the 
artistes” (Low 1949:122)
Iain Reid
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Table 2: The continuity of film trades 1938 - 2005
Gater ACTT Relph Skillset
Report Rate Report Report
rates card 2002 2005
for 1978
1938
Art Director y y y y
Boilerman y a - -
Boom Operator y y y y
Camera Operator y y - y
Carpenter V y y y
Continuity V y y y
Draughtsman y y - y
Editor y y y y
Electrician Maintenance y a y y
Electrician Studio lighting y a y y
First Assistant Director y y y y
First Assistant Editor V y y y
Floor electrician V a y y
Follow Focus y y y y
General labourer V a y
Hairdresser y a - y
Library Editor y y - b
Maintenance Engineer Sound V y - y
Make-up artist y a y y
Painter y a y y
Plasterer y a y y
Plumber y a y y
Powerhouse Assistant y a - -
Property Maker y a - y
Propertyman y a y y
Sound Camera Operator y y - y
Sound Recordist y y y y
Stage Hand y y y y
Still Cameraman y y - y
Unit Production Manager y y y y
a. These were extant grades in the 1970s but not ACTT grades, being either EETPU or ATTKE.
b. The functions of Library Editor now undertaken by the Researcher/Archive grade.
Sources: Gater Report (1949:25); ACTT (FTT June 1978); Relph Report (2002); Skillset (2005:139- 
141)
It should be noted that the Gater Report, on which Table 2 is based, was selective 
and concentrated on the production processes - those studio skills necessary to put 
images ‘into the camera’. In the contemporary film industry there are over one 
hundred and seventy separate skills or grades (listed at Appendix 1) that may be 
utilised at various stages in the production of a feature film, however, the majority
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of these grades would still be immediately recognised by anyone who had worked 
in the industry in the 1930s.
However, some grades have disappeared. Two relatively unskilled grades that 
have been overtaken by technical advances were the Boilerman and the 
Powerhouse Assistant, necessary only until the late 1980s when the greater 
capacity of the national grid and the improved sensitivity of film stock meant that 
studio power plants were no longer required.
Elsewhere, the major change of skills, if not in job titles, has been in post­
production where digital technology has revolutionised, and invariably replaced, 
the old processes of film cutting, editing and post-production which had been 
honed and perfected in the first century of the industry. Digital editing still 
requires good record-keeping and a good visual memory, but the skills and 
dexterity necessary to organise a film bin, to physically cut film, Sellotape new 
joins, file the removed frames and then adjust the separate sound track by the same 
number of frames, are as redundant as hot metal setting in the print industry. 
Although the post-production workforce and the production workforce were very 
distinct bodies, it will be shown that the change in the composition of the former 
was a major factor in the ending of the closed shop restrictions amongst the latter.
Thus the majority of trades remain, and it is this continuity of the skills and grading 
within film production, and the transition from a craft qualification, pre-entry 
closed shop to the contemporary free labour market, that makes employment within 
the sector an ideal case study for the examination of the demise of the closed shop 
and what persists of those employment practices.
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1.3 The hierarchy of employment in film production
“ ...it is true to say that, particularly in the production parts o f the 
industry where freelancing is so high, at 90%, that the little black book 
and who you know is very important ” (DCMS 2003:Q'l23)
1 TThe structure of a film crew is hierarchical, almost military, in its organisation.
In command is either the director or the producer, and primacy, since the demise of 
the big studios when the producers, representing capital, always dominated, 
probably depends on who has initiated the project. If a director has written or 
developed a script he or she will then seek out a producer willing to take the project 
forward by raising the funds. Alternatively, if  a producer has bought the rights to a 
book, developed the script and raised some funds, then they will appoint an 
appropriate director to turn the script into a visual reality.14 Thus, it is probable 
that one will have identified and recruited the other15 - and that may have some 
effect on their relationship - but the result must be a resilient partnership in which 
the director will be responsible for the visual result while the producer is 
responsible for the financial and administrative entity. Thus each has very different 
functions but must recognise and draw on the strength, experience and guidance of 
the other:
Film is a very odd medium because the director has a great deal of 
power in the process, and sometimes there can be a massive rush of 
blood to the head in the process, so there can be occasions where it 
can be combative when it doesn’t need to be. What we seek is a real 
collaboration between producer, writer and director -  between the 
filmmakers. (Tim Bevan, producer, cited by de Winter 2006:98)
The production organisation will be returned to later, but its role is to provide the 
director with all that he needs to realise the production within the agreed budgetary 
parameters. On the film set the director has sole authority and operates through an 
organisational structure which has changed little in the last seventy years, shown in 
a simplified form at Figure 3.
13 The term “sir” is still used, in context and without embarrassment, in day to day conversation o f a 
film set.
14 It may be advantageous for the producer to have a named director and noteworthy cast when 
approaching potential financiers.
15 But not invariably. Some director / producer partnerships become very long standing: James 
Ivory and Ismail Merchant being one of the most notable of recent times; Alan Marshall and Alan 
Parker made eight films together in the 1980s.
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The director’s immediate team consists of the script supervisor, who will provide 
the timings and reminders of the requirements of each scene, a personal assistant to 
arrange all administrative needs and a team of assistant directors and floor runners. 
The latter will communicate the director’s intentions, requirements and comments 
to the remainder of the crew: ensuring that the next scenes are being prepared; that 
cast emerge from make-up to arrive at the set at appropriate time; controlling the 
silence required when the camera is turning; releasing crew members and cast 
when their task for that day is completed - and many other tasks which ensure the 
efficient running of the studio floor.
Over/........
Figure 3: Hierarchy of the crew available to a director on a feature film set.
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The director’s departmental support will be provided through the Heads of 
Department (HoDs) who will all have been selected and appointed by the director 
i.e. the director of photography, the production designer, and the heads of sound, 
special effects and any other specialist departments required. They in turn will have 
assembled their known and preferred teams. Thus the director of photography 
(DoP), who is responsible to the director for the ‘look and feel’ of the film, will 
have selected the camera operator, who frames each shot and operates the camera, 
the focus puller and the gaffer who will organise the electricians lighting the sets. 
The DoP may also have selected the grip, who will assemble the dolly carrying the 
camera and move it when tracking movements are required, but selection may have 
been delegated to the operator with whom the grip works most closely. Similarly, 
the selection of the clapper loader, who will load the film magazines onto the 
camera, record all film used and mark the film (with a board) for sound and image 
as each take commences, may have been delegated to the focus puller. A central 
loader loads the film stock into the magazines if several cameras are being used -  
only one board being needed for all cameras.
The same hierarchical selection process is effected in each department. Thus the 
property master will nominate all the prop men16, the sound mixer will name the 
boom swinger and sound assistant, the art director will select the location managers 
and the set construction manager -  each of whom will then recommend their own 
subordinates. However, once nominated, all film workers must negotiate their 
own individual contract with the production department who are the legal 
employers and responsible for the budget. As will be shown in Chapter 7, there 
are certain conventions of pay parity, and differentiation, between grades which are 
invariably observed, but the producer’s role is to negotiate an acceptable deal with 
each individual worker, knowing that if  the deal is rejected by a nominated crew 
member then the departmental head, unwilling to work without their preferred 
team, may also decline the project -  an outcome which the producer will have to 
justify to the director.
16 They are invariably male, although the Skillset list makes an attempt to remove gender by 
describing them as “props” (see Appendix 1).
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Because each feature film is a separate project and the crew freelance, a new crew 
will be assembled for each specific production. The Skillset 2002 survey showed 
that the average number of productions undertaken by film workers in the last two 
years was four, and nearly 70% had worked between six and thirty weeks on their 
last production (2005:37&38), although those figures include wide variations 
because while production, art departments and construction are involved in the 
lengthy development and pre-production stages, other departments, such as 
electrical, camera and sound, are only employed for the shorter, more intensive 
periods of production. Thirty-five percent of production staff continue to be 
involved in the post-production phase too (2005:44).
Whatever the department, the project characteristics of production means that as a 
crew assemble they are expected to function immediately in their assigned role 
without any formal statement of their tasks and responsibilities. Some of the 
characteristics which make the skills so specific and their acquisition so 
challenging will be described in Chapter 7, but even those in relatively minor trades 
are critical to the successful progress of a production:
The standby crew is so called because their job is to ‘stand by’ the 
camera until needed. There is a carpenter, a painter, a plasterer, a 
rigger and a stage hand. Although each has his craft, they work as a 
team. They build camera rigs, platforms and towers out of 
scaffolding, tubing and wood. The painter touches up where the paint 
is scratched. On location a piece of white rock might catch the sun 
and cause a glare. The painter will spray it with black washable 
paint. They do a hundred and one jobs. (Boorman 1985:165)
Thus, the challenge for all crew members is that every day of every production is a 
very public assessment of their skill and proficiency on which their future 
employment may depend: “You’re only as good as your last job” was the title Blair 
(2001) accurately used for her analysis of the film labour market process. Engaged 
in such highly pressured and creative tasks, departmental heads and crew members 
are reluctant to oversee an unknown who may prove to be a passenger, or worse a 
liability and therefore they invariably select those that they have worked with 
before and who they know can perform the necessary tasks: 88% of assistant 
directors, 82% of camera crew and 80% of costume workers were directly 
approached for their last production (Skillset 2005:86).
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The role of the production department is to ensure that the director has as many 
resources as are practical to deliver the production. Having raised the funds, 
negotiated the crew contracts, arranged the locations, booked the studios, organised 
the transport and all the other requirements necessary for a six to ten week shoot, 
the producer hands over control of the studio floor to the director. Thereafter, the 
production department will be unobtrusive but ubiquitous: ensuing that the correct 
crew members are available each day; fixing the time and place of the call; ensuing 
that the correct transport and equipment is on hand; that the meals are offered when 
required; and delivering the schedules and checklists on which the whole crew 
depend. However, besides these ‘service’ functions, the production department are 
also the book keepers and auditors -  constantly monitoring the budget and schedule 
because it is they who will be ultimately responsible for any overruns. Thus they 
constantly shadow the production, watching, helping, advising -  and monitoring:
I’m around -  I’ll get to the set if there are problems.... I will know -  
because I can’t get rid of my old line producer habits -  exactly what 
is going on every hour. I’ll know what shot they’re on, whether 
they’re behind [schedule], how the day went et cetera. (Eric Fellner, 
producer cited by de Winter 2006:98)
A film unit in production is thus a complex organisation that functions because of 
tacit conventions with few formal controls or documentation. The focus of activity 
may appear to be the creative elements: the director; the cameraman; the camera 
crew; make-up; wardrobe; sound crew and set dressers. But supporting them are 
tiers of support workers, each making their own invaluable contribution: the stand­
bys; electricians; prop men; costume makers; wig fitters; central loaders; video 
assist; floor runners; production runners; catering; drivers and riggers. All must 
work seamlessly to ensure continuous working with minimum downtime, each 
knowing what the next scene will require and ensuring that their part is ready. The 
whole process will be monitored, regulated and overseen by the production 
department who have budgetary and scheduling responsibilities -  but this entire 
team, perhaps sixty to one hundred and fifty workers, will have been assembled
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without the involvement of any formal human resource management, there will be 
no formal job specifications and often no written contracts.
1.4 The research questions
“ ...the questions that were both interesting and capable o f  investigation 
became apparent only gradually” (Brown 19H8:2)
If it is accepted that there has been a continuity of the skills and trades of the film
production sector and if it can be shown that that this group have largely managed
to maintain their elite status and distinctive characteristics then this is especially
noteworthy because the assumption during the post-war period, demonstrated by
several government initiated investigations into the film industry (Gater 1949; CIR
1973; MMC 1989), was that many abnormal and unnecessary work practices were
only maintained through union intransigence and the coercion of the closed shop.
The continuity of so many of those practices, fifteen years after the closed shop
ceased to be legal, would seem to make that assumption questionable.
Therefore, this thesis will attempt to address one primary research question:
How has the workers’ control of employment practices and 
demarcation been perpetuated in the contemporary feature film 
production industry despite the removal of the enforcement implicit 
in the closed shop?
But in order to answer that question, it is necessary to first address several 
subsidiary questions:
1. How do workers obtain and exercise power in the
workplace?
2: How were employment practices and associations first
established in the film production sector?
3: How did the closed shop affect employment practices?
4: What factors contributed to the demise of the ACTT closed
shop?
5: What has been the outcome in those audio-visual sectors
where established employment practices have not been maintained?
6: What has been the role of the employers?
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The answers to these questions could have significance in a number of different 
areas. First, if a viable British film industry is to be perpetuated, then the industry 
must be continually drawing in new members and new talent. It will be seen in 
subsequent chapters that there have been a number of government initiatives and 
considerable investment made to ensure the supply of technically qualified trainees 
because “the British film industry is extremely important to the country, both 
culturally and economically” (DCMS 2003:8). However, it will also be shown 
that, for many, those technical skills are insufficient to gain access to the film 
sector because they lack the necessary social characteristics, financial backing or 
contacts for entry. Determining how employment really functions in the production 
industry could help policy-makers, first to develop a more realistic preparation for 
trainees and, second, to understand the concerns and interests of the existing 
practitioners.
Second, although it is not intended to deal with the professions in this thesis, there 
are many parallels between the restrictions operated by the closed shop and the 
closure operated by the professions:
there are examples among certain professional groups such as lawyers 
and doctors of compulsory membership of the relevant organisation 
and/or job security practices similar to those operated by skilled and 
craft unions (Hansen et al. 1982:8).
But recently, the professions have come under more scrutiny (Coady & Bloch 
1996) and there has been the potential legislative threat of the Bolkestein Directive 
(EU Directive Proposal 13 January 2004) which aimed to break the monopolies 
operated by national, professional institutes. The Bolkestein proposals were later 
emasculated (Economist 10 Mar 2005) but it remains possible that the professions
17may be stripped of their traditional protections . Therefore, it may be of interest 
to see how, despite the easing of closure, the British film unions’ practices have 
survived.
Lastly, if  film sector workers have retained control over access to their sector and 
thus maintained their negotiating position even though the supporting institutions
17 In Lovember 2007, the British Psychological Society is fighting proposals that the Department o f 
Health take over its regulatory authority.
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have been rendered powerless by legislation, then this does raise further questions 
about the effectiveness of political action. The objectives of the Conservative 
government regarding the pre-entry closed shop were set out clearly in the Green 
Paper Removing Barriers to Employment (March 1989):
The Government consider that it is time to take action against the pre­
entry closed shop. This is a restrictive practice, limiting the number 
of people who can obtain employment in the area it covers... It has a 
particularly damaging effect on the supply of skilled workers by 
restricting access to training places (DE 1989:3)
The resulting Act was thus intended as the death knell to the closed shop and was 
certainly perceived as such: “The 1990 Employment Act concluded the long 
process of whittling away at the closed shop which had held so many in its vicious 
thrall in the 1970s”18 (Thatcher 1993:669). If, as this thesis hopes to demonstrate, 
many of the practices implicit in the closed shop have survived and the true reasons 
for the collapse of the closed shop were changes in technology and society, then it 
can be questioned whether legislation can be effective when strong informal 
institutions exist.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
Having set out in broad statements the characteristics of the film production sector 
and the unique position it appears to have established, the structure of the thesis 
will be as follows.
Chapter 2 explains the methodology adopted for this research and the reasons why 
these methods were selected. There are challenges in researching employment in 
the film production industry because, there being a strong creative element, many 
workers do not conform to the expected conventions of employment. Similarly, the 
term ‘British film industry’ is possibly an oxymoron if an industry is defined as “a 
branch of economic or commercial activity” (OED) because British film production 
rarely achieves either. Since the 1950s, British film production has depended on 
entrepreneurs operating through short-lived companies that leave few records.
18 Sadly, she did not specifically explain why the 1970s were specific in this context.
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Furthermore, the industry’s unions have amalgamated beyond recognition leaving 
no archives. The researcher is thus obliged to draw on film literature (which 
largely ignores the production workforce and concentrates on their creative output), 
official reports and statistics, oral history and interviews. The chapter then 
explains the various routes, methods and challenges encountered in the preparation 
of the thesis and lastly describes the process by which respondents were located 
and interviewed.
Chapter 3 will explore the history and some of the literature illustrating how 
workers have sought to establish power and autonomy. First, it will be shown that 
innate talent and acquired skill alone are not sufficient to provide assured power in 
the workplace. Skill must be coupled with social activity to ensure closure as
fL
practised by the 19 century craftsmen to control entry to the ‘mystery’. Having 
secured a monopoly of the trade they were in a strengthened position to protect 
their status and livelihood, although never as successfully as the professions who 
could not only control supply, but initiate demand. The unskilled worker had no 
such unique property and so utilised the power of numbers; the general and 
industrial unions that encompassed all available labour thus ensuring that the 
employers were obliged to bargain. This principle of inclusiveness eventually 
absorbed the craft unions too, although there remained distinctions largely, but not 
completely, designated by the various forms of the closed shop. However, even in 
working environments regulated by formal collective agreements, there were 
opportunities for worker autonomy through informal rules of custom and practice 
and it will be shown that similar influence can be realised through networks and 
social capital. Lastly, it will be shown how internal labour market theory brings 
together many of these elements of defined boundaries and the dependence on 
rules. However, the theory also shows that employers may also gain efficiencies 
through lowered turnover and reduced recruitment, screening and training costs.
The next two chapters will first examine how the film industry came to be, to use 
McCarthy’s (1964) terminology, a craft qualification, pre-entry closed shop (i.e. an 
enforced internal labour market) and then describe the detail of how the closed 
shop was operated and enforced at its zenith. Chapter 4 will first show how the 
early association of film production workers conformed closely to the template set
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by craft workers a century earlier so that, by the late 1930s, the film technicians’ 
union was a craft-based association with the same priority of craft exclusivity. The 
formalities of closed shop exclusivity were to be accomplished by an unusual 
combination of events in the opening stages of the Second World War, but the post 
war fortunes of British film production were to change frequently and the last 
section will explore the union’s attempts to adapt to them.
Chapter 5 will examine how the ACTT could maintain a closed shop in what was, 
by the 1970s, a loosely controlled community of workers where many individuals 
negotiated their own contracts - two factors which McCarthy (1964) had identified 
as likely to diminish the discipline and practicality of any closed shop. It will be 
shown that the admission procedures for those wishing to join the union effectively 
screened out all but the most determined, while the final section will demonstrate 
how the measures available to the union to regulate the seemingly disparate 
production membership were not strong. However, the union could ensure the 
membership’s compliance though the employers who could be coerced through 
their dependence on the unionised laboratories
Chapter 6 will consider whether it was political measures alone that caused the 
demise of the film industry closed shop or whether technology and social change 
were greater influences. Section one will consider the union’s muted reaction to 
the various Employment Acts of the 1980s while section two considers the impact 
which changing technology had upon the stranglehold previously operated by the 
film laboratories. By 1987, the union felt obliged to deny the existence of any 
closed shop to a Monopolies and Mergers Commission enquiry and the reasons for 
that, and the effects of the TV-am dispute of 1987, will be considered in section 
three. Section four will assess the social changes that further eroded the likelihood 
that all newcomers would automatically conform to conventions of union 
membership that their predecessors had accepted unquestioningly.
However, Chapter 7 will show that despite these challenges, a distinctive feature 
film workforce persists and that it conforms to Doeringer & Piore’s four “heuristic” 
tests (1971:5) of an internal labour market. Thus, the first section will show that 
there is longevity to the rules covering wage determination and the allocation of 
film production labour. Section two will demonstrate that commentary exists to
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show that the rules and practices are inconsistent with the operation of a 
competitive market. Section three will show that labour remains a key element in 
the production of film and that on-the-job training provides both industry specific 
skills and induction into the informal networks that maintain the customary laws 
discussed in Section four. The final section explains how producers - the 
employers - have allowed the internal labour market to persist because they utilise 
the stability and efficiency that Doeringer & Piore predicted that it would provide 
(1971:29-31).
For comparison, Chapter 8 will contrast the very different outcome for worker 
autonomy in the other audio visual industries, i.e. all those except the feature film 
workforce. Section one will show how decline in union density in all the audio­
visual industries made it impossible for BECTU to retain any real influence over 
evolving employment practices, while the second section will show that the 
demands of capital and competitive tendering has driven producers to seek cheaper, 
less well-qualified labour. The supply of such labour has come from the growing 
media training sector and section three examines why formal training has received 
so much governmental support, but also how many graduating students are 
susceptible because they emerge into the job market without the socialisation 
implicit in on-the-job training. Furthermore, section four shows that many 
students emerge with little skill specificity and so have to rely on trial and error in 
their initial placements in the hope of gaining more marketable skills.
Finally, Chapter 9 will present a summary of the findings and consider briefly the 
implications of the findings for trade unions, for those seeking employment in the 
audio-visual industry and for government policy in these areas. These conclusions 
will include a discussion of the limitations and strengths of the research.
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C hapter 2 M e t h o d o l o g y
Throughout this research I had the advantage of having worked for over twenty 
years in film production, mainly producing commercials, and for the fourteen years 
1978 to 1992 I had worked almost exclusively with British crews. As a producer I 
was ‘management’, responsible for securing film commissions and then the 
assembly, employment and deployment of the skilled teams who would effect the 
production. However, like all my contemporaries of that period, I was only able to 
work as a producer because I was a union member, having served an informal 
‘apprenticeship’ in a variety of minor positions that eventually secured my election 
to the ACTT in 1983.1 I remain a member of BECTU.
Having worked in the sector is an advantage for a researcher: one is readily 
accepted as being part of the film production community; one understands the 
technical and industry specific vocabulary; recognises the hierarchies; knows some 
of the personalities; and can empathise with the experiences that are expressed 
about working conditions, hours, location shooting, studios and remuneration. 
That familiarity made it much easier for individuals to explain their careers, meant 
I was able to participate in the BECTU history group and also able to recognise the 
significance of some evidence in the literature, statistics and interviews that a less 
attuned researcher might have ignored.
Conversely, there is the challenge that being so familiar with the workings of the 
industry means that there are aspects that are so engrained that one passes them by 
unnoticed. As someone who worked for ten years within the rigid crewing 
confines of “four, four and four” (see page 145) it was disquieting when surprise
1 This requirement, that everyone employed in key appointments in film production was required to 
be a union member, will be explored further in Chapter 4 (page 100).
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was expressed at academic presentations that such a rule could ever have existed. 
Any researcher who has been immersed in any field for many years has to take care 
to be assimilating only the evidence that is assembled and presented, and not 
allowing familiarity and pre-conceived ideas to influence the interpretation of that 
evidence: Blaumer observed when asked to appraise Thomas & Znaniecki’s The 
Polish Peasant in Europe and America:
their particular interpretations of Polish peasant life were not formed 
solely from the materials they present; we have to assume that the 
familiarity with Polish peasant life which enabled their interpretations 
was made in a number of ways. (Blaumer (1939) cited by Glaser &
Strauss 1967:13)
Therefore, it has been necessary to utilise a familiarity with the workplace and the 
workforce to collect the data, but then to be as dispassionate as possible in its 
analysis. In practice, this has not proved as difficult as might be expected for two 
reasons. The first is that as a producer in the 1980s I worked comfortably within 
the accepted framework, never questioning the union rule-book and oblivious to the 
origins and wider implications of the closed shop.2 If one wanted to work in film 
in the 1970s then admission to the union was a challenge to be overcome but, once 
a member, one was part of the community where everyone would exploit the 
collective agreements to their limits. Therefore, as an employer I noted any 
revisions to the collective agreement but that did not stop me, as an entrepreneur,
■5
negotiating private deals with crew members because, by and large, the union was 
just another player in the deals that were being haggled daily with crew, suppliers 
and clients. Therefore, much of the historical and theoretical material discovered in 
this research has been as much a revelation to me as it would be to any newcomer 
researching the sector.
The second reason which has facilitated detachment has been the growing 
awareness as the research progressed that for twenty years I was working in the 
film industry, but I was not completely part o f  that industry. As will become
2 An example of the conditioning that is achieved by on-the-job training ?
3 A typical deal might be that when shooting in Spain either side of a weekend, Saturdays and 
Sundays would be unpaid, but the company would pay for the hotel and the additional baggage 
charges for the crews’ golf clubs. Alternatively, it might pay partners’ airfares. Both options were 
cheaper than paying two rest days for an entire crew.
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clear, those who are truly part of the film industry are motivated by something far 
more significant than an economic activity because they are drawn to the creativity 
of film production and, as will be shown, they are therefore willing to make 
sacrifices to retain that affiliation with the end product and the community that 
achieved it. Stephen Woolley (producer of Company o f  Wolves and the Crying 
Game) expresses it thus:
Two things about film crew -  one is that even though they may lie 
about it, most of them are drawn by the glamour of film -  it’s more 
glamorous hammering a nail into the wall of a film set than the wall 
of a house. And another thing is that crews are fairly nomadic and so 
they’re used to pitching their tents and getting on with it, and there’s a 
sort of camaraderie, the same as you would get with a circus or any 
sort of travelling bunch of players, (cited by de Winter 2006:85)
With working on this research has come the realisation that I was always more 
interested making the film production process function than the end result and thus 
the opportunity to investigate, appreciate, analyse and tabulate that process has 
been especially rewarding.
However, before considering the stages of the research in detail, it is necessary to 
set out some of the basic challenges when researching the British film production 
sector.
2.1 Instability of the sector and the lack of coherent records
“any student soon discovers that no figures regarding British film  
finances are ever, under any circumstances, definite and indisputable ”
(Wood 1952:62)
Although this research is considering employment within the film industry, the two 
terms, ‘employment’ and ‘industry’, must be treated cautiously and it should not be 
assumed that they have the same connotations and implications that might be 
applicable in other, more conventional, environments such as manufacturing.
As will become apparent as the thesis develops, it is probable that any career in 
film production will encounter many periods when the practitioner is not 
‘employed’ within the normal accepted definitions that would involve a contract 
and an identifiable employer. Employment in production has always been a
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precarious occupation and, except for a brief period from 1940 to the mid 1950s, 
the workforce has often been more stable than the employers. In the pre-war 
period, feature film production workers were theoretically in full-time employment 
but, because of the instability of production companies and the paucity of statutory 
protection, this meant little: “film employees worked then [1932], as many do now, 
for the duration of a picture and always received their notice a week before it 
finished” (Box 1974:114). After the late 1950s and the collapse of the big studios 
(see Chapter 5), the majority of the film production workforce became freelance 
workers with the associated unpredictability of rates, intervals of unemployment 
and the frequent obligation to assist, unpaid, in speculative and promotional work:
i.e. “used to pitching their tents and getting on with it” or, as a more academic work 
expressed it:
For many technicians film making is not work, in the sense that work 
is conceptualised as a category of activity seldom enjoyed and 
undertaken exclusively out of strict economic necessity. (Seglow 
1978:39)
Similarly, the term ‘industry’, which the OED defines as “a branch of economic or 
commercial activity”, may be a misnomer when applied to the context of film. 
Film making is an activity which often lacks any economic or commercial logic. It 
originated as a fairground novelty (Low & Manvell 1948), survived the inter-war 
years only through sympathetic legislation (Street 1997) and blossomed in the 
1940s only because of the exceptional circumstances of WW2 (Oakley 1964:161). 
In the immediate post-war period, it was noted that the industry made films “with 
an ever increasing disregard of cost” (Gater 1949:7) and the re-admission of the 
American distributors to the British market through the Anglo-American Film 
Agreement in March 1948 again beleaguered, and then destroyed, the production 
empires that had been created in the 1940s by J Arthur Rank, British Lion, 
Gainsborough and others. These were companies whose structure, hierarchies and 
organisation fitted a manufacturing institution that would have been recognised by 
Commons (1934) and Sayles (1963) where boardroom strategies were executed by 
tiers of management through the co-ordination and deployment of specialist 
divisions: studio; construction; electrical; wardrobe; props; drapes and camera
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(Wood 1952; Street 1997). It could be argued that the inability of those companies 
to survive once the protection of war-time legislation had been stripped away 
demonstrates that film as an “industry”, in the conventional definition used above, 
cannot survive in Britain.
Thereafter, British cinema survived and survives only through the enthusiasm of 
independent producers, the periodic interest of American financiers in the available 
skilled labour force and the occasional success in identifying the prevalent 
consumer demand and taste (Street 1997). The most recent parliamentary report on 
British film described it as an “under-capitalised industry based around 
entrepreneurial individuals driving single-project vehicles” (DCMS 2003:3), a view 
confirmed by one of Britain’s leading producers, Simon Channing-Williams (a 
Palme d’Or winner with Secrets □ Lives): “ ... in the UK, probably ninety percent 
of more of independent producers begin working through a company they have 
started at home” (de Winter 2006:61).
The researcher thus has to accept that this is an employment environment with little 
stability, logic or consistency and where the end product, the exhibited film, is 
often the only tangible evidence that the production ever took place. Film 
companies in particular provide poor evidence for any longitudinal studies because 
of their inherent instability. As will be cited later, only twenty of the 643 film 
companies registered in the 1920s and 1930s remained in production by 1937 
(Wood 1952:91). Since the collapse of the big studios in the 1950s, the majority of 
production companies exist only for the duration of the production of one film (the 
few exceptions to attempt successive productions, such as Goldcrest, have 
invariably collapsed4) and these short-lived organisations leave few records. The 
production employers’ organisations have also always been weak and have never 
been able to exercise control over their entrepreneurial members looking to seize 
competitive advantage over their fellow members (Levelle interview). In 
contemporary production, although a collective agreement technically exists 
between the Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television (PACT) and BECTU,
4 Goldcrest’s successes, Chariots o f  Fire (1981) and Gandhi (1982), were followed by the box 
office disasters of Revolution, The Mission and Absolute Beginners which effectively broke the 
company.
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observance is largely voluntary and unenforced. BECTU now considers it more 
effective to negotiate with specific companies rather than through the employers’ 
association (BECTU official interview).
□or are any union archives available. As already stated, the unions have merged 
beyond recognition: DATTKE and ABS into BETA (1989) and BETA and ACTT 
into BECTU (1991). Given the focus in this thesis on film technicians, the more 
important records might have been those of the ACTT, but those archives that had 
not been disposed of during an office relocation in 1986 were either destroyed or 
sent, un-catalogued, to storage during the merger of the ACTT and BETA in 
January 1991. When it was suggested that, as part of this research, these documents 
could be retrieved and catalogued it was made clear that exercise would be 
pointless. Many filing cabinets had been precipitately emptied into innumerable, 
unmarked crates and so, even assuming the crates still existed and could be located, 
any sifting was more likely to find insignificant administrative paperwork than 
locating the minutes of critical Executive Committees (Reagan interview). The 
final ACTT documents were disposed of during the relocation of the BECTU office 
from Soho to Clapham in 2002.
Fortunately, the researcher can counter the instability, inconsistency and 
incongruity of the British film industry by identifying the more assured elements of 
the often imperfect or incomplete data available and cross referencing them, or 
preferably triangulating them, to arrive at supportable statements which, if not 
“fact”, at least represent an account collaborated by several sources. The principal 
sources available are film literature, some academic literature, oral history and 
official, i.e. government or industry, reports and statistics.
2.2 Film related sources
“not everyone sees the same road accident, but there is no need to
assume from the various accounts that anyone is lying” (Walker
19U218)
The first challenge was the paucity of any original literature with references or 
analysis of employment practices in film production. Although the British Film 
Institute library catalogues over 50,000 books, most ignore the production labour
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force and focus on the creative output of the film industry and the associated 
financiers, actors, writers and directors. The critic Alexander Walker observed that 
“most books about films dwell on their directors” (Walker 1974:16) and a more 
recent author confirmed the anomaly that “there exist plenty of books about 
directors and screenwriters but hardly anything about producers” (de Winter 
2006:2).
Thus, despite the seemingly all-embracing title of Walker’s own highly regarded 
and authoritive book “Hollywood England: The British Film Industry in the 
Sixties” (1974), in nearly 500 pages there are no references to film crew, their 
terms and conditions of employment or the supposedly all-powerful unions. 
Walker’s only reference to camera equipment related to the creative changes made 
possible by their decreasing weight - and the only reference to laboratories was to 
cite the derogatory quote attributed to Tony Richardson (director of Tom Jones 
(1963) - a film which changed concepts of how colour stock could be used): “the 
trouble with labs is that they’re run by chemists, not artists” (1974:141).
So why is this an industry where the means of production is so invisible? There are 
possibly three factors. First, since around 1914, when the film industry first divided 
into three distinct sections of production, distribution and exhibition (Street 
1997:5), workers in film production have been a numerical minority within the 
total film industry - and the subsequent addition of television employees (1950s), 
and then the expansion of the industry caused by video and computer generated 
imagery (1970s onwards) merely exacerbated that minority status. Thus, when a 
film historian, such as Low, does devote a chapter to “The organisation of labour” 
within the 1930s film industry, her prime interest is the 45,000 full-time exhibition 
workers (cinema projectionists, ushers, managers and box office) who were 
organised under 33 DATKE agreements (Low 1985:22) or the 14,000 lab workers, 
rather than the 1,389 registered as working in production (Low 1985:31).
Secondly, distribution and exhibition has always been where the big money was 
made; in 2004, the top twelve film companies in the UK were all distribution and 
exhibition companies (UK Film Council 2007:155). Much of the literature that 
focuses on the business aspects of the film industry ignores the actual process of 
production, unless it runs disastrously over budget, and concentrates on the
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business fortunes of those who made film “happen”; e.g. Money Behind the Screen 
(Klingender & Legg 1937), Mr Rank: A study o f  J  Arthur Rank and British Films 
(Wood 1952) or A Competitive Cinema (Kelly 1966). The last unusually, among 
over two hundred pages of statistics on box office receipts, cinema ownership and 
“the never ending crisis”, devoted six and half pages to “the Film Unions and 
employment prospects” and discussed topics such as the ACTT’s insistence on first 
class travel for overseas flights and a brief mention of the restrictive practice of 
closed shop admission (Kelly 1966:170-176).
Thirdly, as shown above, the creative elements of the film, the director, the actors 
and the script, are always more interesting to the layman than details of those that 
made it.
However, it is in those latter books that one finds the occasional, sometimes 
throwaway, anecdote which gives an insight into film industry employment at the 
time specific films were made. Many of these have been used in the body of the 
thesis to illustrate particular arguments and they include the exasperated American 
director crushing the technicians’ tea trolley on the set of Alien in 1986 (Shone 
2004:165); Muriel Box having to join the union in 1941 (Box 1974:158-159); 
Richard E Grant having to subsidise the salary of the 2nd assistant to secure a 1st 
assistant (they would only work as a team) when the producer was unwilling to pay 
them both (Grant 2006:85); and for the detail of working conditions in the 1980s, 
the director John Boorman always delivered an insightful quote:
Wherever we shoot, the first question is how and where do we feed 
the crew. A film unit works long hours and they demand and expect
an endless flow of food and drink  One of the less pleasant
aspects of film-making with a British crew is that when you address 
them the answers are usually muffled by mouthfuls of food. 
(Boorman 1985:158)
Or:
When you are away on location you have to pay the technicians for 
the Saturday whether they work or not, therefore not to work becomes 
expensive. (Boorman 1985:133)
These instances all represent invaluable evidence but, as Glaser observed, “Being a 
good author of grounded theory requires a lot of reading.” (Glaser 1992:37).
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Another source of data suitable for cross-referencing or triangulation (besides 
interviews which are considered in the final section of this chapter) were statistics.
At the outset of this research it was envisaged that some quantitative research 
would have to be done to substantiate the necessary propositions regarding the state 
of the current film production sector, the employment practices within it and the 
composition of the workforce. However, this project coincided with a growing 
governmental interest in the British feature film industry and the wider audio-visual 
industries. Therefore, concurrent with this research there has been a number of 
official surveys, reports and analysis relating to the specific skills demands of 
feature film production and the ancillary sectors. Titles published in the last six 
years include:
• Freelance Survey (Skillset 2001)
• Relph Report: Examining the costs o f  lower budget UK films and 
their value in the world market (UK Film Council 2002)
• The British Film Industry (DCMS 2003)
• A Bigger Future: UK Film Skills Strategy (Skillset 2003a)
• Developing UK Film Talent (Skillset 2003b)
• Skillset Workforce Survey (Skillset 2003c)
• Feature Film Production Workplace Survey 2005 (Skillset 2005)
• UK Film Council Annual Review □ Statistical Yearbook (UK Film 
Council 2002; 2003; 2004;2005;2006)
• British Film Institute Annual Report (BFI 2001 ;BFI 2002 etc)
• The Economic Impact o f the UK Film Industry (Oxford 
Economics 2007)
•
These publications alone represent over three thousand pages of statistics and 
carefully argued analysis of the UK industry’s place in the world market place, in 
the British economy, in the cultural well-being of the country and, not least, in the 
labour market. Had the surveys been drafted specifically for this research it is 
possible that the different questions might have been asked -  and the data presented 
more sympathetically. For example, the Feature Film Production Workplace 
Survey 2005 established that 33% of respondents were BECTU members, but did 
not provide any analysis by grade or trade, nevertheless, there is no doubt that the 
scale of these surveys (the Feature Film Production Survey sent out nearly 10,000 
questionnaires to identified, working practitioners) meant that they provide a more
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comprehensive depiction of the whole industry than could have been done with this 
researcher’s limited resources.
In the interests of completeness, it should also be stated that there are few tests of 
efficiency in a creative “industry” such as film production. Various examples of 
production costs will be mentioned during the thesis, but the creative and style 
differences in films makes most efficiency comparisons meaningless: Ladies in 
Lavender cost £3.6m; Harry Potter and the Prisoner o f  Azkaban, £100m (BFI 
2005:28); Secrets □ Lies cost $6m to shoot and made $53m; Spice Girls: the Movie 
cost $6m to make and grossed over $90m (de Winter 2006:58&198); when 
shooting a feature film without special effects, or special wardrobe requirements, a 
unit of forty of fifty crew members might expect to shoot two to four minutes of 
edited film each day (Apted interview); for a television “soap”, a crew of fifteen or 
twenty members may shoot seven or eight minutes of edited material each day -  
more if on a fixed set such as Eastenders (Riley interview; Relph 2002:17)). 
How one judges the value of these various productions, their budgets and their 
manpower requirements is too subjective for fruitful evaluation.
Finally, I was also assisted by my participation in the BECTU Oral History Project. 
This project was started in 1986 by a small group of ACTT members who were 
keen to do something to record the experience of those who had contributed to the 
film and television industries. Over the last twenty years more than 550 interviews 
have been recorded and they are held at the national Film and Television Archive. 
Although only one interview is directly quoted in the text (Sydney Cole, producer 
director, 1908-1998) they provided a useful background and the project group 
themselves made helpful suggestions.
2.3 Details of interviews -  the selection and schedule
“Think theory, talk everyday common sense English ” (Glaser 1992:25)
Film industry workers have a reputation for being difficult to research. In her work 
on the American film industry, Professor Candice Jones recalled that it often took 
twenty or thirty calls to each respondent before she could arrange an interview
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because of their natural instinct that only those showing true dedication were 
worthy of their interest:
They gave access to the industry according to a person’s persistence 
and motivation. I had to prove that I was both persistent and 
motivated to do the interviews, before some of them would grant me 
the time. (Jones 1996:60)
In the UK the feature film workforce is not large, but there are no permanent 
employers able to supply a ready-made sample of workers, union density is only 
moderate and it is a fragmented workforce which relies on its own informal 
networks for communication. When one does obtain an individual’s contact details 
the nature of a project-based industry means that if they are working then they are 
never available, and if they are not working they are geographically dispersed.
However, I had worked as a producer in commercials and, as the contemporary 
Skillset website states, “Commercials people live the filmmakers' dream. They are 
very well paid for concentrated periods of intense work” 
(www.skillset.org/commercials 6 Apr 06). For this reason many of those with 
whom I worked were primarily feature film crew filling the waiting time between 
major productions and, twelve years later, I was able to renew my contact with 
several who were kind enough to give me their opinions and recollections.
By using known contacts as my initial sample and then, in some instances 
following up their recommendations, the research followed the qualitative 
technique of ‘snowballing’, which is a suitable method for sampling populations 
which are difficult for researchers to access. However, the risk in this approach is 
that because successive interviewees will be associated with the already completed 
interviews, the researcher could be replicating the same characteristics and thus 
duplicating the same data twice and thus giving it a disproportionate, value:
as a rule, a snowball sampling will be strongly biased toward the 
inclusion of those who have many interrelationships with or are 
coupled to, a large number of individuals. In the absence of 
knowledge of individual inclusion possibilities in different waves of 
the snowball sample, unbiased estimation is not possible. (Berg 1988 
cited by Salganik & Heckathom 2004:197))
However, Salganik & Heckathom concluded that material gained by this 
snowballing was, “when handled properly”, relatively unbiased and, furthermore,
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gave some insight into the role of networks which is, as already shown, critical to 
this research (2004:229-230). In practice, few of these secondary contacts were 
ever available for interview and, as a safeguard, all data collected through interview 
was cross-checked against data from other literature or survey sources. Thus, while 
only two interviews were conducted with representatives of ethnic minorities, their 
“ethnic” views corroborated the much more extensive work done among ethnic 
minority workers in the audio-visual industries by Campion (2005) and Holgate 
(2006) and the statistics of Skillset (2003c & 2005). nevertheless, these two 
interviews did provide very useful, “non-ethnic” unique insights into the challenges 
of admission into the industry in the 1970s, the contemporary challenge of 
selecting the right path once admitted and of the barriers to all workers between 
television and film -  which again were corroborated by other interviewees, 
literature and statistics.
Additionally, BECTU assisted by publishing a letter in Stage Screen and Radio that 
led to several new sources with whom the researcher had had no previous contact.
□early forty in-depth interviews were conducted and the breakdown is shown in 
Table 3. (Interviewees were not asked to state their age but an informed estimate 
has been made based on their experience and recollections.)
The sample shows a slight bias towards older respondents which could be a 
reflection of the researcher’s own age and contacts. However, it was essential to 
have some respondents who recalled the closed shop era and those respondents 
now had to be in their late 40s or early 50s. In practice, most of those in their 40s 
had no experience or few recollections of the closed shop.
In any event, the overall profile would appear to be a reasonable spread of 
respondents when compared to the statistical profile of the industry where over 
60% are over the age of 35 (Skillset 2005:26). Few female crew were interviewed 
but the research emphasis was on technical rather than art department crew and that 
would seem appropriate when Skillset (2005) shows that 91% of camera and 100% 
of sound crews are male while women predominate in art, wardrobe and make-up 
(68%, 70% and 88% respectively) Similarly, the higher proportion of female
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producers seems appropriate given that Skillset (2005) showed that 66% of 
production were female.
Table 3: Respondents' characteristics - occupation, gender & age
Crew 3 males Aged in 20j
1 female 40s
2 males 40s
2 males 50s
3 males 60s
Directors 1 male 20s
3 males 40s
2 males 60s
1 male 70s
Experts/commentatoi 1 female 40s
1 female 50s
Producers 5 females 40s
2 males 40s
2 males 50s
1 female 60s
1 male 70s
Training / trainers 1 male 20s
1 female 40s
1 female 50s
Union 2 males 50s
1 male 60s
1 male 70s
Ex-industry 1 male 40s
It should be noted that there was some overlap between the occupational 
categories. Thus, while only one media related student was interviewed, the three 
crew members in their twenties had recently been students, or taken training 
courses. Furthermore, one of the union participants had been involved in industry
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training since the 1970s. The one student was interviewed specifically to get some 
perspective on how admission was perceived by those who had not yet started that 
process. All their experiences were corroborated by reference to Holgate (2006).
The schedule was determined mainly by respondents’ availability. The first and 
last interviews were with a BECTU official, the first because of the need to 
establish the availability of the ACTT records, the last because I needed to verify 
some of the material that I had collected in the intervening two years. Otherwise it 
would be an exaggeration to say that there was a preconceived plan because 
interviews had to be arranged around respondents’ filming schedules. Several 
interviews were conducted at studios and although these were inevitably more 
fractured interviews, it was useful during the waiting times to refresh my 
recollection of how seamlessly British film crews function.
The interviews were unstructured, for two reasons. Firstly, to avoid any possibility 
that the researcher’s own preconceptions might influence the respondent:
...the researcher never, never asks the question directly in the 
interviews as this would preconceive the emergence of data.
Interview questions have to relate to what the interview is about 
empirically, so the researcher maximises the acquisition of non­
forced data. These specific questions are in the thoughts and the 
analysis of the researcher. (Glaser 1992:25)
Unstructured interviews avoided steering the respondents towards any pre­
conceived idea about the organisation of the industry. It was explained at the 
outset that the research related to admission to the film production industry, 
□ormally this would invoke a description of the interviewee’s prior interest (or not) 
in the industry, their first encounters and their early experiences. This could then 
be developed into a more general discussion which would involve their career path, 
and their contacts, usually introducing more general observations on the industry. 
For those who had joined in the era of the closed shop, the question “how did you 
join the union” (being synonymous with “how did you start in film?”) would 
similarly invariably trigger a complete chronology of their background, the 
contacts who had assisted their application and their early experiences. People 
generally enjoyed talking about their careers and successes -  and their frustrations 
-  and so it was often unnecessary for the interviewer to intervene, beyond general
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steering questions, unless there were specific points which needed clarification or 
expansion. Allowing the respondent to tell of their experiences unprompted 
increased the likelihood that the evidence was coming from the informant's 
experience and not from the questions being asked.
The second reason why the interviews were unstructured was because the 
experience, vintage and sector of the interviewees varied. Thus some had first 
hand experience of admission to the closed shop, others only knew of its reputation 
and the younger interviewees knew nothing about it. Older respondents knew little 
about formal skills training. Some knew much more about specific sectors, such as 
post production or television, others only knew about film. Additionally, it should 
be admitted that there was a prior awareness that some respondents had specific 
experiences that the researcher wanted to explore: why had one individual left the 
industry having seemingly made a promising start? How had another effected the 
transfer from GATTKE to the ACTT? Why had another never joined the union? 
How automatic was the process of union membership when joining a television 
company in the 1970s? These were possibly unique experiences, but which 
needed exploration because often they gave new insights.
The majority of the interviews were recorded, there being a few occasions when it 
was not practical to record because of background noise, the impromptu nature of 
the meeting or the inappropriateness of the setting. The recordings were all done 
digitally and transferred to a computer at the earliest opportunity. One of the 
features of digital recordings is that particular items within an interview can be 
relocated very quickly, so very few interviews were transcribed in full because the 
nature of unstructured interviews is that it is, initially, often impossible to assess 
the value of the material. Therefore, at the first review, a summary of each topic 
covered would be listed, the time code recorded and the appropriate code noted into 
the headings shown in Table 4. Only later, when the material relating to a specific 
category was being analysed, would the material be reviewed and a verbatim 
transcript taken of the relevant sections.
The main contribution of the interviewees was to add the detail unavailable from 
other sources: how an individual was rejected by an ACTT admissions committee; 
how the laboratories could unofficially delay a production in dispute with the
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union; the realities of contemporary work experience; the reactions of a television 
camera crewman working on a film set.
There were no significant contradictions in any of the evidence collected from 
respondents although there were areas of uncertainty. Some respondents were 
unsure about dates and sometimes chronologies became a little confused. A 
challenge when discussing events that happened twenty, thirty or forty years ago is 
that some interviewees readily admitted that they could remember very little, for 
example, about the closed shop because it had been such an accepted feature of 
their working life that they had never queried or thought about how or why it 
operated. In some instances, individuals could neither remember how they had 
been signed up, nor when their membership had lapsed, because it had been 
organised by their employer. For others, every detail of specific events, such as the 
battle to get the first official placement (John Keen) or the celebration when a 
sister’s ticket had been approved (Belinda Harris), were still very vivid -  and in 
some instances those specific incidents still rankled nearly fifty years on (Edward 
Joffe).
I encountered no outright refusals to a request for an interview although my request 
passed via the BECTU office to Linda Loakes (formerly the [national Organiser of 
the ACTT) went unanswered. I had had frequent contact with Linda in the 1980s 
and am sure she would have been a useful source of information about the ACTT’s 
admission processes. Although BECTU was extremely helpful in publishing a 
letter in Stage Screen and Radio unfortunately none of the respondents proved to 
have been a member of a closed shop era admission committee which had been my 
real objective. Sadly, Alan Sapper (General Secretary of the ACTT 1969 to 1991) 
was too ill for a meeting before he died (19 May 2006). Fortunately, I was able to 
interview Tudor Gates (ACTT President 1988 and later joint President of BECTU) 
before his death (14 January 2007).
Two other potential sources (Elizabeth McGiven and The Right Hon. The 
Viscountess Hood (formerly Flora Casement)) were approached because it was 
understood that they had been on the brink of ACTT membership in the 1980s and 
would thus have first hand experience of the admissions process. However, it 
became apparent from my preliminary contact that neither recalled anything of
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what, for them, had been a fleeting phase and so the interviews were not followed 
up.
I am most grateful to all of those who gave their time to me and I hope that I have 
reflected their opinions accurately. I have tried within the text to avoid 
embarrassment by not attributing any quotation to the individual unless it is 
valuable to indicate the background of the author, and so place the opinion 
expressed in context. In addition, there were also innumerable more casual 
conversations and discussions that occurred, either on social occasions or when 
attending shoots, and the contents or sentiments of those are reflected in the text, or 
were used as leads to other quotable sources.
2.4 Stages of research
“The need to preconceive [the question] is strong when there is no trust 
in the discovery o f  a problem. The researcher shouldfight this.... ”
(Glaser 1992:2Z)
From the outset it was clear that this would be a longitudinal study because, if the 
anecdotal indications were correct and little had changed in the employment 
practices of the contemporary film production industry, it would be necessary to 
contrast those employment conditions with those of the closed shop era to confirm 
that there were similarities. Only then would it be practical to start an assessment 
of what conditions or features had made that continuity possible.
The second early assumption was that this would be a qualitative, sociological 
study. Although it was envisaged that some statistical data would have to be 
collected (in the event this was overtaken by the sudden flurry of statistical data 
emerging from Skillset) there was no expectation that sufficient quantitative data 
would emerge to provide a functional answer because, being a longitudinal 
exercise, there would be no standard template which would encompass every era 
and every field of production. Also, again for the reasons stated above, there was 
little documentary evidence available for the closed shop era and therefore the 
research would be dependent on the memories of interviewees and the few literary 
references available.
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In practice, because it appeared at that early stage to be the most critical institution, 
the research started with the closed shop. The original submission for the research 
had stated:
 proposes to concentrate on the [closed shop of the] British film
and television industries. At their peak in 1979 the production 
industries’ craft unions operated a pre-entry closed shop that covered 
60,000 members, including many white collar grades. By regulating 
admission to the union (and thus employment) they controlled not 
only terms and conditions but also demarcation lines and manning 
levels throughout the UK’s media production and distribution. The 
dissertation will explore the process by which the closed shop was 
dismantled, how this has changed employment relations, what kind of 
regulation has replaced it and what impact these changes have had on 
pay and conditions, work allocation, job descriptions and manning 
levels.
Surveys like WERS have revealed the demise of the closed shop but 
relatively little systematic research has been undertaken to reveal how 
an institution, traceable to the very start of the Industrial Revolution, 
could collapse in such a short-time. Understanding how this happened 
and discovering what emerged to replace the controls that the craft 
unions traditionally supplied will provide the core of my thesis.
(Original research proposal 2002)
Having placed such emphasis on “an institution” it seemed necessary to have a 
complete understanding of early labour organisation, the emergence of the craft 
unions and the evolution of the general and industry unions and ultimately the 
closed shop. This was a literature research project guided by the objective of a 
complete understanding of the functions, operation and limitations of the closed 
shop and the results are reflected in Chapter 2.
The next stage of the research process was to prove a blind alley. The logic was 
that if the demise of the closed shop had been a political action, effected by the 
various Employment Acts of the 1980s, then there must have been strategic policy 
objectives that could be “tested” against contemporary film industry employment to 
see if  those objectives had been achieved. However, while the research, using 
Hansard, the various Acts, contemporary press commentary, academic literature 
and many political memoirs was fascinating, it showed that the actions were largely 
pragmatic. The term ‘step by step’ is used in the opening paragraph of the 1987
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Green Paper Trade Unions and their Members summarising the Government’s 
industrial relations legislation to that date (DE 1987:1) and the phrase recurs 
frequently in the descriptions of the Conservative Governments’ approach to 
industrial relations (Prior 1986; Thatcher 1993; Howe 1994). Howe, citing a 
memo from John Hoskyns, suggested that it was an error to be looking for a 
consistent strategy because that was not Mrs Thatcher’s style:
the lack of a methodical mode of working... means that our chance of 
implementing a carefully worked out strategy -  both in policy and 
communications -  is very low indeed... (Howe 1994:249)
And, as confirmation, regarding the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts: “the 
packages themselves had been rather randomly put together...” (Howe 1994:249)5. 
Eventually this research concluded that liberal ideology had dominated and that 
there had been no objective other than the elimination of what was perceived as an 
institution of the left that was disruptive to the labour market, best summarised by 
the statement that “Margaret’s gut instincts were never well disposed towards trade 
unions” (Howe 1994:104). Therefore, this research path was abandoned, although 
the drafted chapter did provide useful references when it was later necessary to 
identify the reasons for the demise of the closed shop.
If the key was not political, the next attempt was to look for an economic 
validation: to identify statistics that would demonstrate that an abnormal income 
situation had persisted over several decades which would show that negotiated 
power, either through collective bargaining or informal autonomy, had been 
effective. Some general statistics regarding incomes in the contemporary sector 
were becoming available (Skillset 2003c; Skillset 2005) and it was assumed that 
interviewees would be able to provide further details. However, historical evidence 
regarding income was less easily identified. The sector has always been too small 
and too specialised to register on any national labour market statistics and therefore 
industry specific data had to be sought. The 1949 Gater report had made 
comparisons of pre- and post-war production wages and from this it was deduced
5 It should be acknowledged that Howe, who had long fallen out with Mrs Thatcher at the time of 
his memoirs and who had been one of the architects of the ill-fated 1971 IRA, might have taken an 
especially jaundiced view.
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that in the late 1930s middle ranking skilled crew (boom operators, focus pullers, 
sound men and continuity6) were earning approximately £325pa. Post war, this 
had more than doubled to between £12.50 and £14.50 per week i.e. perhaps £702pa 
(Gater 1949:25).
This would equate to what Routh described as the “lower professions” (whose 
weighted average for 1936 was £308pa); qualified teachers, draughtsmen, and 
veterinary inspectors. This group too had approximately doubled their income 
(weighted average £708) by 1955 (Routh 1980:70). Sadly, these reference points 
and comparisons faltered thereafter. Fixed salaries for film crew ended with the 
decline of the big studios in 1960, no subsequent figures for the lower professions 
appear in Routh and the changing concepts of class would make it difficult to 
identify an analogous contemporary group to the “lower professions”. The only 
continuous information available for freelance film workers throughout the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s was the minimum daily and weekly rates published periodically 
by the ACTT in Film J  Television Technician, but these only indicated the daily 
rate for the basic eight hour day and the formula for overtime; they gave no 
indication of what a technician might actually earn. For example, the published 
basic rate for a focus puller or boom operator in the summer of 1978 was £94.21 
per week or, if  hired for specific days, £27.09 per day (FTT June 1978). It will be 
shown that this is an industry where a ten or twelve hour day was, and remains, 
normal and thus a technician would expect to be earning at least double the daily 
rate when in work.
Even assuming no overtime, that meant a worker doing five dailies (working single 
days on a commercial or as supplementary crew on a feature) would earn 44% 
more than a worker doing a straight week, or 15% more if he (or, less likely, she) 
only worked four dailies. Assuming that the average crew person was employed 
forty weeks each year then a focus puller working only on weekly rates could have 
earned £3,770 while another focus puller averaging three or four days a week might 
earn £5,400 - but both figures could be doubled with overtime. Further reasons for
6 Boom operators, focus pullers etc were selected because they are middle ranking, but critical 
skills. Lower grades such as loaders may be not be consistent because they are in training while 
senior grades, operators and cameramen can be abnormally elevated because of specific qualities.
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the unpredictability of income will be discussed in Chapter 7, but it was becoming 
clear that, given the uncertainty of what overtime might be expected or how many 
days an average crew member might have worked each year, the available basic 
data was so detached from the real wage income that the comparisons became 
meaningless.
Furthermore, the contemporary statistics also proved meaningless for this task. 
While it was clear that some workers were earning well, it was also clear that some 
workers were earning very little. The Skillset survey revealed that 30% of all 
respondents (remembering that these were all names taken from film call sheets) 
had been unemployed or earned less than £10,000 in the survey year, and only 7% 
had earned more than £75,000 despite 24% having a weekly rate in excess of 
£1,400 (2005:67&70). Dor were the interviews to prove useful in this regard. 
Even when respondents were willing to discuss rates, it became clear that there 
were too many variables, not least that a worker might take lower pay on a specific 
film for economically irrational reasons: the project appealed to them; they were 
keen to work with the director; friends were working on the film; the schedule or 
location was convenient (these reasons will be examined further at page 195).
It will be apparent that there was some frustration at this stage. There appeared to 
be an anecdotal phenomenon (the persistence in certain employment practices in 
the British film production industry) but no framework was emerging against 
which, first to demonstrate that this was a reality and, second to identify why this 
state should have persisted. Up to this point, the majority of the research had been 
literature based and the interviewing was being constantly postponed until the 
specific and necessary questions could be identified; knowing that interviews 
would take time to arrange and each would be a one-off opportunity.
It was the preparation for those interviews that introduced a new concept: that the 
research should be carried out with no preconceptions that either the phenomenon 
or associated reasons exist:
The recorded in-depth interview, or oral history, is a specific research 
method within the general designation of qualitative methodology and 
is close to the basic principle of grounded theory. However,
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grounded theory refers to other kinds of observation of behaviour 
besides the interview. Another important difference between oral 
history and grounded theory lies in the emphasis oral historians place 
on the formation of questions that guide the research. Proponents of 
grounded theory insist on approaching research without 
preconceptions -  that is hypothesis. (Yow 2004:8)
By this stage a preconception of result, if not the reasons, did exist but it had only 
been formed through the anecdotes of earlier interviewing and the limited 
published data. Therefore it seemed appropriate to investigate grounded theory 
(Glaser & Straus 1967; Glaser 1992). Glaser (1992) was encouraging
...when a researcher flounders in getting started on a research project 
it is quite often the result of forcing on the data a preconceived 
problem that ought to take the data apart and give yield, but does not 
because of lack of relevancy. The researcher is lost and sees the data 
as recalcitrant. The grounded theory researcher bypasses this 
problem in getting started by simply studying what is to be studied 
with no preconception of what should be in advance of its emergence.
(Glaser 1992:25-26)
He described the process as:
three major components (1) data collection, which soon becomes 
intricately involved in (2) the methods analysis, that soon generate the 
concepts, hypothesis and integration which result in the production of 
(3) written and verbal presentations. (1992:13)
Freed from the requirement to start with a fixed template of questions, the 
interviewing was started (that process is described more fully in the next section). 
As data became available (interview transcripts, survey details and literature) it was 
analysed and first coded to indicate the specific area to which the item related and 
then grouped in the most appropriate category. One aspect where Glaser appeared 
to offer no advice was when trying to code several different eras or sectors with 
almost identical codes and categories. (In this research, the closed shop era and the 
contemporary film production industry -  plus the wider audio-visual industry 
which it became clear was very different.) This was resolved by coding and then 
consolidating all the available data into headings represented by the matrix at Table
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Categories & associated codes The closed 
shop era
Contemporary 
Film production
Contemporary
audio-visual
sector
A. The state of the industry
Budgets
Crewing
Production data
Production statistics
B. Entry
First job
Frustrated attempts
Gate keeping
The closed shop
C. Skills
Acquisition
Failure
Grades
Progression
Technical changes
D. Lifestyle
Frustrations
Income
Satisfactions
Working conditions
Perception of other sectors
E. Association
Closed shop enforcement
Cohesion
Departments
Employers & associations
Getting work
Networks
Unions
This grouping of data and the comparison of the evidence “horizontally” (to use the 
terminology Table 4) certainly did reveal both similarities and differences that 
could be utilised to demonstrate that:
1. there were distinctive similarities in the experiences and 
employment practices between the closed shop era and those of the 
contemporary film production industry,
2. there were stark contrasts between the experiences and 
employment practices of the closed shop era and those of the 
contemporary audio-visual sector.
3. there were contrasts between the employment practices in the 
contemporary film production industry and the contemporary audio­
visual sector.
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These preliminary findings meant that there were at least two clear questions to be 
answered:
1. Why had so many employment practices of the closed shop 
era survived into the contemporary film production industry?
2. Why had these practices not persisted in the contemporary 
audio-visual sector?
Grounded theory would then suggest that the core variable will emerge as the 
analysis of the data continues, although Glaser and Strauss do appear to differ here:
It is not as Strauss says, ‘the process of selecting the core variable...’
For grounded theory selective coding only starts after and only when 
the analyst is sure that she has found the core variable. The core 
category simply emerges from the constant comparative coding and 
analysing the data. (Glaser 1992:73)
Inevitably, one can never be quite as detached as grounded theory generation 
requires and, as the thesis will demonstrate, one can still make some inadvertent 
assumptions because there are some aspects which are so engrained that no one 
ever mentions them.
At this stage of the research the core variable that appeared to emerge was 
“association” meaning the relationships and cohesion with others implicit in the 
closed shop, networks, social capital, collective bargaining, union membership and 
even mere friendship. Membership of some form of association appeared to be the 
key to the first employment, to career progression, to bargaining power, identity 
and thus livelihood and lifestyle. The absence of association in the audio-visual 
trades appeared to be the reason why individual workers were so vulnerable and 
why there appeared to be less coherent career paths.
Therefore association appeared to warrant further investigation: how had organised 
labour emerged in the early film industry? How had the complete closure through 
the pre-entry closed shop come about? How had it operated and been enforced? 
What had caused its demise? What had replaced it in the contemporary film 
production sector? The early stages of this research was to be predominately 
literary: contemporary commentary, the official, but relatively lightweight ACTT 
history (1983), the recollections of individuals or on back copies of the ACTT 
journal, Film and Television Technician (which proved useful in providing
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commentary on the activities of the 1970s and 1980s). Similarly, the more recent 
BECTU journal, Stage Screen □ Radio, for more contemporary commentary on 
union activities and the obituaries that have been a useful record of how individuals 
joined the industry and the union in the past. The results of this research appear in 
Chapters 4 and 5 while Chapter 6 shows how the changing social and technical 
influences, and some political influence, broke down the traditional admission 
routes to the industry and thus the cohesion that held the many strands of the 
greater industry (film, television, documentaries and laboratories) together.
This clue that it was changing admission processes that influenced the nature of 
association led to the hypothesis that it was the admission process that established 
the viability of association; that there must be a system operated by existing 
practitioners of a critical skill to create barriers for new entrants so limiting the 
labour available and thus maintaining a strong bargaining position for those already 
qualified. The skill provision was necessary because that was the property that 
made the association unique, much as it had been mystery and exclusivity that had 
made the craft unions powerful.
It was clear that rigid admission processes had been the policy of the ACTT from 
the 1940s until the 1970s; therefore what needed to be shown was that some 
admission process persisted in the contemporary film industry. Thus the 
requirement became to demonstrate the requirement of specific skills which would 
be a valued property for employment and then the existence of association 
operating admission to those skills. To show there was an admission process it 
would be necessary to identify a banrier between those who had access, and those 
who were barred, from the possession of the skill. The result of this analysis forms 
the main theme of Chapter 5.
However, as will be seen in Chapter 3, a late factor impacted on the logic and 
findings, valid as they were. Glaser recommends that the researcher does not read 
other theory associated with the general area of study:
There is a need not to study any of the [related] literature in the 
substantive area under study. This dictum is brought about by the 
concern not to contaminate, to be constrained by, inhibit, stifle or 
otherwise impede the researcher’s effort to generate categories, their 
properties, and theoretical codes from the data that truly fit, are
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relevant and work with received or preconceived concepts that may 
really not fit, work or be relevant but appear to do so momentarily.
(Glaser 1992:31)
To date, this researcher had ignored all other theory relating to labour markets and 
so encountering Doeringer & Piore (1971) at a late stage was a revelation. Here 
was theory, relating to craft markets, which needed no adjustment to fit the 
circumstances and evidence identified in the closed shop era and which had many 
parallels in the contemporary film production industry. However, Doeringer & 
Piore also identified one factor which had not been isolated as a core variable in the 
earlier analysis -  the complicity of management in the internal labour market 
because of the “technical efficiencies in recruitment, screening and training” 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:30). This, reflecting the different way in which the power 
of capital is used, will be shown as probably the prime reason why the “craft 
practices” have persisted, even been encouraged, in the contemporary film 
production industry and why the experience of the other audio-visual industries has 
been so different.
This description of the stage of research should not be closed without one further 
reference to Doeringer & Piore which this researcher took as some exoneration for 
the earlier, failed attempts to locate an economic proof of persistent, but irrational 
practices. Doeringer & Piore confirmed that testing that there are rigid laws which 
allow an internal labour market to function without being influenced by the 
external economic forces is not straightforward:
rigorous proof of the rigidity of the internal labour market in the face 
of economic forces would require (1) the specification of a set of 
economic variables which would in principle, govern the pricing and 
allocation of labor and (2) a demonstration that the rules which 
actually govern pricing and allocation are inconsistent with this set of 
variables. ... Unfortunately, the requisite measure of neoclassical 
economic variables are unavailable at the microeconomic level and 
the administrative rules which control internal labour markets in 
practice cannot be defined with sufficient precision to permit 
quantitative testing of their compatibility. As a result, the case for the 
internal labour market must rest on less satisfactory heuristic 
evidence. (Doeringer & Piore 1971:5).
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“Power is the ‘ghost at the bargaining table’” (Martin 1992:1)
If one can accept the premise, which will be expanded in later chapters, that 
workers in film production still possess significant autonomy1 and control over the 
terms and conditions under which they are employed, then they have maintained 
that influence, or power, over an extended period of time and in changing 
circumstances. That some power must be present to maintain the autonomy of the 
film production workforce is based on the presumption that any workers in an 
employment relationship are invariably at a disadvantage because “the balance of 
power between management and unions is heavily weighted towards management” 
(Martin 1992:3).
The early nineteenth century commentator believed that in employment matters 
there were “three kinds of power, the power of wealth, of talents, of numbers” (The 
Crisis 3rd May 1834)2 and, given its simplicity, this appears a useful statement to 
provide some starting framework to the examination of the characteristics and 
institutions through which workers have sought to apply their powers of talent and 
numbers to counter the power of wealth, invariably in the hands of the employers. 
As this chapter will show, the means by which workers have been able to harness 
the power of talents (i.e. skills) and numbers (through collectivity) have evolved, 
often responding to changing circumstances, but the examination ultimately
1 “The right and responsibility to make choices about the methods and techniques used for a given 
task...” (Breagh & Becker 1987)
2 In a contemporary setting, the power of state regulation should be added.
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identifies specific conditions which will later provide benchmarks against which 
the employment of film production workers can be tested.
Section one will show that the weakness of talent alone is that it is insufficient to 
ensure the maintenance of power because the possessor of talent alone has no 
control over demand or supply.
Section two considers the power that was acquired by the closure of an occupation 
to only those who possessed specific talents or skills: “the price he [the worker] 
could get for his labour depended on his keeping it scarce” (Phelps-Brown 
1959:118). Here the professional and the skilled worker shared objectives because 
both had invested in their training, but the skilled lacked the profession’s ability to 
invoke the public interest and so harness legislation and public opinion to safeguard 
their position. Thus the skilled workers’ only effective closure mechanism was by 
restricting access to their training - a mechanism which was often eroded by 
technical, social and legal changes.
The third section considers the power of numbers through defined, formal, labour 
organisations and collective bargaining. The growth through the early and mid 
twentieth century of the general and industrial unions, and in particular the 
utilisation of the closed shop, ensured that workers could use their numerical 
dominance of the labour market to influence employers and governments.
Section four will consider an alternative use of numbers through less well defined 
institutions and without formal agreements. It will be shown that unwritten custom 
and practice are just one example of the considerable influence that can be 
exercised in the work place through the informal institutions of networks and social 
capital.
The fifth section will review the theory relating to internal labour markets showing 
that the administrative rules and custom identified have many parallels with the 
trade union and informal institutions already identified in the preceding sections, 
thus providing a suitable template against which to test employment practices.
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3.1 The power of talent
“Talent: special aptitude; natural ability or skill. ” (OED 19-9)
“a mechanic’s skill is to him what the capitalist’s money is to the 
capitalist” (cited by Cook 1996: titlepage)
Exceptional natural talent or special aptitude, e.g. as possessed by an outstanding
musician, sportsman or artist, provides the owner with a negotiating power which
they can utilise to their advantage; i.e. power is imbued through the rarity or the
brilliance of their talent. However, through the consideration of the seeming
simplicity of that power, it becomes apparent that talent, which is innate, or skill,
which is acquired, may not provide assured power which can be replicated or relied
upon to remain effective, it being vulnerable in two respects.
First, there is no control over the demand. The creation and erosion of demand will 
be examined further in the next section, but without demand for their services the 
employed have no power because they have nothing else with which to bargain 
except their labour, skilled or otherwise:
... the labourer instead of being in the position to sell commodities in 
which his labour is incorporated, must be obliged to offer for sale as a 
commodity that very labour power ... (Marx 1999:109)
The practitioners who rely solely upon the possession of some innate talent or 
acquired skill (“the capability of accomplishing something with precision and 
certainty” (OED 1979)), however unique it might be, have no control over the 
changing environment in which they operate and so changes in taste, consumption 
or technology may leave them vulnerable if  the talent or skill becomes obsolete or 
outmoded because the practitioners are unable to evolve and adapt:
The [US] railroad professions and protoprofessions ... are one such 
example. Had they developed knowledge that abstracted beyond the 
world of the railroad, they might have survived its fall. But 
despatching did not become what we now think of as operational 
research, even though its central task was essentially under the 
jurisdiction now held by that profession. Because they lacked 
abstraction, dispatchers died with their technology. Another such 
group are the itinerant entertainers - musicians, dancing masters,
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singing teachers - whose numbers have been decimated by the 
centralisation of entertainment. (Abbott 1988:29)3
They had skills that continued to give them market power compared 
to other workers, but also skills that faced the threat of erosion by 
new technology... (Cook 1996:30)
The second threat to the power of talent is supply. The possessor of outstanding 
talent has a value, provided there is demand, because there is no alternative 
supplier who can match the quality of their service; the outstanding performer may 
possess genius which is inimitable. However, talent, as the definition states, is 
natural ability (“cleverness, capacity or mental power” (OED 1979)), so there is no 
restriction on the numbers that may possess some lesser measure of that ability -  
albeit that the definition implies that the talented should certainly be “special”. 
Furthermore, possession of a skill relies on both possession of individual ability 
and the social environment in which the activity takes place:
Skill is not easy to define or describe in a useful way because it is a 
contextual entity. Skill is as much the outcome of competing 
knowledge and power in industry, as something which exists in its 
own right. (Cook 1996:2)
Most writers concur on the necessity of distinguishing the skills that 
people bring to jobs (i.e. talents, abilities, capabilities and so on) from 
the skills that jobs require (i.e. task demands, role requirements, and 
what the positions demand, permit, and encourage). The former are 
often viewed as individual possessions, the latter as characteristic 
features of social roles. (Spenner 1990:400).
The social aspects of the skilled will be discussed below, but here it should be 
noted that while there are some limitations imposed by the requirement for 
individual “talents, abilities, capabilities and so on” -  for example the co-ordination 
required by pilots or the need for perfect colour vision in film graders -  these 
impose no finite or predictable limit on those who might aspire to the skilled 
employment. Thus, there may be many possessing sufficient dexterity or 
intellectual ability to acquire and develop skills which are sufficiently complex that 
they also confer some degree of autonomy (Spenner 1990). Therefore, to avoid the 
dilution of that power of autonomy through the oversupply of those capable of
3 Chapter 1 cited other examples.
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meeting the requirements, practitioners must seek to regulate the labour market by 
institutional means.
The nineteenth century craftsmen recognised that control of access to their specific 
skill was a key influence upon wages, because it had been one cause of divergence 
in the interests of masters and journeymen in the mid eighteenth century (Phelps- 
Brown 1959:114) when masters were seeking to break, not uphold, apprenticeship, 
for example by permitting the recruitment of ‘foreigners’ who had not served a 
recognised apprenticeship or to increase the number of apprentices trained (Webb 
& Webb 1920:53).
Both these courses of action “ ....tended to depress the wages, expectations and 
status of the journeyman” (Chase 2000:15) and if all applicants were admitted then 
the expectation of a reasonable livelihood through possession of a time-served skill 
could be dashed. Around 1800, the Corporation of Pinmakers had been obliged to 
petition Parliament because the daily sales of their journeymen, on which they were 
dependent, were devalued:
by reason of the unlimited number of apprentices that some few 
covetous minded members of the company do constantly imploy... 
have by degrees so beaten down the price of pins that the workman is 
not able to live of his work, (cited by Webb 1920:42).
The authority to recruit, the power of wealth, was with the employers. However, 
these early skilled workers were the sole possessors of the mystery - the 
knowledge of their craft - and they could use this power to restrict access to the 
means to acquire the talent or skill; the power of closure.
3.2 The power of closure
“The core prediction o f  closure theory is straightforward: the greater 
the extent o f  closure characterising the occupation, the higher the 
occupation’s rewards ” (Weeden 2002:60)
Weber recognised the restriction of access as a means of acquiring power, when
participants’ “expectations are of improving their position by monopolistic
tactics...”, and he used the terminology open, if  the system “does not deny
participation to anyone who wishes to jo in ...”, or closed, should “participation of
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certain persons [be] excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions” (Weber 
1968:43).
Thus, in an employment setting, the existing practitioners seek to impose closure 
and so:
generate[s] an artificial scarcity of individuals who have the legal, 
technical or socially recognised ability to perform the bundle of tasks 
provided by that occupation. (Weeden 2002:61).
This practice was recognised by the professions (“it is apparent that where a 
profession is closed... a valuable monopoly has been secured by the registered” 
(Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1933:357)) and craft workers alike, the latter by 
coordinating the practices of those “who through servitude and the ritual of 
apprenticeship had been inducted into the same mystery” (Phelps-Brown 1959:118) 
because it was the control of the training of the next cohort through apprenticeship 
that provided the craft unions’ source of power:
Craft unions ... obtained their power by controlling entry into the 
particular skill category; they were able to manipulate the supply of 
skilled labour to maintain their welfare. (Booth 1995:15).
Indeed, this control of entry and the perpetuation of apprentice ratios was one of 
the tests of a craft union: “craft unions in pure form are confined to apprentice- 
served, skilled workers and are intended to protect and promote a marketable 
skill...” (Bean 1994:29). Thus, in 1889, the ‘Liverpool Rules’ of the 
Typographical Association stated that:
Type Composing Machines must be worked exclusively by 
Journeymen and duly recognised Apprentices, such Apprentices to be 
reckoned in the total number allowed to each office... (Musson 
1954:191).
Thirty years later, in 1919, the Association again reviewed the rules relating to 
apprentices, wished to “regulate not only their selection, training and technical 
education, but also their wages” because the Association was still “dominated by 
fear of ‘over flooding’ the labour market and causing unemployment” (Musson 
1954:337). A further twenty years later, in 1933 and 1936, the Delegate Meetings 
of the typographers passed resolutions to urge further limits on apprenticeship 
ratios to reduce unemployment, insisting that the “seven years’ apprenticeship rule
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remained a cardinal feature of T.A. policy...” (Musson 1954:384). By these 
means of regulating entry “the craftsman felt he strengthened his union by not 
bringing men in, but by keeping them out”. (Phelps-Brown, 1959:119)
However, control of the supply of talent, or skilled labour, was only one 
mechanism by which closure could be used to create a position of strength. 
Weeden identified four mechanisms which could enhance reward, of which the 
latter three related to demand:
restricting the supply of labor in an occupation, enhancing overall 
demand for a product or service, solidifying an occupation’s claim to 
be the sole provider of that service, or signalling to customers that the 
occupation provides a service of particular quality. (Weeden 
2002:57)
Weeden identified five strategies utilised to secure occupational closure: 
“licensing, credentialing through the formal education system, certification through 
voluntary programs, representation through occupational associations and 
unionisation”4 (Weeden 2002:60). This list was not exhaustive (and he specifically 
noted the omission of social networks which will be considered in section 3.4) but 
the objective was always to create closure, although, as Weeden indicated, some 
strategies were more effective than others and not every strategy was available to 
all occupational groups.
For example, professional associations in areas such as medicine and education 
could encourage demand for their members’ services by lobbying government for 
increased regulation (Weeden 2002:65) citing public interest. However, unions 
have a less powerful voice, unless able to invoke issues such as health and safety, 
because they are perceived to be acting exclusively in their members’ interest. 
Similarly, the professions have been more successful in channelling demand 
specifically to their members (i.e. “solidifying an occupation’s claim to be the sole 
provider of that service”) by the claim that they alone are capable of adjudicating in 
their sector because:
4 Weeden was considering the situation in the United States, but the strategies would seem 
universal.
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they have a particular knowledge base on which their professional 
judgement is based, they, and not employers or government officials, 
should be the arbiters of the practice of fellow professionals. (Coady 
& Bloch 1996:7)
Lastly, the very reason for the existence of the professions had been their need to 
signal to the world at large that their members should be set apart as uniquely 
capable:
the skilled practitioners came to desire that the competent should 
somehow be distinguished and protected. It was hoped to achieve 
this end by limiting admission to the clubs to those who could show 
evidence of competence, which in those days meant evidence of 
experience and accomplishment. In this way prestige would be 
attached to the members of those clubs or associations. They, and 
they alone, would be the true civil engineers or architects... (Carr- 
Saunders & Wilson 1933:301).
While the craft worker could make similar claims, these were rarely protected and 
so, for example, the changes in work practices and technology that challenged inter 
union demarcation in the late nineteenth century shipbuilding industry of the 
□orth-east had to be settled by the unions themselves (with the occasional 
intervention by the employers) rather than independent or legal arbitration (Clegg 
etal. 1964:128-132).
Weeden had noted that successful closure depended on “legal, technical or socially 
recognised ability” (2002:61) and the craft unions were vulnerable on all three 
counts.
The effect of technical change on skilled workers operating craft qualification, pre­
entry closed shops was already highlighted in Chapter 1, and the effect of 
technology on some occupational groups in the film production industry will be 
considered in section 6.2 (page 164). The potential challenge of new technology is 
that alternative methods will lessen the demand for skilled workers by introducing 
less demanding processes. The first potential challenge is that technology will 
completely replace the process of which the skilled workers have been a critical 
part, thereby rendering them completely redundant; the introduction of the Sinclair 
Pocket Calculator (1972) destroyed the skill-intensive mechanical calculator 
industry. Alternatively, technology may simplify the complexity of the crucial 
process, or reduce the critical judgement necessary, so that the same results can be
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achieved by less skilled workers. Lastly, technology may change or replace the 
essential skill process so fundamentally that even if the new technology requires 
skilled workers, it will have broken the monopoly of the established practitioners 
(the assumption being that the negotiation of a new agreement, even if arranged 
with another skilled workforce, will be more satisfactory to the employer because 
the newcomers will be more compliant.5)
Regarding society’s recognition of skills, although the objectives of closure among 
professionals and craftsmen have often been similar,6 society has always viewed 
the professional very differently to the craft worker. The Preface to the rules of the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers, 1851 made the point well:
The youth who has the good fortune and inclination for preparing 
himself as a useful member of society by the study of physic, and 
who studies that profession with success so as to obtain his diploma 
from the Surgeons’ Hall of College of Surgeons, naturally expects, in 
some measure, that he is entitled to the privileges to which the 
pretending quack can lay no claim; and if in the practice of that useful 
profession he finds himself injured by such a pretender, he has the 
power of instituting a course of law against him. Such are the 
benefits of the learned professions. But the mechanic, though he may 
expend nearly an equal fortune and sacrifice an equal proportion of 
his life in becoming acquainted with the different branches of useful 
mechanism, has no law to protect his privileges, (cited by Webb &
Webb 1920:218)
In practice, professional closure has always been treated more kindly by statutory 
legislation than other supposedly restrictive practices. In the mid 1960s, it was 
observed that the trend for professions to resist competition by limiting the 
availability of substitutes through legal measures, contrasted sharply with other 
contemporary legislation which sought to enforce competition through the 
Restrictive Practices Act 1955 and the Resale Prices Act 1964. While those Acts 
were designed to outlaw price fixing, the professions were allowed to “engage in 
price-fixing and other restrictions and enforce them collectively, sometimes with
5 In 1984, The Times Group newspapers were willing to enter into new agreements with the EETPU 
regarding offset litho printing because these enabled them to abandon the traditional agreements 
with linotype printers of Fleet Street (Greenslade 2003:474)
6 “there are examples among certain professional groups such as lawyers and doctors of compulsory 
membership o f the relevant organisation and/or job security practices similar to those operated by 
skilled and craft unions” (Hanson et al. 1982:8)
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statutory authority”. Similarly, the Monopolies Act of 1949 and the Monopolies & 
Mergers Act of 1965 projected one aim, while at the same time some professions, 
specifically the opticians, had been granted near monopoly powers (Lees 
1966:3&4).
In 1971, great care had to be taken in the drafting of the Industrial Relations Act to 
include trade unions, the perceived operators of restrictive and coercive practices, 
whilst excluding from its provisions the professional bodies. Registration of 
professional bodies would “threaten the interests of powerful pressure groups such 
as the British Medical Association” (Moran 1977:19) - an organisation which still 
unashamedly describes itself as “an independent trade union dedicated to protecting 
individual members and the collective interests of doctors” (BMA website 
February 2006).
This legislative pressure against skilled worker closure was not new. During 
WW1, the wartime legislation effected through the Ministry of Munitions 
encouraged the dilution of craft practices through the admission of women and 
unskilled men into work previously reserved for time-served craftsmen. On 
Clydeside, dilution resulted in unofficial strikes, and eventually it was the Ministry 
that compromised, agreeing that women were only allowed to work when a man 
left, or a new machine was installed, and then only on the simplest tasks (McLean 
1983; Morris 1991), but this was a rare success.
Post-war, new forms of trade unionism exercising a different power, based on 
numerical strength (to be examined in the next section) began to dominate and 
closure became a less effective source of power. Thus the Engineers, in 1926, 
“resolved...to open their ranks to all classes of male engineering workers... One 
by one, other unions of apprenticed craftsmen followed the same path....” (Clegg 
1978:54) and so, while closure should have become “an ever recurring process” 
(Weber 1968:342), in many industries the numbers of semi- and unskilled workers 
now far exceeded the skilled. Even though the piecers had not been particularly 
inclined to unionise themselves (Webb 1920:7; Turner 1962:141), when they were 
accepted by the spinners into a limited form of union membership they 
outnumbered the craft spinners three to one and so the size and numerical ratios 
within the previously craft-based union inevitably changed. Similarly, before the
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WW1, the unskilled, day-wage Steel Smelters’ Union had grown until it 
overwhelmed and absorbed the Associated Iron and Steel Workers craft union 
(Turner 1962:149).
As these “lapses from strict organisational purity” took effect, even the “supremely 
aristocratic London Society of Compositors has recently accepted a body of 
workers ... not recruited by its own strait path of apprenticeship” (Turner 
1962:239) and in the Amalgamated Engineering Union, an established craft union 
and the successor since 1920 of the original “Dew Model” Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, only one third of members (250,000) were deemed to be skilled workers 
by the early 1960s. (McCarthy 1964:48).
By the late 1960s, the Donovan Report could observe that “it has not in fact been 
possible to maintain the craft system in all its exclusiveness everywhere” (Donovan 
1968:88) but that did not mean that the bargaining power of craftsmen was entirely 
spent because it was still “buttressed by scarcity due, not only to the skill, but also 
to the social institutions of the craft” (Clegg 1978:31).
Clegg’s introduction of ‘social institutions’ gives notice of the power that will be 
considered in the fourth section, but his quotation also reconfirmed the consistent 
principle that skill was a bargaining tool. However, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century less skilled workers had begun to discover that they too had a 
bargaining power based, not on closure, but on the inclusion and mobilisation of all 
workers available to the employer.
3.3 The power of formal organisation
“One o f  the main tasks o f trade unions is to limit and control those 
persons and institutions who wield direct authority over industry ”
(Clegg 1960:21)
"No miner can work without a union card" (Sampson 19Ul:635)
Writing in 1898, the Webbs had believed that “effective use of the Device of 
Restriction of numbers is no longer practical.” While they believed that such a 
device had the
...economic advantage of fencing-off particular families, grades or 
classes from the general degradation and thus preserving the
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community, in these privileged groups, a store of industrial traditions, 
a high level of specialised skill, and a degree of physical health and 
general intelligence unobtainable at a bare subsistence wage.
they acknowledged that only a minority of unions still relied up such methods. 
(Webb & Webb 1898:712-713)
The 19th century craft unions had only ever represented a minority of workers, the 
“aristocrats of labour, a mere tenth of the whole labour class” (Webb 1888 cited by 
Phelps Brown 1959:148) but, following the success of the London docks strike 
(1889), many semi- and unskilled workers were drawn to new general and 
industrial unions such as the Gas-workers, the [national Union of Agricultural 
Labourers, the Eastern Counties Labour Federation and the General Railway 
Workers (Webb 1920:405). Unlike the short-lived general unions of 1833-34 (Cole 
1953:104-106) and 1872, these unions survived.
However, the power of the numerical strength of these new general unions could 
only be properly utilised if it encompassed all potential workers, the futility of 
partial strikes having been recognised in earlier industrial disputes:
By a general union they [the working classes] might provide 
themselves with every species of power; and by a general strike they 
might bring their superiors to any terms of accommodation. Have 
these partial strikers provided themselves with either of these two 
powers? Have they more wealth than their masters? More talents or 
more numerical power than the unstruck labourers? ... consequence 
must be that for want of power, they must yield the victory... {The 
Crisis 3rd May 1834)
The means to avoid this fragmentation of effort, enforce unity and so “provide 
themselves with every species of power” would be through the institution of the 
closed shop which is now examined in detail.
In 1806, a Parliamentary Committee report described circumstances where:
every workman on his becoming a member of the society, receives a 
certain card or ticket.... and there is the utmost reason to believe that 
no cloth worker would be suffered to carry on his trade, otherwise 
than in solitude, who should refuse to submit to the obligations and 
rules of the society.” (Report of Committee on the Woollen 
Manufacture 1806:16 cited by Webb 1920:41)
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By 1889, the Webbs indicated that unionists in some sectors were refusing to work 
alongside non-unionists and that their employers were complicit to the 
arrangements:
An employer habitually refuses to engage any workman who does not 
agree to his workshop rules, or to those adopted by the employers’ 
association, In the same way, the Trade Unionist will, if he can, 
refuse to accept work in an establishment where he is obliged to 
associate with non-unionists; “working beside a non-unionist,” say 
the Flint Glass Makers, “is bad enough ... without having to assist 
him in his labor ... This being so we do not hesitate to say that before 
an employer engages a unionist, he ought to clear all non-unionists 
off the premises. Where we have demanded this, it has been done.”
(Webb & Webb 1898:213-214)
Both of these examples would appear to have been describing the attributes of a 
closed shop: “in which employees come to realise that a particular job is only to be 
obtained and retained if they become and remain members of one of a specified 
number of trade unions.” (McCarthy 1964:3).
A question, which fortunately this thesis does not have to answer with precision, is 
when and how the term ‘closed shop’ came to be conjoined in Britain with the 
practices now associated with it. It seems almost certain that the term originated in 
America. The American Iron Moulders’ International Journal of June 1864 noted 
that certain shops had been ‘closed’ pending the settlement of strikes (cited by 
Stockton 1911:14) and the expression ‘closed shop’ does appear in an early 20th 
century British published pamphlet (Post c l905:3) - but examination reveals it to 
be a reprint of an earlier American article. In 1891 there is a British reference to 
the London Dockers’ Union trying to “close a trade” (Howell 1891:150), but 
Drage, writing in 1905 about how some unionists “assert their own right to refuse 
to work with non-unionists” (1905:70), never used the term “closed shop” and nor 
did the Webbs in the 1920 edition of their History o f Trade Unionism. Goodrich, 
writing in 1920, did use the term ‘closed shop’ twice when listing those unions who 
had achieved almost complete unionisation (1920:65). However, he was an 
American, perhaps using an American term, and he never indicated how this might 
be different to his other examples. The Webbs’ example of the late 17th century 
woollen industry, already cited, would suggest that resisting the employment of 
non-unionists had existed from the outset of the British union movement. But it is
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also clear from their descriptions of working life of 1892 that it was not a universal 
requirement to be a member of the appropriate union in order to pursue a craft 
trade. It was sufficient that the individual had qualified through appropriate 
apprenticeship: “tailors and cabinetmakers ... though often highly-skilled 
craftsmen, had only a small minority of their trades in Union” (Webb 1920:441).
These seeming contradictions arose because the term ‘closed shop’ incorporated 
two different practices; the pre- and post-entry closed shop. McCarthy believed 
that the Americans avoided this confusion by using two different terms; only the 
pre-entry practice was described as closed shop, the post-entry being described as a 
“union shop” (1964:16n). However, this must have been a mid 20th century 
development because the distinction had not been obvious earlier in the century:
The workmen in a closed shop elect a representative of the union, 
who is known as Shop Steward. ... When a man is employed, it is 
the duty of the Shop Steward to ascertain if he is or is not a member 
of the union by asking to be shown his union card. If the card is not 
produced he is given a certain time in which to join the union.
(□ational Association of Manufacturers of the USA 1913:23).
A later American (Toner 1942:16) still used a broad definition of closed shop, “a 
certain type of relationship or mode of operation existing between and among 
employers and organised workers”, and argued that union shop and the closed shop 
were often interchangeable, the former being the term preferred by trade unionists. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary confirms that view:
.... in 1942, the American Council on Public Affairs noted that "the 
origin of the term ’closed shop' never has been satisfactorily 
ascertained.” It is clear that ‘closed shop’ has been used in English 
since the early 1900s, but it is not certain whether trade union 
members coined the term themselves or had it foisted upon them by 
opponents of the labour movement. Regardless of its origins, the 
term proved problematic for union leaders in the 1940s, when anti­
union sentiments prompted many politicians (and a good portion of 
the public) to disparage and seek to open ‘closed shops’. To avoid 
the negative connotations of being ‘closed’, union members instead 
embraced ‘union shop’, a term still used for establishments that 
support membership in labour unions.....
In 1968, the Conservative document, A Fair Deal at Work, attempted to use 
McCarthy’s interpretation of the then contemporary American terminology of 
‘closed shop’ and ‘union shop’ to differentiate between the pre- and post-entry
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closed shop (CPC 1968:24) but the distinction never seems to have gained 
acceptance in Britain perhaps because, in the subsequent 1971 Industrial Relations 
Act, the ‘union shop’ became the ‘agency shop’ when it incorporated several 
attenuating features. Ultimately, McCarthy’s assessment was that “the closed shop 
is an extremely varied phenomenon, which affects different groups in differing 
degrees and different ways” (McCarthy 1964:78) so it is first necessary to examine 
the post-entry closed shop because although the pre-entry practice may have been 
seen as a natural continuation of the craft unions’ exclusivity, the post-entry closed 
shop was an extension of the principle of comprehensiveness which had created the 
general and industrial unions.
Because “union power derives from the ability of the union to inflict damage on the 
firm through labour withdrawal” (Booth 1995:72), the common objective of both 
the pre- and post-entry closed shop was to ensure that the bargaining power of the 
existing workforce was not threatened by the availability of any alternative 
workforce. The difference was in the means of rendering any potentially alternative 
labour unavailable to the employer. The skilled worker had erected a barrier 
through exclusivity because only time-served apprentices possessed the necessary 
skills: “the skilled man not only benefited from the scarcity of his skill, but in a 
strike he had its protection against substitution by blacklegs...” The ordinary 
labourer had no such defence: “ ...the unskilled man’s place could be taken by any 
hungry fellow from anywhere” and so the unskilled had to utilise the unity of the 
general and industrial unions as an alternative source of power. By incorporating 
every pool of alternative labour into the union movement it became inaccessible to 
their employers as substitute, blackleg labour - much as the spinners had, albeit in a 
more selective way, ensured that their semi-skilled assistants, the piecers, were 
integrated and unavailable (Turner 1962:142). Thus, “denied strength though 
exclusion, the general union sought it through comprehensiveness” and so “the 
only safeguard was to get all sorts of unskilled men everywhere into one union” 
(Phelps-Brown 1959:150).
The post-entry closed shop took the concept of ‘comprehensiveness’ to the next 
stage: if the ‘open’ unions (using Turner’s distinction) could accommodate all 
workers without question or qualification, then nothing could inhibit the
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membership of anyone who wished to work in a particular workplace, and thus an 
entire labour force “recruited, retained, and subjected to the discipline of the union” 
would enhance the union’s internal strength, enabling it “to wield more effective 
sanctions against employers” (McCarthy 1964:111) by raising the potential cost of 
any dispute to the employer. The creation of such unity from unskilled, mobile 
workers was not always a simple process (McCarthy 1964:126-131), but eventually 
all post-entry closed shops required that every member of a workforce should also 
be a member of a specific union, all recruits should be members of that union and, 
should an employer select a non-unionist for employment, this could only be 
tolerated “so long as he agrees to join the union immediately or shortly after 
engagement” (McCarthy 1964:16).
An employer’s willingness to participate in the enforcement of such practices 
varied between workplaces. McCarthy cites examples where the employer’s active 
involvement extended to confirming a potential employee’s willingness to join the 
union during the selection process (McCarthy 1964:23-24). Alternatively, an 
employer might take a more neutral position; not actively participating, but 
accepting that the closed shop was a principle of importance to the union and that 
tolerance caused the company no great inconvenience or cost. Lastly, the union 
may have had to ‘unilaterally’ impose the closed shop with no formal 
acknowledgement or acceptance by the employer but through shop floor pressures - 
social contact, persuasion, social ostracism, refusing to work alongside non-union 
workers (Clegg 1978:38) or even short, selective strikes against the employment of 
non-unionists such as occurred in the motor industry in the 1950s (McCarthy 
1964:119&120).7
Whatever the means by which it was established, the closed shop did not 
automatically imply power. Although McCarthy quoted the Secretary of one 
employers’ association regarding the closed shop, “this is an issue about power” 
(1964:90), in his more detailed examination he suggested that the unilateral 
imposition of a post-entry closed shop might be “a sign of weakness, or insecurity”
7 In the previous century, there had been a practice of “rattening”, a Sheffield term for the “the 
temporary abstraction of the wheelbands and tools” belonging to non unionists (Drage 1905:11; 
Webb 1920:260), but the practice and term appears to have lapsed.
Iain Reid K 3  Sc
Chapter 3 Power and Labour Markets
on the part of the union (1964:113). Certainly some unions were willing to deny 
that such a condition existed:
To describe the agreement reached as providing a ‘closed shop’ is a 
gross distortion of the facts. Our members in London simply say they 
are not prepared to work with people who will not conform to those 
agreements which have been properly negotiated and approved by the 
vast majority of the people concerned with the agreements. (Arthur 
Deakin (as General Secretary of the TGWU) quoted by Goldstein 
1952:36)
Turner had believed that “most open unions will, in fact, when they feel strong 
enough, attempt to impose [the closed shop] by one means or another” (1962:282) 
but it should be noted some unions achieved close to 100% membership without 
the imposition of a formal closed shop. This situation was not new because in the 
late 19th century the Webbs had observed:
In the best organised industries ... such as the Boilermakers, Flint 
Glass Makers, Tape-sizers, or Stuff pressers -  the very aristocracy of 
‘Old Unionists’ -  the compulsion is so complete that it ceases to be 
apparent. Do man not belonging to the union ever thinks of applying 
for a situation, or would have any chance of obtaining one. (Webb 
1898:215).
A strong union could impose its requirements through negotiation, collective 
bargaining or the “silent and unseen, but absolute compulsion” (Webb 1898:215), 
whereas a union weakened by an inability to organise industries with high mobility 
(such as building and engineering) or which had intermittent contact with those 
members (road haulage) would have problems in maintaining the strike solidarity. 
Therefore it was these weaker, insecure unions that needed a closed shop to impose 
their will on employers, and workers. (McCarthy 1964:152).
The objective of the pre-entry closed shop was still to effect closure - to regulate 
admission to specific employments and so avoid any dilution of the valued 
employment - but by the 1960s the serving of an apprenticeship was no longer the 
sole barrier to ensure exclusivity. McCarthy identified four principal variations in 
forms of the pre-entry shop and it is necessary to summarise them because at least 
three of the four variations were at some stage operated within the film production 
industry.
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The natural successor to the craft union tradition was the craft qualification shop. 
In its purest form, the craft requirement would have been the serving of an 
apprenticeship and, as shown above, the unions took pains to ensure that employers 
maintained strictly agreed apprentice ratios. There could exist a slightly diluted 
form of the craft qualification union where no formal apprenticeship system 
existed, but the principle remained that, once accepted as a union member, the 
worker was free to transfer elsewhere. Similarly, the employer could freely select 
new employees, without seeking union approval, provided that the worker’s ‘ticket’ 
remained current (McCarthy 1964:17 & 18).
The employer did not have that freedom in a promotion veto shop. This usually 
existed because the workers’ freedom to transfer was curtailed because some 
element of the skill was acquired through service and promotion -  and that skill 
was not readily recognised or transferred elsewhere. Thus the union would 
regulate the access to the promotion gateways and insist that the employers select 
the next most senior person as each vacancy for advancement appeared (McCarthy 
1964:20).
While those first two forms may still have retained some links to the exclusivity of 
the craft union, the remaining two forms of pre-entry closed shop related mainly to 
unskilled workers where some barrier to an otherwise potential flood of newcomers 
was necessary. In the labour supply closed shop the union become the sole source 
of labour for a particular employer because he or she was obliged to apply to the 
union for a nominated candidate as each vacancy occurred. The employer retained 
some rights to object to a union’s first nomination, but was still obliged to seek 
another candidate from the union (McCarthy 1964:17). A variation, where the 
union had less control, was the labour pool where the union did not attempt to 
nominate individuals, but agreed with the employer that only recognised union 
members should be selected for employment (McCarthy 1964:17). It should be 
noted that some features of these latter categories were also present in the craft 
related closed shops and some print shops found it necessary to operate using 
elements from the craft qualification and the labour supply closed shops
Thus it can be seen that the term “closed shop” embraced many variations, 
however, the importance of them all was the ability of the union to control, as near
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as practical, one hundred percent of the workforce in the all-important procedures 
of collective bargaining which, in the British system of industrial relations, was 
perceived as the most important power available to workers in the workplace: “A 
priority is accorded to collective bargaining over other methods of external job 
regulation” (Flanders 1975:94).
The term ‘collective bargaining’ appears to have been first used by Beatrice Potter 
(later Mrs Sidney Webb) in 1891 (Webb & Webb 1898:173n) but the full 
significance is explained in a series of examples in Industrial Democracy (Webb & 
Webb 1898) as a means of preventing the employer exploiting the differences in 
worker’s individual circumstances when setting remuneration:
The starving man gets his job at the same piecework rate as the 
workman who could afford to stand out for his usual earnings. The 
superior craftsman retains all his advantages over his fellows, but 
without allowing his superiority to be made the means of reducing the 
weekly wage to the ordinary worker. (Webb & Webb 1898:174)
In addition, collective bargaining created the “working rules” that would be 
“binding on all the employers and workmen of the town or district”: setting the 
hours for the beginning and ending of work, the ratio of apprentices, the provision 
of holidays and the notice required to terminate work (Webb & Webb 1898:175). 
This concept, that collective bargaining, “binding on all”, should regulate industrial 
relations had been re-affirmed by many official reports. In 1917, the Commission 
of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest reporting for Wales and Monmouthshire stated:
1. That it should be a statutory obligation on all workmen to 
belong to a recognised union of their particular industry... Without 
compulsory unionism there can be no stability in industry.
2. That at least in certain industries, especially large scale 
industries, all the employers ... should belong to an employers’ 
association, or if not, they must accept the terms and conditions 
agreed upon by such an association. (Report of the Commissioners,
□o 7 Division 1917:29)
Fifty years later, the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations would make the similar conclusions (Donovan 1968) and many 
employers agreed: Weekes (1975:41) believed that employers found that “one 
hundred percent trade unionism provides one side of a more complete system of
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collective bargaining”; Hart (1979) showed evidence that “bosses loved the closed 
shop”; and The Economist, contemplating Conservative proposals to remove the 
closed shop in 1977, stated that “many industrialists .... will also shudder, so used 
have they become to the convenience of plant bargaining” (Economist 8 Oct 77).
Flanders had made the point that besides being a rule-making process, it was also 
“a power relationship between organisations” (Harbison 1966 cited by Flanders 
1975:219) and that, despite being described as collective bargaining, all resulting 
agreements were not bargains, in the sense of a market activity, but the negotiated 
settlements of power conflicts between pressure groups (Flanders 1975:218). 
Therefore, a collective agreement was:
....not truly a collective bargain. Trade unions do not sell the labour 
of their members; nor do employers’ associations, unlike individual 
employers, buy it. (Flanders 1975:220)
Those agreements were the attempt by the two parties to establish, or retain, control 
over those matters that they perceived as critical in the work place and they 
effected those agreements through rules, procedural and substantive, to establish 
rights and obligations.
The substantive rules (setting wages, working hours and job terms) were 
theoretically binding on a national basis (Donovan’s “formal system” (1968:12)) 
and, being standard rates, needed little clarification. However, the procedural rules 
(the methods of exchange, grievance procedures and the settlement of disputes) 
required interpretation and thus involved other parties besides trade unions and 
employers’ associations (Flanders 1975:87) -  and these different parties created 
new, and more complex relationships because workers’ behaviour in the 
workplace:
... is not only controlled by management. This formal organisation 
of a business enterprise is supplemented and complemented by an 
informal organisation created by the employees .... to meet their own 
social needs at work. (Flanders 1975:88)
Iain Reid ,* | H K 4
Chapter 3 Power and Labour Markets 79
Therefore, despite the rhetoric regarding the supremacy of collective bargaining,
O
there were other means of effecting external job regulation. We shall return to the 
importance of administrative rules and procedures as they relate to the control of an 
internal labour market in section 3.5, but first we should consider the other means 
of effecting job regulation. Flanders recognised five additional methods, and it is 
the fifth of those, “custom and convention” (1975:94) which next needs 
examination because it will demonstrate the power of informal institutions
3.4 The power of informal institutions
“It isn 7 what you know but who you know” (Traditional saying cited by
Field 2003: H)
The worker power discussed in the previous two sections was exercised through 
formal organisations, either craft or trade unions, which controlled predominantly 
through formal rules and regulations. These rules were evident in formal 
apprenticeship schemes and ratios, governances regulating membership and in all 
the procedural and substantive rules associated with collective bargaining. 
However, this thesis will argue in later chapters that these formal organisations 
have often been replaced by more informal methods which regulate and coordinate 
the activities of individuals through networks and social capital using unwritten 
conventions and codes of behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary to establish that the 
power exercised through informal institutions, while less overt than that of the 
formal predecessors, is nevertheless still effective.
“Institutions replace uncertainty by providing a structure in everyday life” (Dorth 
1990:3) and so institutions do perform very similar functions to organisations. 
However, while organisations may be constructed by individuals bound by some 
institutional commonality, institutions and organisations are not the same. 
Organisations have structures, hierarchies, leaders, personalities and internal rules 
whereas institutions are more abstract: “the underlying rules of the game” that 
effect the constraints that “human beings define to shape human interaction.”
8 The Webbs had also noted that “Collective Bargaining is neither co-extensive with, nor limited to, 
Trade Union organisation” (Webb & Webb 1898:177)
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However, institutions can be either formal or informal. Formal, by the application 
of rules and regulations, or informal because of conventions and codes of 
behaviour thus providing a context for any human activity being:
... perfectly analogous to the rules of a game in a competitive team 
sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically 
unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules, 
such as not deliberately injuring a key player on the opposing team.
And, as this analogy would imply, the rules and informal codes are 
sometimes violated and punishment is enacted. (Dorth 1990:4-5).
This section is interested in the informal institution operating though those 
“conventions and codes of behaviour” and without formal organisational support.
The concept that unwritten pacts have often governed the conduct of those in the 
work place has long been accepted and is often discernible in the divergence 
between how management envisaged and set out the work tasks in regulations and 
rules, and the ways in which workers themselves completed those tasks. In some 
instances workers colluded to control the output to levels that were agreed as 
acceptable to the work group (Mathewson 1931; Mayo 1933), in others they had to 
circumvent the management’s rules and directives in order to complete their 
prescribed tasks, as in Burawoy & Lukacs’s description of work practices in a 
communist steel foundry (1992).
Three particular research studies provide the detail of how such informal 
arrangements operated: Roy’s study of quota restriction (1952), Burawoy’s 
explanations of the ‘games that workers play’ (1979) and Brown’s study of 
workplace “custom and practice” (1973).
Brown’s study considered collective bargaining as it related to piecework, but was 
most interested in how the bargaining and rules that were practised on the shop 
floor had evolved from the rules that had often originated as unilateral edicts from 
management. The name given to those evolved rules was “custom and practice” 
and they were significant in that they were non-negotiated; they did not arise from 
any process of formal negotiation (Brown 1973:85-86). Instead, there was process, 
marked by the absence of formal calculation or negotiation, similar to that which 
assessed compensation for “the drift”, the differences between new and “vintage” 
piecework tasks:
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collection of rules of thumb whereby the work study engineers could 
use the formal language of their profession to cobble together 
piecework values acceptable to the workers. (Brown 1973:20).
Thus, even in a formal collective bargaining setting, the conventions of custom and 
practice meant that rates were fixed that would be “acceptable to the workers.”
There is even less obvious presence of formal organisation in Roy’s and Burawoy’s 
experiences as machine operators, indeed often the lower management cooperated. 
Roy describes a conversation with his superintendent, Steve, when he had already 
made $10 on his shift:
“That’s all I’m allowed to make isn’t it?” I asked. Steve hesitated at 
that one. “You can make more,” he said, lowering his eyes. “But I’d 
better not,” I insisted. “Well, you don’t want to spoil it for yourself,” 
he answered. (Roy 1952:102)
Steve’s endorsement of the informal rules of the shop floor, despite his status as the 
management’s representative, demonstrates the power of informal rules and of the 
conventions of the workforce: “each worker sooner or later is sucked into this 
distinctive set of activities and language [i.e. making out]” (Burawoy 1979:64). 
Elsewhere, Burawoy describes how workers could regularly turn out more than the 
required 140% (100% being the figure required for the basic earnings while the 
additional 40% would earn an incentive bonus) but would only put 140% on any 
official returns, keeping the additional parts as a ‘kitty’ for future use. Therefore:
There was always a discrepancy .... between what was registered on 
the books as completed and what was actually completed on the shop 
floor. Shop management was more concerned with the latter and let 
the books take care of themselves. Both the 140% ceiling and the 
practice of banking (keeping a kitty) were recognised and accepted by 
everyone on the shop floor, even if they didn’t meet with the approval 
of higher management. (Burawoy 1979:58)
Thus, the evidence was that:
On the shop floor informal arrangements and practices often take 
precedence over the formal agreements made by employers and 
employees. (Finlay 1988:27)
If Finlay believed that informal arrangements “often take precedence over the 
formal arrangements” (my italics), then Flanders appears to have given the
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informal rules greater power than the collective bargaining which was prevalent in 
the times and settings that he was describing:
These informal rules, which management has no say in making but 
tacitly has to accept, range over many subjects. In earlier times they 
were mainly the trade practices of the craftsmen who protected their 
job territory from invasion by limiting entry and upholding 
demarcation. Today they are the means by which workers who are 
not craftsmen protect their earnings and their bargaining power, but 
equally their security, their status and their values. The effect of full 
employment on workplace relations is not confined to the upsurge in 
intra-plant collective bargainings it has also resulted in a growth in 
unilateral regulation by workers on the shop floor which is expressed 
in employment or working practices acquiring the force of 
institutions. (Flanders 1975:203) (italics in original)
It is possible that Flanders was referring to what Donovan called the “informal 
system” (1968:12), negotiated through the offices of the shop steward -  whose 
authority was part democratic, elected locally as the workers’ representative, but 
also the authority derived from the organisation of the trade union. However, as 
Brown shows, workers, or “gangs of them”, negotiated around the local agreements 
without any of the structures of formal organisation.
... the entire piecework system tends to be taken over by extremely 
fragmented bargaining between individual workers (or gangs of them) 
and ratefixers (or work study engineers or foremen). Joint 
negotiation over piecework base rates ceases. Even the role o f  the 
shop steward is subsidiary... (Brown 1973:21) (my italics)
But these “informal arrangements and practices” require some co-ordination and 
collusion. The “social pressure of a convention [that] makes it best to act that way” 
(Brown 1973:84) could lead to enforced organisation; Hansen had noted that in 
come communities refusal to join the union would result in social ostracism 
(Hanson et al. 1982:8). However, in this context, social pressure probably means 
the more subtle pressure that Burawoy had identified: the necessity for an 
individual to conform to the norm by regulating personal actions. But this still 
remains in a formal framework, the workplace; so was custom and practice only an 
effective power because it was operated within the framework of the more formal 
collective bargaining? The findings of Mathewson (1931), Mayo (1933) and the 
theories of social capital and networks, would suggest not and that the informal 
convention maybe a deliberate measure to circumvent the formal organisation:
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Modem organisations are governed by rules. These are accepted 
procedures ... usually defined clearly in terms of a position rather 
than a person. But when they want to make something happen, many 
people will ignore these formal procedures and responsibilities and 
set off to talk to someone they know. (Field 2003:2)
Therefore, for a greater understanding of how these informal arrangements were 
communicated and coordinated, and the resources that can be applied without 
formal organisation, we must turn to the literature relating to networks and social 
capital. Social capital implies that there is a value in those that an individual knows 
-  and, in turn, who and what they know:
Social capital is embedded in the network of contacts among 
individuals that can be mobilised to serve achieve certain ends ....
Contacts may be based on friendship, work relations, or participation 
in civic and leisure activities. (Jarley 2005:3)
That networks of colleagues and contacts are of value is probably common sense 
(Field 2003:44), however, the connection of networks to the term social capital 
would seem to indicate that the network is a resource, pointing to “ideas of 
investment, accumulation and exploitation” (Field 2003:3). While there has been a 
debate about whether the term “capital” is the best idiom, because this is not a 
capital that can be traded and it confers none of the social and political advantages 
attached to financial capital (Smith & Kulynch 2002:177), Field believes that to try 
to read too much into the terminology is pointless:
Social Capital can be termed capital in so far as it gives rise to
resources that can be deployed in order to enable actors -  both
individuals and groups -  to pursue their goals more effectively than 
they could do without it. (Field 2003:138)
So this is a resource, a power, that can be used in the work place by both
individuals and groups to “pursue goals” which do not need formal organisation, 
although it might just as easily supplement as supplant them. The evidence is that 
social capital returns tangible benefits, as Field’s analysis indicates:
To summarise the findings in a wide variety of research, it seems that 
in general, social capital broadly does what the theorists have 
claimed: to put it crudely, people who are able to draw on others for 
support are healthier than those who cannot; they are also happier and 
wealthier; their children do better at school; and their communities 
suffer less from antisocial behaviour. (Field 2003:45)
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Furthermore, the benefits of social capital are well documented in the employment 
field, workers are more likely to locate work (Field 2003:51) and employees 
introduced through social networks are less likely to be rejected at the application 
stage, less likely to fail the interview and fewer will turn down an offer (Fernandez 
et al 2000 cited by Field 2003:52). Once in the work group, where workers are 
well known to each other and where each has some awareness of the others 
capabilities and characteristics, there is even more probability of collaborative 
behaviour:
We usually observe cooperative behaviour when individuals 
repeatedly interact, when they have a great deal of information about 
each other, and when small numbers characterise the group. (Dorth 
1990:12)
However, the effects of social capital are not all beneficial to employers. The 
network may, as shown above, be used to suppress effort or to fix prices. Also, 
while networks may facilitate the recruitment of suitable candidates, those same 
networks may exclude those who do not, or cannot through ignorance, participate.
Yet while recruitment through connections can be a highly reliable 
way of attracting employees, it can also exclude not only the 
unreliable, but those who are simply outsiders with no existing 
connections on the inside. (Field 2003:122)
It will be shown that this feature is particularly apposite to the closed shop and in 
the contemporary film production and audio-visual sectors because social capital 
does not automatically take any account of an individual’s capabilities or their 
ability to influence their own success:
□or should we allow the interest in social capital to distract us from 
other structural factors which determine people’s life chances. (Field 
2003:139)
Although social capital is often seen to have parallels with human capital, the 
acquisition of the latter is the time and investment of the individual and is 
associated with the economic value to the individual and the firm. The acquisition 
of social capital may also require the investment of time and commitment to 
establish and then maintain the necessary connections, but it may never be of value 
to the individual nor the employer. Also, there is an element of chance in choosing 
the right network at the appropriate moment. While human capital is possessed by
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the individual and has some transferability, the value of social capital is the value 
of the network and the other participants -  and thus it may be worthless in 
changing circumstances.
nevertheless, networks will be shown to be of importance in the sectors under 
examination, and the fifth section will examine the theory which brings together 
much of what has preceded.
3.5 Internal labour markets
“The allocation o f  work assignments [and] the determination o f
wages...all governed by administrative rules that are not wholly 
responsive to market forces” (Doeringer □ Piore 7 9 □/:□?)
A theory very relevant to this research was that relating to internal labour markets,
identified in the American workforces by Doeringer & Piore (1971). They defined
the internal labour market as being: “an administrative unit ... within which the
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules and
procedures.” Jobs within the internal labour market would be filled only by those
who have already been admitted to the organisation and therefore those jobs would
be “shielded” from the direct influences of competitive forces in the external
market. This contrasted with the “external labour market” which would be
governed by more conventional economic theory i.e. where pricing, training and
allocating decisions would be controlled by economic variables (Doeringer & Piore
1971:2)
It will be recognised immediately that descriptions of labour markets where jobs 
are “filled by the promotion or transfer of workers who have already gained entry” 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:2) mirror the vocabulary used by McCarthy in connection 
with the promotion veto and the labour supply varieties of the pre-entry closed 
shop, (McCarthy 1964:17&20) - and there are many other parallels between the 
internal labour market and the pre-entry closed shop. Furthermore, many of those 
characteristics, the control of entry points, on-the-job training, and the ability to 
shield of workers from external economic influences, would appear to be present in 
the contemporary film production industry. Therefore, because Doeringer & Piore 
set out the criteria which they believed characterised the internal labour market, an
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examination of their work may supply appropriate tests by which the existence and 
continuity of an internal labour market can be assessed.
Because it is in intended to test the specific conditions set out by Doeringer & Piore 
against the evidence assembled for the film production sector, it is not proposed 
that this section will be a detailed analysis of their work. Instead, what is proposed 
is a broad summary to establish their general framework, conditions and 
vocabulary because these will largely dictate the structure of what follows in 
subsequent chapters.
Doeringer & Piore identified three differing market structures, the Enterprise 
Markets, the Craft Markets and the Competitive Markets, but their empirical work 
concentrated on the Enterprise Markets which they saw as being “manufacturing 
establishments” in which the internal labour market was “generally synonymous 
with the establishment”. In such establishments:
the predominant pattern appears to be one in which production jobs 
are arranged in seniority districts or lines of progression. Entry job 
classifications tend to lie at the bottom of these lines and vacancies in 
other jobs are usually filled by the promotion of workers from the 
next lowest job classification in the line of progression.
These rules applied as much to management as blue-collar workers, each following 
their respective lines of progression, except that managers’ career structures could 
be operating within a larger corporation and thus bridge several establishments or 
firms (Doeringer & Piore 1971:2-3).
This geographical flexibility, while remaining within the same progression, was 
even more apparent in the Craft Market which tended to be centred on the 
appropriate union and thus operate within its “geographical and occupational 
jurisdiction”. In these markets, confirming the principles of craft exclusivity 
already discussed, it was probable that entry to the craft or occupational internal 
market would be more rigidly controlled than in the manufacturing enterprise 
market. Because of the mobility implicit in skills that could be used in many 
situations (e.g. building trades), it might be though that this work might be more 
vulnerable to market forces than the enclosed world of the enterprise market. 
However, Doeringer & Piore (1971:4) believed that the evidence they presented
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showed that the administrative rules still predominated, thus confirming that these 
craft workers were indeed operating in an internal labour market.
Lastly, Doeringer & Piore hypothesised that there might exist the truly Competitive 
Market where the process of allocating labour and the pricing of jobs would be 
conducted in a purely competitive fashion. This market might not exist, but the 
concept was necessary to illustrate the contrast with the internal labour market 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:4-5).9
Having established the different markets that might exist, it was then necessary to 
prescribe the precise conditions necessary to show that an internal labour market 
was truly effective. It was not enough to merely show that administrative rules 
existed but that they created distinct boundaries within which pricing and job 
allocation differed from the external market. The microeconomic data necessary to 
provide rigorous proof was rarely, if ever, available and so the suggested factors 
that indicated rigidity in the rules were, first, longevity - that the rules had operated 
for an extended period and preferably through changing economic and technical 
circumstances. The second factor was the commentary regarding the rules. Did 
management cite the rules as creating inefficiency? Did unions concede that the 
rules were non-negotiable? If such comments were prevalent then it seemed likely 
that rigid boundaries did indeed exist. Thirdly, it seems probable that labour would 
be a major element of the process and that there would be associated on-the-job 
training and, lastly, there should be distinct inter-dependencies and practices 
amongst work groups which would be manifest as fixed customs and traditions 
relating to wages, promotions and other work arrangements (Doeringer & Piore 
1971 5-7).
If those were the tests that an internal labour market existed, then the three factors 
that created such markets were more easily identifiable being skill specificity, on- 
the-job training and customary law.
The definition of skill specificity drew on Becker’s work regarding trainees (1964) 
and was taken to mean the extent to which an acquired skill might have no
9 It will be shown that in the case of audio-visual production, such a competitive market does exist 
and this will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Iain Reid >&I • S i i S t l l  ± C - * tK 4
Chapter 3 Power and Labour Markets 8 8
application within another firm or sector (Doeringer & Piore 1971:14). It was 
argued that the more specific a skill became, the more expensive the training would 
become for the employer, because trainees would be unwilling to invest themselves 
in a skill with such limited application, and the specificity would mean that there 
would be no economies of scale. However, once the skills were acquired, the 
reduction in labour turnover probably justified those additional costs. The concept 
of skill specificity was coupled closely to job specificity, where a particular task 
might require only specific skills, and technical specificity where familiarity with 
specific machinery could deliver greater speed and accuracy (Doeringer & Piore 
1971:15-17.
Doeringer & Piore’s second factor critical to the development of an internal labour 
market was on-the-job training, a process which was key to understanding internal 
labour markets because it was the informal process by which the newcomer, 
through “osmosis”, “exposure”, “experience” or “working one’s way up through 
promotion” was absorbed :
Very often on-the-job training is not recognised as a distinct process 
at all; it is simply assumed that a worker who has ‘been around’ for a 
while will know how to do certain things. (Doeringer & Piore 
1971:18)
However, the implications of such training were far greater than the technical 
improvement of the newcomer. Training occurs during normal business activities 
and therefore success or failure is soon apparent. This disciplines the learning 
process because the rewards or penalties are effected on the trainee in both 
monetary and psychological terms. Furthermore, because the training requires that 
all those involved, trainer and trainee, are involved in dual roles: in both the 
learning and the production process. This can blur the distinction between jobs, 
even though the formal responsibilities remain, because both trainer and trainee are 
responsible for the end result. (Doeringer & Piore 1971:19).
So why is on-the-job training so prevalent in the internal labour market? Probably 
the over-riding reason is that there is no alternative. The nature of the work cannot 
be replicated in formal instruction because the practitioners cannot demonstrate it 
except in the production setting, either because it is impossible to replicate the
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same challenges or because they do not want to reveal their tacit skills to 
management. Therefore, it seems “natural” to management and workers to place 
the trainee into the real setting because learning will be automatic and a natural 
progression will take place as the trainee, motivated by curiosity, moves from one 
task to another as each is mastered (Doeringer & Piore 1971:20-21).
On-the-job training may also seem costless to management -  although it will 
inevitably involve some waste, because of the trainee’s errors, and some loss of 
productivity on the part of the trainer who is diverted from his normal task. 
However, there is a saving because the trainee only learns the precise requirements 
of the job; there is no teaching or acquisition of skills in excess of the job content 
because the trainee is never exposed to them as they might be in more detached, 
formal classroom instruction. Thus on-the-job training is narrow, but effective in 
teaching the highly specific skills necessary for a particular job (Doeringer & Piore 
1971:21-22).
The third factor necessary for the internal labour market was custom. As already 
shown, entrenched custom and tradition was one of the elements necessary to show 
the existence of an internal labour market but Doeringer & Piore now defined the 
characteristics and implications of custom:
Custom at the workplace is an unwritten set of rules based largely 
upon past practice or precedent. These rules can govern any aspect of 
the work relationship from discipline to compensation. (1971:23)
These rules, they surmised, were the result of stability in the internal labour 
markets and had value to the employer and the workers because the workers, 
having “regular and repeated contact with each other”, “generated a set of 
unwritten rules governing the actions of their members and the relationship 
between members and outsiders”. The resulting rules eventually acquired an 
“ethical or quasi-ethical aura” and thus they defined what was right or wrong, 
acceptable or unacceptable (Doeringer & Piore 1971:23). These rules eventually 
extended to the allocation and pricing of labour and, as they became more 
“constrained and less responsive to market forces”, so rigidity was established in 
those areas (Doeringer & Piore 1971:24)
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Assuming that employers must always seek to minimise their labour costs it might 
seem that customs could create an unacceptable cost to the employer, making the 
process uneconomic. The implicit rigidity would hamper any organisation 
operating in a competitive economic environment for two reasons: first, the rigidity 
created by custom would isolate labour costs from economic reality; second, 
because the workforce’s sanction against management who violated custom was 
also economic: strike; working to rule; and sabotage. Doeringer & Piore (1971:24) 
believed that managerial adherence to work custom could not be seen in purely 
economic terms because their own junior management also belonged to the work 
group, thus custom influenced all management decisions. Furthermore, change 
was not impossible because custom was based on past practice and therefore, if  
new procedures were gradually introduced they would, as they gained acceptance, 
become the accepted custom thus “custom [is] an essentially passive phenomenon 
which tends to grow up around whatever exists.” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:25).
This passive characteristic meant that in a new, non-union enterprise, management 
was free to set whatever rules they pleased, but around these rules, custom begins 
to form and, if there is no economic or technical change, custom will become 
indistinguishable as a separate force. Only as change occurs, does the gap between 
custom and economic efficiency potentially widen and management then has a 
choice - to try to shift custom to a more efficient practice by introducing new 
procedures - so establishing a new custom - or to accept the cost of inefficiency as 
being less than the cost of change (Doeringer & Piore 1971:25).
How the groups formed to support these customs drew upon some of the processes 
discussed in the last section but added the concept of habits - patterns of behaviour 
which the individuals associated with reward. Primary habits are associated with 
basic physical needs, but it is “secondary reinforcers” which develop customs: 
individuals imitate those around them and thus reinforce and perpetuate group 
behaviour. At this stage, it becomes apparent why and how the internal labour 
market becomes a self perpetuating institution. Because of its stability, newcomers 
are relatively few and thus exercise little diluting effect. Furthermore, because 
those newcomers are trained on-the-job, so the means by which they leam the skill 
incorporates them into the group norms (Doeringer & Piore 1971:26-17).
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Moreover, there are several positive factors that enable the internal labour market 
to remain viable: the value of the internal labour market to the worker, the reduced 
turnover costs for the employer, and the efficiency in recruitment, screening and 
training.
The value of the internal labour market to the worker was its stability. The worker 
knew that the investment in the acquisition of a skill in such a market would be a 
long term property with value: “wage sacrifices necessary to attain access to the 
internal labour market thus represent a trade-off between present and future 
income” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:28).
The employers’ gain from the internal labour market was also its stability. Because 
the workers valued the employment, there was low workforce turnover, especially 
amongst the senior workers (i.e. those most expensive to replace). Doeringer & 
Piore highlighted that in:
traditional economic theory turnover has no cost. Labor is treated as 
a variable factor of production, and employers are assumed to hire 
their workforce by the hour or by the day at an hourly or daily rate.
(1971:29)
Turnover when labour became a significant and fixed element of production did 
carry a cost because, firstly, the recruitment, screening and, if necessary, the 
training of replacements would be expensive because the specific skills required 
were not readily available on the external market and, secondly, the customs of the 
workforce imposed constraints on the employer’s ability to terminate workers.
However, those same elements made recruitment, screening and training of internal 
candidates relatively efficient because the stability of the existing employees meant 
there was already awareness among the workers and management of the 
candidates’ characteristics, reliability and skill. External candidates would have to 
be located, tested and have their references checked - and even then there might be 
unpredictable variables which might render the new hire to be poor value 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:30-31) such as learning curve effects.
It will be seen that these factors in many ways made the internal labour market self- 
perpetuating. The stability of the workforce was a benefit to the employer because 
it reduced his selection and training costs but it also reinforced the stability by
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ensuring that the few newcomers that were necessary were also inducted into the 
same customs and practices that created too formidable a cost for the employer to 
challenge them. Those customs, or rules, were both a threat and a benefit; they 
were necessary if, on-the-job training was to operate successfully; they prevented 
rapid change in the terms and conditions of employment and they insulated the 
workforce from external economic conditions (Doeringer & Piore 1971:33).
The desire to perpetuate that isolation had different effects in the craft and 
enterprise markets. In the craft market, more loosely organised than the enterprise 
market, possibly spread over many organisations and probably dependent on union 
control, the means to ensure stability was a “highly rigid set of entry rules”. 
However, once the newcomer had met those criteria, the rules which governed the 
internal allocation of labour were relatively flexible. However, the enterprise 
market, as was shown, depended on strict allocation rules so thus once, on the 
progression, the worker was “guaranteed precedence in employment and promotion 
over those with less seniority” thus workers could be “indifferent to those entering 
the market after them” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:34) and entry rules were relatively 
flexible.
Doeringer & Piore had, to this stage, deliberately omitted mentioning the effect of 
the organisational behaviour of trade unions and management on these processes. 
Trade unions, when present, invariably gave structure to the processes of custom 
and, because local officials identified with the workforce, their effect was to 
strengthen and consolidate what, in the absence of a union, was possibly only 
“unorganised and some unconscious expressions of discontent”. Thus the union 
became “the vehicle for the expression and enforcement of customary law” and this 
was especially marked when the customs were incorporated into the collective 
agreement. Such incorporation potentially removed the flexibility that could be 
effected by the gradual changes to procedures and practice through the frailty of 
memory -  changes could now only be made through collective bargaining 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:35-36).
Similarly, in large hierarchies of management, senior managers would attempt to 
control the actions of shop floor managers through formalised rules and regulations 
so limiting the flexibility that unwritten rules provide. However, flexibility was
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usually restored because those formal rules usually left some management 
discretion and would probably have to include some procedural rules allowing for 
their amendment. Doeringer & Piore also noted that it was junior management, 
“susceptible to social pressure from the work group”, who would give greater 
weight to custom than was consistent with economic efficiency (1971:36-37) -  a 
feature consistent with the “custom and practice” of Brown’s piecework bargaining 
(1973).
Summary
This chapter has examined how workers have obtained and exercised power in the 
workplace, the power necessary to balance that of the employer in the employment 
relationship because “ultimately, an employer will always have the best cards in 
their hands because they control the purse strings” (Gerry Morrison. General 
Secretary BECTU, SSR March 2007)
It was shown that possession of an innate talent or acquired skill may be useful, but 
provided no continuing assurance of power because the practitioner had no control 
over demand or supply. Control over the latter could be achieved by closure and 
the craft workers’ power came through the possession of ‘mystery’: the skills and 
talents necessary for the completion of specialised and demanding work which only 
the craftsman could complete. The restriction of access to that mystery meant that 
no alternative workforce could be trained and thus the potential employer was 
obliged to deal with the craftsmen on their terms. Even when those craftsmen were 
not bound into formal organisations, they would invariably still observe the 
conventions of their trade -  although those conventions and rate cards were almost 
always formalised into collective bargaining.
The professions similarly used closure to restrict supply and so create a monopoly 
over specific activities, but their respectability also enabled them to cite the public 
interest and so create demand by extending their areas of activity while restricting 
less qualified competition. Such activities were often regarded as restrictive 
practices when pursued by trade unions.
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For less skilled work, closure was not an option.10 Without the formality of 
organisation or the abilities to perform a specialist task, any available worker could 
replace an unskilled worker and thus their bargaining power was minimal. 
Therefore, the strategy of the unskilled was inclusivity -  every potentially available 
worker was incorporated into the union, or an associated union, and thus rendered 
unavailable to the employer at the time of any official labour dispute.
The ultimate stage of inclusivity was the closed shop where the worker could not 
be employed unless a member of the union. Although there were many 
classifications within the closed shop, the universal aim was closure:
At one end of the spectrum, the craft union depends largely on 
unilateral control of the labour supply by strict rules of entry and 
demarcation of work, reliance on industrial strength to preserve that 
control, and striving to maintain differentials over the less skilled; and 
at the other the general union relies on inclusive membership, the 
establishment of across-the-board increases, the narrowing of 
differentials, and often the use of political means to underpin 
minimum wages and conditions. (Undy et al. 1981:76).
Thus the workers could speak with a single voice in their negotiations with 
employers and, through the substantive and procedural rules of collective 
bargaining, utilise the collective power which was backed by the ability, ultimately, 
to ensure the total withdrawal of labour.
But even at the height of collective bargaining which, in its “formal system” 
(Donovan 1968:12) was negotiated at a national level between trade unions and 
employers’ associations, there existed at the shop floor custom and practice, 
negotiated by often informal groups and demonstrating that, even without the 
formal structures of trade unions, workers can still retain the power to influence 
their working terms and conditions. These informal institutions acquire the social 
capital which is “embedded in the network of contacts among individuals that can 
be mobilised to achieve certain ends” (Jarley 2005:3). Social capital is not always 
benign, nor is it universally useful -  it works negatively against those who do not
10 Except in those non-skilled occupations able to establish pre-entry closed shops in areas such as 
print and docks, often because of their proximity to craft qualification closed shops.
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possess it. nevertheless, it gives power to the unwritten rules and conventions that 
operate in the workplace.
Finally, the preceding sections having demonstrated the historical origins of the 
institutions potentially empowering workforces and their practical manifestation, 
the fifth section explained how many of these features been distilled into the 
internal labour market theory where the “pricing and allocation of labour is 
governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures”, thus distinguishing them 
from those labour markets where price, allocation and training were controlled 
solely by economic variables (Doeringer & Piore 1971:2). That theory set out 
some of the criteria associated with an internal labour market, the first test being 
that there must be distinct, visible boundaries so demonstrating rigidity in the rules 
to a specific internal labour market (Doeringer & Piore 1971:5-6). The other 
criteria responsible for the existence of internal labour markets were deemed to be 
skill specificity, on-the-job training and customary law. It is these criteria which 
will be used to test the continuity of employment practices from the closed shop era 
to the contemporary film production industry.
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C h ap ter 4 T h e  E v o l u tio n  o f  F o r m a l  C l o su r e  to  t h e  F ilm
T r a d es
An earlier chapter traced the origins of the craft unions and their evolution into the 
pre-entry closed shop, constantly striving to maintain the principle of exclusivity 
through the control of apprenticeship. However, the purity of the craft unions was 
then lost. The pursuit of numerical strength meant that many craft unions became 
diluted either through expansion or by losing their exclusivity, being subsumed into 
the larger unions or merging with others to form new combinations (Undy et al. 
1981:167-219).
Those early processes of association and craft purity were described in national 
terms, illustrated with examples from many different sectors. The next two 
chapters will focus very specifically on the film production sector to better 
illustrate how small numbers of craftsmen could associate to create a craft 
qualification, pre-entry closed shop, which in turn represented an internal labour 
market protected by rigid boundaries, but they will also show that the process was 
neither simple nor automatic.
This chapter will explore the emergence of the craft skills and identities in the 
British film industry and the very specific circumstances which established the 
closed shop in that industry.
The film industry may not appear the most obvious sector when commencing a 
study of the pre-entry closed shop. It was never a very numerically significant 
example of the practice when compared to the traditional industrial sectors such as 
cotton, shipbuilding or coal, nor was it made particularly visible in its militancy in 
a way that, for example, was associated with the print unions (although there were 
significant disputes such as the ten-week lock-out of the union’s ITV division in
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the autumn of 1979). In McCarthy’s consideration of the closed shop, the 7,000 
film production workers (and he included television workers in the same category) 
represented less than 5% of his list of “Comprehensively Closed Trades” - defined 
as being where “the great majority would find it impossible to remain outside a 
union” (1964:31). Therefore, the objective of this chapter is twofold: first to 
demonstrate that the film trades met accepted criteria as a craft qualification, pre­
entry closed shop by the 1970s and secondly to show how the production industry 
evolved to meet the criteria of an internal labour market, and specifically the craft 
market:
These tend to centre around the local union, and the geographical and 
occupational jurisdiction of the local union generally defines the 
boundaries of the market. (Doeringer & Piore 1971:3-4)
Doeringer & Piore stated that the factors that generated an internal labour market 
were threefold: skill specificity; on-the-job training; and customary law (1971:13) 
and the chapter will show how these factors eventually come together.
Therefore, the first section will show that, although the organisation of labour only 
happened in the second quarter of the twentieth century, the processes that led to 
the formation of a film union were remarkably similar to those processes identified 
by the Webbs and others as typical of all early craft unions. As a young industry, 
entry was still relatively open but the second section will show that by the 1930s, 
the film technicians’ union was a craft-based association with the same priorities of 
restricting access and protecting craft that were operated by other craft unions. The 
third section will show how closed shop exclusivity was accomplished by an 
extraordinary combination of events, thereby accelerating what might otherwise 
have taken several more decades to achieve. Section 4.4 will explain the post-war 
patterns of film production and the union’s attempts to adapt to them.
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4.1 The early development of the film technicians’ union
"... the association hopes to be able to play an important part in 
enhancing and improving the prestige and quality o f  British productions 
through keeping its members in touch with the latest technical progress"
(TC 29 Jun 36)
The history of the film industry in the United Kingdom is inevitably short when 
compared to more traditional craft sectors such as printing, textiles, iron & steel or 
woodworking. While it could be argued that the lack of heritage is irrelevant 
because it is only necessary to prove that a pre-entry closed shop existed prior to 
the 1970s, thereby creating an internal labour market, in practice the short history 
of the film unions makes them rather more viable examples of the craft principles 
of exclusivity, because they defy the trends which evolved in other sectors in the 
post WW2 period. As was shown in Chapter 2, many historic crafts evolved into 
craft unions and then suffered inevitable dilution throughout the twentieth century 
as they attempted to absorb potentially competitive labour from other expanding 
industries or merge to achieve numerical influence. The film unions, and in 
particular the then Association of Cinematographic Technicians (ACT), defied that 
process by starting in a relatively new industry as a loose federation of technicians 
with a common interest, and then refining itself to become more ‘craft qualified’. 
It then increased its hold on an expanding industry because, as the demand for 
skilled workers increased (helped by the introduction of commercial television in 
the 1950s), such was the coherence of association and the effectiveness of its 
barriers that there was no alternative labour force. However, this was not a situation 
that was easily achieved and the early history of the union is worth examination to 
show how it can take time, persistence and some elements of chance to establish an 
internal labour market.
British film production only commenced as a commercial business in about 1898 
with the establishment of an offshoot of the French company, Gaumont-British 
(Klingender & Legg 1937:23; Low & Manvell 1948:21)’, but the British appetite 
for cinema was soon apparent and the first purpose-built theatres for film were built
1 The principle of protecting the skills of film-making were established very early. A pioneer, James 
Williamson, wrote of the 1890s “Anyone who had succeeded in making films guarded the process 
and the apparatus with the greatest secrecy” (cited by Low & Manvell 1948:114).
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in 1907/8. By 1915, there were 3,500 such cinemas. However, this was more a 
success for British distribution and exhibition than for British production because 
in 1910 only 15% of films being screened in Britain were of British origin. The 
vast majority originated in America which concentrated its output towards on 
London because it realised London’s significance as a centre for international 
distribution. Meanwhile, British films had little success in the American market 
and Hollywood continued to extend its influence during the First World War and 
was thus able to establish an “unchallenged supremacy” (Street 1997:5).
By 1924, the embryonic British industry was almost moribund with no feature 
films in production because British cinemas still preferred to screen the more 
popular, and profitable, American productions. By 1923, only 10% of films 
screened were British and in 1926, those screenings had halved to 5% (Wood 
1952:49). The industry was eventually rescued by government intervention 
through the Cinematograph Films Act 1927 which stipulated that cinemas must 
show a quota of British films - initially 5% for the six months following the Act, 
rising to 20%, in successive stages over the next eight years. The effect of 
guaranteed funding on production was immediate because, while in 1926 only 
twenty-six British films had been made, 128 were completed in the following year 
and 200 in 1933 (Oakley 1964:110). The British studio system was established; 
although it should be noted that the quotas, while “virtually creating the British 
production industry”, did not “put an end to the predominance of the major 
American producers in the English market” (Klingender & Legg 1937:13).
The desire among film production workers to form some sort of association 
emerged in 1933 and the resultant informal discussions eventually led to the 
formation of the Association of Cine-Technicians (ACT). (There already existed a 
□ational Association of Theatrical Employees (DATE), founded in 1890, but this 
only serviced workers in theatres and cinemas - the latter denoted by the additional 
‘K’ added in 1936 to form DATKE). It is apparent that there must have been an 
earlier attempt at association in the industry because the ACT official union history 
noted that Alf Tumwell was one of the few newsreel cameramen to join the ACT - 
“many of his highly individualistic colleagues refused, having been ‘bitten’ once 
before in an abortive attempt to organise in which they had lost their subscription
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money” (ACTT 1983:170). This may have been a reference to the 
Kinecameraman’s Society of 1918 which had deposited its funds in a bank which 
almost immediately went into liquidation (Chanan 1976:23). The motivations for 
association appear to have been diverse and not all entirely compatible. One early 
faction’s objective had been to take creative control of the film production process. 
One film director, Maurice Elvey, was frustrated by the lack of creative control 
“because the people who owned the films and financed them... used to take them 
and hack them about.” He described how his colleagues first formed an 
association to claim the right to edit the first cut of any film and that “out of this 
ACT derived and I supported it for all I was worth.”
This laudable statement of creative intent may have reflected his rather assured 
status within the film hierarchy. Those more technical, but lower in status and 
possessing less autonomy, felt the need for association for more practical, 
protective reasons as indicated by this quote from a cameraman of the period, Ted 
Lloyd: “working very hard, without proper breaks, night and day, very irregular, if 
any meal breaks, often to the point of illness” (ACTT 1983:170). This debate 
about the nature of the association continued for some time and, in a description 
not dissimilar to 18lh century journeymen bookbinders who would meet “to take a 
social pint of porter together” (Webb & Webb 1920:23), the official ACT history 
described how “concerned individuals were gathering in the pubs and restaurants 
(or rather cafes) of Soho.” There remained some pressure for the association to be 
a professional body or a guild, but eventually the organisation was registered as a 
trade union because that “satisfied the majority of the founding activists” (ACTT 
1983:10). The Association of Cine-Technicians (ACT) was registered (number 
1995) under the Trade Union Acts of 1871 -1927 on 21st June 1933. It affiliated to 
the TUC in 1936.
This encompassing within one union of many different skills and levels of seniority 
remained a peculiarity, perhaps uniquely, of the film industry until the end of the 
closed shop era in that the ‘managers and supervisors’ (directors and producers),
2 In the early days of film, editing was seen as a mechanical process and only emerged as a creative 
skill during WW1. However, distributors and exhibitors still felt entitled to cut or adjust films to 
improve the rental income. (Low 1950:238)
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who were often also ‘the employers’, were members of the same union as the rank 
and file workers whom they employed. Only ‘the money men’ (i.e. capital) could 
be correctly described as outsiders3 and in 1956 a legal ruling confirmed that any 
producer who was not in an entrepreneurial capacity had to be a union member 
(ACTT 1983:33). The Monopolies & Mergers Commission Report in 1989 noted 
that “Many of the directors of these [production] companies are understood still to 
be members of one or other of the main industry trade unions” (MMC 1989:6) and 
in this the ACT was very similar to the Webbs’ description of the early days of 
craft unions: “divided vertically trade by trade, instead of horizontally between 
employers and wage-eamers” (Webb & Webb 1920:46)). This all-embracing 
structure was not followed elsewhere in the film industry. For example, in 
Hollywood the film crafts were all organised independently of each other as guilds 
(the Sound Guild, Camera Guild, Directors’ Guild etc) that each protected their 
own areas of interest. However, the antecedents of the internal labour market are 
significant because, even at this early stage, management was being drawn into the 
work group and so:
abides by custom for the same reason that other members do: because 
it cannot conceive of alternatives, because alternatives that are 
conceivable are discomforting and wrong, or because it fears the 
sullen hostility of the workforce and the implied social ostracism. 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:24)
The newly formed ACT, like the early craft unions, was based around a “house of 
call” (Webb & Webb 1920:23): the first secretary was a Captain Cope who ran a 
“health and strength cafe in Shepherds Bush market” from where “unlike other 
ACT founder members, he was in a position to venture forth from studio to studio 
collecting subs from new members.” Dew members could also join at the cafe 
“you entered this cafe, jerked your head towards the [union] placard while at the 
same time putting half-a-crown on the table, whereupon the proprietor would ... 
lead you round to the back of the cafe where your name would be entered in a 
book” (ACTT 1983:11) Captain Cope must have been plausible and persuasive 
because by the end of 1933 it was estimated that he had 1,200 members recorded in
3 David Puttnam remained a member of the ACTT even as executive producer on Chariots o f  Fire 
(FTT May 1982)
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his books. However, his book-keeping skills did not match his recruiting skills and 
this became apparent at a meeting where the annual report was read:
...Captain Cope, who was quite an agreeable person, I don’t think he 
was in the strict sense dishonest, somehow had got his personal 
accounts and the association’s account a little bit mixed up...
Matthew Cope said ‘in that case all I can do is offer my resignation’ 
and immediately someone .. said ‘move accepted’ and someone else 
said ‘seconded’ and whoever was in the chair ‘we better to put it to 
the vote -  those in favour ? Motion accepted’. (Sidney Cole)
The resignation of Cope clarified the function of the association because: “it hadn’t 
worked terribly well up to that point because it was trying to be respectable and just 
a sort of chartered association, not strictly a union”. The immediate appointment of 
George Elvin (whose father was HH Elvin, then Chairman of the TUC) as the new 
General Secretary ensured that any ambiguity was eliminated.
After that initial flurry, early membership of the ACT remained small and it grew 
slowly. In December 1933, only 98 members were recorded and by December 
1934, membership had fallen to 88. However, by December 1935 it was reported 
that “Over one hundred new members have been admitted during the month and 
the association now has members at every British studio. In several cases it is 
stated that membership is about 100% strong” (TC 16 Dec 35). It is now 
impossible to get any indication of the distribution of members in this era, but if the 
total membership was then about two hundred and that small number still 
represented “about 100% strong” in some studios then the figures would indicate 
just how small some British studios must have been. By April 1936, the third 
Annual Report was able to state that membership of the Association had now 
increased to 845, noting “an increase of 240 in the last three and a half months”, 
thus having been 605 at the previous year end. The union membership was 
patently active enough for the continuing signs of social exchange: “The first ACT 
Ball & Cabaret has been arranged for Shrove Tuesday at Chiltem Court, Baker 
Street. Tickets are now available at 5s each” (TC 16 Apr 36). This assurance and 
interest in social exchange, amongst what must have been a very small and select 
group, would appear to have been in the “trade club” tradition: “they found their 
trade clubs of use mainly for the provision of friendly benefits...” (Webb 1920:45)
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The reports that still exist of the union’s early activities certainly indicate more an 
interest in craft and educational matters than employment-related issues. On 14 
December 1935 it was announced in Today's Cinema that “Mr W. Vinten will 
deliver a lecture to the Association of Cine-technicians on Monday on the 
Manufacture of the Cine-Camera and Apparatus.” In this there are early 
indications of two causal factors of the internal labour market: skill specificity and 
on-the-job training. The skills emerging as essential for film production had few 
applications outside the production industry but, because there were competing 
firms, it is probably too much to claim that that they were “firm specific” as 
required by Becker’s 1964 definition. However, these were skills in which 
workers were prepared to invest their time and collective effort in acquiring.
By contrast, there is very little reference during this period in the trade journals, or 
the ACTT official history, to collective bargaining on behalf of members. This 
may be explained by the resistance of studios and the ever transitory production 
companies to negotiate with the union4; this was still a new industry “in which the 
difference between showmanship and racketeering is often slight...” (Klingender & 
Legg 1937:7). Writing in 1980, Ralph Bond recalled how
working conditions in the thirties were deplorable. Unlimited hours, 
no overtime payments, no sick benefits, no holiday pay. Twelve hour 
shifts were the rule... One of the first successes of the union was an 
agreement with Alex Korda that overtime should be paid after sixty 
hours work.5 (FTT February 1980:10).
Another notable exception was the Gaumont-British Studios which, after an half­
hearted gesture to set up an alternative staff association in 1936, entered into a 
voluntary agreement that represented a “substantial improvement” on pay and 
conditions. It was not until 1939, and then only through a strike threat by the ever- 
powerful laboratory workers (whose controlling influence will be examined later), 
that it was possible to sign “the first collective all industry agreement” with the 
Film Employers’ Federation. But the success was short lived when the federation
4 At British International Pictures in 1937, the company forbade the union representative entry to the 
studio and issued a warning o f instant dismissal for any continuing members of the union. (Letter 
from Jack Mills, FTT April 1979)
5 Ralph Bond was later to be a signatory to the milestone 1943 agreement between the ACT and the 
BFPA
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disintegrated to be replaced by four separate employer organisations, each 
representing their respective sections of the industry: the Short Film Producers; the 
Association of Film Laboratory Employers; the Dewsreel Association and the Film 
Producers Association (the latter representing feature film producers) (ACTT 
1983:14).
The ACT’s more long term success was probably established through their 
parliamentary lobbying on behalf of the British film industry and in particular, their 
efforts relating to the “ill applied” 1927 Cinematograph Films Act. As mentioned 
above, the Act had briefly stimulated British film production, but over time the 
quotas became debased and many home-based productions were “quota quickies” - 
scratch productions, made very quickly, at minimum cost by unrehearsed actors 
and crew, to meet the requirement that 20% of all cinema screenings should be 
“British”. It was even claimed that these British quota productions were often 
never shown to paying audiences but projected “when cinema cleaners were 
preparing the premises for the real audiences for real films -  ambitious and 
prestigious ‘supers’ from the USA” (ACTT 1983:17)6. However, theses quickies 
did meet some of the original objectives by providing work for British technicians 
and allowing directors the opportunity to gain experience (Street 1997:9;Sweet 
2005:111-112). Thus in 1938, when the new Quota Bill went to Committee, the 
ACT succeeding in mobilising sufficient members and parliamentary support to 
ensure that the quota provisions, which had previously only applied to features, 
were extended to short films and that a “minimum cost clause was introduced to
n
kill the shabby tokenism of the old quota quickies.” More significantly for the 
film industry workers, and the first indication that work within the industry was 
potentially valued and attractive employment, was the insertion of a fair wages 
clause into the 1938 Cinematographic Act:
6 Sweet (2005:106) suggests that while there were known instances of this (the 1938 
Kinematograph Year Book reported a test case against two West End cinemas for scheduling British 
Quota pictures before noon that was brought before Magistrates who then closed the loophole) the 
practice was not widespread.
7 Although produced in Britain, these “worthless type of minimum cost films” were often financed 
by American interests to ensure that the quotas were met thus allowing the American films easier 
access (Spencer & Waley 1939:176)
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It meant that to qualify as a British film under the new Act, 
productions had to honour trade union (i.e. ACT) standards on 
conditions and pay. The fair wages clause persuaded many hitherto 
reluctant employers to recognise ACT and to negotiate agreements.
(ACTT 1983:17)
Thus by 1938 the ACT had become established and recognised, and represented 
1,289 members - and as an organisation was probably more stable than many of the
o
film production companies with whom it was negotiating. The industry was still 
financially precarious and dependent on sometimes speculative capital that often 
left studios idle - “It is not unusual for producers and directors to be kicking their 
heels because the financiers are too busy manipulating their shares” (Klingender & 
Legg 1937:7). The role of capital in film production will be examined later, but it 
is worth noting that the directors and producers, who are the ‘project managers’ and 
employers in film production, were just as vulnerable as the production crew when 
the supply of capital was withdrawn.
The interest of speculative capital in film production was the potential for profit 
and one cause of speculative interest in the period 1935-37 was the success of an 
Alexander Korda film, The Private Life o f Henry VIII, which made a profit of over 
£500,000 on its first release (on a production cost estimated to be between £50- 
80,000) (Low 1985:167-168). But Korda’s success was in part because of his 
affiliation to United Artists, and other British companies did not have the same 
access to American markets: “by 1937 the boom was over and the industry was in 
dire financial straits” (Street 1997:10). An ACT pamphlet of the period deplored 
the fickle nature of the financial institutions and the mismanagement of the 
producers - “in the boom period [1936], £4,000,000 was invested in one period of 
ten months. Most of it disappeared, and the great City geniuses are still wondering 
where it all went.” The film crews suffered too: “at the time of writing [1938] 
more than half the skilled film technicians are out of work” because the financiers 
had lost confidence (Spencer & Waley 1939:176) and Kinematograph Weekly (4 
Feb 1938) reported that “voluntary organisations in Borehamwood opened a soup 
kitchen to feed the children of those who had lost their positions at Elstree Studios”
8 Studio employers had no organisation to represent them collectively: "The union had to approach 
individual studios” (FTT Feb 1980)
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(cited by Sweet 2005:111). As already noted, 643 film companies had been 
registered between 1925 and 1936, but by 1937 only twenty remained in 
production (Wood 1952:91) and few companies had ever paid a dividend (Oakley 
1964:134). In such a highly unstable and speculative industry where productions 
were often abandoned and companies dissolved into bankruptcy, crew members 
needed all the protection that could be mustered.
By contrast, studios in Hollywood, assured of a world market, could afford every 
excess, and pay “actors and actresses salaries which make those of Cabinet 
ministers sound like tips.” Some English producers imported American technicians 
(and stars) in the hope that the methods which had worked so well in Hollywood 
could be replicated (Spencer & Waley 1939:176). Creating barriers to resist these 
foreign entrants who would displace the existing British technicians from valued 
employment would prove an early test of the ACT as a craft union.
4.2 The evolution of film trades into a craft union
“The creative worker lives in such uncertainty from day to day and 
from picture to picture that, in final cynicism, he as often as not joins 
the throng and, with his financial masters, maintains the principle o f  
getting his [share] while the getting’s good” (Klingender □ Legg
19301)
The importation of so-called “ace” technicians from the United States to replace 
their British counterparts demonstrates that no internal labour market was yet 
operating in the UK film industry in the mid 1930s -  although it should be noted 
that the economic reason was not to lower wage costs but to improve the quality of 
production (Spencer & Waley 1939:176). However, if  the real tests of craft 
unionism are the control of admission though apprenticeship and the exclusion of 
‘foreigners’ then the ACT of the 1930s can be shown to be energetic in both areas.
‘Foreigners’ for the Coventry Wheelwrights of the seventeenth century had been 
those “unskilled persons pretending themselves to be workmen without having 
been Apprentices” (Chase 2000:14), but the more immediate challenge for the early 
ACT was to control the influx of ‘real’ foreigners (invariably Americans, but later 
German and Austrian refugees fleeing the Hitler regime (Oakley 1964:136)) taking
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valued work in British studios. In March 1935, it was reported that "the Ministry 
of Labour has promised to receive a deputation from the ACT on the question of 
the employment of foreign technicians” and the meeting was reported under the 
headline:
Technicians' Deputation to Ministry of Labour Move Against Foreign 
Technicians: ACT alarmed at "Influx" (TC 20 Mar 1936).
The report explained that approximately one hundred foreign technicians 
“exclusive of a large number of resident aliens” (presumably these were somehow 
acceptable, perhaps because they were ACT members ?) were engaged in the 
production of British films. The ACT felt that:
in our opinion ... not more than 20% of this number can be graded as 
ace technicians. At no time, stated the deputation, has the demand for 
technicians exceeded the supply. Greatest unemployment prevails 
among camera operators and probably not more than 40% received 
regular employment throughout the year.
The ACT delegation noted that there was virtually a "closed shop" [their quotation 
marks] in America, and stated that it would welcome some form of exchange 
between technicians of different countries, but that a large number of foreign 
technicians in key positions retarded the promotion of promising “Britishers”. The 
Today’s Cinema report concluded, in bold type:
The ACT stated that they were not opposed to foreign technicians 
working in British films provided they were ace men9; that their 
crews were British; that their employment did not deprive equally 
expert British technicians of employment; that they were not engaged 
to work under less favourable conditions and salaries than those of 
British technicians and that the Association was given an opportunity 
to be consulted when renewals of such permits were applied for. If 
the influx of foreign technicians continued at its present rate...there 
would not be a single British technician in a key position within a 
period of about six years.
The deputation obviously had some effect because one of the resolutions at the 
ACT Annual Conference in May 1936 noted that "Conference is pleased to learn 
that there has been a stricter supervision with reference to the granting of Labour 
permits since the Ministry of Labour received a deputation from the Association on
9 L o definition of what constituted an “ace man” appears to have survived.
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March 19, 1936.” However, another resolution (useful because it gives us some 
indication of the scale of the problem) still regretted:
that out of 122 applications for labour permits on behalf of foreign 
technicians during 1935, the Ministry of Labour only refused, or 
unfavourably recommended, the granting of 12 such permits, as 1. in 
the opinion of this Conference a large proportion of the technicians to 
whom permits were granted were not ace technicians, and 2. at no 
period during the year was there a shortage of competent British 
technicians. (TC 6 May 36)
The ACT’s effort to regulate a formal apprenticeship system for entrants was less 
successful. In 1936, it was reported that the General Council had appointed an 
Apprenticeship Committee and that an Interim Report had listed nine points 
essential to any scheme that “might commend itself to the ACT”. The nine points 
were summarised as follows (TC 16 April 36):
1. Full cooperation of the major studios was essential.
2. Relationship to be established with schools and kindred 
bodies conducting courses in cinematography. Where necessary, 
alterations and amendments should be suggested to enable courses to 
be approved by both ACT and studios.
3. Scholarship schemes in conjunction with their courses should 
be instituted by ACT studios, schools and other educational bodies in 
order to minimise economic disadvantage.
4. Do premiums should be payable.
5. Any apprentice who has been an apprentice prior to the 
scheme and applies to the ACT employment bureau shall be 
interviewed ... with a view to deciding whether or not he can be 
recommended for suitable employment.
6. Any apprentice who has passed through a recognised course 
should serve a shorter qualifying period in the studio than one who 
has not.
7. ACT should draw up minimum rates of pay for all grades of 
technicians and no apprentice should be permitted to do a job in a 
studio for which he receives less than the recognised salary for that 
particular job.
8. Every apprentice should hold an ACT apprentice ticket 
which shall entitle him to attend lectures and film shows and purchase
the Association’s journal at member’s rates.
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9. The number of apprentices admitted to any one studio during 
any year should be limited by agreement between the studio and 
bodies concerned.
These proposals would have established a proper apprenticeship system and Point 9 
would have allowed the ACT to carefully regulate all admissions to the industry. 
However, the emphasis on formal training would have reduced the emphasis on on- 
the-job training (Points 2 & 6).
The interim report obviously met with general approval across the industry because 
the following day Today's Cinema (essentially a film distribution and exhibition, 
rather than a production, publication) praised the ACT for showing tact and 
foresight:
We particularly like your new apprenticeship scheme Every
industry can do with new blood, with the best youth can offer. The
difficulty is to shape it ... that industry gets the best and is not
saddled with the irresponsible and ill equipped. Probably in no 
industry is there a greater need for youth, for the best which lies 
undiscovered and undeveloped, than in the film industry. Something 
valuable towards giving us that store has been contributed by the 
Polytechnic10, whose film students have proven almost without 
exception valuable additions to our production personnel. (TC 17 
April 36).
However, industry endorsement was insufficient to ensure success because a few 
days later, under the headline "ACT Apprentice Plans Postponed" it was reported 
that:
Plans formulated by the Association of Cine-Technicians for the 
inauguration of an apprenticeship system in the industry whereby 
definite training and examinations in cinematography should be 
instituted, have been shelved owing to the inability of the Education 
Committee of the LCC [London County Council] to give cooperation 
until the expiry of their present triennial educational programme in 
two year's time. In the meantime, however, plans are being 
formulated for a series of evening courses to carry examinations and
10 Sadly, there is no other reference to identify ‘The Polytechnic’ or what courses it was offering. It 
was almost certainly the Regent Street Polytechnic (now Westminster University) which had been 
offering evening courses in cinematography since 1912 and day classes from 1914 (Low 
1948:73fn). However, there were approximately a dozen Polytechnics in London at that period. 
The Regent Street Polytechnic had particular significance for the early film industry having been the 
venue for the first showing (1898) of moving pictures to a paying British audience by the Lumiere 
brothers.
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some form of diplomas. Ultimate scheme contemplated is a 
thorough apprenticeship organisation, carrying with it degrees that 
will be recognised throughout the industry.... (London Reporter 22 
April 36)
However, it was quite clear that the ACT’s aim was that entry to studio work 
should be dependent on proper training and, while the ninth point in the above list 
from the interim committee was not yet as binding as, for example, the apprentice 
ratio agreements of an established craft union such as the Typographical 
Association (Musson 1954:384), doubtless had the apprenticeship scheme been 
implemented, an attempt at enforcement would have soon followed.
In any event, did the absence of formal apprenticeships automatically negate the 
ACT’s claim to craft union status? While Dunn & Gennard had defined craft 
unions as those which “restrict membership to those who have completed an 
apprenticeship or similar training and limit the number trained in this way through, 
for example an apprenticeship ratio” (1984:15), and Turner had initially used the 
definition “distinguished by the apprenticeship system, the restricted entry of boys 
solely as learners into an occupation to which the union confines itself’ (Turner 
1962:233), film production in this period was still a young industry. Many film 
production workers at this period must have joined studios as adults, perhaps 
having trained as apprentices in other skills, and must have acquired their specific 
film skills through on-the-job training. Therefore, it would seem draconian to 
negate the claim on that single count given that the film unions always confined 
themselves to their own occupations so there was no question of dispersion. In 
any event, Turner had conceded that the term ‘craft union’ could be “used in a 
looser way, to describe an association of workers marked off by some superior 
skill” (Turner 1962:234). As will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, employment in 
film production is dependent on many “superior skills”.
Moreover, the small size of the British film industry meant it did not fall into the 
category that Dunn & Gennard described where the “sheer size of the workforce” 
allowed a “leakage of dilutees into skilled grades” and thus “vulgarised” the status 
of the ACT from being a “pure craft qualification shop” into a more lowly “union 
qualification shop” (Dunn & Gennard 1984:35). As will be shown in the 
following chapters, this was certainly not true in the specific categories and grades
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of the film industry examined in the 1970s; if anything their skills became more 
pure as the technical demands became ever greater (a fuller explanation appears at 
page 202). There is the additional factor that, until the whole closed shop system 
began to erode in the 1980s, the film unions never needed to absorb the peripheral 
workers in the way that (as was shown in Chapter 3) many other craft unions had. 
It will be shown in the next chapter, and again in Chapter 7, that a significant 
feature of the film industry was, and continues to be, that skills necessary to reach 
senior appointments can only be acquired through time served and experience 
gained in lower grades. This ensured that key craft workers with specific skills 
could never be replaced by interlopers or “alternative classes of workers brought in 
to execute some portion of the operation” (Webb & Webb 1898:479) unless they 
had received a similar training overseas - and it will be shown that the boundaries 
and customary law were well able to resist these, and thus maintain an internal 
labour market.
4.3 The progression of the ACT from craft union to closed shop
“[In 19U)J Technicians now queued up to join the ACT” (ACTT
1983:21)
By 1939, the ACT had become the established craft union of the British film 
industry technicians and was close to achieving that fundamental objective of all 
unions that “their regulations should be binding on all workers whether they are in 
the union or not” (McCarthy 1964:8). It is probable, although difficult to confirm 
conclusively, that a post-entry closed shop was effective in those last pre-war years.
However, the outbreak of war was to bring rapid changes and the most immediate 
of these was the cessation of studio production following the suspension of the 
Cinematograph Act on the outbreak of war; the government assuming that there 
“would be little time or place for anyone to make British films”11. (Cinemas were 
also closed briefly, in the expectation of aerial bombardment but “when no raids 
came... they were gingerly re-opened.” (Wood 1952:103)). This had an immediate
11 Some British film makers promptly moved to Hollywood. Wardour Street’s popular description 
of this exodus was “Gone With the Wind Up.” (Wood 1952:104)
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effect on employment and by December 1939 ACT membership had fallen from 
over 1,200 to 915, accelerated by early, voluntary enlistment. This rush to enlist, 
and the subsequent moves to conscript film crews, triggered a lengthy debate about 
the most useful contribution that trained film crew could make to the war effort, 
summarised by this extract from a letter to Today*s Cinema’.
These things [conscription] must be set against the contribution to the 
fighting services and the munitions factories of approximately 1,400 
men, for the most part untrained for such work but expert in their own 
branch of modem warfare. (TC 1 Apr 41)
After the initial flurry of measures at the outbreak of war, the government had 
begun to take the view that mass communication would be a constructive 
contribution to the pursuit of the war and in Dovember 1940 they invited 
"Producers & labour to form panel to advise Ministry on reservation” (‘Reserved 
Occupations’ was the term used to denote those to be exempted from military 
service). The Daily Film Renter went on to report that a “committee of the trade 
has now been formed to advise the Ministry of Labour on questions arising from 
reservation of studio employees....". The committee was to consist of producers, 
ACT, DATKE, the Musicians’ Union and a representative of the Dewsreel 
Association, and it was reported that, as a result of the discussion between trade 
spokesmen and Mr Ernest Bevin:
... the Ministry announced a suspension of calling up as far as studio 
personnel was concerned and it will now be a function of the 
committee to advise what adjustments should be made to the 
Schedule of Reserved Occupations to safeguard all men permanently.
(11 Dov 1940).
This process, and the subsequent combined representations of the ACT, DATKE, 
ETU (Electrical Trades Union) and the studio proprietors in meetings held with 
Lord Beaverbrook, persuaded the government that the film industry could make a 
useful contribution to the war effort. From then on, the “ACT found itself in the 
surprising .... position of having a boom on its hands due to its new status” (ACTT 
1983:21). Over the next five years the ACT membership would rise nearly seven 
fold and be confirmed as having 100% membership within the sector. The reasons 
were unusual and perhaps unique.
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As early as 1935, the ACT had been operating as an employment bureau, recording 
that:
....licensed through the LCC, [it] has had a good month. Fourteen 
different companies have engaged staff through the bureau. 
Vacancies were filled in the following departments:- art, camera, 
stills, sound, projection, continuity, cutting & newsreel. Thirty-six 
persons in all were put in contact with employers. (TC 16 Dec 35).
nevertheless, this was, it must be assumed, still a voluntary process for most 
employers even though the same edition reported that “The Associated Realist Film 
Producers (ARFP), the organisation of documentary directors, has affiliated to the 
association [and] will engage staff through the ACT employment bureau.” This 
should not be interpreted as signifying too much because the so-called 
‘documentary movement’, which the ARFP represented, was not regarded as very 
commercial and was noted for being distinctively left-wing, anti-government, anti- 
Chamberlain or pacifist12 (Thorpe & Pronay 1980:27).
However, the recognition that the film industry now was to be considered part of 
the official war effort and the decision that the work undertaken by film technicians 
was to be considered as a ‘reserved occupation’ needed some rules and 
adjudication. Initially this appears to have been done by the committee mentioned 
above. The Daily Film Renter of the 18th Dovember 1940, reported that the Films 
□ations Service Sub-committee had considered 70 names who had applied to be 
reserved "under the scheme discussed recently by the trade with Mr Ernest Bevin.” 
But this appears to have been regarded as too laborious and, needing some quicker 
method to assess who were legitimate film technicians, the Ministry of Labour 
appointed the ACT’s employment bureau as the official vetting body to assess 
those worthy of reserved occupation status. As the official history records 
“technicians now queued to join the ACT, the only body with the authority to 
categorise them as a reserved occupation” (ACTT 1983:21).
12 In 1935, an ACT deputation of documentary makers, led by Ralph Bond, had gone with some 
trepidation to seek union recognition from the Director (John Grierson) o f the government-owned, 
documentary making GPO Film Unit. Starting to explain the benefits of trade unionism, the 
Director cut them short “You don’t have to tell me all that; I am a member of the TGWU” (Ralph 
Bond FTT Feb 1980 plO)
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Despite a reduction in the number of British feature films produced in the war years 
(from more than one hundred in 1941 to forty-six in 1942,3(ACTT 1983:21)) the 
war period was to prove very significant for the status of the industry, its workers 
and the ACT. During the war, 1,887 official films, some 3,200 newsreels and 380 
feature films, all of which had to be approved by the Ministry of Information14 
(Thorpe & Pronay 1980:ix), delivered a home-produced film propaganda effort that 
was deemed to have served Britain well: “British institutions, and the admirable 
aspects of her traditions of government and culture, had never before been so well 
known and so much admired” (Thorpe & Pronay 1980:13).
The surge in standards from the lacklustre, pre-war efforts had been partly achieved 
by the utilisation of the already mentioned British documentary makers who had 
been greatly admired in intellectual circles and at pre-war international film 
festivals (Spencer & Waley 1939:170). Their absorption into mainstream feature 
film production meant that the film industry’s many talents were now centralised 
and the fusion of narrative and documentary style resulted in films such as One o f  
Our Aircraft is Missing, The First o f  the Few, In Which we Serve, San Demetrio, 
London and Millions Like Us.
The outcome of this issue [the absorption of the documentary 
movement] fundamentally affected the organisation and character of 
British Film propaganda in the Second World War and has coloured 
the views of everyone who has written since about the history of the 
British cinema. (Thorpe & Pronay 1980:2s).15
However, the placing into influential positions within the mainstream film industry 
of the more socially aware and left-leaning documentary movement personnel 
would also colour the long-term nature of industrial relations in the film industry 
and strengthen the sense of “customary law” among workers and management.16
13 Conversely, weekly cinema audiences rose spectacularly from 19m in 1939, to 30m in 1945 
(Oakley 1964:153)
14 The Mol occupied the UL Senate House, having requisitioned the newly completed building in 
1939.
15 Rotha (1967:36) wrote: “During the war years a new honesty and integrity and freshness broke 
into British feature production...”
16 For an example, the socialist credentials of the “thick streak o f red” amongst the management and 
staff at Ealing Studios is detailed in Sweet 2005:166-168.
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In the short term, “British cinema was at its peak” in the early 1940s (Oakley 
1964:161) and the outcome was that the film industry, and more specifically its 
technicians and those responsible for production, acquired a new status of 
respectability, not least because George Elvin, the ACT’s General Secretary who 
also sat on the appointments board for Service Film Units, negotiated a military 
rank structure for ACT members serving in service film units whereby clapper 
loaders would be privates, cameraman would be treated as captains and directors 
would have field rank status as majors. This was an exceptional position - for a 
trade union to be able maintain its own structures within the armed services 
throughout the war years (ACTT 1983:21).17
During this same period, the industry became a pre-entry closed shop, hastened by 
the reality that any technician who was not a member of the union, and thus 
regulated by the ACT’s employment bureau, did not have Reserved Occupation 
status and was therefore liable to be conscripted. Thus all of McCarthy’s criteria 
for a recognised skill gap were met because:
if members’ jobs need a special skill, requiring a period of training, 
then, if craft unions can secure the requirement of all the men with 
that skill, they have a labour monopoly and immediately, at any rate, 
there is no alternative labour force. (McCarthy 1964:135).
Furthermore, with all males in the film industry registered as ACT members, the 
union was in a strong position to establish the practices that would prevail long 
after the end of hostilities:
with three-quarters of the men in the film industry fighting in the 
Armed Forces, those who stayed behind were in a strong bargaining 
position to demand what they wanted. It is dubious whether, in fact, 
the ACT raised wages any more than could have been done by 
individual bargaining; but it standardised restrictive practices. (Wood 
1952:212)..
□o records or agreements from this period have been located to confirm exactly 
when the closed shop was acknowledged as effective but Muriel Box, who had
17 One of the pleasures of watching unedited newsreel and service film unit material from WW2 is 
watching the chalked names on clapper boards and identifying names later to be famous, such as 
“Sgt R Boulting” (later the producer/director responsible for Brighton Rock, Heavens Above, I ’m all 
right Jack etc).
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worked at Gaumont-British in the 1930s, and returned to work in continuity at 
Elstree in 1941 confirmed its reality:
Several years had elapsed since I had set foot in a studio ... and on 
walking on to the set on the first day, I was greeted by a member of 
the unit demanding to see my union card ! Alarmed and a little 
shaken, I had to admit to not possessing such a thing. Apparently 
during my absence from the feature film business, the ACT had been 
formed and, as a trade union, was growing rapidly. The shop steward 
explained that I could not work there until I produced my card. His 
adamant attitude put me in an acute dilemma and I was sure I had lost 
my job before I had even started it. Fortunately, some of my old 
colleagues arrived on the set, recognised me, and not only made me a 
member forthwith, but warmly welcomed me back into the fold.
(Box 1974:158-159)18
John Mitchell, who had been an ACT member in the 1930s, did not find the shop 
stewards so accommodating when he returned to production after his war service in 
1946:
on that first Monday back after 6 years, I was approached by Frank 
Sloggett, ACT shop steward, for my paid up card. Dot having one, he 
told me I could not start work and that I must go to Head Office there 
and then, pay my subscription and have a card on my return for his 
examination. (FTT Oct 88).
Therefore, it can be seen that the film industry, and in particular, the ACT, had had 
what was popularly described as a ‘good war’ and made a significant contribution:
Technicians employed in the feature studios were just as much 
working under terms of temporary deferment from military service as 
were the documentary people ... and some of them felt, I believe, that 
their films, although coming under the category of entertainment, 
should none the less be a direct contribution to the war effort. (Rotha 
1967:53).
Furthermore, a craft market, as defined by Doeringer & Piore (1971:3-4), was 
clearly operating. The ACT, through extraordinary circumstances, had established 
a closed shop and developed “its full power as a union” (PEP 1952:89) with rigid 
entry rules in place and operating “geographical and occupational jurisdiction” 
within the defined boundaries of the film production industry. It was now to be
18 Muriel Box (later Lady Gardiner) went on to become a leading British producer and film director 
and won an Oscar as a screenwriter.
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seen whether that advantageous status and position could be maintained in the post­
war years.
4.4 The consolidation of the closed shop
“Throughout this period the union grappled with the shrinking 
indigenous base o f  British feature production” (ACTT 1983:161)
In practice, the fortunes of the film industry in the post-war period were mixed.
The ACT’s and the technicians’ collective war record19 was used to great effect in
the immediate post-war period. For five years, the industry had delivered an
effective, much admired, world-class output without foreign technicians, and it
used this new status to negotiate advantageous agreements, notably with the
Association of Specialised Film Producers, the British Film Producers Association
(BFPA) and the post-war Labour government. This new status was not without
unexpected advantages. When an arbitration was required between the ACT and
the BFPA regarding location allowances, the arbitrator settled in the union’s favour
and ruled that “as your members are professional gentlemen, I shall make it [the
settlement] in guineas” (ACTT 1983:23) .
Whatever the status of the technicians collectively, it did little good for the 
employment of individuals because in the immediate post-war years, cinema 
audiences (and thus film revenue) were in steep decline, falling by 15% from 1,635 
million admissions in 1946 to 1,396 million in 1950 (it was to fall to 515 million by 
1960) (Spraos 1962:14). Soon, half of Britain’s studio space was unoccupied and 
many of the ACT’s membership (now over 9,000, of whom over 1,500 were 
women) was jobless, despite the efforts of the new, Labour government promoted,
90□ational Film Finance Corporation (DFFC) and the Eady Levy. As in the pre­
19 Besides feature and documentary films, film technicians had also made other significant 
contributions to the war effort. The memorial at Pinewood Studios to the Army & Air Force Film 
Units lists 38 combat cameramen killed in action.
20 Another government measure, considered by Harold Wilson, then President o f the Board of 
Trade, was a nationalised distribution circuit, but the ACT was the only supporter o f such a cinema 
chain (some sources suggest ACT were the instigators o f the idea) and it was never pursued as 
policy (Spraos 1962:154; Oakley 1964:166; Kelly 1966:131; PEP 1952:154-156).
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war period, distribution and markets were again the major challenge because 
cinemas quickly reverted to screening the more popular American films:
Their acceptance was widespread because there were no other films 
available and because their shallow nature appealed to the post war 
state of mind of the public. British companies found it more 
profitable and less of a responsibility, to rent American films than to 
make their own. (Rotha 1967:73)
The government’s attempt in 1947 to regulate the imports through taxation, 
created, first, an American embargo, and then the near collapse of Rank, the major 
British producer, as it over-extended its finances to fill the vacuum (Wood 
1952:227-236). During 1949 alone, the number of people employed on feature 
films in British studios (not all of whom were in ACT grades) fell from 7,700 to 
4,400 (Oakley 1964:198).21 A Board of Trade Working Party “to examine ways 
and means of reducing production costs” identified several reasons for this 
“considerable contraction of production [which] has led to heavy dismissals of 
personnel”. However, it concluded that the prime cause for contraction was not 
exclusively production costs. Although there were elements that could be 
addressed (the recommendations did not mention the closed shop, although 
demarcation was to be “examined”) the prime cause was attributable to the wide 
gap between expenditure and income when British films (facing intense American 
competition) could take only a small proportion of the gross box office receipts 
(Gater 1949:7).
Despite, or perhaps because of, this slump in the industry, the ACT successfully 
pursued three objectives. Firstly, after a short dispute in 1946, it agreed a 
demarcation of roles with DATKE, with ACT taking responsibility for organising 
all technical roles.22 Second, it agreed on the minimum crewing levels for all 
productions in Clause 17 of the 1947 Agreement with the British Film Producers 
Association. Thirdly, the ACT succeeded in formalising in their agreements with
21 In addition, during this same period the number of newsreel companies reduced from five, to 
three (losing Gaumont-British Dews and British Paramount Dews).
22 The 1946 dispute had related to film repair technicians and despatch workers employed at 
Kinematographs Renters. The 1947 Agreement was that projectionists in labs and newsreels should 
be with ACT and those employed in cinemas would be []ATKE. All grades in sound and recording 
would be ACT. Regarding film repair, l ATKE would have rights in film distribution but ACT in 
film studios (Ralph Bond in FTT Jul/Aug 88)
Iain Reid
l»» L i w ’  i  f ? c " i n n
Chapter 4 The Evolution of Formal Closure to the Film Trades 119
the major studios the de facto closed shop situation which had existed since the 
early years of the war (Seglow 1978:51). Together, these activities ensured the 
post-war consolidation of the conditions necessary to maintain the closed shop and 
further formalised the administrative rules and procedures necessary to enforce an 
internal labour market by controlling the demarcation, crewing and pricing 
decisions.
However, in reality the prospects for employment within the British film industry 
could not be completely detached from external influences, being influenced more 
by such unpredictable factors as government intervention, Hollywood’s interests, 
currency rates and social trends, than by the state of the industry agreements. Thus 
the experience of the post-war period was varied. The Anglo-American Film 
Agreement of 1948, which restricted the amount of earnings from American films 
that could be remitted back to Hollywood, meant that the major Hollywood 
companies spent nearly £6m on production in the UK between 1948 and 1950 
(Street 1997:15) but thereafter, American spending was reduced until a renewed 
interest in the 1960s. By 1967, 90% of UK film production was financed by 
Hollywood and in 1968, American companies spent over £31 million on UK 
production encouraged by the success of the “Dew Wave, the Beatles, James Bond 
and the prospect of making big-budget films in Britain.. However, as before the 
war, the fluctuations within the industry were sharp and unpredictable and by the 
early 1970s the boom was over:
The latest crop of British films had failed in the States. Hollywood’s 
love affair with swinging London was over. American producers 
were packing their bags and looking for stories set in Denver and 
Philadelphia. (Boorman 1985:21)
So American finance had disappeared again: “by 1974 the sum imported by US 
companies had fallen to £2.9m” (Street 1997:20).
Thereafter, American investment in British production provided the occasional 
boost to the industry, but little security - films such as Alien (1979), Superman 
(1978,), Star Wars (1977) and successive Bond movies provided employment for 
many British technicians, but did little for long term stability when the dollar 
exchange rate changed adversely.
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Domestic demand provided some periods of improved employment; there was 
some success for the new realism of the early 1960s {Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning and This Sporting Life) and later innumerable Carry Ons. In the early 
1980s, there was another British revival, helped by a government policy of “100% 
first year capital allowances, combined with a strong dollar and the growing 
worldwide demand for movies”. The result was a series of films which initially 
generated more investment: Chariots o f Fire (1981), Gandhi (1982), Local Hero 
(1983) and A Passage to India (1985); but the government’s decision to phase out 
capital allowances after 1986 meant that the moment passed and by 1988-91 the 
industry was again relatively idle (Street 1997:21).
McCarthy’s analysis of the film industry (1964:151) correctly suggested that this 
“succession of booms and slumps made the union concerned with job security” and 
that this in turn led them to a “labour supply shop” solution because it seemed the 
most obvious method of limiting access, given that they were “lacking any 
recognised training scheme or apprenticeship system.” He cites the wartime 
experience “when experienced technicians were short, producers discovered that 
their only chance of obtaining them was through the union.” (He adds, in a 
footnote, that “subsequently a recognised training scheme was accepted for the 
more skilled technicians.”)23 In practice, his descriptions may be a little too 
general for what will be shown to be a complicated pattern of enforcement, and it is 
difficult to reconcile his description with other chronologies. The pre-war 
employment agency appears to have exercised little hold over any employer and 
could never be seriously considered as a true labour supply shop - employers only 
became willing to consider negotiating agreements with the ACT after 1938, and 
then only because of the obligations created by the fair wage clauses in the 
Cinematograph Act, so it seems very unlikely that they would have been willing to 
submit to any single source for recruitment. Dot until the war years, when the 
authority of the union’s employment bureau was derived from the Ministry of 
Works, was the union actively able to regulate access to film employment and thus,
23 It is probable that McCarthy, writing in 1964, was referring to the Film Industry Training and 
Apprenticeship Council which was described later as having “never functioned effectively” (DES 
1967:6)
Iain Reid i t
Chapter 4 The Evolution of Formal Closure to the Film Trades 1 2 1
presumably, the availability of crew to producers to which McCarthy refers above. 
In the post-war period, as shown above, even that control did not protect ACT 
members from being laid off, particularly in the labs where the use of imported 
prints and the switching of work between countries in the 1950s gave a hint of the 
coming power of the multi-national companies (ACTT 1983:33).
The impracticality of hiring non-union crew will be considered in more detail in the 
next chapter but, certainly to those outside the industry, the union does appear to 
have presented an efficient hold over employment: “So effective were the closed 
shop agreements that most film companies found it convenient to fill vacancies 
directly through the union’s own employment office or, more accurately, 
employment agency” (Maksymiw 1990:26) and until the collapse of the studio 
system (explained in the next chapter), it appears that film companies with 
vacancies had agreed to “gzve consideration to suitable applicants which the bureau 
put forward.” (my italics) (Seglow 1978:51). This may have been true when 
adding to an existing crew, but the initial selection of heads of department 
remained the director’s (or producer’s) prerogative and it will be shown that they 
invariably nominated their own team. However, there is evidence (see John Keen 
in Chapter 7) that all new entrants had to obtain their first appointment through the 
ACTT bureau.
But the confusion may arise because outsiders did not wholly understand the 
differences that existed between the different divisions within the union; e.g. 
between film freelancers, lab technicians and salaried television workers. 
McCarthy is on more certain ground in the assertion that the “rise in television” had 
made a difference (1964:151) because there a labour supply shop was operated to 
maintain the closed shop (1964:41). In the early 1950s, despite many reservations 
about the proposed commercial television station, the ACT had lobbied hard using 
their parliamentary connections to ensure that the legislation relating to ITV (as it 
became known) would specify that the content be at least 80% British productions. 
When established, the ACT then pressed hard, including the use of a brief strike in 
April 1955, to ensure union recognition, eventually signing a first agreement with 
the Programme Contractors’ Association in 1957. The official union history states 
that the commercial television companies, being entrepreneurs,
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saw nothing threatening in a closed shop. On the contrary, the 
orderliness of recruitment and the stability of employment that a 
closed shop implied, had an attraction for them. And despite the 
power that it gave the unions, they have never made serious efforts to 
rewrite those agreements. (ACTT 1983:103).
Seglow (1978:91) suggests it was the inexperience of the new contractors which 
enabled the more robust ACTT to establish themselves so efficiently and certainly 
the closed shop remained effective until the late 1980s when the financial crisis at 
TVam in 1987 led to a radical review of crewing arrangements (Maksymiw 
1990:27).
Conclusions
From its establishment in the 1930s, the evolution of the film technicians’ union 
has many similarities to the much earlier development of the craft unions in the 
traditional sectors as described by the Webbs (1920) and others (Phelps-Brown 
1959; Clegg et al. 1964 etc) with their emphasis on casual and social association of 
members and the possible mismanagement of funds. It might be argued that the 
element of formal apprenticeship was missing but, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, an analogous period of on-the-job training was necessary to acquire the 
necessary skills to become a film practitioner and gain admission to the union and, 
as cited (page 110), Turner believed that “some superior skill” was sufficient for a 
union to be described as craft (1962:234).
Despite the uncertainties of a precarious industry and employer instability, the 
union emerged as the primary representative of craftsmen within the sector, it 
established a post-entry closed shop and it took steps to secure the methods of entry 
to the profession, whether by the regulation of trainees or the approval of imported, 
ace technicians.
However, where the pressure of exceptional demand during WW2 led to the 
renewed dilution of many other craft-related closed shops (for example among 
carpenters (Connelly I960)), government intervention in the film industry 
effectively created a pre-entry closed shop which the union was able to maintain in 
the post-war period. Thus, throughout the 1950s, the majority of union members
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were full-time employees with major studios, laboratories or the new commercial 
television companies - the latter was certainly maintained through a union- 
managed, labour supply shop. This was a strong position and Seglow (1978:54) 
observed that
whatever one’s view of the union, there is no doubt that by the early 
1950s it had become a force to be reckoned with in its relations with 
the employers with whom it dealt. Its power and influence were out 
of all proportion to its size.
This emergence as a successful and proactive craft union meant that an internal 
labour market was also created because the film production sector was a craft 
market (Doeringer & Piore 1971:3) Within the boundaries of that industry (and 
latterly independent television) the union was able to effect administrative rules 
and procedures that governed entry, labour allocation, demarcation and pricing. 
Despite radically changing external factors, such as periodic slumps in production, 
the rules never varied and, when employment returned, the same rules for 
demarcation and crewing levels were applied.
However, the operation of a craft qualification, pre-entry closed shop when all the 
practitioners are full-time employees is an unremarkable phenomenon. As shown 
in McCarthy’s work, many other examples existed of such circumstances and, until 
some change destabilised the relationships (as shown in Chapter 1), there was little 
threat to the operation of the associated rules and procedures. However, what 
makes the ACT’s closed shop of particular interest is that it survived a far-reaching 
change when the relative stability of the studio system collapsed in the late 1950s. 
Despite that collapse, its successor the ACTT retained cohesion and power until the 
late 1970s, even as the studio practice of full-time employment declined and there 
was an increasing requirement for film technicians to work as freelancers - a 
category notoriously difficult for unions to organise.
The next chapter will examine how the union continued to enforce the admission 
rules necessary to maintain the closed shop and to ensure members continued to 
adhere to the rules once admitted.
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The previous chapter described how the film production sector became a pre-entry 
closed shop and how this status was formalised in the immediate post-war period. 
However, the maintenance of a closed shop did not just happen. The assumption 
must be that employers would have preferred to set the crewing levels, the range of 
salaries and the terms and conditions without the restrictions enforced by the union. 
The production technicians, while theoretically the beneficiaries of the closed shop, 
were not all (as will be shown in Chapter 6) natural supporters of the trade union 
movement and often resented the subscriptions and the political agendas imposed 
by the Association of Cinematographic and Television Technicians (ACTT)1 
leadership. Furthermore, it might have been expected that some members, having 
themselves been frustrated for so long by the union’s rules for admission, might 
have been inclined to resent its influence thereafter. Yet the practice of the closed 
shop held firm for some forty years from around 1940 until the early 1980s and so 
this chapter will consider the influences and institutions which maintained its rules 
and procedures
The first section will consider the nature of the film production industry and in 
particular the challenges of union organisation within what might appear to be a 
very loosely controlled community of workers where many individuals negotiated 
their own contracts - two factors which McCarthy (1964) had identified as likely to 
diminish the discipline and practicality of any closed shop. Section 5.2 will 
consider exactly how the union regulated the point of entry for new entrants - those 
wishing to train for the industry though a quasi-apprenticeship route and on-the-job
1 The Association o f Cine Technicians changed its name in 1956 to Association of Cinematograph 
Television and allied Technicians.
Chapter 5 Enforcing the Rules and Procedures 125
training, while the third section will consider the alternative methods for those who 
had some relevant experience and the effects of the admission processes for women 
and minorities. Lastly, the fourth section will show how the ACTT used the power 
of the laboratories to ensure that employers would maintain the enforcement of the 
rules and procedures and thus the coherence of these seemingly disparate work 
groups.
5.1 The characteristics of the film production community
“the union [ACTT] has developed a series o f  working practices which 
have curtailed employers ’freedom o f action... ” (Seglow 19l8:53)
By the late 1970s the ACTT represented workers in three very different sectors -
commercial television, the laboratories and film production. However, in two of
those primary sectors, commercial television and the laboratories, the workforce
was in full-time employment, at regular places of work and with corporate
employers with recognisable personnel departments collectively bargaining with
the ACTT.
The closed shop for commercial television had been established in 1957 when the 
ACTT had made agreements with the Programme Contractors Association and 
there were few areas for ambiguity in its enforcement because the majority of 
technicians in that sector were full-time employees of the then broadcasting 
companies: Granada, ABC, Associated Rediffusion and ATV etc.. The rules stated 
that a “person who is not a member of the ACTT, or other appropriate union, may 
not be employed in jobs the scope of which is covered by agreements between the 
unions involved and the employers” (ACTT 1983:101). This closed shop was 
maintained, certainly through the 1960s, by a labour supply shop arrangement: “in 
their agreement with the commercial television contractors the Cinematograph 
Technicians have obtained the formal recognition of their right to supply labour” 
(McCarthy 1964:41) and so the union nominated workers to match vacancies up to 
the grade of assistant director, although the companies did retain some ability to 
veto the nominee.
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Similarly, the laboratory technicians, whose role within the union will be examined 
in more detail later, had been incorporated into the union in 1935 when there were 
fifteen labs, “all paying just what they liked to their staff, with working conditions 
fluctuating wildly and no employers’ organisation through which a common policy 
could be discussed.”2 The lab workers made early progress when they signed a 
“landmark” agreement in 1939 with the employers’ federation “guaranteeing two 
weeks’ holiday with pay, sickness pay as well as improved wages and working 
conditions.” nevertheless, although the relationship between the lab workers and 
their employers’ federation was often fraught (the employers’ organisation then 
disbanded to avoid having to engage in collective bargaining until forced, by the 
arbitration process, to reconvene (ACTT 1983:41)) the lab workers were in full­
time, continuous employment. It is not intended to examine the specific processes 
of the laboratory closed shops in any detail.
So the most interesting closed shop was that operated within film production: 
feature films and (after 1957) TV commercials. As shown earlier, although 
McCarthy used the term “film and television industry”, it is more likely that he was 
describing only the broadcasting television company arrangements and the 
confirmation is found in his work-force statistics. He cited only 7,000 employees as 
being in the Labour Supply Shop (1964:37) which tallied with the 7,000 ACTT 
television division members, then “the largest branch” (ACTT 1983:29). 
However, in 1964, the total membership of the ACTT was nearly 13,000 members 
(ACTT 1983:174) and McCarthy makes only one passing reference to these other 
6,000 closed shop workers (1964:158). As will be shown, these 6,000 film 
technicians were not easy to categorise and it may be that McCarthy felt either that 
the group was too small to be of significance, or that their organisational 
arrangements were so diverse that they were best ignored. They are, however, the 
focus of this thesis.
In the immediate post-war period, the studios “manufactured a stream of films” 
(Blair 2001:151) through six big production companies: Associated Films, London
2 In the early days of British cinema there were no centralised laboratories. Each studio developed 
its own film (Low 1950:244)
Iain Reid Kvi *****
Chapter 5 Enforcing the Rules and Procedures 127
Films, British Lion, Ealing Studios, Gainsborough and the Rank Organisation. 
These production companies owned the studios and thus controlled every aspect of 
feature film “manufacture”. In this role, they were perceived to be stable 
employers, although never achieving the same vertical integration as the 
Hollywood studios (Street 1997:29), because they retained all the necessary staff, 
from script developers though to marketing, as full-time employees. In the 
immediate post-war period, the closure effected by the union in the war years held 
firm and the ACT’s success in obtaining concessions from the Labour government 
meant that maintaining union membership levels proved little problem (ACTT 
1983:174). However, the government levies were insufficient to support the home 
industry (ACT 1983:161) and when the studio production system faltered (the last 
companies closed in 1958 and 1959) the studio buildings became “four wallers”: 
empty space to be rented by independent production companies, often registered 
for the production of just one feature film, who would hire crew and cast on fixed 
or short term contracts. Thus, the great majority of film crew became freelance 
technicians to be engaged by production companies that, having drawn up their 
production schedules, would assemble a crew with the necessary skills to film 
specific sequences each day (Blair 2001:151). The resulting employment 
engagements were made for specific individuals to perform unambiguous tasks for 
a period that might be as short as a day - or as long as six months.
This transition of full-time employment to freelance work was not immediate and 
nor did it create an instantaneous, mobile, pool of labour. Throughout the 1960s, 
Pinewood Studios retained its own full-time construction staff that production 
companies using the Pinewood stages were obliged to employ, and it appears that 
other studios did the same; there were similar examples of other departments such 
as camera and drapes. In addition, extant camera crews from the studio era often 
held together as a team, albeit as freelancers. John Keen (a respondent) who was 
then working as a loader, reckons that there were probably thirty or thirty five 
established camera crews in the 1970s who would always try to work as a unit. 
The differentiation between the teams was the creative ability or style of its senior
3 The workers’ nominees on the Working Party on Film Production Costs in 1949, were referred to 
as “Representatives of Film Studio Employees” (Gater 1949)
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member - the director of photography (DoP), but once appointed he (and in that era 
the DoP was invariably male) would then expect to nominate his regular operator, 
focus puller, clapper loader, grip and gaffer. However, they would each be 
employed as individuals.
These very loose arrangements in employment (and maybe prolonged 
unemployment) could theoretically have been a problem for the union retention 
necessary to maintain a closed shop. As McCarthy (1964:107) had stated “when 
unions set out to affect the terms of employment covering a particular job they 
must organise and control a high proportion of the workers who are doing the job” 
and he cited in particular the challenges presented by “turnover and contact”, the 
latter meaning, to be more specific, the lack of contact with union representatives 
(1964:108). Moreover, McCarthy never considered the situation where the 
employer, being a company operating for perhaps only a few months before 
winding up, was potentially unstable too.4
In reality, the constant turnover of film crew and production companies did not 
create the challenges that might have been predicted given the instability of the 
work patterns. Goldstein defined turnover as “membership turnover ... expressed 
in the size and rate of the annual lapsed membership” and the challenge that he 
identified in the TGWU was that workers in a series of short-term employments 
slid in and out of union membership, thus never becoming “trade unionists who 
identify themselves with and feel any allegiance to their Trade Union in particular, 
and to the Trade Union movement in general” (Goldstein 1952:70).
However, the freelance film technicians, although engaged in similar short-term 
employment contracts, were not inclined to slide in and out of union membership 
for several reasons. The first was the hurdle of obtaining union membership.
The detail of those processes will be illustrated below, but suffice to state that no 
automatic right to re-admission existed and the union had been known to impose a 
rule of “no more union cards as long as a union member was unemployed” (Wood
4 The shipping industry had some similarities, in that seamen were only loosely organised and 
signed on for specific voyages, but the employers were more stable and represented by the 
Shipping Federation (McCarthy 1964:126)
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1952:213). Thus membership was something to be retained through prolonged 
periods of unemployment (albeit at a lowered subscription). This caution regarding 
membership was confirmed by in a 1983 study which identified a union density in 
the Entertainment industries of 112%. This seemingly abnormal result was 
explained in a footnote: “The pre-entry closed shop is widespread in this industry 
and a large number of persons who are primarily employed elsewhere belong to 
entertainment unions so that they can seek employment within the industry” (Bain 
& Price 1983:15).
Bain & Price’s note that some might be “primarily employed elsewhere” may have 
been true of some crafts, because set builders (i.e. carpenters, painters & riggers) 
and electricians could probably find alternative work. However, for most film 
technicians, their skill specificity, which will be considered in Chapter 7, meant 
there was no alternative employment for focus pullers, loaders, boom operators or 
grips. A 1952 assessment of the British film industry confirmed this skill 
specificity: while a “carpenter in U ATKE who loses his job can at the present time 
be reasonably certain of finding work in the building industry”, the “experience and 
training of a member of the ACT equips him for few occupations outside the film 
industry” (PEP 1952:279). Although described as “technicians”, many had been 
drawn to the film industry because of the opportunities for creativity and thus they 
were often uninterested in more mundane work and their skills as film technicians 
“fits them for few other things. Thus it strengthens their ties and commitment to an 
industry which, even in good times, is characterised by insecurity and 
unemployment” (Seglow 1978:40). Although Doeringer & Piore had cited the 
stability of employment in the internal labour market as creating groups, here it can 
be seen that it is the common experience that makes:
the same workers come into regular and repeated contact with each 
other. The result is the formation of social groups or communities 
within the internal labour market. (Doeringer & Piore 1971 23)
Another factor militating against the fragmentation that such insecure employment 
might have encouraged was the geographical boundaries of the film industry. 
While technicians could be employed anywhere in the world (“the sun never sets 
on British film crew” (Boorman 1985:197)) the hiring of film crew took place
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within small, specific areas; namely Soho (besides being the base of many 
production companies, it was also the location of the ACTT’s employment agency) 
or the immediate catchments of the major studios - Elstree, Pinewood, Shepperton, 
Denham and others. (Significantly, this coincided with the “geographical and 
occupational jurisdiction” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:3) of the ACTT’s film 
organisers.) For production technicians, bound as they were to an “industry where 
employment was on a casual basis and prolonged periods of unemployment were 
normal” (Seglow 1978:40) there was no shame attached to being out of work and 
so when not working it was essential to be ‘seen around’, knowing that every 
casual encounter would remind one’s peer group, production companies and the 
various booking services that one was alive and available. The technician never 
knew when he or she might be considered for a production, or who might be called 
upon for a reference, so it was essential to be remembered. John Boorman gave 
some insight assembling a film crew in 1983: “when you are considering a
technician you do not know, the accepted procedure is to call up people with whom 
he has worked” (1985:67).
So was this enough of a community that it became self policing, abiding by the 
conventions of “community-based labour” where union membership was “linked to 
social identity within the local community, [i.e.] Refusal to join may mean 
ostracism for the individual employee” (Hanson et al. 1982:8)? As indicated, this 
was a loose community of skilled, freelance workers of whom many were primarily 
motivated by creativity, with reward often a secondary consideration, and so not 
the most easily controlled constituency for union organisers. Furthermore, the 
nature of the short-term, freelance employment contracts meant that theoretically 
employers could have negotiated individual deals as they wished -  and 
occasionally they did. In reality, it is impossible to assess whether the community 
of workers would have held firm because there were other factors that ensured 
union control which will be considered in the fourth section. However, first it is 
necessary to consider the rules and procedures that regulated admission to that 
community.
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5.2 The screening of entrants and on-the-job training
“[For craftsmen] the main consideration was the control o f  entry to the 
trade ” (Phelps-Brown 1959:119)
In his example of how the closed shop was maintained among the skilled craftsmen
in print, McCarthy demonstrated that two processes were necessary - the craft
qualification shop (to maintain the skill gap and restrict entrants) and the labour
supply shop (to deal with the special problems of casual labour) (1964:152). He
also suggested that the film industry relied solely on a labour supply shop but, as
has been shown, if this had ever been true after the war years, it had certainly
lapsed by the mid ‘70s when the situation was more akin to McCarthy’s labour
pool: “so long as he confines his choice to members of the pool, the employer does
not need to apply to the union for labour” (1964:18). In practice, the skill gap was
assured because no-one except those gaining access to “the pool” could get the
necessary training and skills, and so the next two sections will examine how
admission to that film technicians’ pool was regulated in the closed shop era.
Doeringer & Piore state that in the craft market “the rules governing entry to the 
craft or occupational type of internal market are more rigid than those found in 
manufacturing industries” (1971:4) and certainly the barriers to ACTT membership 
and thus to the established film industry were considerable. In 1966, Kelly stated 
“One of the most serious criticisms of the ACTT concerns its awkward attitude to 
new entrants to the industry.” However, he went on to explain the union’s 
legitimate concerns:
... the union naturally feels obliged to protect the jobs of its members 
in an industry which has the aura of glamour that attracts more 
entrants than there are vacancies and which has had more than its 
share of ruthless or financially inept employers... (1966:174)
It will be shown in Chapter 8 that fears about the combination of oversupply of 
would-be film recruits and less than conscientious employers willing to exploit 
their potential, were well founded. Even in the closed shop era, the natural 
fluctuations of the industry inevitably created an occasional oversupply of labour 
but, provided the union could ensure that agreements were enforced, then 
“insecurity of employment ... should be offset by high wages during employment 
...” (Kelly 1966:175).
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The maintenance of a pool balanced to meet employers’ requirements and to ensure 
reasonable employment for all members was a delicate matter and therefore 
anything that disguised the true employment situation, such as permanent television 
employees moonlighting as film workers (i.e. taking freelance jobs in their spare 
time), had to be eliminated. The FTT reminded members frequently that 
moonlighting threatened everyone’s employment: not only did it displace 
legitimate freelancers, it also disadvantaged those production companies who 
complied with the union’s agreements. Those who moonlighted were warned that 
they would be "expelled from the union - sacked - and that's the end of a career, 
because you won’t be able to join the ranks of the freelancers without a ticket." 
(FTT April 1979; March 1980) thereby emphasising both the value of membership 
and the rigidity of the boundaries to the industry.
Discouraging unscrupulous moonlighters was also critical because they reduced the 
available employment seen to be available - which in turn influenced the 
admissions policy. As indicated, there were periods when no new tickets would be 
issued if there was any recorded unemployment (Wood 1952:213) and members of 
the camera, stills and script supervisors section were reminded of the need to 
register when they were not working because their lack of employment would be 
noted “when membership applications were considered” (FTT May 87). Therefore, 
a freeze on all membership applications should be considered as the first entry 
control.
Assuming that members were being accepted into membership, then a number of 
admission methods or routes existed and, because often some overlap existed 
between them, it was not always easy to clearly differentiate between them. It 
seems probable that a diversity of standards always existed. As illustrated before, 
in 1941 Muriel Box had been instantly accepted into the union (Box 1974:158-159) 
whereas Karel Reisz (who went on to direct Saturday Night and Sunday Morning) 
waited seven years to become a member of the ACTT (Kelly 1966:174). As noted 
earlier, social capital is useful to those that possess it (Muriel Box was assisted in 
her union membership by “old colleagues” (1974:13)) but it can “also exclude not 
only the unreliable, but those who are simply outsiders with no existing 
connections on the inside” (Field 2003:122). Reisz was Jewish, a Czech and a
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graduate (natural Sciences, Cambridge). Kelly, who had identified Reisz as 
typical of the industry’s problem in identifying new talent, wrote “the picture the 
outsider gets is of an apparently rigid system, peppered with loopholes and 
inconsistencies....” (1966:174) and it is probable that the situation never changed. 
Commenting on admission to the ACTT closed shop in its latter years, a BECTU 
official who had had first-hand experience described it as “all informal, so luck 
played a part, ... [the rules] were rough and ready -  and not very even...”
Therefore, perhaps the second barrier can be defined as uncertainty. With contacts 
(i.e. social capital) and the correct timing, entry to film production could be 
relatively easy:
In the early ‘60s I worked at Shepperton Studios as a prop man.
Eddie [an old school friend] asked if I could get him a job there and 
within a couple of weeks he started work. (SSC May 2006:21)
Without contacts it was more difficult to establish the methods of becoming a 
union member. With no published rules5 it was not always easy to know the 
criteria even if one was already working. Belinda Harris joined a newly formed 
film research company in the mid 1980s. Film research, the location of existing 
film material and clearing any associated copyright, had traditionally been done by 
editors and production assistants and so doing the work as corporate activity was a 
new concept which did not fit directly into any ACTT category:
ACTT didn't recognise film research as a specific job which was one 
of the problems. They did give people tickets as film librarians but I 
seem to remember that we wanted to distance ourselves from that and 
anyway you had to be employed full-time by a library.... It was very 
similar to trying to get an Equity card .... once you had declared your 
hand as not having membership you could theoretically be in a worse 
position than just keeping your head down..6
Thus, it was difficult for an individual to know when and how to apply to the 
ACTT unless they had inside contacts or an informal sponsor. This is perhaps why
5 The rules, such as they were, were published in the ACTT rulebook and therefore not accessible to 
‘outsiders’.
6 Belinda Harris also revealed yet another enforcement of association method used by the unions: “it 
was quite difficult to advertise the company without ACTT membership. The first couple of years 
we were in The Knowledge and Kemps [the two key industry directories] we had to say that we were 
applying for membership. The editorial people would say to me 'but you are applying aren't you ?' 
to which the required answer was, of course, 'yes'”.
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many would-be film technicians took the traditional method of entry - the aspiring 
candidate had first to prove that they had the perseverance to find a vacancy in one 
of the junior, non-unionised grades and then start building the necessary social 
capital.
Although film production was closed in that it was impossible to progress without 
union membership, the industry was not a “comprehensively closed trade” as 
defined by McCarthy (1964:30), “it is impossible for a single non-unionist to 
remain in it”, because there was a strata of junior positions which could be filled by 
non-union people. The collective agreements stipulated the number of ACTT 
members that the production company was obliged to employ. However, once that 
level was achieved, production companies could then employ non-union members 
in a number of minor roles: runners; location fixers; traffic marshals; 3rd assistant 
directors; drivers and production assistants. For many, employment in these minor 
roles was the quasi-apprenticeship route to union membership and legitimate 
employment because it provided the opportunity to gain the necessary experience, 
to meet working crew members and thus join networks. This 2005 obituary 
illustrates a process followed by thousands of entrants in the period from the 1930s 
until the late 1980s:
Towards the end of 1940, Peter [Lambert] entered the industry as an 
unpaid tea boy in the engineering department of Welwyn Studios, but 
it wasn’t long before he was offered the job of trainee runner (third 
assistant) in the camera department... Peter was soon employed as a 
clapper loader.. It was then that Peter joined the ACT. (SSR Mar 
2005:18)
Four things are notable in this obituary. The first is that the initial appointment was 
unpaid and it will be shown that this practice became widespread again as the 
century closed. The second is the necessary shift to on-the-job training - learning 
about the business in a non technical, production role as an assistant director but 
also being absorbed into the community and being acquainted with the customs and 
procedures. The third is that it was only when Peter became a loader, a junior 
technician working on the camera, that he became a member of the ACT. Of 
course, there is no indication that he could not have joined earlier, but it would 
seem that in 1940 the idea of the ACT as a craft union was established and that
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continuous on-the-job training was deemed necessary before membership was 
offered. The final factor was that Peter Lambert was able to gain a place as an 
unpaid tea boy as a first appointment - as will be shown in the next section, by the 
1950s the ACTT held waiting lists for such lowly appointments because they were 
a route to union admission.
The next entry control happened when the newcomer got that first minor position, 
because they would have to demonstrate that they were capable of meeting the 
demands of the industry. The practical and physical demands of working on a film 
set should not be underestimated. The work as a camera driver or camera assistant 
often meant reporting for work at 5:30 or 6am to load the camera equipment. The 
equipment would then be driven to the studio or location to arrive by 7:30 or 8am 
so that the grip could check the equipment before the camera crew arrived at 8:30 
to set up for the first scenes. If the shoot involved a large number of actors, or any 
special make-up, prosthetics or wigs then the makeup department might be required 
to be at the studio or location from 7am. For fully qualified unit members, these 
timings would necessitate an early start from home and, depending on their 
seniority, they would either drive themselves or be collected by a car. For trainees 
and assistants without private transport, getting to Shepperton or Pinewood studio 
or, even worse, a location shoot, would involve a very early start and travel by tube 
or night bus to a pre-arranged rendezvous with someone who did own a car, 
perhaps staying overnight with friends or, if desperate, sleeping in the camera van 
overnight.
At the end of the shooting day (the “wrap”) when the key crew members departed, 
the trainees, assistants and junior members of every department would continue 
work to tidy up and re-box the camera equipment, to complete the camera sheets or 
prepare for the next day’s shooting. The producers took great care to avoid “time 
off the clock” payments to union members working to time sheets, but junior, non­
union members of the crew or full-time employees of the production company were 
invariably on straight days and so their working hours were immaterial. One 
production runner remembers a shoot at Elstree Studios where he had:
become quite frazzled, permanently thinking about whether you’d
booked the dog for the right day ?... Had you got the extras there on
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the right day ? Cars booked to get everybody home ? And you did 
that quite intensively if it was for, like, for a five day shoot -  and I 
know it doesn’t sound like a lot but by the end ... by the time you got 
to the weekend you have been leaving the house at 6, and coming 
back at 11 by the time you’d been to drop off rushes....and literally 
hitting the sack to wake up the next day -  it was quite stressful.
Undoubtedly, part of this probationary process for a trainee was to assess whether 
the candidate had the stamina and personal skills to survive, what Doeringer & 
Pirore describe as “screening” (1971:30-31). A producer who had employed a 
number of runners tried to summarise the process:
...not just the stamina, [it was] whether they had the aptitude ... you 
can sit and interview somebody until the cows come home but it is 
actual practice that is the proof of the pudding ... and you have to 
actually work with somebody to see if they can coordinate and 
whether they can prioritise and whether they are able to ‘juggle’....
You had to be married to the job ... and we certainly sifted through 
quite a few characters because of that [failing], (ex-Producer)
Some did just serve their time and gain their ACTT membership, but the process 
could be very prolonged as this production manager who had worked as a runner in 
the mid to late 1980s remembered:
you had to do 365 days in production, i.e. working on something that 
was being shot .... you could then approach the union and register 
with them throughout this period and then say that “here, I’ve done 
all these days and here’s the evidence of contacts” and then apply [for 
full membership] once you got offered a graded job, like as a third 
assistant. Then you could say you have got to let me in because a. I 
am sponsored by two people, and b. I’ve done all my days.... It took 
me four years to work my 365 days. (Producer)
For others who showed the necessary stamina, enthusiasm and potential in some 
menial employment as a runner or driver, the expectation was that they would be 
identified by a potential sponsor: either an experienced technician with reasonable 
standing within the union and industry, or a production or facilities company 
willing to employee them as full-time trainees for formal on-the-job training. Both 
routes would invariably lead to union membership, and thus advancement in the 
industry, but there might be a significant difference in the style of employment and 
level of reward.
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If adopted by a sympathetic production company or equipment supplier, the trainee 
would effectively serve an on-the-job apprenticeship of several years, progressing 
in stages as they became more experienced in the basic skills:
I was taken on as a salaried trainee camera assistant by a film 
production company who owned their own equipment. The 
agreement with the ACTT was that for the first year I could work as a 
supernumerary on all shoots where the equipment was being used i.e.
I was additional to the four union members working on camera.
However, in my second year, I could work as the loader (the fourth 
member), but only for my employer. In my third year I could work 
on any production as a loader and I then got my full ticket. The 
production company did well out of it because although they carried 
me for the first year, I was much cheaper than a freelance loader in 
the second and third year. The benefit for me was that I emerged 
with a full [union] ticket and lots of contacts after three years’ paid 
employment. (Focus Puller)
This three-year evolution to full status comes closest to the pure form of the craft 
union tradition where a time-served apprenticeship was the natural means to 
progress to acceptance to full union membership. The economic rationale was 
similar to that demonstrated by Becker’s model of cost saving: trainees will pay for 
the costs of their own training, and they will be willing to do so because of the 
higher pay they will get later as skilled workers (Becker 1975:25). In reality, 
whether the company or the trainee was the net beneficiary from such an 
arrangement depended on how busy the production company was during the three 
years. The cost of the additional salary of a supernumerary in the first year was 
probably easily offset by the savings made by not employing a freelance loader, 
who would invoice against their timesheets, in the second and third year. The 
benefit to the individual was that they emerged trained, with union membership and 
an embryonic network of contacts -  the social capital necessary to secure future 
employment.
By the late 1980s, companies adopting an individual had become an accepted route 
under the title of JOBFIT; a more formal, college-based admission system 
sponsored by the ACTT, IPPA, BFTPA and AFVPA and assisted by a grant from 
the GLC. The scheme was reported in the FTT (Mar 87) and gives a useful 
indicator, first of the demand for placements in the film industry - over 5,000 
enquiries were received, and second of the stringency of the admission controls to
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the industry. Two hundred were interviewed and only forty-two JOBFIT places 
were offered.
A less pure form of the apprenticeship, usually taken by those continuing a family 
tradition and therefore less concerned acquiring contacts, was to be ‘adopted’ by a 
relative or established technician who would arrange union membership through 
informal channels and then facilitate the newcomer’s employment whenever the 
filming required several technicians. This arrangement was rarely used for camera 
crew because the necessary skills were too critical, but it was practical for trades 
such as grips, prop men, make-up and wardrobe where the senior technician could 
take responsibility and the less experienced and unskilled assistant would work 
under their direction The disadvantage for the entrant was that although the 
financial reward when working was much greater (as union members, they were 
invariably paid at the full union rate), work could be very intermittent because 
production companies could be reluctant to employ such trainees knowing that they 
were paying the full rate for a less than fully-skilled craftsman. If the trainee and 
trainer were working alongside each other then the situation might be as Doeringer 
& Piore had described:
The experienced workman begins by assigning novices to the simpler 
parts of the jobs which he originally performed. He then gradually 
assigns more complicated tasks... As the workman shifts more 
complex tasks to the trainee, he also reduces his supervisory and 
teaching efforts, and reabsorbs some of the simpler tasks... 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:19)
However, film work often meant that the trainee could be separated from their 
mentor - and that could be a challenge. A production manager recalls encountering 
one such family member on the set of a night shoot in the late 1980s:
.... to find that [the prop man’s] son, who’s just out of school .......
has no clue about being a prop man whatsoever. But he’s on a top 
rate, the same rate as his father who has worked on fifty films over 
thirty years, [even though he] doesn’t even know how to hang up a 
blind and there I am ... thinking to myself, “I am getting paid dick all 
for this and this guy is on £220 a day and he thinks it’s great. It’s 
just not fair.” ... I don’t know what happened to those guys ... 
whether they managed to survive the experience and whether he 
today is a fantastic prop man, but there was no training for these 
people, they just walked in after school and the nepotism was factor
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number one: if you don’t know anyone in the business you won’t get 
into the business. In those days the business was strong enough and 
the network, the nepotism factor, was strong enough in the film 
‘game’, as it was called, to give these guys sufficient work -  and you 
don’t need a lot of work at sixteen if you are earning £220 a day plus 
all the overtime.
5.3 Variations and minorities
even closed occupations are rarely demarcated by absolute 
boundaries ” (Tumer 1962:2 C5)
It was a generally held assumption that the union application process was easier if
individuals applied for membership from sectors where the union was keen to
increase its presence. Kelly believed that people were “pestered to join the union
because they already have a foot in the door, e.g. in the BBC or an industrial [i.e.
corporate or training film] unit.” (1966:174) and some did join via that route. In
July 1980, the FTT reported that amongst the 157 members elected, seventy eight
were BBC members “restricted to the BBC for two years.” The only motivation
for accepting membership with such a condition must have been the longer term
benefit of unrestricted access to ACTT graded jobs because the BBC did not
recognise the ACTT, having its own union - the Association of Broadcasting Staff
(ABS). However, these routes were an uncertain, lengthy and possibly
unrewarding process if the aim was solely to achieve ACTT membership. The
BBC’s own selection and entry processes were themselves demanding and the
non-broadcasting (e.g. corporate and training film) production units were small
backwaters in career terms, comprised mainly already qualified technicians.
Experience gained was useful, but neither was a natural route into mainstream
production because such applicants, being outsiders, had no access to the film
networks necessary to obtain work.
However, these were alternative routes to membership if individuals were prepared 
to wait, serve their time and then pursue a wider career. In the same FTT item 
(July 1980) it was reported that ten researchers had been elected but "restricted to 
grade," presumably for some specified time. And some alternative routes were 
well recognised and utilised:
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Loads of people got their union membership from working at what 
was then Visnews.7 Once they had the ticket they left and as far as I 
could see they could call themselves anything - I remember a lot of 
the promo directors that we worked with had done a 6 month stint at 
Visnews just to get membership. (Producer)
Another interviewee worked in one of the first motion control studios in the early 
1980s. This was a then revolutionary technique linking robotic arms to very early 
computers so that the same camera moves could be replicated every time, an 
essential facility in special effects and animation. However, as a new technique, it 
was as yet not recognised by the union and so anyone could be employed:
Another guy there who was working for them ... had been a 
projectionist at the Chiltem Cinema in Beaconsfield ... and I know 
subsequently he then ended up working in special effects... (DoP)
Any direct approach to the ACTT could be frustrating, even when applicants had 
experience obtained elsewhere. In 1957, Edward Joffe, a South African with 
experience as a producer, director and writer came to London with a letter of
o
introduction to Sir Michael Balcon who, after an interview, offered Joffe a minor 
position in the press department so he could learn about the UK industry. 
However, there was one snag:
‘You will have to get a union ticket; these are not rules of my making
but I daren’t go against the ACTT’  and off I toddled to the
ACTT and I got in there and they kept me waiting for half an hour 
and then an hour and then eventually a woman said that so and so will
see you  I said ‘I have been to see Sir Michael Balcon, I can get a
job there as a tea boy and I would like to apply for a union ticket...’
So they said ‘what qualifications have you got ?’ So I said ‘What 
qualifications do you need to be a tea boy ?’ and they said ‘Oh well, 
there are a lot of other people who are in line for those jobs’
Joffe was rejected (even though he offered, tongue in cheek, to take a tea making 
test to demonstrate his proficiency) and so he returned to Sir Michael (at that time 
one of the most senior producers in Britain) who admitted that there was nothing
7 Visnews was an independent film and video news agency, subsequently absorbed into Reuters 
(1993).
8 Producer o f Thirty-nine Steps, A Yank at Oxford, the Cruel Sea, Scott of the Antarctic and many 
of the Ealing comedies
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that he could do. Fortunately, Joffe then met someone involved in Admags9 and 
was offered employment as a producer/writer. Although Admags were transmitted 
by the commercial television companies (which had union agreements), the 
production of Admags was not union-regulated. Only when Joffe later joined 
Granada did the technical supervisor eventually break down his reservations about 
the ACTT and persuade him to join. Joffe went on to become a successful 
television director.
Lastly, although difficult to quantify, there were routes into production via the 
laboratory division and occasional transfers between unions, demonstrated by this 
letter to Stage, Screen □ Radio: “I worked as a lowly third assistant director on the 
Edgar Wallace series at Merton Park in 1961-2. It was my very first job in film 
production having obtained my ACTT membership as a trainee printer.” (Deh-Ta 
Hsiung SSR March 2005).
Some transferred from theoretically lower grades having been trained and 
promoted:
I got a DATTKE ticket as a production secretary in television, then I 
got a training as a gallery PA and, once I had completed my training I 
could transfer to the ACTT.
- Interviewer: was it a problem to transfer?
□o, because I was then within a company and it went with the grade, 
but that was one of the few areas where they were actually training 
and converting. (Sharon Goode)
Transfers from DATTKE were not impossible, but could take time. John Keen 
joined Pinewood Studios in 1966 as a carpenter and was immediately enrolled into 
DATTKE, but in 1972 he wanted to transfer to the camera department. While he 
had friends in the camera department who were willing to train him, John could 
only work if there was no ACTT member available and so he was obliged to 
telephone the union daily to ask if there was a vacancy -  and would invariably be 
rebuffed. However, knowing the crews at Pinewood enabled him to co-ordinate his 
calls with their requests for a loader and by that means he was able to get some
9 Admags, 1955-1963, were short programmes where presenters demonstrated advertisers’ products. 
(Gable 1980:74-82)
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intermittent work. Otherwise, being employed in the studios, he was able to watch, 
but not touch the camera on the set, and to practise loading and stripping cameras 
in Pinewood’s own camera store. John made three applications for membership of 
the ACTT over a two year period but he was rejected twice, and eventually 
admitted only on a rules technicality.
There do not appear to have been any additional obstacles for those women or 
minority representatives who tried to get into the industry. Women had first joined 
the union before the war and always on equal pay (George Elvin having a strong 
personal commitment to eliminating sex-based differentials (ACTT 1983:23)) but 
women remained a minority on camera while being predominant in 
continuity/script supervision and make-up, wardrobe, set dressing etc. The 
obstacles to women joining the camera department were sometimes more to do 
with job design than any inherent prejudice:.
We tried using a female trainee to become a loader but the trainee’s 
main task role was to check equipment, load the camera van and then 
make sure that the correct equipment was to hand when the camera 
crew wanted it. She pointed out.... quite rightly.... that the camera 
cases had all been designed by a man and were too large for a 
woman. On several occasions she had to be helped reload the van by 
the rest of the crew -  who were all charging overtime at their 
appropriate rates.... It was just too expensive to keep her on and 
anyway she gave up after a few weeks. We then employed a male 
trainee. (Female Producer)
If women did face challenges in joining the more male-orientated departments such 
as camera and sound, the obstacles could be overcome by the dedicated and 
persistent. Sue Gibson had qualified and worked as a photographer before realising 
that her real interest was in film. She went to the national Film and Television 
School (DFTS) because:
...at that time it was still a closed shop with the union and they had a 
deal whereby you were guaranteed a ticket if somebody offered you a 
job which wasn’t necessarily the case in the outside world. You 
could be offered a job and they would try every trick in the book not 
to let you have it ‘cos there was some member or other that was out 
of work...
After graduating from the LIFTS, she worked in a motion control studio but did not 
immediately apply for her ticket, not wanting to be restricted to special effects
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work. However, after nine months she received a telephone call from a cameraman 
who had heard of her work and he invited her to be the clapper loader on Privates 
on Parade, which was the appointment that she needed to get a full camera 
department ticket. She quickly rose10 to become the first woman director of 
photography working in commercials and features (at the DFTS she had trained as 
a cinematographer) encountering little opposition from established male crew, even 
when she was so new as to be uncertain of the correct etiquette and might have 
encountered resistance:
I remember the first time on the set [as the DoP], I think I had got 
four brutes in a row and I’d said where to put them on the pre-light.
Kevin Day, [the gaffer] who was working with me ...said “what’s the 
matter Sue ? You don’t look very happy.’ And I went ‘Yeah, they’re 
not quite where I want them and that’s not quite what I want and I 
know you can’t move them.’ And he went ‘Yes we can.’ Because 
I’d read in books ... that you don’t get the sparks to move your lights; 
once you’ve set them they’re there, they’re not going to move big 
lights like brutes. So all that was a bit of a revelation. 11
□or did there appear to have been much additional obstacle for entrants from ethnic 
minorities, although the numbers entering the sector were so low that the 
assessment can be nothing other than anecdotal. Do appropriate statistics exist for 
the 1970s, but in an 1989 survey, under 2% of film and broadcast employees 
reported ethnic origins from outside UK, Europe, America or Australasia (Varlaam 
et al. 1990:17). Alrick Riley (now a successful BAFT A-winning television 
director) remembers the few black role models that inspired him to pursue a media 
career when he made a political film on 8mm as a teenager. Alrick’s description 
of that meeting recalls no reservation in their encouragement to indicate that a 
black person could not make the grade:
Basically it was the success of that film, got me into taking seriously 
the whole thing of having a career in the media. The film was shown 
at a conference and I met all of the black people in the film industry
10 So speedy was her rise that between her first jobs as a DoP, Sue was still having to work as a 
clapper loader to fulfil commitments she had made before her breakthrough.
11 Sue Gibson was the first woman to be elected to membership of the British Guild of 
Cinematographers and is now their Vice-President.
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at the time, - that probably amounted to about eight, and they were all1there -  and they encouraged us to take this business seriously.
So with so many routes to union membership, was anyone with sufficient 
motivation ever excluded? Thirty or forty years on, it has proved impossible to 
locate an interviewee who had made a legitimate effort to join the union and been 
rejected, but certainly some contemporary commentators believed that potential 
talent was discouraged though this “attracted no attention when unknown lads 
whom nobody had heard of were not allowed to become clapper boys; but among 
them might have been the David Leans of twenty years hence” (Wood 1952:213). 
Certainly as may be judged from the related experiences of those above, admission 
to the union did require a mixture of luck, and certainly persistence (verging on 
obstinacy) and nepotism invariably helped. However, it was always possible to 
work on the periphery of the business, and admission was almost always possible, 
eventually. A national Organiser of the ACTT, Linda Loakes, rebutting the 
supposed restrictive nature of admissions said:
“you can hardly call ACTT a private club when it admits 1,500 new 
members each year" (FTT Feb 87)
5.4 The enforcement of the boundaries
“ACTT is a craft union which, in the past, derived much o f  its strength 
from its ability to control the supply o f labour” (Maksymiw 1990:26)
“And it is muscle they [the laboratories] have often used to protect their 
own -  and other members ’ -working conditions ” (ACTT 19C3:39)
Although there were routes into the industry besides on-the-job training, they all
required that ultimately a worker had to have a union ticket, and in that the ACTT
did appear to have established the firm “geographical and occupational” boundaries
required by Doeringer & Piore for the internal labour market, and the controls
required by McCarthy for the pre-entry closed shop. However, the film workers
were freelance, skilled and creative, thus well able to negotiate their own contracts,
12 In 2006, Alrick’s two collaborators on his 8mm film are also still active in the industry.
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so lastly it is necessary to establish how the ACTT was able to maintain control and 
ensure that the rules and procedures were respected.
Given the itinerant nature of film production, the union had little regular contact 
with its freelance members so it utilised the organisations most in contact with the 
workforce - the production companies which employed them. The concept that the 
employer is part of the union’s disciplinary process was not new. Allen (1954:57) 
said of the closed shop environment “...the employer becomes an ally in the 
maintenance of discipline” and that view seems justified in the film industry. The 
majority of employers were members of either the IFA (Independent Film-makers’ 
Association which became after 1991, PACT - the Producers’ Alliance for Cinema 
& Television) and the AFPA (Advertising Film Producers' Association, later the 
AFVPA when Videotape was added). The ACTT had collective agreements with 
both organisations that agreed, along with all the conditions of employment, the 
minimum crewing levels for all productions. The precise arrangements varied, but 
the norm was colloquially known as “four, four & four”: four union members 
should be employed on camera, four on sound and four in the production team (the 
latter being the director, producer, continuity, first assistant).
The union still faced the challenge of enforcing those crewing levels but their first 
control was the checking of the daily ‘call-sheets’, or crew lists, used by every 
production company:
In theory, companies were always supposed to inform the ACTT of a 
shoot (wherever it was) although I don't remember exactly when it 
became obligatory to deposit a call-sheet at HQ. We were certainly 
doing it at Picture Palace in ’73.... (Producer).
These call-sheets (an example is at Appendix 2) specified the exact composition of 
the crew. However, the submission process was not perfect because the call sheet 
might relate to only one day’s shoot, was rarely available until late the evening 
before and its delivery was slow (posting the form to the ACTT was considered 
acceptable and facsimile was not common until the mid 1980s) so the shoot was 
often completed before the membership office could check the crewing levels. 
Similarly, a production company could ‘forget’ to submit a call sheet altogether if 
they were in breach of the agreement - although it was rumoured that the ACTT
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telephoned the studios each day to check which companies were using each stage. 
Lastly, a production company was unlikely to risk its standing with the ACTT by 
showing that they were not employing the required number of members (i.e. “short- 
crewing”) so there would certainly be sufficient crew listed on the call sheet, even 
if not actually present at the shoot (companies could arrange this by paying an 
appropriate crew member to stay at home for a ‘straight day’s pay’).
The union’s more proactive enforcement measure was the physical spot-checking 
of technicians’ union cards at the studios (location shoots were never visited 
because they were usually too far away from Soho):
Regular checks were made at studios, mainly to keep subscriptions up 
to date - the Union administration was hopelessly inefficient. The 
idea wasn't principally to catch out non-members or short crewing 
because the ticket system was self-policing in the sense that no head 
of department would want to be embarrassed by a non-member in his 
crew. For example, no serious sound recordist would be caught dead 
without the other three unless a waiver had been agreed because he 
would get it in the neck... (Producer)
Obtaining a waiver, i.e. being allowed to reduce the crew below the appropriate 
agreement’s crewing levels, was not quickly arranged but might be agreed if, for 
example, there was no requirement for a focus puller because the subject was 
inanimate and static (perhaps a pack shot for a commercial). The negotiation was 
rarely simple, and often contentious, particularly in TV commercials where 
companies were bidding competitively and where losing one or two crew members 
might make a considerable difference in the price to the client:
...it became increasingly obvious that four on sound on location was 
ludicrous and there were also occasions when the new generation of 
hands-on cameramen (who operated themselves) meant three on 
camera was enough too. The ACTT refused to recognise this shift 
and insisted that 4/4/4 remained although, in certain circumstances it 
was prepared to negotiate. In the beginning, technicians were paid the 
full rate to stay at home (so the savings lay in overtime - remember, 
we weren't allowed to do pay deals - travel, hotels and per diems).
This then evolved into paying the union off after a negotiation 
with the organiser (Joe Telford in my day). The money was supposed 
to go into the ACTT comfort fund or suchlike but it wasn't always a 
cheque (I don't recall any receipts) and many of us were suspicious 
that other cash changed hands because all production companies were 
not treated alike. I remember quoting a location and negotiating one
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less on sound to then lose the job to Illustra [another production 
company] who got two on sound and one on camera. All the AFPA 
Council (and other top producers) had, earlier, all sworn on their 
mother's graves that they would stick together on a level playing field 
so that was an early lesson for me in group loyalty in a competitive 
business. (Producer)
Joe Telford’s reputation as a union enforcer was legendary throughout the industry. 
His obituary in 1987 recorded the regime he had imposed: “[Joe] was feared by 
most of our commercial production companies. They were particularly nervous 
about his unexpected visits, and particularly about his almost second sight which 
let him know when an agreement was being breached...” (FTT Dov 87).13
The ACTT had no capability to inspect what was happening on foreign location 
shoots so an administrative measure was imposed. Crew lists had to be submitted 
to the union so that Overseas Location Clearance certificates (known as “White 
Cards” - example at Appendix 3) could be issued to each union member 
authorising that “The under mentioned member is cleared for the location shown 
overleaf in compliance with Rule 19” which stated:
□o member will be allowed to proceed on a film (quota or non-quota) 
or television foreign location or reconnaissance abroad (with the 
exception of urgent newsreel assignments) without informing Head 
Office of the fact. Any member failing to comply with this 
requirement may be subject to disciplinary action. Clearance 
certificates will not be issued to any members whose Trade Union 
subscriptions are in arrears.
Theoretically, the issuing of these cards assured the crew member that the ACTT 
confirmed that the member was correctly insured under the appropriate agreement. 
In practice, as indicated in the last line of Rule 19, it enabled the union to apply 
pressure on those members whose subscriptions were in arrears. The penalty for 
not obtaining prior clearance from the ACTT was that technicians had no recourse 
to the union should things go wrong. In 1980, the Film Production Branch 
considered an appeal for assistance from a crew who had been abroad without 
obtaining Location Clearance when the film company went bankrupt. It was
13 One interviewee believed that the retirement of Joe Telford in 1980 marked the end of the union’s 
ability to enforce the closed shop. His obituary also has the unfortunate phrase: “the ACTT’s 
progress will be your epitaph.”
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agreed that those members should not be helped from union funds (FTT March 
1980).
The need to pressure members to pay their full subscriptions was important because 
their payment was a loosely controlled process. ACTT members were supposed to 
pay a subscription of 1% of their income, but this was self-assessed for freelance 
members so there was considerable latitude in how much was submitted and when 
- many were inclined to pay just above the annual minimum once each year. 
Production companies were under no obligation to inform the union of the actual 
fees paid to individual members, and rarely had the structure to do so. Companies 
were small organisations when not in production, often based around two or three 
producers or directors, a few full-time assistants and some limited provision for 
bookkeeping. Business practices were not that sophisticated, and the bond of film 
making invariably meant that the division between employers and crew, especially 
on small productions, was not great. Invariably, “the employers” - producers and 
directors - were themselves members of the ACTT, and this meant that there was 
no clear line between employers and employees, the possession of a ticket being 
the critical, and common, factor necessary to work:
I started with Michael Law as the assistant around 1966 and the 
ACTT regime was draconian. Although you didn't need a ticket to be 
a producer (four on production wasn't usually a problem) I thought it 
would be better to have one rather than not and got one quite easily 
when I joined Gerry Poulson to produce in 1969 (which, of course, 
proved a Godsend when I decided to direct because tickets were 
"transferable"). (Peter Levelle)
Production companies were often transitory and there was no obligation for a 
company to be a member of the IFA or the AFVPA and thus be bound to the 
various union agreements. However, regardless of whether or not they were 
members of the employer associations, all companies invariably worked closely to 
the union agreements because the advantage for both production company and 
crew was that there was a recognised template for rates, hours to be worked, 
arrangements for overtime, travel time etc. Thus, the only information necessary to 
employ a crew member for the day was confirmation of the time and place where 
they were needed. Everything else would be assumed to accord to the union’s 
standard agreement unless it had been specifically negotiated.
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As described, these enforcement measures available to the ACTT may seem 
rudimentary, and to a large extent, they probably were.14 Do one had any real 
knowledge of how efficiently the ACTT checked the call-sheets; spot checks could 
be easily evaded and, if necessary, every production company knew of some 
friendly freelance crew who could be hired retrospectively to make-up the numbers 
should the union conduct a crewing audit. Some crew were certainly ambivalent to 
the union, regarding it as too expensive and too politically active.
However, the ACTT had two more effective weapons that combined to ensure 
compliance: the laboratories and fear.
Booth had observed that the exercise of union power could be exercised through a 
minority of unionised labour if their work was complementary in production with 
non-unionised labour. In film production all technical workers were union 
members but, as already shown, the ACTT’s hold over individual freelance 
workers was relatively weak. However, by controlling the essential workers, in 
this instance those in the labs on whom all others depended, the union had the 
means to exercise control over the whole industry:
[Although] these workers represent only a small fraction of the 
sector, the union does not control the labour force of the sector. But it 
can nevertheless paralyse the industry if its membership goes on 
strike (Booth 1995:74).
The exercise of union control in the laboratories was relatively simple because the 
work was more akin to light industrial employment and thus very different to the 
that of the dispersed creative departments on the studio floor. Therefore they were 
“less glamorous, perhaps, but ... the backbone of the union” (ACTT 1983:71). 
Whereas Sayles might have perceived the freelance film workforce as an Apathetic 
Group (“the least likely to develop grievances or engage in concerted action” and 
“less prone to engage in union activities” (1963:8)), the laboratory workers were 
undoubtedly a Strategic Group with the appropriate behaviour characteristics: 
pressured, continuous work; “the core of the union regulars”; and “highly 
cohesive” (1963:19&34).
14 The union did have some ‘successes.’ My own name was taken off the screen credits for 
Chariots o f  Fire (1981) because I was not yet a member of the ACTT.
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Kelly in his analysis of the state of employment relations of the film industry noted 
that “negotiations are generally concluded satisfactorily for the two sides must live 
with each other.” But whereas most film production workers were in daily contact 
with their employers, the producers, the laboratory employers were big multi­
national companies, such as Technicolor, Rank and Kodak, and thus negotiations 
were more confrontational. The ACTT had only had two major strikes in the thirty 
years 1934 to 1964, and significantly both had related to the laboratories (Kelly 
1966:171). The laboratories were 100% ACTT closed shops and the 1954 strike 
and subsequent lock-out had been particularly bitter, only finally resolved by the 
intervention of the Ministry of Labour, and enforced arbitration. The laboratories 
therefore were:
... the industrial powerhouse of the union. Time and again, while 
always ready to defend their own interests, the lab workers -  with the 
largest battalion at Rank Denham -  have come to the aid of the 
union’s membership when the call has been made. (ACTT 1983:33)
Sayles had selected the term strategic because of behavioural characteristics, not to 
indicate a position in the production chain (1963:19). However, until the advent of 
video (in the early 1980s) all production was totally dependent on the laboratories. 
All 35mm or 16mm film negative was processed overnight and the first print 
(“rushes”) delivered back to the studio the next morning for a first viewing by the 
director, editor and lighting cameraman. From then on, the progress of editing was 
dependent on the daily orders delivered from the labs until the final, married (i.e. 
film with sound track), graded (i.e. colour corrected) print was delivered ready for 
transmission or screening. Even when that print had been delivered, there were 
two last points where pressure could be applied. The negative, on which the whole 
production depended, remained the property of the laboratory until the processing 
charges had been paid in full. Without the “lab certificate” confirming those 
payments, the producers could not collect their final fee. Finally, if the production 
was for transmission from a UK commercial TV station, ACTT members would 
not handle it without the lab’s clearance, so the material would not be aired.
Therefore, the ACTT had the ability to hinder any production at the laboratory or 
before transmission - thereby severing the production company’s source of revenue 
- if there was any hint of a variation from the production agreement, a dispute over
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crewing levels, a disagreement about overtime or crew being unpaid. Joe Marks 
recalled that the release of a feature film, Gorgo, had to be twice delayed in 1961 
when the union refused to allow the release of the prints until the American 
producers had settled their bills with the special effects company. Another 
producer commented:
It wasn’t a good idea for a production company to get caught breaking 
the rules .... because the downside of a dispute with the ACTT was 
grim. The lab technicians (prints were used in those days) and the 
men handling the reels of commercials at the TV stations were all 
union members happy to oblige if the Union "blacked” a
commercial So they had you by the balls on a swift route to
financial meltdown! Some commercials were certainly blacked but 
how you find out which they were and how the situation was 
resolved, I have no idea...
The uncertainty reflected in the last line of the previous quote exemplifies the 
doubts that maintained the mystery of the union’s power. Do one quite knew how 
well the closed shop was enforced, but nor was anyone willing to explore just how 
far tolerance would be extended, because the ACTT was known to be 
“unreasonable and unyielding in negotiations, even at the cost of wholesale 
unemployment of its members” (Wood 1952:213). Do one knew who might be the 
activists on the crew who would report back to the ACTT if there were any attempt 
to negotiate an illicit deal or short crewing. In October 1979, the FTT reported 
under Feature Production Branch activities that the “camera section [had] reported^ 
this production [Mouse and the Woman] to the Branch” and that “a number of crew 
members were not in the union." There was some deliberation whether to allow the 
production to continue but, eventually, “accepting the producer's protestations of 
ignorance”, the producer and production manager were reprimanded and 
production allowed to continue "in strict accordance with ACTT regulations" (FTT 
Oct 1979). Every producer or production manager knew that discovery of such an 
illicit arrangement could jeopardise a production, mean missed deadlines, lost 
business, potential bankruptcy, a tarnished reputation in a small industry and thus 
potential loss of livelihood - and it was only bold or rash producers who attempted 
or tolerated any deviation from the accepted rules and procedures.
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With a limited shooting schedule, perhaps because a star has only a 
certain time free between other film commitments, producers are 
vulnerable to local union arm twisting. (Kelly 1966:171)
And by the 1960s and 1970s this power had been long established. Commenting 
just after the war, Wood had observed of the industry:
Those who learnt enough about films to criticise the ACT were 
understandably hesitant to voice their criticism, for fear that it might 
ban them from films for ever. (Wood 1952:213)
This sense of closed community, in which total interdependence meant that no 
divergence could be tolerated, is not that far removed from that of the eighteenth 
century “trade clubs of handicraftsmen” which, the Webbs had observed, “would 
have scouted the idea of allowing any man to work at their trade who was not a 
member of the club”; they had further commented that “this silent and unseen, but 
absolute compulsion, is the ideal of every trade union” (1898:214&215). 
However, while the objective of the ACTT in the twentieth century may have been 
similar, the “absolute compulsion” was perhaps not quite so idealistic, being 
enforced more by fear and uncertainty:
[the] Commercials Organiser ...would have been the principal 
policeman on the ticket front - it was sickening, the way we all had to 
toady up to him. (Producer)
Conclusions
That the ACTT had imposed and maintained a pre-entry closed shop in the film 
production industry from 1945 until the late 1970s seems without question. To 
progress in the industry, every worker had to meet the admission requirements of 
the union, the exact specifications of which were imprecise but which appear to 
have been the persistence necessary to locate an entry position, then demonstrating 
stamina and enthusiasm in that role, and finally acquiring the essential patronage. 
Although the weighting of those elements could vary, they meant that every 
member had served a quasi-apprenticeship through on-the-job training -  and many 
managers had followed the same route.
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The reward for that investment of time and effort was to gain access to an industry 
where employment conditions were largely prescribed by the union. The power to 
enforce this regime in a fragmented and often unstable industry appears to have 
come from a combination of craft and numerical strength applied in two very 
difference divisions of the industry. The element of craft exclusivity meant that 
there was theoretically no means to acquire the necessary film production skills 
except through one of the union approved gateways, and these were carefully 
regulated to prevent any excess of labour in the market. Should an individual 
manage to acquire the skills elsewhere, for example by working abroad, the union 
possessed the power to prevent the production companies substituting union 
members, or deviating in any other way, through their cohesive, numerical control 
of the critical laboratory workforce. Without access to the laboratories, no 
production company could survive, and this ensured compliance with all aspects of 
the collective agreements relating to film production: crewing, terms and 
conditions; pay and overtime rates; meals and travel.
It might be assumed that these powers were necessary to counter the power of 
concerted capital in the hands of the employers but in reality, the converse was 
true. The union was, and had to, be powerful if it was to protect the interests of its 
members because the film employers were, for the most part, weak, uncoordinated 
and transitory and the work was intermittent. Therefore, the union needed to be 
able to impose its will and prevent unscrupulous, ineffective or short-lived 
companies attempting deals which would erode the living standards of its members.
So if this was a closed shop, was it also an internal labour market? Certainly there 
appears to have been a labour market where “the pricing and allocation is governed 
by a set of administrative rules and procedures” and a craft market where 
“geographical and occupational jurisdiction of the local union generally defines the 
boundaries of the market” ((Doeringer & Piore 1971:2-4). The boundaries of the 
market were clearly defined and within them the union’s control over the pricing 
and crewing was complete. All workers were invariably inducted into the industry 
through on-the-job training (1971:17-22) and the skills they acquired were job and 
technology specific (1971:13-17) being unsuitable for any other industry. Lastly, 
the process of admission and training meant that all within the industry had been
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screened and conditioned to recognise and accept the customs and practices of the 
industry’s workforce: “the unwritten set of rules based largely upon past practice or 
precedent” (1971:23).
However, Doeringer & Piore believed the objective of workers and employers was 
stability and achievement of this was qualified because of the insecure environment 
within which the industry, workers and management, existed. The post-war 
British film industry was not an assured environment in which to work, so while it 
was true that a stable community of workers existed, and that within that 
community there were universally accepted customs and rules, the nature of the 
industry meant that they were not entirely protected from the vagaries of taste, style 
and international exchange rates.
The stability that the internal labour market did achieve through the rules, 
procedures and customs imposed by the union, was that workers were assured that 
there was no competitive market that could undercut their rates and that, when 
working, there would be prescribed employment conditions and practices (rates 
were never adjusted down to reflect market conditions). Producers were assured 
that there would always be a pool of appropriately qualified, skilled workers and a 
predictable tariff card. In this way the workers were “shielded from the direct 
influences of competitive forces” (Doeringer 1971:2), albeit only in the domestic 
external market.
However, this was the situation in the late 1970s, the 1980s would see a 
transformation and it is next necessary to consider the processes that would erode 
the conditions that had maintained union supremacy over relatively weak 
employers.
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“..due to new technological changes and a more hostile industrial 
environment, the [ACTT] union has run into a number o f  serious 
problems which cast doubt on the union’s ability to remain an effective 
bargaining force” (Maksymiw 1990:26)
In the late 1970s, there were few indications of any impending change that would 
affect the status quo of the closed shop within the film industry. Industrial relations 
within the sector remained well entrenched along preordained lines that had 
changed little since the 1950s because the union was expected to fight hard for its 
members who, as film technicians, had few alternative employments and little 
security (PEP 1952:279). By the late 1970s, feature film production had reverted 
to a pattern not dissimilar to the 1930s when the employers - the producers - were 
almost as vulnerable as the technicians, being dependent themselves on often 
unpredictable financial backers. Thus “the distant and not so distant history of the 
industry provide the film unions with reasons for being tough in bargaining, 
sceptical of management intentions and fiercely loyal to their members” (Kelly 
1966:171).
Despite this apparent hard stance, both sides continued to work in reasonable 
harmony, the employers deviating little from the collective agreements and mindful 
that every stage of the film production process was dependent on the unionised 
laboratories. In 1980, the notes for the Feature Production Branch in the Film □ 
Television Technician (FTT), in a section describing a “personal dispute” with a 
production company, recorded that the writer was “relieved to know that the 
negative is lodged at Rank Laboratories so, if the worst comes to the worst, I am
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sure we can rely on our labs colleagues1” (FTT March 1980). The threat was more 
than implicit.
However, in the 1980s the closure of the film industry workforce was presented 
with several new challenges and this chapter considers the effect of these processes 
on the ACTT and its membership. Section 6.1 considers the effect of the 1980s 
Employment Acts on the behaviour of the union, as the accepted conventions 
protecting the operation of the closed shop were removed. Section 6.2 considers 
the impact which changing technology had upon the stranglehold previously 
operated by the film laboratories to support the union’s policies. Although the first 
changes in technology came primarily from the increasing use in television news of 
Electronic Dews Gathering (EDG), the advances in video technology began to 
affect all aspects of the production process in television and commercials. Section 
6.3 is an assessment of the investigation done by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) into the operation of the closed shop within the film industry 
and the impact of the TV-am dispute of 1987 - the television industry’s Wapping - 
when an employer contested the prescribed working practices and crewing 
agreements. Section 6.4 will assess some of the ill-defined, but undoubtedly 
eroding, forces of social change that initiated a shift in attitudes, perhaps of little 
significance alone but, combined with the other changes, sufficient to challenge the 
authority of the union’s control over access to the labour market.
6.1 The 1980s Employment Acts and the ACTT
"Unions like the ACTT already have extremely democratic structures 
developed by their own members and reflecting their needs ” (FTT
Aug/Sep 83)
It is not intended to review here all the implications of the five Employment Acts 
passed between 1980 and 1990 which have been well recorded elsewhere 
(Auerbach 1990; Barlow 1996; Honeyball 1988; Mcllroy 1991), justified by those 
who participated in their formulation (Howe 1994; Prior 1986; Tebbit 1988;
1 Had “our labs colleagues” taken official industrial action, it would have been secondary action 
which was about to be made illegal under the 1980 Employment Act.
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Thatcher 1993) and whose objectives are stated in a number of Green and White 
papers (including DEI 980; DEI 987; DEI988). However, one of their effects was 
to slowly strip away, “step by step” (DEI987:1) the protections which had enabled 
the closed shop to operate.
□o official ACTT records survive for this period so the reaction to this legislation 
has to be gauged from the union journal, the Film □ Television Technician (FTT), 
and the recollections of individuals. However, an initial observation must be that 
throughout the 1980s there is little in the FTT to indicate concern about any of the 
measures being enacted. Whether this was because the legislation was considered 
to be of little significance to a system as institutionalised as film employment, 
whether because it was assumed that a future Labour government would repeal the 
legislation or whether because there was a policy that the union’s official journal 
was not the vehicle to alert members to their new rights, will be assessed later.
The FTT’s first comment on new Government plans came soon after the 1979 
General Election and set the tone of the debate about employment law as reflected 
in the pages of the FTT throughout the 1980s. Describing activity as a “phoney 
war”, more emphasis was placed on the proposed abortion law amendments and the 
ending of the Retail Price Index (sixteen lines of copy devoted to each) than to the 
changes to dismissal laws and right to picket (ten lines) (FTT Aug/Sep 1979). The 
FTT made no further reference to employment legislation for six months when it 
returned to the first Employment Bill, but that commentary appears to have been 
taken from a TUC briefing because there is no specific mention of the film industry 
and it refers very broadly to “Trade Union Movement" opposition (FTT February 
1980).3
A month later, the challenges that the 1980s Employment Bill posed for the film 
industry were addressed more specifically in a valedictory article by Joe Telford,
2 Although working in the industry through the 1980s and early 1990s, I recall no awareness o f the 
changes that were being effected on the closed shop and I don’t believe many of my co-workers did 
either. It has been significant during the interviews that almost no one can pinpoint the moment 
they realised that the closed shop had gone.
3 Although the copy does not appear to have been lifted from either document, the TUC had 
published two documents, Bargain to Beat the Act (TUC 1980) and Beat the Act (TUC 1981) to 
assist union members in opposing the 1980 Employment Act.
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who was retiring as the national organiser for commercials, shorts and 
documentaries. He correctly recognised the threat that the proposed laws relating 
to secondary picketing would present:
...particular dangers to ACTT... If someone darted off to Spain to 
make a commercial and instead of taking the proper crew and getting 
clearance, just two men had gone, and they weren't insured, there's a 
commercial our members in the labs are expected to process, our 
members in post-production are expected to edit, and our members in 
television are expected to transmit. Are we going to be prevented 
from taking secondary action to catch up with someone who's dug a 
hole through our agreements ? (FTT March 1980
These were valid points for the film industry where the various processes were 
undertaken by different commercial entities (and thus different employers). 
However, there was no further comment in the FTT which did not return to the 
government’s employment legislation for another two years when, in a full page 
article under the headline "Tebbit4 is danger!", the ACTT’s research officer, Andy 
Egan, explained the new legislation incorporated in the 1982 Employment 
Relations Act. Having listed three of the provisions (the removal of immunities, 
the attack on union funds and the definition of a dispute), Egan moved to a section 
entitled "Closed Shop: freedom for whom?":
From the ACTT's point of view, it has to be remembered that this 
package is applicable even where the closed shop takes the form of 
custom and practice rather than a formal union management
agreement  The outlawing of union-only labour contracts and
the restrictions on industrial action to ensure that only union labour is 
used would, of course, have a number of implications for the ACTT, 
since strong union organisation is essential in a fragmented labour 
market. (FTT Jan 1982:6) (my italics)
Egan’s observation concerning the need for a strong union organisation was 
significant because, as was shown in Chapter 5, the union’s own ability to organise 
its freelance members was not strong and was dependent on the employers whose 
position was now being strengthened.
Egan followed this with another article “ACTT & the Tebbit Bill" (FTT Aug/Sep 
1982) indicating the implications of the Bill “if allowed to operate.” The phrase is
4 orman Tebbit had been appointed Employment Secretary in September 1981.
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interesting because in the summer of 1982 a general election was probably two 
years away so there can have been little hope of an immediate Labour victory to 
reverse the proposals. Was Egan assuming that the proposals would be met by the 
same collective resistance that had neutralised the 1971 Industrial Relations Act ? 
Whatever the unstated expectations, Egan predicted that the Bill would undermine 
collective union organisation, would benefit ’free riders’ who want “the advantages 
without the obligations of union membership and who disrupt industrial relations to 
the cost of employers and members alike”. He emphasised that closed shop ballots 
were not a legal requirement, but recognised that without them there was the threat 
that “dismissals of free riders will be automatically unfair”. Egan closed with a 
warning to employers that the ACTT, in line with TUC policy, would refuse to 
cooperate with any ballots, and warned employers that attempts to include non­
union labour or to undercut agreements would be “as disruptive to their interests as 
to members.” It is not clear exactly how such disruption would have been effected, 
but the laboratory staff had considerable scope to disrupt the smooth flow of a 
production without any hint of recognisable secondary industrial action.
Determined as that sounds, there is little evidence that the Employment Bills were 
foremost in the Executive’s priorities at this time (FTT Dec 1982). Film production 
was going through a cyclical boom and it may have been that demand for labour 
was such that employment legislation seemed an unimportant threat. At the ACTT 
1982 conference, the government’s proposed employment legislation had appeared 
to be a low priority. Of the thirty five proposed motions only one motion put to 
conference related to Trade Union legislation and that stated, in very general terms, 
a support for TUC policy.
Considering the battles that were being fought at Wapping, Orgreave and 
Warrington it is an insight into the priorities of the ACTT, as a craft union, that so 
little relating to employment issues was debated at Annual Conference through the 
1980s. In 1980, of the twenty five resolutions considered at Conference, only four 
concerned political issues such as the opposition to public spending cuts, the 
support of the TUC in defence of union rights, picketing, discrimination and equal 
opportunity. By 1983, the percentage of “political” resolutions had risen to nearly 
a third, but the subject matter was not particularly focussed on Employment Act
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issues: nuclear disarmament, the British nationality Act and equal opportunities. 
Only one resolution of the thirty five related to trade union rights and again the 
motion was to support the TUC - although two resolutions relating to union 
administration were patently influenced by political events: a motion to set up a 
strike fund and a motion that the union should decide which party should receive 
the political levy. The 1984 Conference had three resolutions regarding trade 
union legislation. However, the motions are virtually identical, but proposed by 
three different divisions, and again merely supported the TUC urging them to take 
“no further part”, “to desist from collaboration [with the government]” and assuring 
them of the ACTT’s support.
An insider explained that this lack of resolutions and calls for action was because 
the considered view was that the debate about the Employment Acts had to be 
conducted at the national level by the TUC. The ACTT, a small craft union, could 
achieve little by lobbying alone and, in the climate of the time, there was little to 
motivate the interest of anyone but the most committed in the small, “step by step” 
(DE1987:1) processes that were eroding the union’s powers:
People moved away from employment law, it was just too boring for 
them. They would focus on some other outrage that was more 
personalised, and easier to get a grip on, and get worked up about, 
than the niceties of this latest bit of legislation.
Thus the Closed Shop is not specifically mentioned in any Conference debates 
about the Employment Acts until 1990 when there were two motions. Conference 
resolution (Do 15) stated :
Conference is further concerned that the attack on the Closed Shop 
will have a detrimental effect on the relationship between the 
management and shop floor where the Closed Shop agreement exists.
The second motion was from the Technicolor Laboratory Shop:
Conference instructs the secretariat to inform managements operating 
under ACTT agreements that the withdrawal of the Closed Shop 
procedure will have an adverse effect on the collective relationship 
between shop floor and company administration. (FTT Feb 1990).
These motions are only significant because, as will be shown in the third section, it 
is debatable whether a closed shop still existed in 1990.
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The disinclination of the Annual Conference to debate anything outside the film 
industry other than the broadest issues (nuclear disarmament and equal 
opportunities were unlikely to divide delegates) probably reflected the divisions 
that existed between the political activities of union activists and leadership and the 
constituent branches of the membership, in particular film production and the 
laboratories. This difference is seen in the monthly union journal, the FTT, which 
attempted to balance the priorities between being a trade journal (reviewing new 
equipment and techniques), a union information sheet (details of new rates, 
regulations and union business) and a political pamphlet, devoting significant space 
to issues well removed from the industry. In the FTT May 1987 there was a double 
page editorial devoted to the perils of nuclear power stations and there were 
frequent features about Dicaragua, abortion and Chile. There was some dissent 
from this preoccupation with events far removed from the union’s interests and an 
FTT letter writer (January 1984) lambasted the Executive’s condemning the US 
invasion of Grenada: "what is the point of these pious resolutions ?" Some of the 
membership held strong feelings about the FTT’s priorities and while it can 
probably be assumed that the laboratories and the more socially aware remnants of 
the documentary movement remained staunchly to the left, much of the production 
membership was more middle-of-the-road, being resident in home county suburbs, 
relatively well off -  and probably always had been. In the 1950s:
most of the people working at Pinewood were also Conservatives.
Only four members of the Pinewood ACT shop - the largest in the 
union after the labs - paid the levy to the Labour Party. ‘It wasn’t just 
inertia’ recalled Anthony Perry elected treasurer and later chairman of 
the Pinewood shop ‘most really were Conservatives’ (Harper &
Porter 2003:40)
However, while that might have remained true of film production workers, it did 
not reflect the overall composition of the union. In December 1978, 89.7% of 
ACTT members paid the political levy knowing that it would be passed to the 
Labour Party and significantly that was the highest registered percentage for any 
union, the next being SOGAT at 75.2% (FTT Mar 80). Therefore, reading through 
the back copies of the FTT, it is only the letters, rather than any editorial material, 
that reveal any right-leaning under-swell within the ACTT:
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As Conservative supporters, we feel we have, for far too long, quietly 
suffered and seemingly supported these outbursts [by Alan Sapper, 
the union’s General Secretary]. There are a great many Conservatives 
in the ACTT and we rarely hear of moves to stimulate our industry, 
but often of hate and envy from our left wing Executive. (FTT 
Aug/Sep 1982)
And in support of the Employment Acts:
... the closed shop is an ugly, sometimes brutal, attack on an 
individual’s right to earn his living without harassment; that 
secondary picketing is sometimes grossly unjust to an employer who 
is not involved in the dispute; that compulsory secret ballots before 
all major union decisions would do more to sweeten the industrial 
climate of this country more than any other single act. (FTT June 
1982).
But these were a minority. The Aug/Sep 1982 edition carried many more letters 
expressing solidarity with an ongoing ASLEF dispute, and the second letter quoted 
was countered by an editorial which stated that “what FTT has said... has been in 
accord with the policies of the Union adopted at Annual Conference and General 
Council Meetings." Sadly, what might have been an indicator of political leanings 
within the ACTT, the Political Fund ballot of 1985, was ambiguous. The ballot 
approved the political fund by 7,140 to 5,043 votes but on a very low turnout of 
49% (some unions, such as the Fire Brigade Union and the Carpet Weavers, 
registered turnouts close to 90%). Furthermore, the 59% in favour of a political 
fund was the lowest percentage recorded in the thirty six political fund ballots 
conducted between 1985 -  1986 (unions such as ASLEF, the Tailors & Garment 
Workers and the DUM recorded votes over 90% in favour of a fund) (FTT Dec 
1985; Webb 1992:29).
If the union’s official rhetoric remained fairly strident5 throughout the 1980s, there 
were signs that adherence to previously rigid boundaries regarding admissions, 
crewing levels and demarcation had begun to waver. In 1982, there was a first 
attempt to move from the draconian rule of “four, four & four” crewing levels: “in 
consultation with Heads of Departments, crews may be reduced for pack shots,
5 An informed commentator on this period (who did not wish to be cited) has observed that the 
union had to take a stand, and it meant what was said. It was obvious, given the climate of the time, 
that the union movement would be diminished -  but that could not be publicly admitted.
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second unit, test shooting and filming in restricted areas" (FTT Aug/Sept 1982). 
As will be shown in the next section, this proposal was never ratified, but the 
possibility of deviation had been recognised.
Also, although it is not easy to attach them to specific external factors, there were 
moves in 1987 to soften admissions policies. In early 1987, FTT reported a 
proposal to actively seek new members:
... ACTT membership policy should be rto seek out and to encourage 
membership (possibly with certain initial restrictions) of those who 
can establish that they earn their principal livelihood in a grade 
organised by the ACTT... * (FTT April 1987).
Moreover, whereas the post-war custom had always been “that a job should be 
advertised and that, if a firm cannot find adequately qualified ACTT members, it 
can employ a non-member” (Kelly 1966:174), by the late 1980s production 
companies who were in favour with the ACTT could usually get tickets for junior 
production staff without bothering to seek out existing ACTT members. The 
assumption seems to have been that if a legitimate company was prepared to 
employ an individual, then the union was prepared to accept them as a member, 
thus effectively creating a post-entry closed shop arrangement. Patsi Bucknall, 
who joined a production company as a production assistant in 1987, recalled that 
she was granted an immediate ticket when her company wrote to the union.
Furthermore, it would appear that demarcation control was also to be eased: “Those 
in workshops franchised by ACTT are allowed to become members and, if there is 
a restriction to a job or a section of the industry, this will lapse after two years" 
(FTT Feb 87).
Perhaps because of this easing of the barriers to membership, ACTT membership 
reached a new peak in 1987 at 27,157, thereby defying the national trend of falling 
union members during the 1980s (Kelly & Willman 2004:1). The two largest 
divisions being ITV at 6,745 and the London Film Division at 6,662 (FTT May 
87). From this continuing growth in membership, and the seeming lack of interest 
that the Executive had paid to the employment legislation, it might be assumed that 
all remained well with the cohesion of the union and its environment despite the
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Employment Acts. However, there was a greater threat that would prove more 
challenging.
6.2 The impact of new technology
“Video tape will curtail the employment o f lab members and put a 
strong weapon in the hands o f the employers ” (FTT June 1958)
As the quote above shows, someone within the ACTT had recognised very early 
that video would shift the balance of power within the film production sector and 
this section will argue that its impact, and that of digital technology, was more 
corrosive to closure than the Employment Acts. The introduction through the 
1980s of these new technologies had two major consequences. First, it reduced the 
dependency of the production process on the laboratories, and thus weakened the 
union’s traditional choke point, and second, it introduced a new class of post­
production technicians who had not come through the traditional entry 
conditioning, whose new skills were not readily absorbed into the accepted union 
categories and who therefore owed no allegiance to the established film practices or 
union.
The ACTT was consistently slow to recognise changes in technology and the 
evolution of sound crewing was a typical example. As early as 1966, Kelly had 
commented that
in the early days of talkies four men were necessary to manhandle 
bulky accumulators and wax recording gear. But in this age of the 
tape recorder the [sound] crew ought to be smaller (1966:171).
In the early 1980s technology had moved on further and an English director 
shooting in Paris recalled that sound was recorded by one man who carried the 
equipment on a neck strap and operated the boom with his freed hands (PL). 
However, in Britain, sound crewing was slow to follow. In the autumn of 1982 
there was a draft commercial agreement reducing four, four and four to a total crew 
of ten (FTT Aug/Sept 1982:15) but next month Jacki McCarten (the ACTT’s 
official responsible for commercials) reported that "they [the Film Branch] want to 
tighten it up" (FTT October 1982). However, some producers must have assumed 
that the draft agreement would be ratified and reduced their crews because six
Iain Reid v j • !  i t
Chapter 6 1980s: The Erosion of Formal Closure 165
months later, under the headline "warning on crewing", Jacki McCarten issued the 
following caution:
I would remind members that under the current [1970 FPA/ACTT] 
agreement, the minimum crew for a synch sound commercial is four 
on production, four on camera and four on sound.
Apparently, still further clarification was needed because a month later McCarten 
felt it necessary to issue a further notice: "Reference to a sound crew of three in a 
recent circular relates only to films under the provisions of Clause 19 of the current 
BFTPA/ACTT Agreement which does DOT specify crewing levels by 
Department" (FTT May 1983).
□ine months later (i.e. seventeen months after the draft agreement and eighteen 
years after Kelly’s comment) a new commercials agreement was announced (FTT 
Jan 84). This showed a reduction in sound crew was permitted - "a minimum of 
four on production, four on camera and three on sound", and furthermore that there 
could be diminishing crew, ranging through options such as vox pops, no artistes 
etc to "pack shot (silent) in studio” which now required only two on production and 
three on camera (FTT Feb 84).
If it had taken many years to accommodate the improvements to sound technology, 
then the ACTT’s reaction to the arrival of video technology was no quicker or more 
charitable. Even in 1983, when video was beginning to make some impact, the 
ACTT wrote disparagingly of video’s primitive origins in CCTV where it “kept an 
eye on smart motor cars in shabby showrooms, where many of its exponents come 
from.” The writer went on:
..it was not until 1977 that a renegade mix of broadcast production 
people and those who had been through their CCTV apprenticeship in 
partnership with engineers who had left the BBC, started a plethora of 
small TV facilities companies... A programme contractor who 
makes money out of programme making and is only reliant upon 
equipment as a cost efficient tool will arrive at a better equation in 
favour of the programme possibilities than a company which looks to 
the number of hours clocked up on a machine for its sole income.
And what of those that operated these electronic behemoths ?
Iain Reid
Chapter 6 1980s: The Erosion of Formal Closure 166
Editors become categorised in ‘divisions’ according to ‘their speed’ 
and the industry will not produce better programmes in such an 
environment.
The writer went on that the “Achilles heel” of the new systems was that the 
automated functions of the camera
continually deal in averages and compromises to the exclusion of 
anything special. It provides a limited set of options rather than a 
means of pure expression; it needs ingenuity to extend its qualities for 
the feature [film].
Accepting that “all of this places stresses on the movie making industry generally” 
the writer conceded that video would attract investment, but also noted that while 
many “businesses run very well by the efficient production of high volume, low 
cost products” would this new industry carry on the tradition of making better 
movies: “Will it make a Chariots o f  FireV’6 Only at the end of the piece does the 
writer become more conciliatory:
....it is a great opportunity. But only with the help of those pillars of 
the industry.... the union and its membership [who] are best placed 
to nurture the potential of this bright, clever teenager. (ACTT 
1983:160).
Video therefore was a clumsy tool, operated by renegades for whom speed and 
clocked hours were the only measure of success.
The first impact of video on employment within the industry (excluding the 
addition of a video assist operator7 - not a mandated ACTT grade - to commercial 
and feature film crews in the late 1970s) came not in the programme or features 
sectors, but in news gathering and the laboratories. In December 1982, the FTT 
announced that the UPITD lab was closing because “EDG [Electronic Dews 
Gathering] has meant that far fewer pictures are being put on film” but pressure 
was mounting on all laboratories: in Dovember 1981, Reed’s Colour Film 
Laboratory had closed with the loss of 17 jobs; in 1985, the Humphries Film
6 Chariots o f  Fire had won an Oscar in 1982.
7 The video assist camera built into a 35mm film camera recorded the image through the lens each 
time the shutter closed to allow the film to move on one frame. Although a primitive, flickering 
image, it allowed the director to view the framing and action that the camera had recorded 
immediately after each take. The first experimental use o f a video camera in this function had been 
in 1968 on Oliver! (Morris 2006:139).
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Laboratory closed with the loss of 130 jobs (FTT April 85); and the following year 
a further 29 jobs were lost when the Brent laboratories closed (FTT Jun 86).
In this era, video technology still had minimal impact on the production process of 
quality programmes or cinema because the quality of lenses and the automated 
systems, delivering only “averages and compromises”, meant that only low grade 
productions were shot directly onto video. However, video did have a big impact 
on home entertainment (VHS had been introduced into the UK in 1978) and in 
1983 the ACTT showed a brief interest in recruiting in the duplication industry, 
recognising that: “Video tape duplication is now a major and growing part of the 
entertainment industry in this country, but it is on the whole neither as well 
organised or effective as it might be." Therefore: "it is now the established policy 
of ACTT to organise in this area of video tape duplicating and the Union openly 
states its full intent to take a more active part in this expanding field of the 
entertainment industry.... [It] looks forward to increasing communication with tape 
duplicating workers, especially those who are not at present members of the 
union." (FTT Oct 83). Sadly, it is not clear whether this initiative had much effect, 
but it is reasonable to speculate that it did not because there is no subsequent report 
of recruitment successes or negotiated agreements with duplication houses.
This growth in home entertainment had been significant for the production 
industry, but more significant for its workforce were the developments, first in 
video and then in digital technology, which were to effect sweeping changes in 
post-production procedures through the late 1980s.
Historically, the laboratories had been critical to post-production because all 
editing of film was done using positive prints (the negative remaining in the 
laboratory). At the early morning showing of rushes (the overnight print of those 
takes selected at the shoot) to the director and cameraman the editor would note 
their preferred takes. The film was then broken down into the various slates and 
takes and logged, separating out the preferred material. Writing in 1985, John 
Boorman described the film editing process: :
The slow mechanical editing processes give time for reflection: 
cutting and joining, adjusting the soundtracks, looking at the off cuts, 
hanging up the strips of film in bins, rearranging them. All around us,
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on shelves, cans of films cover the walls. Every shot numbered, each 
can labelled. (Boorman 1985:210).
Working slowly, and usually sequentially, the editor would assemble the first cut 
for viewing: each preferred take had to be viewed, marked with chronograph, 
trimmed to length and spliced with Sellotape to create a rough cut. To 
subsequently change any shot meant removing the Sellotape and splicing in an 
alternative piece of film while an assistant would reconnect the discarded material 
with its header and footer and then re-file the rejected take in a film bin or can.
Only when this rough cut was approved by all involved parties, would the negative 
be withdrawn from the labs and passed to a neg cutter (another ACTT grade) who 
would, by matching the edge numbers, duplicate the film as a negative for printing.
Q
(This is a simplified description that ignores the soundtrack requirement .) 
Thereafter, the whole post-production process and vocabulary were laboratory 
processes: negatives, intemegs, inter positives, dup negs, bulks, graded prints and 
married prints. The final stages of any film involved the daily screening of a print 
so that the colour grading could be checked. Any necessary changes would be sent 
to the lab who would supply a corrected print the following day. Three weeks was 
allowed in the schedule for grading (Peter Levelle) and only when the final graded 
version was approved would the bulk prints be run off and despatched to the 
cinema distributor or broadcasting stations. The bulk print order itself was no 
small undertaking and again a lab function: a normal order for a commercial would 
be 500-600 prints for cinema distribution and a dozen for each commercial 
television station.
The process of bulk distribution for TV broadcasting, historically very profitable 
for the labs, was the first process to be replaced by electronic distribution in the 
very late 1970s. Improvements in telecine (the transferring of film to video) and 
the “condescending” cooperation of the TV stations meant that “play outs” (the 
electronic distribution of commercials to the television stations) became possible 
every Saturday morning during the TV stations downtime (David Jeffers).
8 If the picture involved dialogue or sound, then much of this process was duplicated because the 
sound track was printed onto a separate strip of film to create a ‘double head’ which had to be 
married, cut and filed with the appropriate picture frames.
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More changes followed which eliminated all the physical editing with film 
described above. All quality production continued to be shot on film, but thereafter 
the process was transformed. Do positive print of selected takes was required 
because the entire developed negative was transferred onto digital tape. Once the 
tape had been viewed by the director and cameraman, the material would be loaded 
into a digital editing machine (AVID) where the material could be ‘cut’, moved or 
duplicated with none of the generation losses experienced with film. Copies of a 
specific cut could be “dumped” onto video at any intermediate point and discarded 
if  another version was preferred. Only when the final version was approved would 
the negative be required for the final telecine grading -  a process which again 
required no laboratory involvement.
This transformation of the post-production world, and the reduction of the 
laboratories’ involvement, was not an immediate process. Many feature films 
continued to be cut in the traditional way9 and their distribution to cinemas still 
required the production of bulk prints. However, the process had started and the 
strength of the labs as the “industrial powerhouse of the union” was slowly eroded. 
In addition to the lab closures noted above, the number of employees at 
Technicolor was reduced from 1,200 to 300 (ACTT 1983:33)10 and the ultimate 
sanction for the enforcement of union agreements, the control of the critical 
negative, had gone. After the 1980 Employment Relations Act, secondary action 
had become illegal but it had rarely been necessary to apply pressure by using 
formal industrial action. The mere withdrawal of co-operation, the temporary 
misplacing of a negative or failure to get a shipment ‘onto the afternoon van’ was 
sufficiently disruptive for everyone to understand the message. However, with the 
laboratories no longer involved on a day to day basis the union had lost the ability 
to threaten the flow of the production process.
Post-production technology had thus neutralised the laboratories as the ACTT’s 
ultimate bulwark, but the concurrent growth of the video facility industry meant 
that there was a second influence upon the traditional union structure. The
9 The storage and memory of the early computers could not cope with the volume of a feature film.
10 In the summer of 2006, Technicolor announced 49 redundancies which reduced their total 
headcount to “less than 70 workers” (SSR July/August 2006).
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traditional post-production processes had been orchestrated and co-ordinated by the 
film editors who had invariably worked up from the cutting room floor to become 
ACTT members, and they jealously guarded their status which was based upon 
their specific skills of editorial judgement and manual dexterity with the time- 
honoured tools of film cutting. The new technology required none of their manual 
skills but, more critically, nor did it require their co-ordination skills with the 
laboratories. This change was gradual and many editors transformed themselves 
into post-production coordinators, but the editor as a pivotal link with the 
laboratories (and, by implication, with the union) was no longer critical. With this 
seemingly small change, which barely affected the traditional work of the studio 
floor, the balance of power within the industry had changed.
6.3 State of the closed shop 1988
“the introduction o f  new technology is having an effect” (MMC
1989:10)
It is fortuitous that an official record exists of the declared employment practices 
that were operating within the industry in the late 1980s. In March 1988, the 
Secretary of State for Employment (Dorman Fowler) announced that the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was to question whether two 
specific restrictive practices existed within the making of programmes, films or 
advertisements for broadcasting on television or exhibition in cinemas.
The reference practices specified were:
A restricting the extent to which work is performed by workers
who are not members of a particular trade union
B. requiring that minimum numbers of workers (whether or not
of specified descriptions) be engaged on particular productions or 
tasks (MMC 1989:42).
The first of these practices might have been implicit in the operation of a pre-entry 
closed shop, which it should be noted, was not yet an unlawful arrangement in 
1988. However, the reference was made under Section 79 of the Fair Trading Act 
1973 which allowed the Commission to investigate whether a practice was a 
restrictive labour practice and, if  so, whether it operated against the public interest.
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The Commission therefore investigated the whole range of activities which might 
have been considered part of the film or television sector including musicians, 
actors and journalists. However, this commentary will focus on the representations 
relating to the ACTT.
The Commission noted that there were “three indications of the existence of 
Practice A“ involving the ACTT: the first was the possibility of a closed shop 
which restricted the work available to those who were not ACTT members; second 
the requirement that subcontractors had to conform to ACTT agreements and the 
restrictions placed on broadcasting programmes not produced under ACTT rules; 
third, demarcation between the ACTT and other unions. The indications were 
located in three national agreements -  one between the ACTT and the television 
stations (requiring the latter to notify vacancies to the union) and the two 
agreements with BFTPA and AFVPA (which included a model letter of 
engagement requiring confirmation that the prospective employee was a “union 
member in good standing”). However, the situation was confused because the 
agreement between ACTT and the ITV companies had lapsed in July 1988 and the 
Independent Television Association said that the national agreement would not be 
renewed. The BFTPA reported that they had proposed the removal of the clause, 
but that negotiations had not yet started. The AFVPA had “no proposals in hand to 
amend the model letter of engagement, but said its members were not inhibited 
thereby from recruiting whom they wished for the making of TV commercials” 
(MMC 1989:13&14).
Regarding practice B (the minimum numbers of crew required) the Commission 
decided that it had been normal that:
either by custom or practice or by terms of a specific agreement 
minimum numbers of ACTT members had to be employed on 
particular productions or tasks. (MMC1989:15)
However, again the situation was confused because although the ITV companies 
agreed that might have been true, the situation had changed “during the course of 
the enquiry” and crewing was now “to need”. The Commission accepted this, 
stating “we therefore did not enquire further into this practice...”. BFTPA and 
AFVPA admitted having agreements with the ACTT specifying minimum crew,
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however “many of the terms of these agreements are under review”. The AFVPA 
gave evidence that they had “made proposals to change the interpretation of the 
minimum crewing clauses in agreement with the ACTT...” (MMC 1989:15). The 
Commission was probably generous to accept this because although they were 
satisfied “that a large number of dispensations11 were granted in 1988”, it also 
noted that meant a reduction of crewing levels in only 1.5% of all commercials 
(MMC 1989:55).
Officially, the Commission concluded that the ACTT was not responsible for 
restrictive practices and that view was certainly the interpretation made by external 
commentators:
In 1989 the ACTT was cleared by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission enquiring into restrictive practices. The commission 
acted upon the submission prepared by ACTT, Responding to 
Change, and concluded that whilst many restrictive practices had 
existed in the past, the situation had changed radically over the two 
years prior to the enquiry and indications were that this would 
continue. (Maksymiw 1990:27)
However, the Commission’s decision that the ACTT was not responsible for 
restrictive practices was not confirmation that restrictive practices did not exist, 
merely that the union was able to present them as reasonable:
The inquiry accepted that the de facto closed shops for technicians at 
some companies arose naturally because trade union membership was 
treated as a badge of competence, and did not stop companies 
recruiting whom they liked. (FTT May 1989)
The Commission’s task did not appear to extend to considering where an 
alternative labour force might acquire the “competence” if they were not union 
members.
Overall, the challenge for the Commission was that the evidence presented was 
ambiguous and perhaps, on occasions, disingenuous. The Commission may not 
have been oblivious to this, but do seem to have accepted the assurances given. 
Thus in their conclusions regarding the ACTT the Commission stated
n These “dispensations” were the waiver arrangements, referred to in Chapter 5, whereby 
companies could negotiate a short crew with the union..
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...we found either that reference practices did not exist at 31 
December 1988, or in a few cases that reference practices might still 
have existed but could be realistically expected to disappear as a 
result of current or intended negotiations.... (MMC 1989:1) (my 
italics)
Other observations indicate they may have recognised that the evidence presented 
was not conclusive. For example:
“The Commission received conflicting evidence about the practical 
effect of the minimum manning clauses in the AFVPA [commercials] 
agreement, particularly about the ease with which dispensations from 
the minima could be obtained. We examined data on a number of 
productions, but found that no firm conclusions could be drawn.”
(MMC 1989:15)
The Commission also appears not to have understood the relationships that existed 
between the AFPVA, the commercial production companies, and the advertisers: 
represented by the ISBA (Incorporated Society of British Advertisers) and the IPA 
(Institute of Practitioners in Advertising). During the 1980s, the advertisers had 
become alarmed at the rising costs of producing TV commercials and there had 
been a joint initiative in 1987 by the IPA, the ISBA and the AFPA which had 
invited Sir Leo Pliatsky to conduct an independent investigation into TV 
commercial production. Sir Leo had little specific criticism of the production 
process but found that the soaring costs were the result of the lax controls operated 
by the advertising agencies, the absence of few formal contracts and the lack of 
training for those controlling large agency budgets -  none of which reflected well 
on the advertising agencies who were responsible for the advertisers’ interests. Sir 
Leo recommended a number of new procedures and schedules (Pliatsky 1987) but 
few of these had taken effect by the time of the Commission’s enquiry.
In their submission to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the ISBA stated 
that their members believed that “film-making procedures are over-rigid and too 
costly” because of craft union practices, specifically the restriction that:
“films for TV must be made using union approved methods and 
labour. It is impossible for advertisers to show [i.e. broadcast] non­
approved material... Minimum crewing levels are insisted upon 
throughout the filmmaking process, however simple the sequence.
Finally, union agreements permit excessive overtime, unjustified 
meal breaks and unwarranted allowances. The film production
Iain Reid
Chapter 6 1980s: The Erosion of Formal Closure 174
companies, usually small and under financed, cannot afford to risk 
union alienation by insisting upon better control and management.”
The latter assertion was correct. As shown in Chapter 5, production companies 
were unwilling to jeopardise their livelihood by confronting the unions, but another 
clue to the behaviour of the production companies, and the advertising agencies, 
was contained elsewhere in the ISBA submission:
“unnecessary costs incurred at the production stage are multiplied by 
the fixed mark-ups from the film production company and the 
advertising agency....” (MMC 1989:111).
The production companies and advertising agencies made their money by marking 
up the costs of the production. As long as all production companies observed the 
crewing arrangements the cartel of producers and agencies could share the resulting 
generous profits. This Commission either did not understand or were unwilling to 
acknowledge this, and so accepted the assurances they received from the AFVPA 
without apparently appreciating that the consistency and stability of the union 
practices were essential for the survival of many production companies. Therefore, 
the AFVPA took pains to convince the Commission that no restrictive practices 
existed and in their submitted evidence rejected any suggestion of over crewing, 
emphasising that “there is every sign that the production sector is as lean and 
efficient as it ever has been...” (MMC 1989:109. These assurances appeared to 
have worked because the final Report stated that “of the comments made by the 
AFVPA one of the most important was” that:
“It is simply not true to suggest that production companies ... are in 
any way inhibited from recruiting the people they wish to use in the 
production... It is also untrue to say that there is any significant over 
manning....” (MMC 1989:31)
Again, the Commission never appears to have questioned whether any qualified 
non-union members were available and overall, it was patently difficult for the 
Commission members to understand exactly what did happen in a sector which 
they acknowledged was:
“ ...highly informal with some of the characteristics of a cottage 
industry. Reputation, knowledge and word of mouth prevail in 
recruitment alongside more formal, but less well used recruiting 
systems” (MMC 1989:6).
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Thus, even when the Commission was presented with prima facie evidence, the 
unions (ACTT, BETA and the EETPU) were able to create doubts:
“whether some agreements had been implemented in practice, or 
whether some of the agreements had the effect which might have 
been expected from the phrases used, and whether indeed the words 
used to describe an arrangement indicated the existence of a reference 
practice” (MMC 1989:31).
In short, the Commission, who admittedly were examining the sector at a time of 
rapid change, do appear to have accepted much of the evidence at face value and 
not investigated much further. The report is littered with statements which, for 
those who were working in the industry at the time, are questionable:
“ACTT said that foreign made commercials appeared regularly on 
British TV” (1989:14);
“we were told that ... all demarcations involving the ACTT had been 
discontinued [and] we did not therefore consider them further”
(198914);
“I should make it absolutely clear that Equity is entirely opposed to 
the practice which you describe as ghosting” (1989:19).1
When the final Report was published in 1989 the ACTT made much of their 
vindication. Roy Lockett of the ACTT wrote that the “recently published - and 
suspiciously delayed - report from the Commission totally exonerates the unions. 
If it has done nothing else, it has finally destroyed the myth of restrictive practices 
in our industry” (FTT May 89). However, the ACTT’s evidence to the 
Commission had reflected a considerable shift in position from that being taken 
only eighteen months earlier when Brian Shemmings, national Organiser of the 
ACTT, had stated
"I would make it absolutely clear that all material whether it is for 
broadcast or non broadcast must be made under the appropriate 
ACTT agreements using ACTT members. This situation has 
prevailed for many years and there is no reason for any alteration"
(FTT Sep 86).
12 This is a carefully qualified statement by Equity because it goes on to state they would never 
accept payment to a member in respect of work not done. In practice, the deal was usually that the 
member would duplicate the work of the non-member, but it would then be discarded in the cutting 
room. I had been involved in the negotiation of such an arrangement in Summer of 1987.
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Patently something had shifted within the sector in that short period and the cause 
of that that shift may have been the TVam dispute.
TVam, the first commercial franchise for breakfast television, had started 
broadcasting in February 1983 but ratings had been poor. By early 1987, a 
recovery plan to ensure the survival of the company included a proposal for 
reduced crewing levels and increased labour flexibility (David Chipp).
As a commercial TV company, TVam was signatory to the national agreement with 
the ACTT and so any change in crewing levels would have to be agreed with the 
union, negotiations did not proceed well and in Dovember 1987 there was a strike
tliby technical workers, followed by a management lock out on 24 Dovember of all 
229 ACTT staff. Historically, it might have been expected that TVam would have 
ceased transmission through their inability to locate suitably trained alternative 
staff, but the structure of broadcasting had changed and TVam were able to recruit 
non-union staff from the “growing freelance cable and satellite sector” (Maksymiw 
1990:27). The negotiations between ACTT and management made little progress 
but despite extensive picketing, and the publication of photographs of the strike 
breakers in the FTT (Jan 88; Feb 88), TVam was able to continue broadcasting, 
albeit on a much reduced scale. Eventually, on 17 February, TVam dismissed all 
229 ACTT technicians.
Within weeks a new deal, incorporating the changed working patterns, was agreed 
with the ACTT and the FTT reported, somewhat disingenuously, that the union had 
“lifted the threat last month to close down the company's operation" (FTT Mar 84). 
The reality was that the ACTT had been able to threaten, but not able to implement 
a close down because an alternative labour force was available. Although the 
TVam dispute relates to television production, whereas this thesis aims to track 
film workers, the significance of the 1987-1988 dispute is that the established 
demarcation of jobs across the whole industry was breaking down and thus all 
collective agreements would become open to interpretation.
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6.4 Social change
"The union’s polices on new membership make it seem like the 
apotheosis o f the Tory party - i.e. a tool fo r  the rich and elite to 
maintain their privileged position by excluding all outsiders and their 
right to work” (Letter to FTT Oct 85)
As the letter quoted above indicates, besides the technical, legal and political
challenges to the ACTT, there was some dissent to union policies within the
membership. It is impossible to quantify this dissent but it does represent one of a
number of processes occurring in this period which can be described as social
change and, although it is not easy to attribute distinctive results to what are
essentially anecdotal and isolated incidents, they are worth noting because of their
cumulative effect. Throughout the 1980’s there was an influx of workers into the
industry who, for various reasons, bypassed the traditional on-the-job training and
thus had none of the conditioning and induction into the customary rules that had
shaped the industry for so long. Thus automatic recognition of the union’s
primacy and an unquestioning acceptance of the rules and procedures could no
longer be presumed.
□owhere was this more marked that in the innovative post-production companies 
described above, which were dependent on a new generation of software and 
digital technicians who knew nothing of the traditional routes of entry to the union 
and the old loyalties. Despite the scom for video in the ACTT article already 
cited at page 165 (ACTT 1983:160), the new technical possibilities and the demand 
for capital expenditure spawned independent post-production facility houses which 
owed nothing to their film cutting antecedents. As the technology was new it 
required inventive and technically capable recruits because no-one was yet 
qualified to teach or train:
Recruits had engineering qualifications straight from university; 
engineering in its broadest sense, electrical engineering, chemical 
engineering - effectively most at that stage science-orientated because
you did have to have, in those days,  a pretty good understanding
of computing technology. The ‘must have’ wasn’t your creative 
talent, it was your ability to actually understand computing 
technology.
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In this new environment the ACTT was tolerated, some union members were 
recruited and management was willing to observe the conventions of the 
established industry:
 if I cast my mind back to 1980, yes, there was a union
membership and I was aware that you had to have a ticket. In fact I 
think a ticket was bought for me for the first year or two [by the 
company], but bit by bit by the mid ‘80s the whole idea of it 
disappeared. [Respondent was a departmental manager at the time]
But:
People resented it anyway, the idea of paying 1% of your income was 
pretty abhorrent in the late ‘80s, plus within the context of our 
industry [post-production facilities] there didn’t seem to be a 
relevance of what they [the ACTT] were doing. (David Jeffers)
In the new post-production grades, where new technology required the invention of 
new crafts and skills, there were no appropriate union agreements. Even the more 
general agreement about terms and conditions, working hours, meal breaks and 
mileage, which had been drafted to suit production crew working the studio floor, 
were slowly discarded by a new generation of management who, having invested 
heavily in post-production technology, wanted to work different shift patterns:
Throughout the late ‘80s, and early ‘90s, bit by bit, I just got rid of 
[the ACTT practices] and we just bought people out of those rather 
bizarre practices because the industry couldn’t afford to operate on 
that sort of business model whereby people who got no ten hour break 
[overnight or] if they worked past midnight, got paid for four days. It 
just wouldn’t work like that. The reality is that we had a young, 
highly skilled workforce who were well remunerated for what they 
did. (David Jeffers)
Post-production workers were not the only ones beginning to question how relevant 
the union was for them. Unit photographers were technically an ACTT grade but 
they were highly-regarded specialists who could negotiate their own deals 
regardless of the specified union rate. In 1986, Stephen Spielberg asked a stills 
photographer, Murray Close, to work on Empire o f  the Sun. Murray had been 
working in America and he had no intention of rejoining the ACTT because “the 
union was doing nothing for me whatsoever; there was no negotiating going on ”. 
The producers felt confident enough to employ him anyway:
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the production manager, Roy Button, had to go to the pre-production 
meeting with the union [when crewing would be discussed and 
approved] and he came back and told me ‘the union told us we can’t 
hire you’ and 1 said ‘why’s that ?’ and he said ‘because you haven’t
paid your union dues for two years’  Someone’s got to tell
Stephen [Spielberg] we can’t hire you.’ So we had a laugh - and it 
didn’t happen and I didn’t pay my union dues
Murray worked on the film unchallenged and when eventually the union contacted
him two years later, he met the ACTT representative, Brian Shemmings,
I was, at that time, probably one of the busiest photographers in 
England and clearly not a member of the union and they didn’t like 
the way that looked.... So, Brian came down and he was very nice 
and we sat and chatted for half hour, 45 minutes and I said ‘I don’t 
want to cause any problems here, Brian, if you’re willing to cross out 
all my bad debt, as you see it, I’ll start paying my dues from now on 
and rejoin if you like, if that will make everyone happy,... but you’ve 
got to tell me what the union can do for me, you can’t negotiate for
me anymore because you have no jurisdiction any more ......... And
he basically came up with ‘I can get you car insurance’ so I said ‘OK 
Brian, that’s great’ we shook hands and that was a deal - and that was 
the last I ever heard from him. (Murray Close).
The growing number of graduates in the film industry from the 1970s and 1980s 
created another new constituency of members who, being more self-confident and 
assured in their own status, were more questioning of the union. Do contemporary 
analysis exists for the 1970s and 1980s, but the Feature Film Workforce Survey 
2005 asked the educational qualifications of film employees and their year of entry 
into the industry. While there may be some inaccuracy because the 2005 survey 
cannot represent the complete cohort of those earlier years, the overall trend is 
clear, as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Highest Academic Qualification Obtained (by year of entry to film industry)
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(Skillset 2005:98).
These graduate film entrants, like their counterparts in post-production, found little 
in the ACTT’s activities of immediate interest. Michael Apted joined Granada, and 
the ACTT, from Cambridge in 1963.
I was, I suppose, barely aware of [the union]. I was aware of Alan 
Sapper but it seemed even to me at that time largely irrelevant to what 
I was doing and seemed much more about organising labour than 
dealing with the issues that I might have as a director. The ACTT 
seemed very left wing, very radical, very associated with the more 
revolutionary part of the industry rather than the realities of middle 
class people. I didn’t really get involved with it [the trade union 
movement] until I went to America.13
In the early 1980s, Tim Sullivan also joined Granada from Cambridge as a 
researcher and he was immediately signed up to the ACTT. He only became aware 
of the union’s ability to control his career when he made an early application for a 
place on the prestigious training course run by Granada for directors:
13 Michael Apted, director o f  Gorky Park, Coal M iner’s Daughter, Amazing Grace etc, is now 
President o f the Directors Guild o f America.
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 and that’s when I was told “Do, no, no you need to have ACTT
membership” so I said “Well I obviously have” and they said “Do, 
but yours is restricted for two years”. Well, no one had told me that 
and what that meant was that you had to stay in that grade, as a 
researcher, for two years and that was that.
Among the graduates trying to enter the industry were those from the newly formed 
□ational Film School. Officially the union had no reservations about admitting the 
trained graduates from such a school:
The industry blames the trade unions for restricting entry into the 
studios. But Mr George Elvin, secretary of the technicians’ union, 
went on record last summer to state that thirty trained beginners 
would be welcome annually in the film and television industries. 
(Dickinson 1963:9)
In 1967, the Lloyd Committee, set up to consider the establishment of a national 
film school had reported:
So far as the ACTT is concerned, we are satisfied that there would be 
no objection whatever to granting a union card to any students who 
qualified through a national film school, and indeed, the ACTT has 
expressed itself firmly in favour of improving methods of recruitment 
in this way. (DES 1967:6)14
In practice, the Lloyd Committee’s hopes were frustrated because the ACTT 
remained reluctant to accept graduating students and even national Film School 
(□FS) productions were scrutinised if they displaced ACTT members’ productions. 
At the 1980 ACTT Annual Conference, the screening of student productions on 
Channel 4 was debated because they contravened the agreement that all broadcast 
material must be produced by ACTT members. Conference eventually agreed, 
“against some opposition”, that DFS films could be shown because students’ work 
should be seen as proxy productions of the many ACTT members employed as 
instructors at the national Film School (FTT May 1980).
Moreover, Film School graduates applying to the union were not to be treated any 
differently to other entrants from established training schemes such as Jobfit 
(already referred to on page 137). At the ACTT Annual Conference in 1983, there 
was a call for the General Council to "expedite the implementation of suitable
14 George Elvin, Secretary of the ACTT, was also a member of the Lloyd Committee.
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training schemes and to ensure that those who successfully complete those courses 
shall have priority in their application for membership" (FTT May 83) but the 
policy remained that they should not get an automatic ticket on graduation, but only 
when they had secured their first appointment (as Sue Gibson had found). This 
policy meant that “the ACTT has not pulled up the drawbridge on new entrants. It 
helped to set up the national Film School, and students from there - and five other 
educational establishments - automatically get Union tickets i f  they can get jobs" 
(FTT Feb 87). (my italics) The official explanation was that the ACTT did not 
want to be seen to be treating the DFTS15 graduates preferentially to the graduates 
of their own schemes (FTT Mar 87).
The reluctance of the established practitioners to automatically accept graduates 
from the national Film School or the union sponsored training schemes into union 
membership demonstrates it was not sufficient to have acquired proficiency in the 
specific skills alone to gain admission. More important appears to have been the 
vital reassurances first, that there was no member unemployed in the job market 
and second, that the applicant had found a suitable employment in an approved 
grade and thus been screened as a suitable candidate acceptable to the community. 
Otherwise, having not been on-the-job trained, there was a fear that candidates 
trained away from the studio floor were unlikely to be aware of or bound by the 
conventions and the customary laws.
Equally distrusted were the emerging executive women in the industry. As shown 
in Chapter 5, women had always been accepted into the industry’s unions and some 
had taken significant roles in departments such as art, make-up and continuity. 
However, they had been invariably barred from the most senior, executive roles 
where they would be required to take control of the whole production, either 
creatively or financially. Kay Mander joined the ACT in 1935 in continuity and 
later directed several films, one a winner at the Venice Film Festival in 1956. 
However, she directed nothing thereafter: “Michael Balcon told me quite flatly that 
women couldn’t handle film crews and, anyway, there weren’t any suitable films
15 The ational Film School was renamed the ational Film and Television School in 1982.
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for women to direct” (ACTT 1983:67). Muriel Box had had a similar experience in 
the 1940s:
.. .the script which I had prepared and written myself, was taken out 
of my hands at the last minute by Arthur Elton, head of the Films 
Division at the MOI when he heard I was to be its director. The 
reason, he informed Sydney (then executive producer) was that he did 
not feel it was the type of film for a woman to direct ! (Box 
1974:163)
By the 1980s, it seemed generally accepted that women could lead in all creative 
roles. However, there was still some reluctance to accept women in senior 
production appointments. In 1986, Gale Ann Hurd produced Aliens at Shepperton 
Studios and described the opposition she met from some crew members:
It was very up-front, their discomfort with women... People would 
come in and sit down and would say ‘Who is really producing this 
film?’ and I would say ‘I am really producing this film’ and they 
would laugh and say, ‘Go no no, you’re the director’s wife, lovely to 
meet you, but who will I really be reporting to?’ and I would say,
‘Actually me’. ‘Well if that’s the truth, I want to be completely up 
front with you. I won’t take orders from a woman” said one... ‘Well 
you clearly won’t be working on this film.’ I thought it might be an 
isolated occurrence, but it happened quite a few times. (Shone 
2004:164)
The ACTT recognised that equal pay for women was not sufficient to ensure their 
status and so in 1981 the Annual Conference voted for the appointment of a full­
time Equality Officer, appointed in January 1982 (ACTT 1983:77). As shown with 
the example of Sue Gibson (page 142), women were beginning to appear in senior, 
technical positions. One respondent specifically identified the transition in the 
status of women with the demise of the closed shop because both occurred between 
1989, when she had been declined union membership as a location manager on the 
grounds that “this was not a job for a woman”, and 1991, when she had again 
applied and been granted a ticket (Martell).16
Overall, the doubt appears to have been that all these ‘newcomers’, women, 
software engineers, university and film school graduates, often had little or no first 
hand experience of the established conventions of the industry and this was
16 In the contemporary feature film industry, 66% of production staff are women (Skillset 2005:25).
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possibly justified. Many were interested only in the creative aspects of film -  or 
the challenges of new digital technology -  and not with the cohesion of a 
workforce with which they had little association. Therefore, although it is 
impossible to quantify, this new generation, coupled with the changing attitudes of 
some existing members, did assist the speed of change in the production 
community.
Conclusions
This research has found little to suggest that the 1980s legislation did much to 
accelerate the demise of the closed shop, which appears to have been under some 
pressure anyway. The absence of contemporary ACTT records may mean that 
there was a spirited debate within the organisation, but little has survived other than 
the occasional condemnation of government policies in the union journal. 
However, it should be noted that certainly by 1988, two years before the 1990 
Employment Act and four years before it became effective, the union seemed 
willing to deny the existence of any effective closed shop practices before the 
MMC enquiry.
The reasons for the easing of the closed shop’s hold are relatively easy to identify - 
weighing which was the most influential is more of a challenge. It seems probable 
that technology, in the form of video and digital storage, was the major factor, 
principally because it broke the influence of the laboratories over the entire 
production process and thus removed the union’s ability to bring pressure on the 
production company employers. Without that control, the union would have had to 
deal with individual members who were, as shown in earlier chapters, disparate 
freelance workers, often artistically motivated, all arranging their own contracts 
and thus not easily subjected to any disciplinary controls. Secondly, the new 
technologies introduced a new generation of workers who, coming straight from 
computing, mathematical or engineering degrees, had little time for or
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identification with the traditional studio floor practices and with the union that 
enforced them. This new generation were “geeks” - people for whom the task itself 
was much more engrossing than the terms and conditions that they were working 
to: “the whole workforce is vocational, people don’t join to do nine to five... There 
is a passion, [you] come here because you are prepared to live and breath the 
work...” (David Jeffers). This was, as already shown (page 195), also true of 
many film workers. However, in the new digital industry there was no tradition of 
a union presence, and nor was there any equivalent of the exceptional 
circumstances of 1939/1940 to encourage union membership. Furthermore, these 
digital workers invariably worked alone in Soho editing rooms, with none of the 
bonding experiences which existed on the studio floor or on a location shoot, where 
terms and conditions of employment might be discussed during idle moments.
Besides this structural change being effected in the industry, there were a number 
of other, simultaneous changes. It is evident from the proceedings of the MMC 
enquiry (set up not to question employment practices, but to ensure fair trading) 
that no one was willing to actively defend the operation of restricted labour 
practices - all parties were at pains to explain that, even if such practices had 
existed, they were no longer operational. As shown above and in previous 
chapters, this was a major shift in attitude that predates the relevant Employment 
Act.
Furthermore, there were changes in the composition of film production workers 
beyond those happening in post-production. There were more women employed 
outside the art departments, more graduates coming direct into the business and 
more individualism. In this environment, the union should have made new 
alliances and shown itself to be of value, but the evidence shows that the union 
leadership remained relatively detached from these new workers, more pre­
occupied with Dicaragua, nuclear power, abortion and Chile which were far 
removed from the shop floor issues.
Would the union have been capable of incorporating the new post-production 
workers and using their cohesiveness and critical position to replace the leverage 
that the laboratories had supplied ? It seems unlikely. First, everyone in these 
new sectors was new: there was no existing shop floor hierarchy to mobilise
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interest; little awareness among the graduate entrants of what a union could do; and 
there was no union tradition. Secondly, the formation of these companies was 
different. Whereas film post-production had been based around the craftsman 
editor in a cutting room with an assistant, video and digital post-production was 
big business requiring a huge capital investment in electronic equipment and 
extensive premises (invariably in Soho) to house it. This change in the position of 
capital in the production process will be examined in the next two chapters but the 
ACTT’s commentator on video had recognised the trend: “the value of human 
effort is reduced when their electronic counterparts grow out of proportion in a 
company” (ACTT 1983:160) Suffice here to state that these new employers were 
probably not as inclined to accept union primacy as the frail and transitory 
production companies had been.
Thus, by failing to encompass the new technologies into new branches, with 
legislation removing the protection of the closed shop and with better educated 
newcomers more likely to question the administrative rules and procedures, the 
union lost influence and with it the power to enforce the closed shop to the extent 
that it had operated before the MMC enquiry. As with all evolving changes it is 
difficult to fix specific dates but an incident in 1986, coupled with the evidence 
cited above, indicates that by the mid 1980s a very different atmosphere existed in 
film production to that of the mid 1970s described in Chapter 5:
“things finally came to a head over the endless breaks that the crew 
insisted on taking -  for tea, to go to the pub for lunch, for lottery 
raffles. “It was union regulated, whether you wanted it or not” said 
Giler [the executive producer]” Matters were finally settled when the 
director [an American] destroyed the tea trolley “mashed it into a 
cube” and issued ultimatums to the crew. (Shone 2004:165)
Thus the control of employment practices in film production had changed, but 
many of the practices were so well engrained, and the existing labour pool had 
been so tightly regulated for so long, that it was almost impossible to deviate from 
the unofficial rules and procedures that had been so well established. As stated 
earlier, many respondents for this research cannot remember exactly when or how 
they realised that the closed shop was no longer effective. Furthermore, within the 
film production sector closure had been so complete that there had been few
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opportunities for anyone other than union members to gain the specific skills and 
experience and thus there was no immediate available alternative labour force 
challenging for positions. How the situation evolved in two very different 
divisions of the industry will be examined in the next two chapters.
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" [An internal labour market] depends upon the rigidity o f the rules 
which define the boundaries o f internal markets and which govern 
pricing and allocation within them ” (Doeringer □ Piore 19 J1. 5)
Chapter 5 demonstrated that film production employment in the closed shop era 
conformed with the internal labour market theory of Doeringer and Piore (1971). 
However, that internal labour market was a craft market, i.e. one that was 
organised:
around the local union, and the geographical and occupational 
jurisdiction of the local union generally defines the boundaries of the 
market. (Doeringer & Piore 1971:3-4)
Chapter 5 also showed that the union was able to maintain those boundaries not 
though the direct control of their membership, but through the pressure that they 
could impose on the relatively weak production companies because of the latter’s 
dependence on the laboratories.
This chapter aims to use the criteria of internal labour market to provide a template 
against which to test if there is continuity of employment practices into 
contemporary film production. Should an internal labour market still exist, a 
second objective of this chapter will be to establish how this labour market has 
persisted without the union control implicit in Doeringer & Piore’s definition of a 
craft market.
The first indications that there continues to be a bounded, distinctive film 
production workforce came in the 2004 statistics of Skillset, the Sector Skills
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Council set up 1993, licensed by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills. 
(Skillset 2001:4). As noted in Chapter 1, Skillset recognised that there was a 
separate and distinctive workforce for the feature film industry in their survey of 
the other audio-visual industries (those industries will be examined in Chapter 8):
Previous experience has established that the modus operandi of the 
film industry is sufficiently different from the rest of the audio-visual 
industries to merit a completely different methodology. (Skillset 
2003c: 15)
That different methodology was undertaken in 2004 and identified 9,700 named 
British crew members from the call sheets of 109 eligible productions (Skillset 
2005:19). These were feature films made in 2002, with a British crew, lasting 
eighty minutes or longer and with a budget in excess of VAm i.e. those films made 
utilising the crewing structures, invariably 35mm equipment and the production 
methods that were largely unchanged since the 1930s or 1940s
This clear identification of a select group means that some of the necessary 
microeconomic data that Doeringer & Piore thought necessary for a rigorous proof 
of the rigidity of an internal labour market (1971:5) is available because the survey 
identified that in 2003 the feature film workforce was better paid, with a mean 
annual salary of £37,276, than the wider audio-visual sector, £29,840. (The 2003 
□ew Earnings Survey showed that average gross annual pay of all fulltime 
employees in Britain was £25,170.) (Skillset 2005:65).
The feature film workforce also had distinctive demographic characteristics. There 
were few young people employed in the feature film workforce (only 3% in the age 
bracket 16-24 compared to the overall UK workforce of 16%) and the majority of 
the workforce in established, occupational groups were over thirty-five years old: 
camera department 73%; construction 91%; sound 75%; and costume 71%. Only 
in two areas were the majority under thirty-five, assistant directors (60%) and 
location workers (58%) (Skillset 2005:25&26), these being the occupational groups 
that included a number of entry grades - runners, traffic marshals and production 
assistants.
The feature film workforce was not only older than those working in the other 
audio-visual industries, it was significantly older than the overall UK workforce:
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66% of feature film workers were over thirty-five whereas in the wider audio­
visual sector 62% were below that age; only 3% of feature film workers were 
younger than twenty-four in contrast to the 16% of the UK labour force in that age 
group; the mean age of feature film workers was just over forty years (Skillset 
2005:25&26).
There were also marked differences in the gender distribution of feature film 
workers because only 33% of women worked in film compared to 46% in the UK 
workforce. However, this is not uniquely abnormal and the overall film workforce 
figure disguised that in some sectors women were the majority: production 66%; 
costume 70%; and hair/make-up 88% (Skillset 2005:24&25). However, the ethnic 
analysis of crews provided more positive indications that boundaries must exist 
because although most of film production is based on the London region, where 
24% of the population is considered to have minority ethnic origins, those 
characteristics only applied to 5% of the London based feature film workforce 
(Skillset 2005:27).
However, while these statistics showed that a distinctive work force might exist, 
they provided no evidence that the film labour market was shielded from economic 
forces and so this chapter will seek that evidence through Doeringer & Piore’s four 
“heuristic” factors which might indicate an internal labour market (1971:5).
Section 7.1 will show that there is longevity to the rules covering wage 
determination and the allocation of film production labour and that many 
principles remain unchanged from the closed shop era when the union nominated to 
the employers those workers available for employment. The second section tests 
Doeringer & Piore’s requirement that the effective rules and practices are 
inconsistent with the operation of a competitive market. The challenge here is that 
union and management are no longer appropriate sources of commentary -  but the 
evidence is nevertheless available. Section 7.3 will show that labour remains a key 
element in the production of film and that on-the-job training provides both a route 
to the industry specific skills and the essential entry route to the informal networks 
that maintain the customary laws discussed in Section 7.4.
Iain Reid
Chapter 7 The Characteristics of Contemporary Film Employment 191
Section 7.5 will demonstrate that the producers are still active participants in the 
internal labour market’s operation because they utilise the stability and efficiency 
that Doeringer & Piore predicted that it would provide (1971:29-31) in order to 
reduce their own exposure to financial risk.
7.1 The longevity of the rules
“The main problem always was, and, in fact remains, getting in ”
(Langham 1996.TL)
“the production model used today has not changed significantly in 
decades” (Davenport 2006:251)
Doeringer & Piore’s first “heuristic” factor required that “many of the rules
governing internal wage determination and allocation have survived over a
considerable period of time”, preferably through changing economic and technical
circumstances (1971:6). The changing environments have been reviewed in
Chapters 1, 5 and 6 so the requirement here is to demonstrate that the wage
determination and labour allocation procedures have persisted too.
The easiest of these to demonstrate is labour allocation because that remains firmly 
within the control of the workforce. The convention persists within feature film 
production that the director selects the Heads of Department (HoD) for their 
creative abilities and each HoD then recruits their preferred team, each of whom 
will negotiate their own contract with the producers (Blair 2001:160; Davenport 
2006:254). This is a long-established principle. The director of photography, 
Ossie Morris could only recall one occasion, in a career that had started in 1932, 
when a director had attempted to impose an operator. Ossie had regarded the 
intervention as such a serious affront that he considered resigning from the picture, 
it being “always accepted that cinematographers pick their own crews” (Morris 
2006:242).
Demonstrating continuity, in 2004, Richard E Grant (the director) identified 
Charlie Watson as his ideal first assistant director when he was selecting crew for 
Wah-Wah. However the producers had not budgeted for Charlie’s nominated 
second assistant, Alex Oakley, and so both declined the film: “Alex and Charlie 
will not play victim to [the producer’s] divide-and-rule tactics and both refuse to do
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the job without the other.” Grant only secured both assistants by agreeing to pay 
the financial shortfall out of his own pocket (Grant 2006:83-85), demonstrating 
both the importance that crew place on working with their own team, and the 
importance that directors place upon securing the right individuals for specific 
roles.
Another continuous factor in the placement of labour is the nepotism and family 
contacts necessary to enter the industry as these three references relating to 1932, 
1967 and 2003 demonstrate:
His entrance into British film [in 1932] was procured through the 
purest nepotism: his mother took C.M.Woolf to tea, who, thrilled to 
have a great grandson of Alfred Lord Tennyson dangled before him, 
found the boy a place as camera assistant under Michael Balcon.
(Sweet 2005:169)
It is clear that as conditions are at present it is a very haphazard 
matter indeed whether those who wish to make a career in film 
making, however suitable or talented they may be, can in practice 
find a way into the industry. Frequently this may depend on whether 
they have access to some person of position who is able to facilitate 
their entry. (DES 1967:5)
... one of the very startling findings from the Developing United 
Kingdom Film Talent report is that nepotism still plays a huge role in 
terms of how people fare in developing their careers within the 
industry, indeed in entering the industry in the first place. (DCMS 
2003:II:Q610)
Little has changed here since the closed shop era described in Chapter 5. When 
crew need to recruit they fall back on those they know and trust and so look to their 
own family members or friends who can be relied upon to understand the 
requirements and accept the conventions: Blair et al. (2001) established that 56% 
of crew identified family or friends as their means of initial entry into the film 
workforce.
If no such candidates are available, crew will look for those with some proven 
commitment and that usually means those that work in the periphery of a film unit - 
the drivers, production company runners, even catering assistants - all of whom 
have some understanding of the industry and its demands. The Director of a
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respected training scheme, noted that these methods have not changed in twenty 
five years:
It is the same now for young people wanting to get a foot in the door.
If they haven’t got family in the industry that they can tag along with, 
then they do need to look for any means they can, whether it’s 
running in a facilities company, whether it’s driving, camera truck 
driver, whatever it is they will still need to find those routes to get the 
contacts, to get the experience necessary to start to progress...
Although heads of department nominally select all their team, the task of selecting 
trainees is often delegated to those who will work most closely with the 
newcomers:
The obvious gatekeepers1 are the cameramen and the operators but 
generally the operator will say to me, you’re in charge of the rest of 
the crew. Dot necessarily the grip, the grip will be his [the 
operator’s] choice, but certainly the loader and the trainees would be 
me. (Focus puller)
Therefore, should a department need supplementary crew members then the extant 
crew will source these from the recommendations of other crew that they know and 
trust, or they will induct those that they have observed on ‘dailies’, the days when 
members of the extant crew have worked on another production:
... when I am looking for a trainee, I will go through other contacts...
For instance, the loader I have got at the moment, I rang up another 
focus puller and said ‘Who did you use on that ? What was he like 
‘cos I’d heard he was very good ?’ .... so only through 
recommendation. Or if they come in on a film as a B camera, or 
dailies or something like that. You tend to sort of pick people up like 
that. But generally, if  I’ve never worked with someone, I won’t use 
them, unless they come with an enormous reputation.
[Trainees ?] I have a selection of about five or six that I would use.
They are people I have met along the way, if I go in on dailies. My 
latest acquisition I went in a day on a Miss Marples and he was acting 
as central loader and doing all the paper work and running the back of 
the truck and getting us tea and coffee ... being an upper end trainee.
And he said ‘Look, I desperately need to do some feature films, all 
I’ve done is tele and it’s becoming tedious’ and so I got him on a 
couple of things recently, normally it’s about £350pw.
11 had prompted the term ‘gatekeeper’
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So although the closed shop formality of admission to the union has gone, there is 
continuity in that management - the producers - still have little jurisdiction over the 
composition of the crew and the selection of new entrants. The producers’ only 
ability to veto is through their financial control, but should they exercise that right 
they risk alienating the key creative talents on which they are dependent because 
this is an area where crew know that they have the upper hand:
Sometimes you do get directors, producers saying “I’d love you to 
use my useless nephew” -  at which point you say “I will use your 
useless nephew but if he is late, useless or has any facial piercing then 
he’s out...”
The continuity in the determination of wages is less easily proven because 
undoubtedly there has been an erosion of the official union agreements which 
governed the industry in the 1970s and 1980s. An example of the complicated 
matrix of overtime, meals, travel and weekend working used in a now defunct 
BECTU / AFVPA agreement is shown at Appendix 5 and that reflects the old 
‘industry standard’ day of eight hours. Most interviewees confirmed that the detail 
of these agreements had been ignored since the mid 1990s when crew were 
invariably asked to work a ten, eleven or twelve hour day. However, as will be 
shown, many crew in this sector are compensated by a higher rate than the extant, 
but largely ignored, agreement specifies, and even if the old agreements are no 
longer observed, the conventions are not forgotten:
“You don’t step out of the principles of the agreements, otherwise 
you’d have a riot on your hands .... If you worked long hours without 
recognising the overtime or whatever it would be hopeless” 
(Producer)
The challenge in being definitive in this area is that film production remains a 
sector where 89% of workers are employed on a freelance basis (Skillset 2005:37) 
and thus, while the ACTT negotiated collective agreements in the closed shop era 
(and BECTU continues to do so) these only specified the minimum rates for each 
grade (examples appear in FTT June 1978). Those working on feature films have 
invariably been paid more than the basic and those with especially valued skills
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were always able to name their price. In 1951, Ossie Morris described negotiating 
his fee as Director of Photography on Moulin Rouge:
When I saw John [Woolfe, the producer], he said ‘John Huston wants 
you to photograph Moulin Rouge for him. What salary do you want?’
I said ‘I’d like £100 a week, sir.’
He nearly fell off his chair. ‘But you were only getting £40 a week 
on your last film.’
“Yes, I said, “but I think I’m worth more now.” (Morris 2006:68)
When Morris received his contract it averaged nearly £120pw and these 
inexplicable inconsistencies persist through to the present. This contemporary 
focus puller was very open about the unpredictability of his daily rate which the 
extant agreement specified should be £165 per ten hour day:
Generally TV is between £220 and £270 a day. Feature films one 
hopes is between £300 and £400 a day. Do rhyme or reason why the 
money is why it is. Stormbreaker last year was a £40m budget and I 
was paid about £300 a day, so that’s relatively low for a feature film.
Therefore, it can be argued that wage determination remains consistent, if only in 
its unpredictably, as in the days of the closed shop era. Patently the proffered rate 
can vary, but the challenge is that there are so many non-economic factors involved 
in wage determination that it is difficult to weigh their relative importance. As 
Seglow had observed (1978:39) for many technicians film making is a creative 
activity that is not undertaken out of strict economic necessity and, as will be 
shown below, employment for some crew is secondary to status or convenience. In 
mid 2006, The Hogfather was shot in an east London television studio and many 
potential crew declined the shoot because of the onerous commuting from west 
London (where many freelance crew live to be close the main film studios). Film 
crew are sensitive to many subjective factors which will affect their expectations 
and thus their requirements: the status of the production; the kudos of working with 
specific crew; the compatibility of the schedule with other commitments; and 
personal factors because there are “those who don’t want to leave their wives and 
those who are desperate to get away from them.” (Boorman 1985:104). These 
many subjective considerations may have little to do with economic factors such as
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the availability of alternative labour or the proffered rate being probably more 
closely linked to some personal preferences - or what others in their network is 
doing:
there’s always a reason for doing something, or a reason for not doing 
it, you take into account who the cameraman is, who the actors are ... 
but generally it’s am I doing anything else ?
...it was, you know, fairly dodgy TV but it filled a gap in between 
one film and the next and it was 25 minutes from home, it was a five 
day week and we finished exactly on time every day and that was 
guaranteed from the beginning, there was never any overtime, no 
messing about...
Overall, it seems that the rules relating to wage determination and allocation of 
labour have changed very little in the fifteen years since the closed shop era ended. 
Wage determination remains a matter of individual negotiation and the proffered 
rates remain as unpredictable as ever in an industry where there are many factors 
qualifying any offer of employment other than financial reward: during the closed 
shop era, Tony Richardson had directed Look back in Anger for no fee (Walker 
1974:58).
There is less uncertainly about the allocation of labour which remains firmly in the 
workforce’s control. Even without the controls of the union, the workforce remains 
self selecting in terms of appointments and entrants -  and there are still four, and 
often five, on camera (Relph 2002:25).
7.2 The inconsistencies with a competitive market
“ ’The way we do things here ’ has made it very difficult fo r  producers 
to control budgets... ” (Relph 2002:10)
The second factor identified by Doeringer & Piore as being important to show the
existence of an internal labour market was the commentary regarding the rules of
the workplace. If management was particularly critical of the rules because they
created inefficiency, or the union and management conceded that some undesirable
practices were so ingrained that they were non-negotiable, then it was probable that
there were rules that would not survive in a competitive market. If such comments
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were prevalent then rigid boundaries did indeed exist and the workforce was 
shielded from external economic pressures (1971:6).
Of the four Doeringer & Piore requirements for an internal labour market, this is 
the condition that requires some concessions. As will be shown in the next 
chapter, when feature film production is compared to the wider audio-visual 
industry it is clear that the rules in feature film production have proved more 
resilient than those in sectors more exposed to the demands of capital. However, 
Doeringer & Piore’s nomination of the union as the rulemaking body of the craft 
market’s boundaries is no longer applicable. While the Skillset survey found that 
33% of the feature film workforce were BECTU members (2005:77), many remain 
members solely for the services to the individual:
I get the £3m indemnity in case I smash something or break 
something...” (Grip).
using Hyman’s (1994) typology of union identities, BECTU’s current 
approach could be predominantly defined as that of the ‘friendly 
society’, providing mutual insurance, representation and consumer 
services to individual employees. (Blair at al. 2002:3).
BECTU’s total membership of 25,000 (SSR Jun 2005) now represents a much 
wider range of entertainment interests (e.g. 5,000 members are in the theatre 
division) so its density is inevitably low amongst the total audio-visual workforce 
of 144,000 (Skillset 2003 & 2005) and the anecdotal evidence is that BECTU is no 
longer significant or influential in collective bargaining. One former union 
member went to the bar at Shepperton studios:
“So there was a bunch of electricians and scene hands and all sorts of 
people standing around in the bar, so Peter and I joined them and we 
said ‘do you know the guy who used to be in charge of BECTU’, and 
they said to me ‘What’s BECTU ?’”
When Sue Gibson asked for a show of hands of union members from crew 
discussing their grievances on a dining bus, “only a couple of hands went up.” 
Two feature film producers discussing terms and conditions among production 
units confirmed the lack of influence that the union had on real negotiations and the 
lack of awareness amongst the workforce:
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The lower grades don’t have any sense of negotiations going on 
regarding their employment. ... [They] can find that the film is, or is 
not, applying the BECTU / PACT agreement. And, if doesn’t need 
to, then why should it ?
Health and safety [legislation] and the European working time 
directive have had much more impact on us than the unions.
However, even if the union is no longer a viable force in the enforcement of the 
rules, there is ample evidence that rules still exist and that they confound the 
pricing and distribution of labour that would exist in a competitive market. The 
evidence is contained in the Film Council’s Relph Report (2002).2
The Relph Report was an extensive survey of low budget films (those costing 
between £2m -  4m made in 1999 and 2000) to identify why UK production costs 
were so high. The report covered many aspects of production including producers’ 
and directors’ fees, equipment costs, the availability of cheap finance from tax 
breaks and Lottery funding and the crew expectation for catering and hotels. 
However, a primary reason for high costs was that:
Both producers and crew have expectations about terms of 
employment, working practices and conditions ... (Relph 2002:1)
The specific reasons were not hard to identify because there was an “ingrained 
attitude of crew of how things are ‘supposed to be done’...” (Relph 2002:87) and 
the examples cited conform to the rules and principles already identified in this 
paper:
Heads of departments ... expected to be provided with staff according 
to a fairly rigid set of parameters otherwise they maintain they cannot 
do their job properly. (Relph 2002:9);
Cinematographers [DoPs] invariably insist on their regular crews and 
those crews do sometimes take advantage of that because they know 
they are not really competing for the job. Many producers like to keep 
parity between grades at similar levels in different departments ....
So a focus puller or camera assistant who knows he is preferred can 
cause havoc in the rest of the budget. (Relph 2002:25)
2 Simon Relph was Chairman o f the British Academy of Film & Television A rts..
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Demarcation is a major factor in the organisation of art departments.
People on the floor spend most of the day standing about because 
their skills are only needed for a few minutes. That is not to say most 
people don’t help their mates -  standbys certainly muck in with one 
another - but a painter is needed to paint and a rigger to rig ... (Relph 
2002:30)
However, these observations only confirm that working practices remained extant, 
they do not show that the rules are contrary to those operating an open competitive 
market -  except that Relph then went on to make comparisons with six analogous 
films made in the United States and five European countries: UK, France, 
Germany, Denmark and Spain. This revealed striking contrasts because mainland 
European production was cheaper and the crews were smaller: although every 
country employed four on camera, all other departments were smaller. Thus there 
were nine employed in the UK art department, there were six in the French, five in 
Denmark, USA and Germany and only four employed in Spain (Relph 2002 49). 
The overall result was that:
There were 56 crew on the British film, 38 on the US film and 36 on 
the French film. The Spanish had a crew of 31. The German and the 
Danish crews’ total, at 27, were both less than half the British total.
(Relph 2002:42)
All the European countries scheduled more shooting weeks, but limited them to 
five days -  only America matched the long hours culture and the six day week of 
the UK but then the Americans had lower pay rates.
The long hours culture of UK film making is an example of an accepted procedure 
that can be regarded as “not only undesirable but ... beyond the control of the 
parties to renegotiate . . . ” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:6). As shown above, the rules 
involving overtime in the closed shop era were complicated and often open to 
interpretation so the rationalisation has been that producers negotiate a ten, or 
twelve hour deal. The Skillset survey showed that 77% of camera crew reported 
that they worked eleven hours or more (2005:43) and that evidence was confirmed 
by most interviewees:
Call to wrap is eleven hours, generally, and a lot of productions do 
twelve hour days, call to wrap. And then if you do a continuous 
working day then you knock two hours off; an hour for the lunch and
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an hour for them getting continuity of work throughout the day...
(Focus puller)
Twelve hours a day including lunch. Anything after that is an hourly 
payment, everyone gets the same actually so it’s not a personal 
question. It’s £30 an hour after the twelve hours. We have no 
choice, that’s one of the reasons they [American productions] come to 
England. (Stills photographer)
These long hours and six day weeks result in enhanced weekly payments (Skillset 
found that over 50% were earning over £1,200 per week (2005:70)) and Relph 
believed that crews now regarded this as their basic pay and so were unwilling to 
discount their rates if  offered a five day week and shorter days (2002:8).
Thus the evidence indicates that the UK feature film production community 
operates “rules which are not consistent with the pricing and distribution of labour 
which would prevail in a competitive market...” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:6). 
However, the British film production industry does survive despite these rules and 
the reason would seem to be in part related to the highly skilled and specialised 
work force whose role will now be discussed.
7.3 The critical role of labour
“We have technicians and people second to none in the world ... our 
cameramen, our sound recorders, our designers are the best in the 
world. There is nobody better” (DCMS2003:II:Ev85)
Doeringer & Piore’s third factor which could indicate the rigidity of the internal
labour market was related to the role of labour. “Investment in enterprise specific
human capital, on-the-job training and the role of labor as a fixed or quasi-fixed
factor of production” were conditions that appear consistent with the internal
labour market (1971:6). All are conditions met by the contemporary production
industry.
The workforce is a critical element of film production. The freelance workforce 
statistics indicate a ratio of approximately eighty to ninety freelance workers per 
UK production (Skillset 2005:UK Film Council 2003:68; BFI 2004:32)3 and Relph
3 Relph estimated 55 crew on a low budget film (2002:9)
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found that crew represented 20-25% of the total budget (2002:10). Longitudinal 
comparisons are almost meaningless given the differences in the scope and 
complexity of different productions, but a random, unscientific selection of 
Chariots o f  Fire (1981) and the Hogfather (2006) showed that the 1981 Unit List 
production recorded seventy-two production crew (i.e. excluding post-production, 
publicity, legal and cast) whereas the 2006 production named ninety-two 
production crew members for the same categories, plus a further twenty-eight 
available for dailies. Many departments and grades were identical in the two unit 
lists (e.g. wardrobe, electrical, gaffer, grip and standbys) and the notable additions 
were in the camera department (the Hogfather used two cameras and the associated 
crew increased from five (in 1981) to twelve) plus the additional staff required for 
special effects.
Some of this increase can be explained by changing technology because although 
in many other industries technical advances have been used to reduce the 
manpower requirement, within feature films the technology has been used to 
improve the end result - and that improvement has created more employment:
We have cameras that are lighter, easier to load; film stock is faster, 
needing much less light; the huge lamps have been superseded by 
miniaturised versions -  yet schedules get longer and crews larger. Of 
course, the answer is that instead of trying to save time, these devices 
allow us to attempt more difficult shots and effects. Film has been 
described as the ‘art of the possible’, and every year more things 
become possible. (Boorman 1985:126).
That ‘art of the possible’ has continued to advance in the last two decades, 
particularly because of special effects using computer graphics. Although digital 
technology is a predominately post-production process, it has imposed new 
requirements on the studio floor - and thus impacts on the production crewing 
considered in this paper - because although technology has eased some material 
and organisational demands, it has placed more demands on the skills of the crew. 
In Gladiator (2000) the actions of a handful of men were replicated using digital 
computer graphics to create battle scenes seemingly enacted by thousands. For the 
producers, this scaling down of the cast and the associated wardrobe, 
accommodation, catering and transport, represented a huge cost saving, but that 
same process greatly increased the demands placed upon the skills of the crew and
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cinematographer who had to capture various images so consistently that they could 
be successfully merged in the post-production process. Every special effect 
requires new skills to be developed, and those that master them possess unique, 
highly-valued qualities, being able to juggle the various elements of film, light and 
subject:
Effective special effects nearly always involve a mixture of 
techniques. The trigonometry of the brain is ruthlessly clever. If 
there is something wrong it will detect it. The beholder will not know 
what is wrong, just that something is wrong. So we must trick the 
eye and brain by shifting from one device to another and creating a 
perfect illusion. (Boorman 1985:55)
Thus, while the function of a camera operator or a focus puller may appear obvious 
and simple (the responsibilities of the operator are listed at Appendix 4), dexterity, 
experience and proficiency are required to perform these crafts at the highest level - 
and these can only be achieved through aptitude and practice because the 
complexity of the tasks cannot be replicated in the classroom (Doeringer & Piore 
1971:20):
A good [operator] will always enhance and improve the shot, 
adjusting the position of the extras and props and being acutely aware 
of anything that goes wrong. He also organises the equipment 
required for each shot and plans ahead with his chief grip so that he 
can begin laying tracks for a subsequent set up or prepare the crane.
He will constantly strive to enrich the frame and be concerned, 
together with the continuity girl, in matching one shot to the next.
While I rehearse the actors, he will direct the prop men and special 
effects people to make sure that everything is working. Finally he has 
the dextrous task of operating the camera movements. (Boorman 
1985:117)
□ot many can possess all these skills, and thus those that have them will be a 
significant contribution to the successful completion of a film in both creative and 
material terms.
Similarly, one of the many skills of the focus puller is to guarantee that the 
relationship between aperture and focus will ensure that the projected image 
constantly mimics the depth of field of the human eye so that the attention of the 
cinema audience will, with no conscious thought on their part, be drawn to the area 
of the screen that the director wants them to see. This may not seem difficult when
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even the cheapest camera has auto-focus, but in cinema the camera and subject may 
both be moving, the light across the scene may vary and actors’ actions may vary. -  
and maintaining focus is just one objective. Knowing what will be happening in the 
cinema audience’s peripheral vision will also be critical because the director may 
want the audience to appreciate the wider view before being drawn to a particular 
character or event within that mass of visual information. Thus as a shot evolves, 
the focus puller may be simultaneously adjusting both focus and aperture and while 
technology has assisted with some of the demands upon focus pullers (remote 
controlled operation of the focus and aperture has eased some of the physical 
contortions required when cameras are in inaccessible places), the technology does 
not yet exist that can match the innate skills of a trained focus puller and camera 
operator team.4
In performing these tasks to ensure that the recorded image is consistently perfect - 
whether a take is repeated many times or just once because of the prohibitive cost 
of a special stunt -  they fulfil the criteria of job specificity (their skills have no 
application in any other job) and technical specificity (their familiarity with 
specific machinery delivers greater speed and accuracy) that Doeringer & Piore 
required (1971:15-17).
These skill characteristics of a camera crew are replicated in all the departments of 
a film unit: the grip’s ability to adjust the speed of a moving dolly to match the 
operator’s and director’s requirements; the make-up artist’s ability to create a life 
threatening wound; the stunt artist’s ability to fall from a building to a specific 
mark; the polystyrene sculptor to create a cliff face. It is these “highly specialised, 
narrow based skills, enabling them to work efficiently together at short notice” 
(Davenport 2006:254) that make them so invaluable to producers.
However, the acquisition of those very specialised skills still requires an investment 
in terms of time and effort that has changed little since the 1970s because the skills 
are so specific:
4 Even when using motion control cameras (where a computer is programmed to repeat the same 
camera move every time) an operator and focus puller must set up the camera at the outset.
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... if you want to work in the sound department, you will be a boom 
operator for five, ten years and then you might progress to be a sound 
recordist for ten, twenty years. But if you suddenly wanted to work 
in the art department, that would be really hard because you wouldn’t 
have the skills or the experience to do that... (Davenport 2006:254)
And although it will be shown in the next chapter that there is a growing education 
industry for the audio-visual industries, it will also be shown that, to date, that 
those coming from formal education have less access to the internal labour market 
because the skills acquired through on-the-job training conform to a recognised 
pattern:
... the people that are getting trained up by those fifty-years-olds are 
still working exactly the same way as those fifty-year-olds when they 
were twenty. So while the technology moves on.... the actual 
working standards and practice haven’t changed.. (Davenport 
2006:254)
Therefore, as Doeringer & Piore assert, it seems “natural” for the trainee to be 
working in the real setting, amongst those with whom their career will be linked, 
where learning will be automatic and progress, motivated by curiosity, will move 
the trainee from one task to another as each is mastered (Doeringer & Piore 
1971:20-21).
On-the-job training is characterised by its informality. In many ways 
it appears to occur automatically by “osmosis” as the worker observes 
others or repeatedly performs his job. (Doeringer & Piore 1971:39)
Lastly, as already noted, the intensity of the work cannot be replicated elsewhere - 
it can only be experienced in the production setting because of the urgency and 
degree of perfection required. However, as Doeringer & Piore predicted 
(1971:19&20) such training is not without cost: “the process frequently involves 
waste of material” and it also carries immediate indications of success and failure. 
In one respondent’s evidence, the penalty of failure for a trainee was effected in 
both monetary and psychological terms.
We were doing a very complicated shot with Sean Connery. He was 
in a car doing a stunt ... it’s not launched into the air but the old guy 
is bashed into a seat and there’s dust and it’s not a pleasant shot to do 
for him. And we had three of four cameras bolted onto the front of 
the fake car and one of the cameras I was convinced at the end had 
run out, and the loader kept guaranteeing me that ‘no, it was fine’ and
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we had got the shot in that roll - and the next day the last two takes 
were not on the roll, so he’d run out two takes... He was asked to 
leave the production. On his way out he was asked to go and explain 
to Mr Connery why he had to do the shot again -  he just disappeared, 
took his bags and ran. (Focus puller)
Thus labour is a key component of film production as Doeringer & Piore required. 
The critical position of labour has not been supplanted by technology, indeed the 
specific skills required have become more refined and more specialist as 
technology has extended the possibilities available to directors. Furthermore, 
given the nature and stability of film crew, the natural route for entry continues to 
be on-the-job training alongside those to whom the trainee’s career will inevitably 
be linked. This training and the subsequent progression is not without possible 
without the investment of time and effort of the individual:
“wage sacrifices necessary to attain access to the internal labour 
market thus represent a trade-off between present and future income” 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:28).
Within film production these wage sacrifices are not only necessary for initial 
entry, they may also be necessary to progress and advance through the grade 
hierarchy. One respondent described how he had earned £45,000 in his last year as 
a clapper loader, but only £6,000 in the following year as he established himself as 
a focus puller.
But if the role of labour and its associated, specific skills remains consistent within 
film making, does that stability create continuity in all the associated rules and 
customs of the workplace ?
7.4 The persistence of customs and traditions
“I t ’s who you know, again it always has been, i t ’s scary. It ’s who you 
play go lf with, up at the top. The Bonds have a go lf day at the end, their 
wrap party is a go lf day: they ’re at Foxhills ” (Focus puller 2006)
Doeringer & Piore’s last criteria to indicate the existence of an internal labour
market was the least formal and related to the re-enforcing of boundaries that social
capital and networks could create in a stable workforce :
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... a series of phenomena connected with the psychological behaviour 
of workgroups and the process by which customs are formed at the 
workplace which create certain rigidities within the internal labour 
market. (Doeringer & Piore 1971:6)
This process could be considered cyclical. Because workers strive for stability they 
contrive, as already shown, to work with a consistent group so building a network 
on which they depend for work, recommendation and advancement: i.e. social 
capital. This constant interaction with a small group generates “a set of unwritten 
rules governing the actions of their members and the relationship between members 
and outsiders”. Furthermore, on-the-job training conditions those that meet the 
induction requirements to emerge into the community abiding by the rules and 
obligations which dictate acceptable conduct within the group. For example, there 
is no technical reason why pay parity should exist between focus pullers, boom 
swingers or sound assistants - but it is a convention respected by management and 
the workforce:
Everyone always goes into parity: you can’t earn more than the boom 
swinger or whoever. (Focus Puller)5
As the cycle continues these rules become so established that they acquire an 
“ethical or quasi-ethical aura” -  setting out what is and what is not acceptable 
behaviour until these rules govern many aspects of the work relationship 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:23&24).
Other research has established that the composition of the British feature film 
workforce is remarkably consistent (Blair 2001:154;Davenport 2006:255) and, 
because crew select those they will work with, if a particular combination has 
worked once, then everyone will always attempt to book the same team again, even 
on commercials:
“It was for PC World -  and I have done about 15 of them now... they 
never get tedious, they are good fun actually ‘cos its all -  you know 
when you get a certain director, they’re quite specific towards their 
crew....” [Interviewer: so i t ’s always same crew ?] “Yea, with some 
slight alterations here and there but 99% of it...” (Assistant Director)
5 The same respondent added that individuals could sometimes personalise their deal by adding 
“some bogus bit of equipment just to make that rate a bit more palatable because they appreciate 
your skill....”
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Crews assemble “their sort of people”, people they know that they can work with 
and who will respect the rules and conventions, conscious that their unit fits into a 
framework of interdependent units, all relying upon personal relationships for their 
survival. Doeringer & Piore had referred to the similarity between custom in the 
internal labour market and the customary law in medieval Europe, invoking the 
feudal manor (1971:23) and that same reference was invoked relating to the 
prevalent hierarchy which existed among film workgroups:
In some respects the industry is still quite feudal: productions are 
often little principalities with a rigid pecking order. Since most 
personnel are freelance and dependent on the patronage of the 
hierarchy for their next job this often fosters an unhealthy 
environment where diversity of opinion is stifled and sycophancy 
rewarded. Talent and ability are recognised but jobs are equally often 
awarded on the basis of who one knows or whether one's face fits:
‘are they one of us ?’ (DCMS 2003:III:Ev95)
Within such a “feudal” hiring system relationships are important and conformity to 
the rules, the maintenance of “a good reputation” and recognition of the hierarchy 
are critical to employment:
As projects are typically short, those who work in the film industry 
have to re-secure work on a very regular basis and so that 
interdependence among group members and pressure to maintain a 
good reputation (on a group and individual level) is felt on an 
ongoing basis. (Blair 2001:16)
“loyalty to the DoP is paramount when putting a [camera] crew 
together” (Morris 2006:242)
Furthermore, any introduction of a new individual into a group will create ‘a 
dependent’ that will be forever associated with their ‘sponsor’:
What you don’t want to do is find yourself in a situation whereby the 
art director’s cocked it up and you’ve been the one that’s suggested 
the art director .. and he [the director] says ... ‘Look .. that chap’s 
useless, he’s your fault’ (A senior manager cited by Blair 2001:159)
Within Doeringer & Piore’s requirements of the internal labour market, “workers 
who violate the code are subject to discipline” by management or the remainder of 
the group (Doeringer & Piore 1971:23-24) and in this example, an interviewee had 
transgressed the accepted code having publicly “taken the piss” out of an influential
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production manager. He had thus severed his link to that patronage and described a 
subsequent encounter:
I saw him at Panavision, I was at the end of one corridor and my 
mate, who runs Panavision, was talking to him and [when my name 
was mentioned] he said ‘he’s not one of our team’.
If there is a sense of loyalty to one’s extended “family” (an individual may possess 
social capital in a number of teams) then that sense of collective identity also 
extends to being part of the feature film workforce too. Crews want to work within 
their own ‘strata’, with those they know share the same values and skill base. The 
most clearly defined boundary is that between film and television, the latter being 
almost universally regarded with disdain:
“The biggest problem in the film industry is the fact that film industry 
is incredibly snobbish about television. A lot of people who work in 
film industry do not want to have anything to do with television.”
(DCMS 2003 :Q 15)
The Relph Report (2002) had noted that there were many practices within 
television that could be advantageously applied to feature film production, but 
noted that while a cinematographer may agree to “television” conditions, “his or 
her regular crew usually won’t . ...” (2002:59. The rigidity of the barrier, however 
illogical, was recognised from both sides
“... when I went [to the DFTS], you know, I didn’t talk about 
television, I only talked about film. And I have only ever studied film 
in my life, I have never studied television.... Dow I have been lucky 
that ... I haven’t had to do things like The Bill, or London’s Burning 
or stuff like that. I have been able to do stuff that’s quite high profile 
so it’s been quite engaging but, nevertheless at the end of the day, I 
want to make a movie, to make a film. But that’s a tough thing 
because the film world is very different to the television world. Film 
are very sort of, look down on us people in television” (Television 
Director)
Thus the effects of social capital are not all beneficial to employers because while 
established workgroups ensure that the team work well together, relying on those 
networks may exclude many who are just as capable, and may offer better value, 
but who are unwilling or unable to participate being “ those who are simply 
outsiders with no existing connections on the inside” (Field 2003:22).
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The divisions within the feature film workforce are more subtle and not so readily 
recognised by the outsider, but the rules are very real nevertheless. This 
respondent likened them to soccer divisions and emphasised the conventions of 
family connections:
I suppose I’m in the First Division, probably number 5 or 6, they [in 
the Premier Division] are not necessarily the best focus pullers, I’ve 
watched them, but they talk the right talk, and with the right people - 
and usually they come from the Hume family or the Mathew family 
or the Coop family..
These “unwritten rules based largely upon past practice or precedent” (Doeringer & 
Piore 1971:23) were usually too great to surmount, again because of the difficulty 
in acquiring social capital in another network. Without the critical connections 
outside one’s normal hierarchy, the conventions would invariably work against the 
individual because another group’s network would intervene:
I will never work in ... ‘A’ band movies, that sort of niche like 
Batman, all those really big American pictures, the Warner Brothers 
movies that come over here. .. .1 was so close to doing Batman. That 
was the annoying thing, I nearly broke that barrier and I just got 
stomped on by, you know.... [Interviewer: can you explain ?] The 
cameraman phoned the cameraman on [Captain Correlli 5 ] Mandolin 
and the two focus pullers who did that, they were mates ... and they 
recommended those focus pullers and they did it.
At the pinnacle of those “A band movies” or the “Premier Division” is the crew 
that work on the Bond ' movies. The status, closeness and exclusivity of the Bond 
crews are legendary throughout the feature film sector. One interviewee repeated 
an anecdote which, sadly, is unsubstantiated, (she heard it from an accountant who 
also looked after a number of Bond crew members) that when there had been an 
extended gap in the 00□ series many of the ‘Bond Boys’ had sold their second 
homes in Spain and taken their children out of private schooling rather than accept 
bookings for what they perceived as inferior work on mainstream films. One DoP 
described these elite workers as “Mafia” and another crew member, who had not 
worked in this group, described how the system perpetuated itself:
The second unit crew on the Bond movies is always the same, and it 
very much works that the tea boy becomes the trainee becomes the 
clapper loader becomes the .. and ends up then the cameraman. I am 
sure whoever is cameraman on the second unit now was the clapper
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loader 15 or 20 years ago and that is very obvious and it is incredibly 
closed shop and if you’re not friends, and you don’t play golf with the 
right people then you’re not going to get in there. ... You’re never 
going to work on the Tomb Raider, the Bond, the Harry Potter.
Harry Potter is as incestuous. I’ve worked with the operator that 
works second unit on Harry Potter and he’s done all of them and we 
didn’t really see eye to eye and that just guarantees that I’ll never 
work on Harry Potter even for an additional camera on a final day 
even if someone put my name forward.. Dot in a malicious way ....
So that sort of cliquey side of it is very prevalent...
In these informal ways, relying on custom and precedent, the system is perpetuated 
through a number of internal labour markets, each technically limited by its 
collective social capital. The evidence would indicate that either there is just 
sufficient interchange of individuals, or that there is an institutional persistence 
from the closed shop era, to ensure that those separate markets are similar in their 
customs and procedures despite their different composition. However, the value of 
the internal labour market to all workgroups is stability because these rules regulate 
the allocation and pricing of labour (so ensuring that the groups do not compete on 
economic grounds) and, as they became more “constrained and less responsive to 
market forces”, so rigidity has been established in those areas as Doeringer & Piore 
predicted (1971:28).
However, this still does not explain why the employers have not been able to break 
up this seeming anomaly of worker control. While there is some strength through 
the informal coordination of numbers and the possession of specific skills, these 
seem relatively insignificant in a multi-million pound industry where it might be 
assumed that capital would seek out the most economically competitive. The next 
section will demonstrate that it is still the producers who perpetuate the system.
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7.5 The complicity of employers
“At the end o f  the day, producing is simply having the will to get 
something done, and figuring out a way to make sure that thousands o f
people will help you. ” (Producer cited by de Winter 2006:xii)
Chapter 5 showed that an internal labour market existed in the closed shop era and 
that it was maintained through the power held by the unions over the production 
companies who were vulnerable to pressure from the laboratories. The evidence 
shown in this chapter indicates that an internal labour market still exists and 
therefore it has to be explained how this is maintained when the union’s remit has 
been eroded and the laboratories, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 6, no longer 
hold a critical position.
It might be assumed that the employers would now hold the stronger position and, 
to make themselves more competitive, be striving to break up what Relph (2002) 
had identified as entrenched working practices that encouraged greater costs than in 
the European and American markets. However, the characteristics of UK 
production companies have changed little in the last twenty five years and the 
majority remain small and uninterested in labour matters. In 2003, UK film 
production was described as “an under capitalised ‘cottage’ industry based around 
entrepreneurial individuals...” (DCMS 2003:3) and in the latest statistics available 
(2004), 89% of the 6,210 production companies turned over less than £lm  (many 
are dormant but remain registered for tax purposes). Only 186 turned over more 
than £5m (UK Film Council 2007:155).
So if the production companies remain weak and if the unions can no longer 
command any authority, does the internal labour market persist solely through 
institutional inertia ? Doeringer & Piore (1971:25) showed that union involvement 
meant that changes could be effected through collective bargaining, but when 
unions are not involved change was only effected through the slow evolution of 
precedent and past practice. However, the next chapter will show that other 
groups, equally well established as internal labour markets in the closed shop era, 
have not survived, and so other reasons must be sought for its persistence in the 
feature film industry.
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This section will argue that there are two, related reasons why the producers have 
not challenged the internal labour market.
First, there is the position of capital. The production companies are not the 
possessors of capital. They are middlemen who raise the funds for unique projects 
from the distributors, exhibitors and other investors who will be the profit takers if 
a film sells well. Therefore, the producers have no interest in reforming the 
workforce’s organisation if it delivers the necessary results at no cost for which 
they are liable.
The second reason is that the producers recognise the various efficiencies that the 
stability of the internal labour market provides in an otherwise unstable 
environment because, within reason, they can assemble a viable and well practiced 
workforce “whose skill and behavioural characteristics are well known to 
management” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:31) with minimal recruitment and 
screening costs. Those two reasons will now be explored in greater detail.
“UK producers are not entrepreneurs in the sense that is generally understood” 
(Davenport 2006:253) because they rarely expose themselves to personal financial 
risk beyond establishing the fabric of a production company which, when not in 
production, requires little more than a few administrative staff. The producers’ 
interest is in making films and making a reasonable income and they do this by 
acting as the intermediaries, bringing together capital (from the distributors, 
exhibitors, television companies and other parties willing to speculate) and the 
creative team (the director, cast and crew) that will actually realise the film by 
turning a script or concept into visual entertainment. This is not to belittle the 
producers’ contribution. Many feel passionate about film - and their skills in 
bringing the necessary constituents together are critical if projects are to happen - 
but their commercial commitment and ambition are tempered because, given the 
limitations on how many projects can be managed simultaneously, they are rarely 
interested in expanding their companies’ turnover or size.6 Furthermore, they need
6 In 2006, only two production companies were involved in more than 4 projects. 332 companies 
were associated with just one feature (UK Film Council 2007:148)
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to make no capital investment themselves when all the production assets required 
for filmmaking are readily available for hire; studios, camera equipment, transport
-  and ultimately crew (Davenport 2006:253).
Producers raise capital for each unique film project and they do this on the strength 
of the creative product that they can offer - and thus the standing and reputation of 
those who will make the artistic contribution, the director, cast and crew, are not 
merely creative preference, but a business requirement. When even a middle 
ranking film will cost over £20m (UK Film Council 2007:144) and fewer that one 
in ten films is successful at the box-office (Davenport 2006:253), the financial 
backers will want to assure themselves that they have the best possible production 
talent available -  the director of photography, the art director, the costume 
designer, the production designer, make-up and the editor. And with those names, 
as already indicated, come their preferred teams and the associated customs and 
practices.
This concentration by producers “on production with insufficient emphasis on 
distribution” (DCMS 2003:3) has two effects. First, that it is the distributors and 
exhibitors who will take their profit through the marketing of the film to the
n
public. Thus, even when British films are successful, the producer has no 
material interest in the commercial success of the production because the profits, or 
losses, are already assigned to remote backers. Secondly, the producer’s reputation
-  and thus their ability to raise finance for the next production -  will be based on 
their ability to deliver a film on time and on budget. Thus producers are the 
coordinators and the servants of all the interested parties:
“People ask me ‘Oh so do you just raise the money ?’ And, cynically,
I say ‘Yeah, if someone asks me if they can make a movie I just get 
out my chequebook.’ I can’t explain to them -  nor do I want to -  the 
whole process of finding a property, bringing in a writer and a 
director, looking for actors, working out deals, sorting out the money, 
talking to the studio or the sales agents, seeing a film into production, 
keeping the director and the actors happy on set, watching dailies,
commenting on the edit ” (Stephen Evans (producer, The Madness
o f King George) cited by de Winter 2006:x)
7 In 2004, the top twelve UK based film companies made their profits not from production but from 
distribution, video and exhibition (UK Film Council 2007:155).
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It is significant that Evans never mentions the production crew perhaps because, for 
a fraught producer, it is the most dependable element. However, the crew’s role is 
critical because, lacking the skills necessary to make a film themselves, producers 
are dependent on those who do possess them and it is the characteristics of the 
internal labour market that provides them with immediate access to the labour 
resources they need. Therefore producers, or at least their subordinates, align with 
crew practices to reduce financial risk and to take the advantages that the internal 
labour market offers in terms of stability and efficiency.
To avoid risk they build slack into their schedule by paying overtime regardless of 
whether it is needed (Relph 2002) and hire whatever crew is necessary to ensure 
that there is the facility to do creative work quickly and precisely. For the feature 
film Amazing Grace, the shooting of the House of Commons slavery debates of 
1806 required over twenty specialist hair and make-up technicians to start work at 
6am each day to prepare the cast of several hundred in the appropriate powdered 
wigs of the period.8 In circumstances such as these, the more crew that are hired, 
the greater the daily cost and the greater the requirement to cover for every possible 
contingency and so avoid the wasteful downtime that might occur if a button falls 
from a costume, a wig needs resetting or a loaded magazine is not immediately 
available. Thus, the producer has little interest in economising on crew numbers 
because their goodwill and creative contribution are critical to a successful project 
unless, as will be shown later, it starts to encroach into other essential creative 
elements. Furthermore, because a producer’s fee is often based on a percentage of 
the total production cost (Relph 2002), the producer has no incentive to reduce 
crew costs.
Therefore, to retain the crew’s goodwill and so utilise the advantages that the 
internal labour market offers, producers invariably cooperate with the established 
customs and rules of the workforce:
Management, especially lower management, belongs to the
workgroup and abides by custom for the same reason that other group
8 Also indicative of how feature film crews can ‘grow’, the same shoot also utilised three cameras 
simultaneously, serviced by fifteen camera technicians, to avoid the cast having to repeat speeches 
and thus retain some spontaneity and passion in their lengthy parliamentary debates.
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members do: because it cannot conceive of alternatives, because 
alternatives that are conceivable are discomforting and seem wrong, 
or because it fears the sullen hostility of the workforce and the 
implied social ostracism.” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:24)
And by doing so, producers achieve the savings and efficiencies that Doeringer & 
Piore predicted because crews will select themselves with no requirement for 
advertising, screening or training. Thus there is no requirement for HR managers, 
job specifications or imposed hierarchies because each worker will arrive with the 
specific skills and know their allotted place and tasks.
The costs to the producers are those relating to on-the-job training and 
accommodating the established precedents and rules of the workgroup. Regarding 
training, there may be, as already shown, trainee errors and some loss of 
productivity on the part of the trainer (Doeringer & Piore 1971:21-22). However, 
these are probably minor costs compared to the trial and error that might otherwise 
be expected in the assembly of a large and complex single-project team.
The accommodation of the precedents and rules is more challenging, but eased by 
the reality that there are few practical alternatives. When raising capital, producers 
are not in a conventional competitive environment because they are raising finance 
for a unique project for which they probably own the creative rights. However, the 
producer’s challenge is to raise as much finance as is realistic for the production 
and so provide the director (and in turn the HoDs) with all the facilities and 
resources that they require to bring the script to fulfilment. The producer, as 
shown, probably has no financial interest in the final commercial success of the 
film, but without a reasonable budget it will be impossible to attract appropriate 
creative participation:
So you have ‘A’ list casts working with ‘A’ list directors and an ‘A’ 
list production team which gives you an ‘A’ list budget of anywhere 
between $100 -  200 million. Then there are ‘B’ list casts with ‘B’ list 
directors and ‘B’ list crews... (Stephen Woolley, UK producer, cited 
by de Winter 2006:83)
Woolley went on to state that to raise finance you have to have a few ‘A’s in your 
package “to get the budget and deals you want.” However, the process is not 
without pressure because there must be some restrictions on budgets and directors
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can rarely be given all the scope that they crave.9 Thus, this producer explained 
why the union’s formal rules were discarded:
... if creatively you’ve pushed out the boundary you then have to 
have a much tighter rein on the costs. So how do you judge that from 
the [union] rule book ? You need flexibility .... [The] producers’ 
association [PACT] has embraced what we have developed over the 
last ten years, more flexibility and trying, at the very least, to prove to 
the Americans that it is cheaper to make films here... Unfortunately, 
the more American films we do, the higher standard that we achieve, 
the greater expectation comes from everyone.
However, there is a recognition that claims made by the informal social groups 
within the workforce, here referred to as “the gang”, had to be taken more seriously 
- and accommodated. The same producer observed:
The power of the gang is very much in evidence .... the people that 
knew they would be doing the longest hours came in and laid down a 
big warning that ‘So much would they take’ ... and we had to decide 
that either we were going to battle it and say ‘fuck o ff  (which we 
could have done) ... and if we had not been supported by an 
American studio system [which did make additional funds available] 
then we may have had to have done that. Which would have made it 
a tougher ride.
When budgets do come under pressure, and backers are not willing to make 
additional funds available, then producers must make economies somewhere. 
However, while there is some effect on crew, it is noticeable in these next three 
quotes that there is no suggestion that the crew should make direct concessions: 
the schedule would be shortened; the distributors, not the producers, had imposed a 
rate freeze; and visual effects would be sacrificed before crew rates were reviewed:
They [producers] are always tightening up their schedules and their 
budgets, especially in TV, and they’ve knocked two days off the 
schedule ... (DoP)
The new Harry Potter, they said ‘Warner’s company policy: we’re 
not paying any more than we did on Goblet o f  Fire which was a year 
ago - and for me that was their policy from Prisoner o f  Azkaban, as 
well, so I said ‘Hang on, that’s two and a half years since I’ve had a
9 In the film Atonement (2007), the director was refused the additional £4m he wanted for a Stuka 
attack on the Dunkirk beaches sequence. The producers said £40m was enough for an “art film”.
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pay rise’ and they just said ‘Well I’m sorry, but this is Warner’s 
company policy. (Photographer)
Suddenly, from one day to the next, we were $1.8 million short. The 
only way to get the film going was to go to Mike [the director] and 
say “We are short by this much. Any suggestions ?” We decided to 
cut all of the exteriors except those we could afford to do, but we 
would only shoot them at the end of the film when we knew how 
much money we had left. (Producer cited by de Winter 2006:59)
In summary, it would appear that the rules and procedures of the internal labour 
market are respected by the producers: in part because they need the active 
cooperation of the crew and their associated skills; in part because of the 
efficiencies they gain in recruitment, screening and a ready to function workforce; 
and in part because the costs can be passed on directly to those backing the project 
financially. The internal labour market thus remains unchallenged because the 
management in direct contact has, as Doeringer & Piore predicted, become drawn 
into the work group themselves and thus they “abide[s] by custom for the same 
reasons that other group members do” (1971:24).
Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to establish that an internal labour market remains 
extant in feature film production and how it is maintained even though the 
organisational support provided by the union though the closed shop has gone.
The preliminary evidence of a clearly distinctive labour market is in the statistical 
data provided by Skillset (2005) which shows that film production workers are 
older and better paid than those working in the wider audio-visual industry. 
However, that merely shows that a separate group exists and it was necessary to 
use the factors suggested by Doeringer & Piore (1971:6) to show that there are 
rigid boundaries surrounding this workforce and that it is shielded from the direct 
competitive influences of the external market.
Examination of the four factors showed that there was strong evidence that the 
rules relating to the deployment of labour are long-standing and remain as firm as
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they were in the closed shop era. Many of the principles relating to wage 
determination also remain firm, although there have been some changes in how the 
rules are interpreted. Thus the conventions regarding parity are still observed, but 
the overtime rules have been simplified so that more is paid for a longer basic day.
Doeringer & Piore’s second test was that that there should be some evidence of 
irrational practices that would not be acceptable in a truly competitive market. 
The challenge was they expected such evidence to come from management and the 
unions, but in the contemporary film production industry neither party are likely 
sources. Management, it will be shown, now aligns with the internal labour 
market while the unions are effectively defunct in collective bargaining. The 
evidence of uncompetitive practices was found in the Relph Report (2002) which 
showed that not only were film practices more expensive than those utilised 
television, but also that prevalent UK film production was significantly more 
expensive than analogous European and American practice.
The next condition thought indicative of the internal labour market was that labour 
should be critical to the overall production process and that there should be specific 
skills, probably acquired through on-the-job training. Film production still meets 
all these requirements because specific skills are still critical to film making and the 
increasing use of technology creates new demands on the workforce. Although it 
will be shown that some of those skills can now be gained through formal 
education, successful entry invariably requires the acquisition of social capital, and 
the accepted way to acquire that continues to be through on-the-job training. 
Being part of a network is critical for the crew member to survive. Crew not only 
depend upon team membership for employment - 81% were recruited for their most 
recent production by word of mouth (Skillset 2005:85) - but team membership 
exerts power on the studio floor where that of the union has foundered.
The last of the factors, was that there should be evidence of community custom and 
practice which decreed what behaviour was acceptable and what violated the codes. 
The film production industry again meets this requirement because there is clearly 
a sense of community which is evident in the stability and continuity of work 
groups who respect conventions and divisions which have no formal, 
organisational backing.
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The evidence seems clear that the internal labour market, where “the pricing and 
allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:3), remains viable in the feature film production industry.
However, if there is no formal organisation and if the rules create economically 
uncompetitive situations, why should the employers not ignore these worker 
regulated rules and so reduce costs ? The answer is that producers are not risking 
their own capital. Producers are the brokers for capital and therefore in partnership 
with the workforce because their own livelihood depends on the skills that a 
cooperative workforce can apply to each new project. Therefore, the producers 
utilise the advantages that Doeringer & Piore predicted through efficiencies in 
recruitment, screening and training and respect the rules and precedents that the 
workforce have established.
Overall, it seems acceptable to say that the internal labour market is still extant in 
the film production industry which retains distinct boundaries, even though there is 
no longer “the geographical and occupational jurisdiction of the local union 
generally defines the boundaries of the market” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:3-4). The 
workforce itself defines the boundaries and maintains them with the assistance of 
the producers. However, all evidence suggests that the importance of social 
networks remains as critical as it ever has been for a successful career in film 
production, because the system, with the producers acting as the buffer between 
labour and capital, is largely self perpetuating. Dew entrants are inducted through 
on-the-job training which perpetuates in each generation a certain style of 
production, the specific skills and the customary laws and practices: past precedent 
remains largely unchallenged by employer or technology and change evolves very 
slowly in a small, closed community.
In 1996, A Career in Broadcast, Film and Video emphasised the importance of 
cultivating existing practitioners as being critical to gaining an entry to the those 
sectors:
“start making contacts by attending short courses, conferences, 
anything that is relevant to your field of interest... many of the jobs 
will not be advertised at all.... (Skillset 1996:23)
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Ten years on, and nearly twenty years since the demise of the closed shop, it 
would appear that little has changed in film production employment. The next 
chapter will examine a very different post-closed shop outcome.
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‘thousands o f people each year consider entering a career in the media 
- fa r  more than there are jobs available” (Skillset 1996:1)
Doeringer & Piore hypothesised that, as a contrast to the internal labour market, 
there might exist a truly competitive market where the process of allocating and 
pricing of jobs would be dictated by economic forces. This market might not exist, 
but the concept was necessary to illustrate the contrast with the internal labour 
market (1971:4).
In the case of film production there may be such an alternative because from the 
late 1980s the previously cohesive labour force regulated through ACTT 
membership split into various sectors. One of these was the feature film production 
sector which, as shown in Chapter 7, has preserved its employment practices. 
However, other sectors of the industry have been less resilient and an examination 
of some of these sectors provides an illuminating contrast because for many the 
entry requirements to the internal labour market of the film production sector prove 
too onerous and thus they are obliged to work in the open competitive labour 
market if they wish to persist in the audio-visual industry.
The term ‘audio-visual industry’ has been adopted by various government agencies 
to describe contemporary production of the moving image in a range of formats, 
some of which are far removed from traditional film or television. It should be 
noted that technically film production is a small element of that enlarged industry 
but as the features of contemporary film production have already been described, 
the commentary in this chapter relates mainly to the other sectors. Therefore, the 
term “wider audio-visual industry” should be taken to include film production
Iain Reid
Chapter 8 A Comparison: Other Audio-Visual Sectors 222
along with all the other sectors, the term “other audio-visual sectors” will be used 
to describe those sectors but to exclude film production.
The other audio-visual sectors are very fragmented and many are still evolving. 
The Skillset audio-visual census of 2002 estimated that there were approximately 
134,100 workers -  but there were perhaps a further 50,000 freelancers who were 
not working on the census date. These workers were working in twelve broad 
sectors the largest of which was terrestrial television (24,900) and the smallest 
computer games (8,000), commercials (7,200) and corporate productions (3,200) 
(Skillset 2003a: 19). As already discussed, the additional 9,700 working in feature 
film production where covered in a separate survey (Skillset 2005).
With such disparate groups generalisations are not easy and the range of 
occupational groups make a complete review impractical because the nature of 
some work is not dissimilar to feature film production (e.g. television drama) 
whereas other sectors, such as digital re-mastering, are closer to electrical 
engineering. It is therefore intended to describe the conditions within a few 
specific sectors and to focus especially on the “ports of entry” which Doeringer & 
Piore identified as being a useful indicator of the degree of openness (1971:43). 
However, it should be noted that some sectors, although distinct from feature film 
production, do retain some characteristics of the internal labour market: the 
workforce engaged in ‘high-end’ television drama, although generally ignored by 
feature film workers, retains some of the characteristics of the internal labour 
market (Blair et al. 2002) although, as will be shown later, their negotiating 
position is not as strong as their film counterparts.
The point of entry is particularly critical because it is there that the practitioners of 
the craft internal labour market exercise most control -  entry is a workforce 
controlled process (Doeringer & Piore 1971:34). It will become apparent in this 
chapter that there is a considerable oversupply of potential labour in what has 
always been perceived as an attractive occupational sector. However, whereas 
successful entry into the craft internal labour market provides the entrant with the 
appropriate skills and acceptance into an occupational peer group, those who do not 
secure such positions must probe the other less structured sectors in the hope that 
they will secure some foothold which they can develop into a career. This chapter
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will show that those footholds are controlled by management and the wages and 
conditions of employment are management prerogatives.
Section 8.1 will show how the rapid expansion of the wider audio visual industry 
and the simultaneous decline in union membership made it impossible for the 
emergent union, BECTU, to retain any real influence over evolving employment 
practices. The second section will consider how the place of capital is very 
different in the other audio-visual sectors to its role in feature film production 
because it is less speculative and makes rational calculations about the potential 
returns for specific investments. As a result, labour costs and conditions are 
squeezed as producers seek every possibly economy to competitively tender for 
funding at levels much lower than those of film production.
However, producers are aided in this search for cheap qualified labour because of 
the growth of formal media training. Section 8.3 examines why formal training has 
received governmental support but also that many graduating students emerge 
without the socialisation implicit in on-the-job training and so, in their desperation 
to take any foothold, take whatever low or unpaid work is made available.
Section 8.4 shows that despite government attempts to make formal skills training 
more relevant to the audio-visual industry’s requirements, many students emerge 
with little skill specificity and so have to rely on trial and error in their initial 
placements in the hope of gaining more marketable skills.
8.1 The erosion of union boundaries
“The television, film  and video industry has experienced a decade o f  
unprecedented change brought about by technological, organisational 
and economic developments. Such change is set to continue fo r  the 
foreseeable future. ” (Varlaam et al. 1990:9)
As shown in Chapter 6, the growth of video and digital post production, and the
associated decline of the laboratories, was the technical change that most affected
feature film production in the 1980s. However, while these changes had affected
some aspects of television production, e.g. through electronic news gathering, there
had been the first signs of far reaching changes in television with the introduction
of longer broadcasting hours, Channel 4 (1982) and breakfast television (1983),
Thus, as the quote above accurately predicted, the 1990s were also to be a period of
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further changes and principally these would be the technical, organisational and 
educational evolution in the other audio-visual sectors. Film production, as already 
shown, would henceforth be relatively unaffected.
It is doubtful whether the formal rules operated by the ACTT could ever have 
accommodated these changes, even had the controls not already been in decline by 
the late 1980s. The ACTT, as highlighted in Chapter 6, was failing to recruit in the 
new video and digital sectors, but there was also a prolonged erosion of its 
established membership because, even as the industry expanded, the number of 
existing members paying their subscriptions was in decline. Some, such as those 
laid off from the laboratories, were natural wastage but others, perhaps moving to 
the new unregulated sectors of cable, satellite and digital post-production, simply 
allowed their membership to lapse. As was shown in earlier chapters, the activities 
and benefits of the union did not appeal to all members and in the early 1980s the 
F7Thad listed nearly 1,800 members whose subscriptions were “in serious arrears” 
(Feb 1980). However, at that time the strictures of the closed shop still held firm so 
that “the moment their names were published they promptly paid up, generally 
speaking.” As union influence declined, members became less compliant 
especially because the union rules had never considered the possibility that 
members might drift away:
□obody was ever deemed to have left ACTT; it’s as easy as that.
You were merely in arrears or limbo or whatever - but you were 
never actually written off... Once people began to believe there 
would be no sanctions of any kind against them ... then there was a 
gradual fall off from actually paying the subscription -  although they 
still technically belonged to the ACTT because we simply didn’t 
allow anybody to resign, we could throw them out, but that was all.
(Tudor Gates - former ACTT president)
Thus, while ACTT membership reached a peak of 27,157 in May 1987 (FTT), the 
reality was that the numbers and associated union authority were already in decline 
and by the early 1990s the concept that union membership was a precondition to 
take specific appointments within the industry had gone; Louise Decouteau, who 
started in production in 1991, does not recall union membership ever being 
mentioned. By January 1991, the industry’s three unions had been obliged to 
merge, in part reflecting the declining numbers and in part the changing
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demarcations within the other audio-visual sectors, to form BECTU, the 
Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union.
It was unfortunate for the unions that this period of internal re-organisation and 
uncertainty occurred just as the industry was embarking on its rapid expansion 
because the new sectors would rapidly outgrow numerically the established 
employees of the film and terrestrial television industries -  and many would be 
young entrants keen to get a foothold:
The television, film and video industry is one of the very few sectors 
unlikely to suffer problems with recruitment in the current 
demographic downturn. There will be no shortage of applicants keen 
to enter the industry to meet increased demand. (Varlaam et al.
1990:6)
This forecast of employment growth was well founded, even if the statistics are 
inevitably imprecise in an industry where freelancers, or those on short-term 
contracts, drift in and out of an industry which is itself ill-defined.1 In the closed 
shop era of the late 1980s there had been approximately 60,000 members of the 
three main craft unions; ACTT, APS and UATTKE (BECTU website 5 Dec 2005) 
and if one surmises that there were another 10,000 working in the then, unregulated 
sectors (the emerging digital post-production sectors, cable, satellite and the 
established corporate and non-broadcast sectors), that suggests that there were 
about 70,000 workers in the whole industry. As already shown (page 222), the 
Skillset 2002 survey indicated a total audio-visual workforce of approximately
194,000 workers -  thus nearly tripling of the workforce in twelve years.
The union’s challenge was that alongside this growth in potential members, there 
were so many other simultaneous changes: organisational; technical; educational; 
and social. The social changes were described in Chapter 6, and the educational 
changes will be dealt with in a later section -  but the technical changes were just as 
demanding for the union because new formats and means of distribution meant the 
creation of many new companies, either to produce transmission material or to
1 This is an industry where labour force statistics are difficult to isolate and confused in their 
definition: “there is no single tracking system for UK based or UK related film production, and
those that exist vary in their definition of UK production as well as the information they collect” 
(Skillset 2005:18).
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effect the distribution and transmission. Initially this was just cable and satellite 
but as the 1990s progressed there was a continuing growth of music promos, 
interactive video and training videos, besides an increasing fragmentation of the 
established broadcasting sectors plus the continual advances in technology and 
formats: DVDs, MPEGs; MP3; ipods; G3 phones; alternative high definition 
formats etc.
Thus there was now a spectrum of formats and production establishments 
encompassed within the much looser boundaries of the wider audio-visual industry 
and these created so many divisions, layers and pockets of employment that the 
union had little opportunity to organise members or to establish any collective 
bargaining structure with the employers who, it will be shown, had less reason to 
be as compliant as the film producers. By 2003, there were 25,000 people working 
in interactive media alone (Skillset 2003c:20) - an occupational group that had not 
existed fifteen years earlier and which alone more than doubled the numbers 
working in feature film production.
Also, while the job titles within mainstream film have remained consistent, the 
adaptation of those same titles by the new sectors meant that there has been no 
consistency for drafting collective agreements. Tim Sullivan (who it may be 
remembered was made to wait for three years before starting his training as a 
director (Chapter 5)) believes that there is now too little control over the term 
‘director’: the twenty-seven year old director of corporate videos, earning £375pw 
with one assistant, has nothing except the title in common with a director of a 
modest feature film controlling a crew of fifty or more - or the director of a 
commercial who may be earning in excess of £5,000 per day.
With such changes in the composition of the industry it has been difficult for 
BECTU to establish relationships with the employers (whose own associations are 
weak) or with the workforce who are distributed in many small companies that 
have never had any union presence on which to build:
Every decade they [the union] do try and have a recruiting drive. I
think for the first time in however long we have one member of the
2 One of the most significant of these, MTV Europe, had been launched on Is1 August 1987.
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union here, I don’t know what possessed them to become a member 
of the union but there is one person out of 450 who is a member of 
BECTU. (Managing Director, post production company)
As a result, there has been little interest in the negotiation of collective agreements 
whose effectiveness has already been shown to be questionable. The agreement 
between BECTU and the Advertising Producers’ Association lapsed in July 2002 
and has not been renegotiated: “There are currently no agreed freelance rates for 
work on commercials, but BECTU publishes a rate card with recommended rates” 
(BECTU website 15 January 2007).
The BECTU agreement with PACT is extant, but opinion varies about its 
effectiveness. As shown, in film production it is acknowledged, if not always 
observed to the letter, but most film workers are paid well in excess of its basic 
provisions anyway. Within mainstream, terrestrial television production Sara 
Langton, an industry lawyer involved in contract negotiations, believed that the 
minimum rates were recognised as a base line. However elsewhere, where 
financial economy becomes more than critical than quality, the agreement is less 
rigorously observed:
... most BECTU freelancers working on high- and medium- budget 
features, network TV drama and other high value productions have 
consistently earned well above PACT rates. But in other areas, where 
the advent of multi-channel TV has put pressure on costs, low pay is 
rife, with members regularly paid below the PACT / BECTU 
minimums. In other words, we have learned that agreeing a 
minimum rate does not automatically prevent low pay (SSR May 
2003).
Furthermore, because employers did not want to issue a contract, which could be 
produced as evidence that they were paying below the agreement minimum, they 
ignored the whole agreement and refused to provide any formal contract. Thus, the 
low paid workers were:
doubly disadvantaged... they also miss out on all the other conditions 
covering hours of work, travel arrangements, rest breaks, sickness and 
so on.
BECTU therefore resolved that it was better for the individuals to have the 
protection of a contract and so all rates became the “recommended” minimums in 
the hope that employers would honour the rest of the agreement even where they
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did not match the preferred union rate (SSR May 2003:18 ). However, this does 
not protect workers working in the areas not covered by the PACT agreement such 
as training films, corporate videos, pop promos or the rapidly growing internet 
sector but there are few signs of any maintainable move to unionisation.
Mobilisation theory states that a shift to unionisation will arise when there is not 
only dissatisfaction at work but also “a set of individuals with a sense of injustice” 
who recognise the source of their problems, identify with each other and accept 
appropriate leadership (Kelly 1998:29). The challenge for the contemporary union 
is that many workers blame no-one for their situation because their entry into the 
industry has conditioned them to expect erratic employment and meagre pay - 
indeed, their over-riding sentiment regarding their employer may be gratitude for 
the opportunity. BECTU’s experience is that individuals only approach the union 
when they eventually realise that there is no career path or advancement. Their 
employers are generally unwilling to negotiate and those individuals drift away 
from the industry and are replaced by the next, eager generation of entrants (Egan 
interview).
With the limited effectiveness of the union’s agreements, and a fragmented 
workforce with few binding instincts, BECTU’s membership has remained at about
25,000 and that total now includes sectors unrelated to audio-visual employment 
e.g. theatre (5,000 members), leisure activities, bingo, the arts and exhibition. If 
union density in the film production industry is thirty three percent (Skillset 
2005:77) that accounts for approximately 3,200 of the 6,800 London Film 
production division members, while the BBC division has 8,000 members among 
the BBC’s 27,000 employees (BECTU source). With those two sectors removed, it 
would appear that there are approximately 8,000 union members in the other audio­
visual workforce of 147,000; suggesting a density of 6%.
Thus, it is clear that there is no longer any semblance of a union controlled 
“geographical and occupational jurisdiction” (Doeringer & Piore (1971:4) within 
the other audio-visual sectors. However, the loss of the union’s jurisdiction for 
employment and working practices will be shown to have been very different in 
some sectors to that of film production industry. The remainder of the chapter will 
explain how the erosion of the established practices has been effected.
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8.2 The different position of capital
“Between 19/9 and 199UTory television policy did maintain one, and 
only one, consistent thrust — to make television more a matter o f  the 
marketplace, and less a matter o f  public service. ” (Goodwin 1998:166)
“It is easy to get trapped in the low budget /n o  budget end o f things ”
(Skillset website)
The changes described in the structure of the industry inevitably also affected the 
nature of some employers and the role of capital in the audio-visual industry. As 
was shown in Chapter 7, film producers remained a “cottage” industry, 
entrepreneurs often working from home (de Winter 2006:61), whose objective was 
to effect the link between a creative idea and the necessary capital and then to 
utilise that capital to realise the production by hiring equipment, facilities and crew. 
However, producers in the other audio-visual sectors operate in a much more 
structured market where capital is far less speculative and more cautious, seeking a 
very specific return on a predetermined investment.
The demands of capital are most clear in those areas which service the wider audio­
visual industry where huge capital investment in property, equipment and software 
is required. This is nowhere more clear than amongst the independent facility 
companies who provide post-production services for films and television 
establishment. Chapter 5 showed that here management control of the working 
practices was re-established from the outset because twenty-four hour working was 
essential to obtain satisfactory returns on the capital investment. Thus the union’s 
time o ff the clock rules had to be eliminated: “because the industry couldn’t afford 
to operate on that sort of business model whereby people who got no ten hour 
break, [or] if they worked past midnight, got paid for four days” (MD facilities 
house].
In this area, management and capital remain synonymous and the balance between 
investment, labour, demand and costings is critical for commercial success. A 
contemporary facility company has to invest £1 million - £4 million in new 
technology each year to remain competitive and that investment must be made 
before the new service can be offered and income received. Against that 
investment, and the associated West End property necessary to house the 
equipment, labour costs are a small proportion of the total service and, except for a
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few, exceptionally creative “stars” (in areas such as telecine) who may be able to 
dictate their terms, the majority of these operators have readily available, universal 
skills with software such as Flame or Inferno. Therefore, management sets the 
wages and makes the rules regarding labour deployment to meet the commercial 
trading requirements with little regard for custom and practice. (MD facility 
company interview).
However, although post production was part of the 1970s closed shop, it had 
always been a little detached from the studio floor and it was probably television 
production that had most parallels with film production -  and that now provides a 
bleak contrast of post-closed shop employment practices. Here employees have 
been full exposed by declining union influence to management’s priorities of 
“productivity improvements, labour intensification and cost reductions” (Kelly 
1996:83) by the shift in the balance of power to the employers and the restructuring 
of the industry.
The 1990 Broadcasting Act was a deregulation measure to break up the monopoly 
of the established fifteen independent broadcasting companies and it led to an 
auction of the television franchises which were reassigned in 1992: Thames 
Television was replaced by Carlton; TVam by GMTV etc (Goodwin 1998). In the 
resulting takeovers, amalgamations and subsequent layoffs many executives and 
workers set up small independent production companies, encouraged by the 
implementation of a new quota system that required that 25% of terrestrial 
broadcasting would come from independent producers, theoretically breaking up 
the domination of the BBC (Goodwin 1998:123&124) and the big television 
companies which now became ‘publisher-broadcasters’; companies that would buy 
programmes from external sources. The result was a major revision of the 
organisation of the workforce:
In 1979 practically all British television employees were directly 
employed by the two poles of the duopoly [i.e. the BBC & ITV]; in 
1995 perhaps half of them were employed by cable or satellite 
broadcasters, independent producers, independent facility companies 
or were freelance. (Goodwin 1998:160)
However, the position of capital had not moved. The BBC (through the licence 
fee) and the independent companies (through advertising revenue) still controlled
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the available capital which rose about five fold (double the rate of inflation) 
between 1980 and 1997 (Wedell & Luckham 2001:108). Furthermore, the tacit 
knowledge about broadcasting, audiences and programme requirements remained 
with the business operators of the publisher-broadcasters who now held all the key 
positions: the Royal Television Society believed that the new controllers “are 
certainly accountants” (Wedell & Luckham 2001:46). The BBC responded to the 
same pressures:
The BBC governors came to feel a lot less secure about the future of 
the licence fee and tried to pre-empt any government criticism by 
making the Corporation more efficient. (Wedell & Luckham 
2001:40)3
Commercial efficiency was necessary, because as part of the industry’s 
transformation, an increasing number of channels became available and audiences 
were thus dissipated. For the independent companies this meant a decreasing 
audience share -  and the associated advertising revenue (Table 5).
Table 5: Television audiences 1980 - 1997
191 0a 1991 t 2001 P
BBC 1 39% 32% 20%
BBC 2 12% 12% LP/o
ITV (9% 31% 1LP/o
CHANNEL □ - 11% 9%
five - 2% 5%
Alternative viewing - 11% 39%
a. Goodwin (1998:155& 156
b. BARB Broadcasters' Audience Research Board
http://www.barb.co.uk/indexl .cfrn 17 Jul 07
3 The debate about further limits to BBC funding continues (2006) although its future seems more 
assured.
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However, satellite, cable and the internet make only a small contribution to the 
production process (many concentrating their funding on sporting events, feature 
films and music promos) so the terrestrial channels remain the main financiers of 
original material. These terrestrial ‘publisher-broadcasters’ ensure that they obtain 
the necessary programming by creating a competitive market where independent 
television producers bid for specific time slots for which specific funding is 
available. Thus, although the Channel 4 process promotes the process as a 
partnership:
Channel 4 has always put the principle of creative and commercial 
partnership at the heart of its Terms of Trade, in recognition of the 
collaborative nature of its commissioning process and the value that 
the Producer and Channel 4 bring to a programme through their joint 
involvement. (Channel 4 2003:14)
the reality is that all producers are working within very specific parameters 
regarding programme content, audience segment and costs, all controlled by 
Channel 4 (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: A typical television programme commissioning process
Core Commissioning Process
Development
re g ia re tPProducer submits 
proposal
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EDITORIAL
APPROVAL
1 Commissioning 
■ Prog Planning
Channel k establishes 
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core rights (using 
tariff and assessing 
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(Channel 4 2003:13)
It is thus apparent that Channel 4 retains tight creative and monetary control of the 
production process and of particular significance is the “indicative price for core 
rights” because all commissioning television stations publish tariff tables indicating 
what they will pay for particular programmes (examples at Appendix 6).
An examination of these tables reveals how much lower television budgets are than 
those normal within feature films. The maximum allowed for an hour of television 
drama is £800,000 or £13,300 per minute (ITV Peak time drama 2004). By 
contrast, in Relph’s (2002:6) sample of “low budget” feature films, twenty-one 
cost between £lm  and £7m, or between £10,000 and £67,000 per minute4, the 
majority already four or five times the budget available to the television producer. 
If one starts to consider major feature films of that same period then the difference 
rises to twelve fold {Bridget Jones: The edge o f reason (£18m)) or even fifty fold 
{Harry Potter and the Prisoner o f  Azkaban (£ 100m)).
Table 6: Sample television and feature film costs 2003/2004
£'000 i.e. per minute
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Television
Drama ITV (Indicative tariffs 2001) 1115,000 I 00,000 6,900 13,300
Five (Prescribed tariffs 2001) 150,000 600,000 2,500 10,000
Channel I l (Core Rights 2003) 350,000 600,000 5, [30 10,000
Feature Films Low budget feature (Relph 2002) 1,000,000 6 ,1 00,000 10,000 6 1 (000
Ladies in Lavender (2001 I) 3,600,000 35,000
Bridget Jones: Edge of 
Reason (20011) irtooo,ooo 166,1 00
Harry Potter /  Azkaban (2001 j) 100,000,000 I 09,200
Further examination of the tariff tables shows that these television drama budgets 
are comparatively generous. Producers working in entertainment, documentaries 
or factual programmes must work within much lower budgets: £25,000 for thirty
4 Relph had identified three feature films costing below £ lm  but these were “micro budget” films 
which the statistics (2002:11) indicate were shot by unpaid crew, probably as a leisure pursuit
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minutes of night time entertainment programme on ITV, £50,000 for a ‘soap’ on 
Five or even as low as £12,500 for half an hour of children’s programming.
Thus television producers have become the purveyors of production services for 
specific tasks and are constrained by tightening financial parameters because the 
broadcasters retain far more control over the production than do the backers of a 
feature film project, being aware of both production costs and the potential revenue 
to them as broadcasters. Furthermore, budgets are becoming tighter as the 
commissioning broadcasters lose their audience share. Relph noted that Channel 
4’s tariff of £600,000 per hour had not increased since the 1980s (2002:54)) 
demonstrating the increasing pressure on television budgets.
Competitive costing has thus become more critical to the television producer but 
there are two factors not available to the feature film producer that help to offset 
that pressure. First, when a television commission is approved then the project is 
effectively guaranteed. The feature film producer by contrast is offering bespoke 
packages to speculative investors and may have many backers, all of whom need 
constant attention and who may withdraw if the schedule falters. Second, the 
television is commissioned with a predictable lead time to the transmission date. 
These two factors mean that producers have more time to devote to the production 
and can assemble their own crews, making their own deals. One respondent who 
has been involved in both television and film said:
... but equally with television there is less risk because the work is 
commissioned. The backer of a film can always walk away and the 
whole production collapses. That’s why I always double my fee for a 
feature.
These two predictable factors enable television producers to reduce their budgets, 
and there are also other measures available to them. The lower salaries in the 
television sector have already been encountered in Chapter 7 (film crew described 
how they were expected to work for lower daily rates on television productions 
than they earned on film), and Relph (2002:54) showed that there were other ways 
in which television production reduced costs on drama productions. However, 
these all referred to the better quality, high-end of television production where
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there is evidence that some internal labour market and network practices are 
perpetuated (Starkey et al. 2000; Saundry et al. 2005).
However, at the lower end of the scale, employment conditions can become eroded 
where producers are under pressure to deliver half an hour of television for £20,000 
and the labour market operates unregulated by formal agreements or accepted 
custom. As summarised in the BECTU quote above, “where the advent of multi­
channel TV has put pressure on costs, low pay is rife” (SSR My 2003). However, 
production would not be viable without cheap labour because many other costs, 
equipment hire, travel, post production etc, are not negotiable. These low budget 
productions are developed for late night viewing, with a short shelf-life, or that are 
being developed for the new forms of distribution, to be viewed on a mobile 
telephone, ipod or website. They are productions where creative standards are less 
important or where the instigators’ creative vision or need to make the programme 
has run ahead of their budgetary resources. These productions, often developed 
with much enthusiasm and verve, have to make economies, and the most obvious 
area where money can be saved when a labour surplus exists is by using eager, but 
inexperienced, crew. A letter from a runner to Broadcast (3 March 2006) stated 
that he was earning £11,000, but that "the new runner is on only £10,000. We both 
work a 45 hour week.” Holgate (2006:10) found that the average central London 
salary for those starting out in the sector, assuming that they were paid, was 
£12,000.
However, full-time work is difficult to obtain and the majority of employment is 
project based. Short term engagements pay better, but the work is less predictable. 
An interviewee, a graduate linguist, had been paid £250pw working on the UK 
Chart Show but had increased this to £400pw when he was working on The 
Property Show as a translator, but doubling up as a producer and researcher. But,
when you add up all the holiday you haven’t taken, you’re actually 
getting something like £375 [pw].... Do [paid] Bank Holidays or 
anything like that.5
5 Twenty years earlier, the union would have required that three people fulfil these three roles as 
interpreter, researcher and producer, each of whom would have been earning approximately £300 
per week (rates from FTT Jun 86).
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The respondent was eventually employed as a director/editor in corporate video but 
was still earning £375pw i.e. less than £20,000pa assuming that the work lasted for 
as long as twelve months. In reality the respondent, James, had already been 
unemployed for four months in that calendar year and was dependent on parental 
support.
To put these figures in perspective, a 2005 survey by the Association of Graduate 
Employers indicated that the median starting salary for graduates was £22,000 with 
60% of employers saying that they would offer salaries between £17,500 and 
£22,500 (The Times 10 Feb 2005). By comparison, starting salaries in the audio­
visual industries are much lower. To be a runner on a television production is 
probably the height of every aspiring entrants’ ambition, but even if the full 
BECTU/PACT rate is paid, the probable salary will be £13,104pa (rate card for 
contracts starting on or after 1 Jul 2006). In a commercials company, one 
respondent estimated that additional shoot fees, in a good year with a successful 
company, might increase that to £18,000 but emphasised that nothing was ever 
guaranteed.
So if employers are dictating salaries, who is responsible for the deployment of 
labour? Again, commercial pressures mean that management takes a much closer 
interest in crewing levels. As Relph (2002:54) showed, television drama 
production employs fewer people than the feature film equivalent and the working 
practices mean that they shoot more screen time each day. In the newer sectors 
there may be even less demarcation: the interviewee, James, was currently 
employed as a “Director, operator and editor” on twenty minute corporate videos 
and he had one assistant -  essentially a two person production team -  just as on The 
Property Show where he had also covered three “traditional” grades.
However, the real challenge of all these practices is that there is no natural 
progression from these entry appointments to the next grade. As long as these 
entrants remain willing, producers will find roles were they can utilise the entrants’ 
natural enthusiasm and skill but provide little training or progression to the next 
level of income and experience. One BECTU official observed:
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So often, young entrants will do several jobs -  but suddenly they’re 
twenty- eight or thirty and still haven’t got a proper job, contract, 
pension or income. So then they quit the industry (Egan interview).
The employers in the expanded industry, driven by commercial necessity, have no 
need to invest in these workers because another generation will soon be available, 
and thus there is no obligation to invest in training or the development of a human 
resource strategy, just as the Webbs had observed in the late nineteenth century
When the employer finds himself freed from all obligation to teach 
his boys .... he naturally prefers to keep them continuously employed 
on such routine work as they can best perform. (Webb & Webb 
1898:482).
However, if  the demands of competitive capital have required management to take 
control of the workplace, why in these other audio-visual sectors has informal 
social organisation not emerged to protect the workers’ interests? The next section 
will consider how the trend to formal education has eliminated the social network.
8.3 The loss of socialisation
“it’s very hard to know where to start because the entry points are 
illogical and irrational ” (Stewart Till, UK Film Council Chairman cited
by BFI200D19)
“nepotism is still rife ” (DCMS 2003: IlI:Ev95)
As Doeringer & Piore indicated, and as was demonstrated in Chapter 7, on-the-job 
training by established practitioners perpetuated the internal labour market in two 
ways: the specificity of the training ensured that working practices were 
unquestioned because neither management nor workforce could conceive of 
alternatives (Doeringer & Piore 1971:24); but also the successful trainee was 
conditioned to accept the customs and practices of the workplace by those with 
whom their career would be linked (1971:13-22). In film production, that system 
has continued to operate, but in the other audio-visual industries on-the-job 
training, as an extended apprenticeship where the trainee is adopted by an 
experienced practitioner, has become superfluous because of the increasing 
availability of those who have acquired some understanding of the tasks through 
formal training. In 2002, 25% of the audio-visual workforce had a media related
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degree; 66% of the workforce were graduates; and 24% had a post graduate degree 
(Skillset 2003c:9).6 It will be recalled that only 46% of the film production 
workforce were graduates (Skillset 2005:97) and that the main route of entry was 
through personal contact, 81% had been recruited for their most recent production 
by word of mouth (Skillset 2005:85).
This section will examine the reasons for the growth of formal audio-visual 
education and demonstrate that the lack of socialisation leaves the entrant 
vulnerable to economic forces. The next section will examine the skills value of 
current formal training.
The growth of formal media training arose in part because of an increasing official 
interest in all the audio-visual industries. Some post-war interest had been apparent 
in the Gater Report (1949), the Eady Levy or the ill-fated intervention to restrict 
American imports, but these had been directed to the protection of the British film 
industry. The debates about television in the 1950s and 1960s had been more to do 
with the quality of transmitted material and perceived profiteering, rather than the 
workforce (Goodwin 1998:12-14). However, since the 1990s there has been a 
growing governmental interest in the associated employment, perhaps because of a 
realisation of the importance to the British economy of a global industry which in 
2003 was worth £42.3bn worldwide and growing at 6.3% per annum (Skillset 
2003a:5). (In 2006, the UK film industry contributed £4.3 billion to UK GDP 
(Oxford Economics 2007:5)).
In 2003, a report by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
identified that the film industry’s main success was servicing the major Hollywood 
studios which were attracted by UK talent, facilities and tax regime. However, 
there were issues relating to training and development if the UK’s high standing 
was to be maintained:
The UK is second to the US in terms of the level of craft skills we 
have. We need to maintain that. If we do not invest in that through 
training but through production, we will lose those craft sets. Once
6 These figures are for the wider audio-visual sector and include older workers. A 1995 tracking 
survey of the then 21-30 age group of television workers showed that 88% were graduates (BFI 
Television Tracking Study 1995:8).
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we have lost them, they are very hard to put back into the system.
(DCMS 2003:Q43)
Furthermore, some submitted evidence suggested that on-the-job training was too 
informal, precisely the quality which Doeringer & Piore had valued because it 
taught only the skills required and was tailored to the trainee (1971:21&22)
The training in the British film industry since the end of the 
traditional studio system, when television started to come on and film 
became essentially a freelance production activity, has been ad hoc 
and relatively disorganised. (DCMS 2003:Q608)
However, the Committee’s final report did note that there were different opinions:
We received mixed evidence from the industry with regard to whether 
training is best received through apprenticeships and on the job 
experience or through college courses which give a more theoretical 
education before entering the job. (DCMS 2003:47)
The debate about formal, theoretical training was long running. It will be recalled 
that in the 1930s the ACT had failed to initiate a formal apprenticeship scheme 
which was to have included academic instruction and although there were 
references to “schools and kindred bodies conducting courses in cinematography” 
(TC 16 April 36), no further detail was supplied. In the 1950s, Wood (1952:213) 
had believed that the career path implicit in the closed shop, that is to gain entry at 
the bottom and then work through the various grades, was the reason the post-war 
industry was ill-equipped to recognise and accept new talent, and that the resulting 
slow progress through the various grades inhibited natural aptitude and genius.
Fifteen years later, Kelly questioned again the lack of formal training and 
recognised the conditioning that established practitioners perpetuated through their 
control of on-the-job training:
Why then has Britain no such [national] school? .... there is the 
theory that organised training is unnecessary because talent will 
always out. But the journey from tea-boy to director may take many 
years and the man who makes it may have had any spark of brilliance 
dulled by the time he arrives. Both of these arguments are near to 
being the cult of amateurism in disguise. Hiding behind them too are
7 In 1948, Paul Rotha had concurred: “British studios are filled with persons of third rate 
intelligence who are inclined to condemn anything that is beyond their range” (1967:314)
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the vested interest of those already in the industry who do not relish 
competition from men who are younger, better trained and more 
flexible in their attitude to new techniques.” (Kelly 1966:162 & 163)
The following year, Professor Lord Lloyd of Hampstead QC led an enquiry into 
what form a national film school should take and this identified again the challenge 
that the traditional, nepotistic route through on-the-job training presented to would- 
be entrants:
the absence of any acknowledged mode of entry results, in practice, 
in an effective bar being raised to the recruitment of many persons of 
talent. (DES 1967:6).
Thus, for over fifty years the challenge was perceived as being that access to ill- 
defined, informal, on-the-job training was a potential bar to talented young people. 
That there was no shortage of potential entrants was unquestioned. The 2003, the 
DCMS report noted
there are certainly enough keen young people anxious to work in 
film... however, they may not be able to do so because of the lack of 
adequate training as well as the obvious limited size of the industry.
Strangely, the Committee did not appear to consider the “limited size of the 
industry” to be a significant factor, but decided that the solution was that the 
“Government [should] ensure an integrated approach to education and skills 
training” (DCMS 2003:47) and that: “The training and development strategy set 
out by Skillset and the UK Film Council is an impressive wish list of welcome 
developments. We believe it strikes the right notes” (DCMS 2003:51).
The Skillset proposal had set out a strategy for the key areas: careers information, 
education, new entrants and professional development, and lastly, the collection 
and analysis of information relating to the business. However, what is of interest 
here is career information and entrants because The Bigger Future acknowledged 
that this was an industry where “nepotism and contacts, rather than open selection 
and aptitude” remained the key recruitment criteria (Skillset 2003a:5).
However, the challenge presented by “nepotism and contacts” is not easily 
overcome. As already shown in the last chapter, the characteristics of the internal 
labour market suit the feature film production industry well and the existing 
practitioners have little inclination to change it.
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...it is true to say that, particularly in the production parts of the 
industry where freelancing is so high ... that the little black book and 
who you know is very important. (DCMS 2003:Q423)
Few crew concern themselves about the long-term regeneration of the workforce 
and those taking on trainees did it as required, with no particular view as to whether 
they were a long-term necessity. This attitude is confirmed by the Skillset survey 
which asked what the feature film workforce thought about the number of people 
employed in their specialisation “given the current volume of work available in the 
film industry”. Overall, 50% thought that the number of people working was about 
right, 42% thought that there were too many specialising in their particular field 
and only 8% thought that there were too few people. In such an environment, it 
can be assumed that the 92% majority are not openly encouraging new entrants and 
this is not auspicious for the would-be applicant to the film production industry 
where there is such an oversupply of candidates:
I currently have ten clapper loaders who I’d choose from, in a 
specific order. (Focus puller)
[It’s] always hard in a freelance field. People will, without even 
thinking about it, employ to assist them people that they identify with.
(Director of FT2)
Thirty years ago the Lloyd Committee had recognised that a gap would always 
exist between those educated though on-the-job training and those taking courses at 
a “cultural institution, perhaps constituting a department of the humanities in a 
university” (DES 1967:3) because there was:
a considerable danger of becoming a rather academic or highbrow 
institution remote from the realities and needs of the film world, out 
of touch with the life of the cinema, and therefore unable to make a 
serious or practical contribution to its development. (DES 1967:12).
Contemporary practice would certainly appear to support this. An established 
director who has spoken at a number of film schools and on media courses 
indicated the problem:
The people who are teaching, for the most part, don’t have any 
experience in the business, or the experiences that they’ve had have 
been very bad.
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The students too realise this deficiency. This student had attended a university film 
course:
....we’ve been in a lot of discussion with my course leader about 
contacts, whether or not they provide any [contacts] -  and they don’t.
And the reason they don’t is it’s not a film school and unfortunately it 
has taken me IVz years to think about it and realise that it’s 80% 
theory, not a film school at all. A film school is film making. This is 
only 20% film making so that means that 80% of the staff that we 
work with have backgrounds in film theory - and even the people that 
teach us film making, they’re both freelance so they don’t really 
sustain any proper contacts...
Skillset believed that this problem could be overcome if students were able to 
identify those courses specifically designed to teach the practical skills that the 
industry would welcome, and so “resolve any mismatch between industry skill 
needs and education provision” (2003a:28). However, skill proficiency would 
appear to be secondary to personal skills for many feature film production 
gatekeepers as shown in these quotes from practitioners:
The idea of being stuck into a twelve or sixteen week film with 
somebody, with somebody who... you can’t gel with...
.... people genuinely hate you being late and won't stand for it. If 
they are there so should you be. I know a trainee who worked for one 
of my friends, and he likes said trainee, but will never use them for 
work as they were unreliable and turned up late on numerous 
occasions
so when productions say get another loader in for tomorrow, we’ll 
have three cameras, there’s a specific order that they’ll come in, 
taking into account skill -  and how funny they are...
... we had a trainee there and he was just so not what you needed...
He didn’t get on with any of us and he just was wrong. It was bizarre.
One grip I worked for didn't want me there. In the first week, in fact 
on the first day, he would say, ‘It's gonna be a slow one today, go 
home if you like’ and this carried on for the first week: ‘There's 
nothing for you to do blah blah blah.’ So I just cleaned all the gear, 
put everything away tidily when they'd gone etc. This carried on for 
three weeks and I thought he hated me. After that time he said he'd 
been testing how genuine I was and how much I wanted to be a grip, 
and from then on taught me more than anyone else did in the two 
years. I now work for him regularly and we're good friends.
Iain Reid
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FT2 (an acronym for Film and Television Freelance Training, and the restyled 
successor to Jobfit which was examined in Chapter 5) has provides apprenticeship 
style training for the junior technical, production and craft trades of feature film 
production and is highly regarded. However, even FT2 had to acknowledge the 
inherent preferences, or prejudices, of existing industry workers when they tracked 
their former students:
.... we can work really hard at bringing in good talented people from 
diverse backgrounds, but when it actually comes to getting freelance 
employment, women in technical areas, people with disabilities and 
people from ethnic minority backgrounds seem to get less work than 
their white male colleagues. All the people that came back to us in 
that original tracking and said ‘I’m no longer in the industry’ were all 
from one of those under represented groups, which really choked us.
(Director FT2)
As a government funded agency, FT2 has an obligation to recruit and encourage 
minority trainees and therefore may be particularly aware of the challenges that 
these groups face, but the challenge for minorities does appear to be very specific:
for black people it’s tough because they don’t know the people to tell 
them about the business and how it works ...and if you don’t know 
about the business, it’s very hard. (Black director)
However, minorities are easily identified and, because of the current interest in 
diversity, they are categorised and tracked as separate groups. In practice, it can 
probably be assumed that discrimination of some sort will operate against all 
entrants in some way. This white, male grip remembers the challenges of his early 
placements as a trainee:
.... quite frankly half the people you work for don’t want you there 
‘cause they'd rather have their own trainee, so you have to work extra 
hard to stick in their memory. I was always, always the first person at 
work and the last to leave from my department. This counts for a lot 
as a trainee, it means you’re at work about thirty minutes more than 
everyone else - but hey, it’s your choice, impress or go home. (Ex 
FT2 trainee)
Thus practical formal training can provide appropriate opportunities but it is still 
only those possessing “the individual’s curiosity about what goes on around him, as 
well as his desire to master a job for its extrinsic and intrinsic rewards” (Doeringer 
& Piore 1971:21) who will be able to capitalise on them and start to make the
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contacts necessary for a career which will be dependent on contacts. Others will 
have to utilise another resource, parental support, to seek contacts through unpaid 
‘work experience.’
In the legitimate, high-end film business, unpaid work appears to be the exception.
As a rule, you wouldn’t [ask trainees to work unpaid]. I don’t think it 
is quite fair to normally expect people to work for nothing. (Feature 
film production manager)
I can understand that they [the trainee] are obviously getting 
something out of it in that they’re going to be on set with a proper 
film crew... but morally there is part of me saying ‘that is a proper 
job’ (DoP)
But in almost every other sector there are many employers willing to take 
advantage of the potential labour surplus trying to gain a foothold in the industry:
...many young potential film makers will testify to the sweatshop 
mentality of working on some films. The pay-off is not financial -  
many trying to get onto the bottom rung of the ladder work for 
nothing on these films -  but it is to gain a few lines of experience on 
their CVs. (BFI 2004:20)
How do you get a foot in the door? One way is you say ‘I will work 
for nothing’, and people at quite a high level are prepared to [accept 
them] except that they do it under the guise of work experience; take 
people who in effect are working for nothing. It’s a form of cheap 
labour. (Tudor Gates)
One film student interviewed had had three unpaid work experience placements, 
but none had lasted for more than a few days, while another student had done two 
months unpaid work for FilmFour:
...he wasn’t being paid and he was actually being subsidised by his 
father to get out there every day ... [You] can’t really afford to do it 
really, if  you’re a student and it takes out two months of your summer 
holidays and they’re not even paying your travel. Dot a lot of people 
can afford to do that.
And the value for that individual?
It’s just a bit cruel really because ... I think the only person that he’s 
still able to call up is the guy who was his original contact because 
everybody else just forgot him.
Iain Reid
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While this might reflect a failing on the part of the individual to make himself 
memorable, the underlying concern must be the legality and morality of asking 
students to fulfil real and legitimate tasks without the protection of statutory 
employment:
[There] has been a lot of talk within the industry of companies 
abusing free work experience. PACT has taken a very strong line on 
legal advice that they are breaking the law if they are using people.
And that’s certainly the advice we got from our lawyers way back, 
that if someone, even if it’s supernumerary, if someone is told to turn 
up at a certain time and do things under instruction they are a worker 
under the legislation... (Director FT2)
However, even the most structured organisations could fail to prevent the 
enthusiastic and persistent student inadvertently exceeding the guidelines:
The BBC have a very clear policy with timelines [limits] on work 
experience, it’s four weeks or something. But you know what 
happens in big corporations like that, someone goes on Watchdog or 
whatever for four week’s work experience in their college holidays... 
and that production thinks they’re brilliant, mentions it to someone 
else who then offers them four weeks, then thinks they’re brilliant and 
mentions it to someone else.... We’ve seen CVs of people who have 
been practically a year and a half on work experience gaining a lot of 
skills and whatever, but not paid. Dow that again has a diversity 
impact because the kids that can afford to do that tend to be the 
middle class ones where mummy and daddy can support them.
This view, that only the middle classes can spend months in unpaid work, hoping 
for a suitable paid appointment and so "skew the industry towards those from 
wealthy backgrounds...” (Broadcast 3 March 2006) is supported by other evidence 
(Holgate 2006:10; Campion 2005). On-the-job training may have been informal in 
its structure, but it was invariably legitimate paid work that inducted the trainee 
into the working community of which he or she was now part. The new challenge 
for policy makers is two fold. The first is that the widespread practice of ‘work 
experience’ has created a barrier just as divisive as the old nepotistic admission to 
the closed shop except that now it is only those with parental support who can 
purchase, through their unpaid time, the necessary exposure to the industry which 
might lead to legitimate employment. This barrier to entry works as well as it did 
seventy years ago for the professions: “the rule works so as to exclude those who 
cannot afford to wait” (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933:383).
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The second challenge has been the failure to recognise the strength of the internal 
labour market and to assume that training alone will be sufficient to qualify for 
entry. As will be shown in the next section, the lack of skill specificity in the 
training is one obstacle to entry, but the other is that the potential entrant has no 
understanding of how the workforce operates in the feature film industry where 
there are few formal entry routes. Therefore, in an attempt to make contacts and 
locate the necessary sponsors, the potential entrant reverts to the other audio-visual 
sectors where they take any employment at any salary -  or perhaps no salary at all. 
This would-be entrant to the wider audio-visual industry reflects the situation of 
many thousands:
[I shall] send my CV off to every contact that I have ... to say that 
I’ve graduated and do you know anyone who’s looking for a 
graduate. And then try and do what I’ve done before, which is get 
onto The Knowledge and send my CV out to the hundreds of 
companies in London and small film companies and just see if I can 
get anything back from that. And then try to go to as many seminars, 
open days and anything else and be constantly on the lookout. I 
really have no strategy, which is a terrible thing... I’m clueless 
really. (Graduating film course student)
Thus, in ten years the real entry requirement has changed little:
start making contacts by attending short courses, conferences, 
anything that is relevant to your field of interest... many of the jobs 
will not be advertised at all.... (Skillset 1996:23)
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8.4 The challenges of skill specificity
“Over the last twenty years there has been a massive expansion in 
courses which provide opportunities to study the media, film  and 
communications. Yet there is a clear perception right across the film  
industry that only a few  o f  those courses deliver the right mix o f  
vocational skills which equip students to enter the industry ” (Skillset
2003: IQ
If formal training fails to prepare entrants socially for a fragmented industry where 
few companies advertise vacancies (Skillset 2005;85) then there are also some 
doubts whether routes other than on-the-job training adequately prepare entrants 
with the specific skills required in feature film employment. Thus many potential 
entrants, having completed formal training, opt for more general employment 
within the other audio-visual sectors where there are less structured career paths.
In 2006, the most superficial search of UCAS for first degree level courses 
(ignoring the more general “media” courses (2,462 options) and those including 
‘film studies’ in the title (1540 options)), revealed 51 courses under the general 
heading of ‘film production.’ Those courses ranged from an HDD in film making 
(University of Worcester), through a BA in Film Production (Arts Institute at 
Bournemouth) to the more specific ‘set design for stage and screen’ (Wimbledon 
College of Art). If the general media courses are included then it is estimated that 
there are approximately 25,000 students graduating each year with some sort of 
film or television-related degree (Holgate 2006:9) but, as the Lloyd Committee had 
suggested some forty years earlier, the value and purpose of some courses are not 
always easy to define. In June 2003, giving evidence to the Culture Media and 
Sport Enquiry into the British Film Industry, the Director of Policy and 
Development at Skillset answered cautiously the questions “Are there other good 
courses as well as your own in the UK ? How many people are going through in 
total each year?”
We do not know the last part of that question in terms of exactly how 
many students are studying film courses. We know only part of the 
answer to the first question, ‘are there good courses’, because there 
are just under 1,000 undergraduate courses aimed at film and just 
over 200 postgraduate courses aimed at film. Of those the majority 
will absolutely not be aimed at training or producing people to work 
in the industry. They are academic, theoretical studies of the media.
It is not always tremendously clear what course is doing what. It is
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often not clear for the students, for the employers and for the 
funders... (DCMS 2003:Q433)
Thus the challenge for many graduating students is that they have been on courses 
that have developed their critical skills, but given them few of the practical skills 
necessary to gain entry to the industry. For some students this realisation had 
dawned as the course progressed:
[Initially] I found it [the course] wonderful because finally I was 
doing something that I enjoyed, focussing on something that I really 
enjoyed. However as the years have gone on, I felt that I was being 
slightly conned in the sense that when I arrived, I believed that it was 
going to be a practical course... (Graduating film course student)
You don’t need a degree in media work to be in the media industry.
They don’t take your course very seriously... (Student cited in 
Holgate 2006:19)
It doesn’t help, I think, that my tutor has constantly instilled in me 
that if you want to have a career in the media, don’t do a media 
degree. That was one of the first things I was told. (BME student,
Holgate 2006:19) 8
Sharon Goode, Director of FT2, confirmed that many students do fail to understand 
the realities of a media-related course:
[I] say to people ‘look it’s great what you’ve done’, particularly 
media studies, ‘it means you are a really informed audience and the 
industry likes a really informed audience, but if you have done a 
degree as a philosopher, a degree in philosophy, would you expect a 
company to employ you as a philosopher ?’ Your degree is great, but 
....we would rather take on people that have done a City & Guilds 
sound engineering or a bit of technical drawing....
And when the media studies graduates apply to the craft training providers, such as 
FT2, they are regarded with suspicion:
Some of them do still apply because they want the contacts or they 
want a couple more years where someone else is worrying about them 
getting a job, not them. It is very rare we take someone on; there 
would have to be a really good reason why we took someone like that 
on.... (DirectorFT2)
8 Many more quotes expressing similar views can be found in Holgate 2006:16-19)
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The highly regarded FT2 scheme was created to replace the traditional 
apprenticeships lost when the film studios went "four walled" and the permanent 
staff crews were replaced by freelance crews assembled ad hoc by production 
companies (DCMS 2003:Ev.65).9 In 2006, FT2 was providing a number of 
practical courses for film and television:
Currently [we’ve] got 42 [trainees] on the Dew Entrant Technical 
Training Programme and that ranges from assistant editors, camera 
assistants, sound assistants, make-up, hair, wardrobe, art, props....
Six on an eighteen month scheme called the Independent Companies’
Research Training Scheme. Five set craft apprentices (Plasterers, 
painters, fibrous plasterers) and we’ve got four on a grips’ 
apprenticeship scheme ... (Director FT2)
The competition for places is stiff. Each year between 400 and 500 applications 
are received of whom fewer than 3% will be successful although approximately 
67% of the applications come from graduates who, as cited above, are unlikely to 
be accepted unless they have particular aptitude. Many applicants have illusions 
about the glamour of the industry and these are carefully screened out by those 
aware that “when you’re seven weeks into an eight week shoot of six day weeks, 
ten hour days it all seems very different....” Great care has to be taken because the 
training is comprehensive and costly:
It costs a lot of money to put someone through that sort of 
apprenticeship style training. It is something like £30,000 a year now 
with their salary, our overheads, the short course training which at the 
end gives them work on AVID, with traditional film, [and] a range of 
technical courses10 and there’re not cheap.... It costs. [We] 
constantly have to make the case that we believe that it is better that 
you have a small number of highly qualified and highly skilled people 
than diluting it by giving too much general industry information to a 
vast number of people who then actually haven’t got the skills to 
operate in a freelance sector. (Director FT2)
However, as shown above even having demonstrated the necessary commitment 
and with the benefit of highly specialised and informed training these entrants still 
have to demonstrate the right personal qualities and make the appropriate contacts 
to secure employment.
9 Most technicians interviewed for this report rated FT2 trained apprentices very highly.
10 These include Health & Safety, first aid etc.
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The majority of university graduating students have little skill specificity and this 
was noted in the 2002 Skillset report which recognised a need for further and 
higher education to “resolve any mismatch between industry skill needs and 
education provision” (2003a:28). Skillset believed that the first problem was that 
students were unable to identify those courses specifically designed to teach the 
practical skills that the industry would welcome, rather than the theoretical, media 
skills, and their solution was presented in July 2005 through the nomination of a 
network of seven academic institutions that would be known as Screen 
Academies.n These institutions would work together “to provide new courses, 
summer schools, work placements, master classes, bursaries, online learning 
resources and a talent scout programme to help develop the brightest and the best.” 
The objective was to create a network of:
single institutions and consortia, and acceptance ... based on the 
quality of existing courses and their ability to complement each other.
... A Skillset spokeswoman said the academies would be a "beacon" 
to anyone wanting to enter the film industry as they would highlight 
the best courses and entry routes. (The Guardian 6 July 2005)
The approved courses included the first ever film MBA at the Cass Business 
School (created to address specifically the challenges of distribution and financing 
which had been identified by the 2003 DCMS Report) but also a number of courses 
which required more modest entry standards; for example, the BTEC First Diploma 
in Media had a minimum entry requirement of two GCSEs at grade D. The 
concept of the network was that those with talent, but with relatively modest 
qualifications, would be able to rise seamlessly through the various courses and 
thus develop the skills necessary to qualify them for admission to the wider audio­
visual industry.
Given that there are as yet few graduates from the Screen Academies it is too soon 
to assess whether the new network will achieve its objective of ensuring that “UK 
film gets the skilled talent it needs for a strong and healthy business” (Skillset press
11 The seven Screen Academies were Arts Institute Bournemouth & Bournemouth Media School; 
London College o f Communication, UAL and Ealing Institute o f Media; LTapier University & 
Edinburgh College of Art; The Film Academy (University of Glamorgan) & International Film 
School Wales (University of Wales Ljewport); London Film School; national Film & Television 
School; The Film Business Academy at Cass Business School.
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release 5 July 2005). However, the Academies may not be the complete solution to 
the ‘talent’ challenge. First, there is no indication that they provide the essential 
contacts within the industry and secondly because the courses are not 
comprehensive of all the skills required by the audio-visual industries. While there 
are many opportunities to study post-production, script development and 
animation, only two academies, the London Film School and the national Film and
I ^
Television School, offer experience in working with film (as opposed to video). 
Furthermore, none of the academies appears to offer specific courses in the craft 
skills such as set construction, special effects, make-up or grips.
Past experience has been that even when practical courses are available they may 
still not be tailored to the industry’s requirements:
Existing DVQs are said to be too bureaucratic. They produce too 
much paperwork and are largely irrelevant in context, for example 
making people use precision tools far more accurately than is 
necessary in model making (Skillset 2003b2:87)
There was a view that senior people in the video sector are less aware 
of the technological possibilities than the technicians involved in 
manufacture and content creation... (Skillset 2003b: 109)
And even if the taught skills are appropriate, there is evidence that over capacity 
leads to a surplus of qualified entrants. The skills survey of 2003 reported that “a 
key industry organisation estimates that the TV and film industry needs 10-20 
entrants per year in sound” and then listed the twenty FE or HE institutions training 
sound engineers. Evidence to the DCMS revealed the frustration that this surplus 
could generate:
I think it is a terrible mistake to waste a lot of money, whether it is 
state money or not, training people to work in an industry that has no 
jobs for them. It seems to me crazy. It creates false perceptions, 
people feel very bitter, they whinge a lot, because they feel ‘I have 
done my training. Why isn’t anybody taking any notice?’ The reality 
is that the jobs are not there. (DCMS 2003 :Q22)
The result of inappropriate training, an oversupply of aspiring film-makers and 
production companies eager to reduce costs is that this inexperienced supply of
12 Developing UK Film Talent listed only two Masters courses as suitable for camera training. 
There were no undergraduate courses (Skillset 2003b:66).
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labour is utilised to fulfil junior, possibly inappropriate roles. While this does 
provide a foothold, and a potential meeting with contacts, many entrants then move 
unwittingly between seemingly glamorous, but structureless appointments.
One respondent, James, obtained two weeks’ unpaid work placement on Walking 
with Dinosaurs and then a few weeks in a very low paid job on another production 
with the same company. However, helped by a helpful production manager (his 
first sponsor), he was called by another company to work on the Hit JO UK Chart 
Show in a role for which he had received no training:
....within a few days, on the first kind of shoot, which was just an 
interview, but we were filming it, and I was operating the camera and 
all that kind of stuff and I got involved in research and I took care of 
all sorts of bits and bobs. [Organising] the competition [which was] 
not inspiring work, but a responsibility when you have to get three 
prizes in. It was just more interesting work.
However, the choices faced by the inexperienced are not easy for them to assess. A 
successful director likened the entrants’ job choices to a straw poll; a lottery at 
which the ill-informed could be easily side-tracked towards dead-ends:
If you don’t know about the business, it’s very hard because ....you 
see straws there and ‘Maybe I’ll just go for that one ‘cos it looks the 
most attractive to get me in.’ But you need someone to say ‘you see 
all those straws there, forget them because 90% are just a waste of 
time.’
In taking the seemingly more exciting Chart Show appointment, James had rejected 
an offer of a position as the multi-lingual researcher (French, Spanish and Italian) 
on The Property Show:
At that point I didn’t know anything about TV and what any of these 
jobs were and what they meant and actually how, if I’d started 
straight off as a multi-lingual researcher, that’s skipping out quite a 
lot of hard work at the lower levels. Anyway it was a property show, 
not interested in that at all, I had other things in the pipeline....
When it was re-offered, he took the job and made another rapid advance in skill 
and responsibility because on location it was:
Basically me and the director. In terms of producing everything [it 
was] me: script content, finding the houses; sorting out the recces; the 
shoots; film permissions... It was a very, very demanding, tiring 
job.... an incredible education.
lain Reid
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However, when that contract terminated, he had had no opportunity to line up a 
new job and so was unemployed for four months, dependent on parental support 
but spending his time making a short film and editing his own material. 
Eventually, that work gave him sufficient credibility to get employed as a 
director/editor on corporate instructional videos. At his interview:
I came in and said, ‘Yea I can do both of those things’ ... and was 
able to pull out my ipod and say, “have a look” and they saw my little 
film, had a giggle ... and I got this job.
So eighteen months into the business, James had effected four different entries and 
thus experienced four very different types of production, pursued his own project 
and was now gaining experience with the complete creative control which would 
take years to attain in a mainstream film career. However, he remained in a 
backwater to the main industry and none of his working experience had brought 
him any closer to full-time employment on a recognisable career path.
An experienced director described this challenge of making the correct career 
choices:
It’s just the beginning of the battle. You’ve got many wars to go 
through and you’re going to lose several of them. But at least it’s the 
right war to be fighting to get through. Forget all the other ninety 
[choices], not only are you going to lose -  you are going to be killed, 
and by the end of it you won’t have anything left, you’ll end up doing 
something else.
Conclusions
Given the growth in the size of the industry and the simultaneous easing of the 
closed shop, two possible outcomes for employment in the audio-visual industry 
might have been predicted in the early 1990s. First, that the union’s fears of a free 
market system exposed to external economic forces would be fulfilled and there 
would be a reversion to the exploitative methods of the 1930s. Alternatively, it 
might have been that the hopes of those such as Kelly (“talent should be found and 
the best use made of it with fewer of today’s hindrances” (1966:166)) would at last 
be realised and that the industry would have become a true meritocracy, where
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recruitment would be based upon talent and aptitude and where formal training 
would replace the closed shop’s rite of passage.
In practice, there appear to have been three outcomes for the production industries. 
The first, perhaps unexpected, but as demonstrated in earlier chapters, is that 
employment within the feature film production workforce remains largely 
unchanged. The internal labour market remains extant and largely self regulating 
because its stability suits workers and employers alike. The second outcome is that 
Kelly’s hopes have been partially realised in that each year approximately 25,000 
graduates are able to study and train in media-related subjects thus theoretically 
preparing themselves for a media career uninhibited by the mystery of closed shop 
admission -  and some do successfully forge a career. However, the contemporary 
challenge is that the barrier of closed shop entry has been replaced by a confusing 
maze of alternatives created by a third outcome, the breakdown of the previously 
predictable structures into a largely deregulated, fragmented industry.
This third outcome has meant that in most sectors there has been a return to the free 
market where economic forces predominate and managers have taken control to 
protect their interests and ensure they maintain their place in a competitive market. 
As shown, this is especially prevalent in television production where a plethora of 
companies are competing for the same limited funding distributed by the publisher- 
broadcasters. In these sectors, even if  there is no illegal exploitation -  and some 
would claim that an excessive use of unpaid work experience is exploitation - there 
is certainly pressure to secure the maximum output from each individual for the 
lowest practical wage in the knowledge, by both parties, that there is a large labour 
surplus. Thus new entrants cannot be selective or demanding.
In this respect, audio-visual entry has always been difficult and there are many 
warnings about the pitfalls. The contemporary Skillset website lists the following 
warnings to would-be film industry entrants:
• It’s a tough business. More people want to work in the industry 
than there are jobs available. Some people work for nothing, even 
agreeing to work in dangerous conditions.
• A lot of jobs involve long hours and uncomfortable working 
conditions. You might have to work shifts and weekends.
Iain Reid
Chapter 8 A Comparison: Other Audio-Visual Sectors 255
• It's easy to get stuck in the badly organised, low/no budget end of 
things.
• You might have to do a few menial jobs on your way up the 
ladder.
• You have to make your own luck.
(www.skillset.org/careers/getting_in 16 Sep 2005)
This 2005 list of warnings is probably more dire (e.g. “dangerous conditions”) than 
might have been issued thirty years earlier at the height of the pre-entry closed 
shop, or fifty years earlier during the big studio era. During the latter period, there 
had been distinct routes for new entrants in every department and therefore they 
were properly appointed members of staff, salaried and placed in specific 
appointments with personnel departments to monitor their progress. That progress 
may have been slow, but there was an identifiable route of advancement with some 
degree of security assisted by union agreements that would ensure that overtime 
and shift work was appropriately recognised.
Subsequently, in the less structured, freelance system of the 1970s and 1980s, there 
were many faults and inconsistencies for new entrants, but the all-pervading 
influence of the unions did ensure that everyone, members and non-members, 
received some protection because industry agreements imposed some budgetary 
constraints and thus limited overtime, weekend or bank holiday working. Even if 
new entrants, such as runners, tea-boys, drivers or make-up assistants were not 
union members, the accepted conventions of the period required that they were 
reasonably treated and rewarded; the crew who they worked alongside, perhaps 
empowered by their knowledge of the union’s influence, would expect no less. 
Additionally, the union’s required crewing levels ensured that there were 
recognisable supernumerary positions where new entrants would gain the required 
experience -  and hence access to the essential union membership with the assured 
status that implied.
The challenge in the contemporary environment is that there is so little protection 
and so little guidance for the entrant whose enthusiasm for any employment makes 
them vulnerable to the economic forces to which the employers themselves are 
subjected. As shown, the union is no longer able to do more than “recommend
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minimum wages”, assuming that the employer is signatory to an appropriate 
agreement, and it is less likely that the entrant will be a union member and aware of 
that entitlement -  or that there will be a union representative within the company to 
ensure the agreement is enforced. And in these other audio-visual sectors the 
formality of the union has not been replaced by the observance of custom and 
practice seen amongst the feature film crew, partly because the expansion of the 
industry has so diluted the workforce that there are few who remember those 
practices, and partly because the new working practices do not create the hierarchy, 
and the associated paternalism, that still exists within the self-selecting internal 
labour market. In the film production workforce, there are still accepted customs, 
practices and loyalties that will still motivate an individual to take a stand when 
they observe what they deem to be an unfair practice:
When I asked for an additional trainee to run the video, he [the 
producer] said ‘Oh we’ve got £100 left in the budget. Do you think 
anyone would do that and we’d obviously feed them?’ and I had to 
say ‘Well I don’t know anybody who’d do it for £100 for a 72 hour 
week.’ And I’ll be interested to see if he does find anyone and I will 
be interested to see if I happen to ring anybody up and say ‘look 
there’s someone working for below the minimum wage’ since I feel 
slightly strongly about it. (Focus puller)
The contrast in the other audio-visual sectors is that there are few customs and 
practices and little of the loyalty or career path created through on-the-job training. 
This runner had been promoted to production assistant after two years with a 
company:
I didn’t really get on with the producer ... we were very different 
people... After we completed the first job, I got the ‘flu so I took 
three days off work.... Of course, she got another PA on the job and 
before I knew it, they were hiring somebody in for full-time.... Then 
I went back to being a runner ... and realised actually once they had 
hired in her new PA there wasn’t going to be another opportunity for 
me to move up for six to nine months -  and I wasn’t willing to wait 
that long
In short, the other audio-visual sectors provide none of the stability or assurances of 
the internal labour market.
Iain Reid
257
C h a p ter  9 C o n c l u s io n s
Introduction
This thesis started with the premise that little appeared to have changed in British 
film production employment practices since the demise of the closed shop and so 
one primary research question was posed:
How has the workers’ control of employment practices and 
demarcation been perpetuated in the contemporary feature film 
production industry despite the removal of the enforcement implicit 
in the closed shop?
However, in order to answer that question, it was considered necessary to first 
explore several subsidiary questions in order to establish how employment 
practices are created and maintained in any working environment, and specifically 
how employment practices had been established in the evolving British film 
production industry:
1. How do workers obtain and exercise power in the workplace?
2: How were employment practices and associations first established 
in the film production sector?
3: How did the closed shop affect the industry’s employment 
practices?
4: What factors contributed to the demise of the ACTT closed shop?
5: What has been the outcome in those audio-visual sectors where 
employment practices have not been maintained?
6: What has been the role of the employers?
The consideration of these questions, allied to the analysis of the various forms of 
power associated with labour markets, inevitably revealed that although these
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questions could be approached separately, the answers were often interlinked and 
interdependent. Therefore, while each is answered in these conclusions, the format 
is adjusted to avoid repetition and to add clarity. Appropriate references to the 
cited evidence are included.
9.1 Limitations and strengths of the research
Limitations:
The principal challenge to this research must be that in such an unstructured and 
poorly documented industry it is unlikely that the sampling will ever be sufficiently 
comprehensive to ensure that the findings will be universally valid. As explained 
in the methodology chapter, employment in the feature film industry has been, until 
recently, of secondary interest to the product. The lack of surviving union records 
from the closed shop era and the paucity of historical statistical records does mean 
that the research is dependent on secondary evidence or individual recollection that 
may now be coloured by subsequent events.
Even contemporary research is constrained by the willingness and availability of 
respondents to participate in surveys or submit themselves for interview. Skillset in 
their comprehensive survey of the 2002 workforce conceded that their statistics 
excluded an estimated 50,000 freelancers not working on Census Day (Skillset 
2003c:8) and that when they conducted their subsequent survey of the 9,700 
identified individuals working in feature films they discovered that they could 
locate no contact details for 55% of them (Skillset 2005:19). With such a disparate 
workforce it was impractical to impose a strict interview protocol on respondents.
Also, it has been necessary to make distinctions between the various audio-visual 
sectors which may not always exist because there can be no defined boundaries 
when freelance workers are employed on project work. Although, as shown, the 
majority of workers will only do either only film or television work, inevitably 
there are some less hardened in their preferences and some will drift between the 
sectors although, as shown, the barriers around feature film production remain firm 
(pages 189-190).
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In defence, no evidence has been presented that has not been verified by other 
sources, but there might yet be alternatives unexplored.
Strengths:
The author’s privileged access and knowledge of the industry meant that it was 
possible to locate and interview individuals not otherwise readily available and 
also, knowing the hierarchy and vocabulary, to then understand and recognise the 
values of the opinions offered. Although there are potential hazards in the 
researcher knowing too much about the subject matter (pages 34-35) the evidence 
presented has been exhaustively tested and verified against alternative sources.
However, the main strength of the research is that it attempts to impose some 
historical context and theoretical structure on the persistence of an institution which 
is relatively under researched. Although the film industry workforce has attracted 
some interest because of its use of networks and the organisation of boundaryless 
careers (Jones & Walsh 1997; Blair 2001; Blair et al, 2001; Saundry 2005) few, if 
any, have examined the foundations of those practices and especially the operation
of the closed shop and its enforcement in the fifty year period 1940 to 1990.
Already the memories of that institution are fading and one objective of this 
research was to ensure that some its features were recorded
Lastly, looking forward, it is hoped that this research will provide some insights 
into how the feature film workforce really operates, and thus influence future 
policy for the maintenance of a viable industry.
9.2 Labour power and internal labour markets
That film production workers still exercise significant control over demarcation and 
their employment was demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8, where the contemporary 
conditions of film production employment were contrasted with those of other 
audio-visual sectors. While some of the latter are sectors created after the closed 
shop’s demise (pages 225-226), there are many workers that in the closed shop era 
had enjoyed a status similar to that of the film production workers but are now 
employed in less favourable conditions. Therefore, there has to be an assumption
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that the film production workers still possess sufficient influence and power to 
match or counter the normally dominant power of the employers.
The exploration of the literature on labour power revealed many potential sources: 
innate talent; acquired skill; closure; unity and numerical strength; custom and 
practice; and social networks. The chronological evolution of the film production 
workforce summarised in this thesis shows that all of these powers have been 
utilised at some stage. However, the theory that incorporates them all, and which 
has most resonance with the conditions which have remained prevalent in the film 
production industry, is the internal labour market theory where the “pricing and 
allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” 
that operate seemingly independent of external economic variables (Doeringer & 
Piore 1971:2).
The primary test for an internal labour market is that there must be distinct, visible 
boundaries demonstrating rigidity in the rules of a specific workforce (Doeringer & 
Piore 1971:5-6). Thereafter, it should be possible to identify the other criteria that 
Doeringer & Piore identified as critical to an internal labour market: skill 
specificity; on-the-job training; and customary law. These seem appropriate 
criteria with which to test the persistence of employment practices from the closed 
shop era to the contemporary film production industry.
9.3 The origins of film production employment practices
The research has identified that the employment practices evident in the 
contemporary industry have been shaped during three phases of employer / worker 
relationships in British film production: the pre WW2 period, when employment 
relations within the embryonic industry were haphazard; the war-time and 
subsequent forty-five years of more formal industrial relations with the operation of 
a pre-entry closed shop; and the post 1990 period when the industry reverted to less 
formal arrangements. This section will consider the first two periods, the third will 
be considered in more detail in sections 9.6 and 9.7.
The demarcation between the first two periods was the government intervention of 
1940 which changed the status of the ACT from a respected, but not universally
Iain Reid ►*! SC J4K +
Chapter 9 Conclusions 261
recognised, union and employment bureau to being the legitimate organisation 
which would identify those whose work was of sufficient value to be designated as 
a reserved occupation (page 113). By this unusual method closure was finally 
achieved and enforced because those outside the union were conscripted and thus 
rendered unavailable for employment. By 1945, the ACT had established, and was 
able to maintain, a closed shop (page 116) and thus had the “geographical and 
occupational jurisdiction” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:2) necessary to designate the 
production workforce as a craft market.
The principles that had governed employment in the pre-war period are less easy to 
define because of the relative weakness of both employers and employees in an 
industry that was still evolving rapidly with little stability or coherence. By the 
1920s and 1930s the distribution and exhibition elements (page 99) of the film 
industry were becoming a major commercial and cultural feature of Britain. 
However, the British production industry had always been in the shadow of the 
much larger American studios (pages 99 & 118) and survived as a separate, often 
faltering entity mainly through protectionist government intervention (the 
Cinematograph Films Acts 1927 and 1938). The power of the employers was thus 
weak, engaged in an activity “in which the difference between showmanship and 
racketeering is often slight” (Klingender & Legg 1937:7) and dependent on the 
supply of capital from speculative financiers whose support was erratic and 
unpredictable (page 105).
However, in this era the employees also had little control over their employment. 
Employment conditions were harsh with few statutory controls: there was no 
declared limit on the working day, although twelve hour days and six day weeks 
were the norm; there was no provision for sickness or holiday pay; and workers 
were laid off at the completion of each film project (page 36). Although there was 
a embryonic union in the ACT, its membership often dropped below one hundred 
(page 102) and the only apparent form of employee generated power appears to 
have come through emerging social networks: the limited evidence available
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indicates that entry to the industry was either by accident or by invitation1 and it 
was already becoming established that heads of department would choose their 
own crew (page 191) -  an indication of nascent customary law. When the ACT 
eventually emerged as a potential bargaining authority in the late 1930s (page 103) 
it possessed few meaningful powers exercisable in collective bargaining because 
the employers were themselves still weak and transitory (page 106). The rare 
success the union achieved in collective bargaining on behalf of the laboratories in 
1939 was negated when the employers’ federation was dissolved (page 104).
Elsewhere the ACT had sufficient influence to successfully lobby the government 
regarding the 1938 Cinematograph Films Act (page 104) and registering their 
opposition to foreign, “ace” technicians (pages 106-107). However, it should be 
noted that this influence possibly had more to do with the social connections of the 
union’s hierarchy than the power of their numerical strength2. The ACT had also 
received some praise for their considered proposals to introduce a formal 
apprentice scheme -  and although their efforts failed (page 109) it is clear that in 
the immediate pre-war period that the necessary skills were becoming sufficiently 
specific that there was no other means of acquisition than on-the-job training - thus 
there was an emerging internal labour market. Furthermore, that acquired skill had 
to be recognised by the emerging social network for there to be employment 
opportunities and thus customary law was becoming more defined.
Any uncertainty about the degree of closure, the strength of the employees and the 
endurance of the employers was removed during the Second World War. First, as 
already shown, the ACT achieved effective closure through government 
intervention (page 113) and was thus able to legitimately represent all technicians 
actively employed in the film production industry between 1941 and 1945. 
Second, film production was decreed to be an important part of the war effort and 
so the industry was consolidated, joining together what had been disparate groups: 
left-wing documentary makers; feature film producers; the laboratories; and
1 Or both, Muriel Box got her first, secretarial, appointment in a studio through a friend, and her first 
break into continuity when someone else had appendicitis (Box 1974:98 & 100).
2 The ACT’s General Secretary, George Elvin, was the son of the Chairman of the TUC (page 102). 
The ACT’s President from 1934 was Anthony Asquith, son of Herbert Asquith (ACTT 1983:13).
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entrepreneurs, such as J Arthur Rank, and their associated capital (pages 114-115). 
The era is regarded by many to have been the pinnacle of independent British 
production and during this period the ACT, the sole representative of the available 
skilled workforce, was able to formalise collective bargaining agreements 
regarding crewing levels, the closed shop and inter-union demarcation (pages 118- 
119). Thus the internal labour market, where “pricing and allocation of labour is 
governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” (Doeringer & Piore 
1971:2) was institutionalised and this thesis has argued that many of the working 
practices established in that period remain extant today -  only the formality of the 
union’s participation has been eroded.
In the immediate post-war period, the big studio system maintained a continuous 
stream of new productions utilising methods and industrial relations similar to 
those of any contemporaneous large-scale manufacturing organisation. Boardroom 
strategies were communicated through tiers of management to be executed by full­
time employees deployed in co-ordinated and specialised divisions: script, studio; 
construction; electrical; wardrobe; props; drapes, publicity and camera (page 36). 
This was an era of “conventional” industrial relations between two strong actors 
whose respective powers were those of employers, the possessors of capital and the 
ultimate sanctions over employment, and the employees’ representatives, 
possessing the powers associated with collective action. Although the peak level 
relationship was acrimonious, compromise was usually reached, there being only 
one major strike in 1954 (significantly, as will be shown, in the laboratories) while 
relationships on the studio floor between management and workers remained 
amicable (Kelly 1966:170-171).
However, this period of formal industrial relations was relatively short-lived 
because the studio production system with its associated hierarchies and full time 
employment did not survive in the competitive post-war markets. By the late 
1950s, the major companies were either insolvent or they had abandoned 
production to concentrate on the more profitable distribution and exhibition and so 
the studios became “four wall” operations -  empty space to be rented by 
independent producers for single production projects (page 127).
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This conversion had two significant effects. First, technical crew were invariably 
released from full time employment to become freelance workers -  albeit that they 
usually endeavoured to work within established teams, bounded by their own social 
networks (page 127). Second, subsequent producers of feature films no longer had 
direct links to assured capital -  but simultaneously their need for capital investment 
was reduced because all the elements required for filmmaking could be readily 
hired (page 212-213). This second effect will be dealt with in more detail below, 
but it should be noted that those individuals now acting as employers were 
essentially independent entrepreneurs, only loosely bound to any employers’ 
federation (indeed many, having started their careers as crew, remained members 
of the ACTT) (pages 37 & 101).
The significance of the technical crew becoming freelance might have been more 
critical had the workforce fragmented into a pool of independent contractors, each 
negotiating individual deals with the now independent and relatively uncoordinated 
producers. However, the ACTT was able to impose their geographical and 
occupational jurisdiction over the freelance craft workers and their employers 
through their control of the more conventionally employed laboratory workers 
(page 151). The laboratory process was, until the advent of video (pages 166-167), 
critical to any visual production and producers came to realise that it was in their 
best interest to conform to the prescribed crewing levels, demarcation and 
employment conditions (pages 151-152) and thus it was they who observed the 
rules and thus maintained the union’s authority over the itinerant freelancers.
Thus the internal labour market, loosely established in the pre-war period and 
formalised through the exigencies of wartime production, was sheltered by the 
overwhelming power possessed by the ACTT’s control of the laboratory workforce 
- “the industrial powerhouse of the union” (ACTT 1983:33). The fear of the 
potential sanction ensured that all employers not only complied with, but also 
policed, the union arrangements: the administrative rules and procedures that 
governed entry, labour allocation, demarcation and pricing. Despite radically 
changing external factors in the post-war period which created unpredictable peaks 
and troughs in British film production and employment (pages 119-120), the rules
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were never varied and, when full employment returned, the same rules for 
demarcation and crewing levels were relentlessly and ruthlessly applied.
9.4 The effect of the closed shop on employment practices
Such was the power exercised by the ACT, and then the ACTT, during the fifty 
year, closed shop era that it is not easy to define what might have been the post-war 
outcomes had it not existed. Employment relations within the film and television 
production sectors were shaped by the union to the extent that composition and the 
divisions within the various post-war industry were defined by the associated union 
agreements (page 11).
Certainly exacting regulation should have been a major concern of the ACTT in the 
era of the ‘big studio’ collective bargaining. Without the protection of a strong 
union it is possible that living standards of film production workers would have 
suffered as all British studios sought to reduce costs and so remain internationally 
competitive. Although Flanders believed that most employers had an interest in 
“curbing ‘cut-throat’ wage competition among themselves” (Flanders 1975:91), 
the challenge for the big studios was not the competition of their domestic rivals, 
but the American studios. Thus the British studios had a justification for seeking to 
collectively reduce production costs by any available means - and the union an 
equal justification for protecting its members’ interests.
However, as already shown, after the decline of the big studios the ACTT retained 
a commanding position over relatively weak employer associations, and it used that 
power to ensure that there was little change in the practices, demarcation and 
operation of the industry. While under that protection, the membership showed no 
inclination for reform of employment practices: the ACTT was reluctant to change 
crewing levels despite very apparent technical changes (pages 164-165); it was 
dismissive of the potential effects of the Employment Acts (pages 157-160); and it 
failed to adjust traditional barriers and demarcation to accommodate the 
composition and population of the emerging video and digital sectors (page 186). 
The majority of conference motions in the early 1980s endorsed the union’s
Iain Reid
Chapter 9 Conclusions 266
position in opposing any change (page 160) and although there were occasional 
calls for reform, these rarely referred to specific aspects of the industry (page 162).
In so maintaining the status quo of studio floor practices, the ACTT was fulfilling a 
predictable function:
Union organization often served to strengthen or reinforce processes 
of [informal] regulation that were never completely eliminated 
(Flanders 1975:91)
Union involvement meant that any changes to those now strengthened regulations 
could only be effected through collective bargaining (Doeringer & Piore 1971:25), 
but with such an imbalance between the union and the employers, there was little 
need to make concessions. Furthermore, the workforce also possessed its own 
considerable influence through the internal labour market to resist any changes to 
the administrative rules:
In addition to custom, changes in the rules are subject to several other 
constraints. One of these is inherent in the nature of skill specificity 
and of on-the-job training. Both place a tremendous amount of power 
in the hands of the experienced labor force (Doeringer & Piore 
1972:32)
The result was that this was a labour market doubly protected from external forces 
because workers not only possessed the legitimate constraints of skill specificity 
and on-the-job training, but they also operated under the umbrella of the ACTT’s 
overwhelming power over the employers: “its power and influence were out of all 
proportion to its size” (Seglow 1978:54). The union’s rigorous control of crewing 
levels (pages 145-147) meant that union membership was critical to anyone who 
wanted to work in the industry (page 132) and entry required a knowledge of the 
admission requirements and processes (page 133) acquired either through a family 
or friend’s introduction (page 138) or the serving of some quasi apprenticeship 
(pages 134-136). Even relatively minor boundary concessions, such as allowing the 
transmission of the material produced by students of the DFS, were agreed only 
reluctantly and on a technicality (page 182). Thus only those already socialised as 
acceptable to the production community could expect admission and, perhaps more 
importantly, subsequent employment.
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Thus, as Weber had predicted, closure had became “an ever recurring process” 
(1968:342) and, as several generations of film production workers evolved through 
an unchanging cycle, so “wage relationships and sequences of promotion which are 
followed repeatedly tend to become customary” (Doeringer & Piore 1971:32).
9.5 Causes of the demise of the closed shop
The closed world of film production employment started to erode in the 1980s not 
primarily, this thesis argues, because of the Employment Acts (pages 156-164) but 
because of new technology. The effect of video and then digital technology was 
twofold. First, it meant that productions could bypass the processing laboratories 
(pages 167-169) which, as union strongholds, had previously been the ultimate 
sanction because of their influence over the fortunes of the production company 
employers at every stage of shooting and post-production. Secondly, the advent of 
digital editing and effects introduced a cohort of new workers who owed no 
allegiance to the traditional mysteries and the union. These newcomers were often 
graduates in electronics, computers and engineering - passionate ‘geeks’ for whom 
completion of a challenging and innovative task was more interesting than past 
battles fought for better terms and conditions of employment (pages 177-178).
These changes in the structure of the industry, the declining sympathy of the 
freelance members for left-wing agendas (pages 161-162), the failure of the union 
to recognise the effect of women in senior roles (pages 182-183) and to 
accommodate graduates with no traditional ties (pages 180-181) together meant 
that the union’s authority was weakened. By 1988, before The Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission the film industry unions were no longer willing (or perhaps, 
because of the Employment Acts, no longer able) to defend the closed shop (pages 
170-175) which had already been breached in the television sector at TVam (page 
176).
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9.6 Post closed shop outcomes in the other audio-visual sectors
The changes in the wider audio-visual industry in the early 1990s were far greater 
than the ending of the closed shop arrangements and the consolidation of the 
associated unions (page 8). Dot only was there a rapid growth in the size of the 
sector because of deregulation (page 230), but there was a proliferation of new 
technologies and new formats (page 226) which required new proficiencies and 
attributes for which past skills and on-the-job training had little relevance. At the 
same time there was an expansion of formal education, the volume of which 
(25,000 media related graduates annually (Holgate 2006:9)) had little relationship 
to the requirements of the audio-visual industry.
The outcome for the film production workforce after the closed shop will be 
considered in the next section but, while there are a few exceptions (e.g. high-end 
television drama) (page 222), many of the other audio-visual sectors now display 
the characteristics of a competitive market where there are
jobs which are not contained within well-defined administrative units 
and for which the process of the allocating and pricing of labour 
occurs in a more or less competitive fashion (Doeringer and Piore 
1971:4).
The exploration of the reasons for that competitive market reveals that in these 
sectors the elements which had maintained the internal labour market have been 
eroded or discarded. After 1990, the union was unable to maintain any formal 
boundaries around the proliferation of new sectors (page 225) and the much 
debated expansion of formal education (pages 238-241 & 246) meant a decline in 
on-the-job training and skill specificity (page 250). The result is an oversupply of 
those with just sufficient skills ready to meet the very basic requirements of the 
new sectors (pages 248 & 251) and, without the socialisation associated with on the 
job training, there has been no transmission of customary law. Additionally, the 
utilisation of new, low-budget production techniques has mean that there is less 
relevance for the past, high-value skills (page 252).
Moreover, as this expanded workforce lost all the power associated with talent, 
acquired skills, collective action and social networks, the power of capital 
increased. Contemporary television programmes are competitively tendered and so
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production facility houses and programme makers make rational calculations of 
their potential profit on any production (pages 229-234). As a result, labour costs 
and conditions are squeezed as producers seek every possibly economy, thus 
salaries are low (pages 235-237), employment turnover is high (page 237 & 256) 
and management has established control over the pricing and allocation of labour 
(page 236).
9.7 Indications of, and reasons for the persistence of the internal
labour market
That they are older and better paid than workers in the other audio-visual sectors is 
an immediate indication that the film production workforce remains a distinctive 
labour force (page 189-190 & 208). However, this alone does not show that an 
internal labour market persists, nor does the continuity of the associated trades 
(pages 18-19).
However, the tests suggested by Doeringer & Piore confirm that there continue to 
be rigid boundaries surrounding this workforce which is shielded from the direct 
competitive influences of the external market. Those tests showed that the rules 
relating to the deployment of labour are long-standing and as consistent as they 
were in the closed shop era (pages 191-192) and many of the principles relating to 
wage determination also remain firm, although there have been some changes in 
how the principles are interpreted (page 197). Secondly, there continue to be 
seemingly irrational practices that would not be acceptable in a truly competitive 
market. Relph showed contemporary British film production to be inefficient, in 
purely economic terms, when compared to British television (page 199) and 
analogous European and American film production (page 200).
Thirdly, labour remains critical to the film production process, which requires a 
high degree of skill specificity, unique to the sector (page 202-203), that can only 
be acquired through on-the-job training (page 204-205). On-the-job training is not 
only critical to gaining the necessary experience and skill, it also enables the 
acquisition of social capital and thus advancement (page 207-208) because 
Doeringer & Piore’s fourth factor requires that there should exist community
Iain Reid »c-3 J t i - 3 . i l  i t .
Chapter 9 Conclusions 270
custom and practice which decrees what behaviour is acceptable and what might 
violate the accepted codes. Again, there was clear evidence that there were 
recognised conventions (page 206) and divisions (page 209-210) which have no 
formal, organisational backing.
Thus the evidence indicates that an internal labour market, where “the pricing and 
allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” 
(Doeringer & Piore 1971:3), remains extant in the feature film production industry.
However, while all that evidence showed that an internal labour market remains 
active and showed the reasons why it might perpetuate itself, it gave little 
indication why the employers should tolerate its continuity. If there are seeming 
irrational practices and inefficiencies in worker established rules of labour pricing 
and allocation, then the assumption must be that the employers engaged in feature 
film production should eliminate them - especially when there is no formal 
organisation to protect them as there had been in the era of the closed shop.
The explanation of employer tolerance is found in the nature of capital and those 
who deploy it. In the feature film production process, the producers - the 
employers -  are not risking their own capital. Unlike their television counterparts 
who are competitively tendering and thus seeking to reduce costs and increase their 
profit, feature film producers are offering a unique, bespoke product which they 
will manage for a fee, usually a percentage of the total cost. Thus, exposed to little 
capital risk themselves, their main concern is that the project should proceed as 
smoothly and successfully as possible by utilising the talents of the best crew 
available. Therefore, producers have no interest in reforming a workforce which, 
as Doeringer & Piore predicted, through efficiencies in recruitment, screening and 
training will always deliver a well integrated and professional working team to 
each project.
However, official policy views this internal recruitment strategy, not as a logical 
and proven means of assembling successful, working teams, but as “nepotism and 
contacts, rather than open selection and aptitude” (Skillset 2003a:5) and it assumes 
the solution to broadening admission to the sector is that: “Government [should] 
ensure an integrated approach to education and skills training” (DCMS 2003:47).
Chapter 9 Conclusions 271
Thus the DCMS enquiry believed that while apprenticeships were useful in 
providing job experience “which many in the industry value”, the advantage of 
formal education was that it provided open access to all and so reduced the 
influence of nepotism - even through they heard evidence that the “obvious limited 
size of the industry” (DCMS 2003:47) was as much an obstacle as the lack of 
adequate training, or worse, inappropriate training:
Lots of media studies courses all over this country that are all
disparate, nothing plugs into anything (Sir Alan Parker to DCMS
2003: Ev 237)
Therefore government policy is to continue to encourage formal education which 
often fails to recognise, and therefore makes little attempt to match or reform, the 
requirements valued by those operating the gateways to the extant internal labour 
market (page 193 & 242). The result is that many of those who qualify merely 
flood the competitive market and so reinforce the determination of those in the film 
production sector to maintain their distinctive boundaries.
Whether the internal labour market will continue to deliver the employment 
stability that the workforce craves remains closely linked to the success of the 
British feature film. However, this thesis shows that as long as British production 
remains an “undercapitalised ‘cottage’ industry” (DCMS 2003:3) the producers 
will maintain their partnership with the workforce because their own livelihood 
depends on the continuity of skills that the internal labour market can deliver to 
each new project.
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Periodicals
Broadcast
Daily Film Renter
Economist
Film & Television Technician 
Kinematograph Weekly 
London Reporter 
Screen International 
Stage Screen & Radio 
Today’s Cinema
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Sources
Alrick Riley Director
Andy Egan ACTT / BECTU
Angus More Gordon Production Manager
Belinda Harris Head of Archive and Rights Clearance
Ben Southgate Furniture restorer - ex runner
Chris Coleman Media student
Chris Stoaling Second AD
David Chipp Former board director TVam
David Jeffers MD Post Production Facility
David Wells Grip
Eddy French Editor
Edward Joffe Director / Producer
Fred Smallbone Former Lithographic printer
James Levelle Director / Editor Corporate Productions
Joe Marks Producer
John Keen Director of Photography
Julian Bucknall Focus Puller
Louise Decouteau Producer
Martel 1 Producer
Mark Cooper Producer
Martin Foley Camera operator
Mary Hillman Make-up
Michael Apted Director
Michael Levelle 3rd Assistant
Mike Allen Cameraman
Murray Ashton Location Manager
Murray Close Stills Photographer
Dancy Platt Producer
Patsi Bucknall Producer
Penny Kay Producer
Peter Levelle Producer / Director
Roy Lockett ACTT/BECTU
Sally Fisher CineGuilds GB
Sara Langton Production lawyer
Sarah Lane Skillset
Sharon Goode Director FT2
Sue Gibson Director of Photography
Tim Sullivan Director
Tudor Gates Former President ACTT
Vadim Jean Director
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Appendix 1 Job Titles & Grades in Comtemporary Film Production
Production
Director
Writer
Producer
Executive Producer 
Line Producer 
Associate Producer 
Co-Producer 
Production Co-ordinator 
Assistant Production Co­
ordinator 
Producer's Assistant 
Director's Assistant 
Production runner 
Production Manager 
Production Assistant
Script Supervisor 
Continuity 
Script Editor
Development Co-ordinator
Assistant Directors
1st Assistant Director 
2nd Assistant Director 
3rd Assistant Director 
Floor Runner
Art, set decorating & props
Production Designer 
Supervising Art Director 
Art Director 
Standby Art Director 
Assistant Art Director 
Storyboard Artist 
Draughtsman 
Junior Draughtsman 
Graphic Artist 
Art Department Trainee 
Art Department Runner 
Set Decorator 
Assistant Set Decorator
Production Buyer 
Assistant Production Buyer 
Drapes master 
Art Department Assistant
Property Master 
Props storeman 
Chargehand Dresser 
Chargehand Standby Prop 
Dresser 
Junior Dresser 
Standby props 
Dressing props 
Greensman
Camera
Director of Photography 
Camera operator 
Focus puller 
Clapper loader 
Key Grip 
Camera Grip 
Assistant Grip 
Steadicam operator 
Crane operator 
Camera trainee 
1 st Assistant Camera 
2nd Assistant Camera
Sound
Sound mixer 
Sound maintenance 
Sound recordist 
Boom operator 
Sound assistant 
Sound trainee 
Sound editor 
Sound designer
Electrical
HOD Electrician 
Gaffer 
Best boy 
Electrician 
Rigging gaffer 
Rigging electrician 
Apprentice electrician 
Genny operator 
Electrician trainee
283
Costume
Costume designer 
Assistant costume designer 
Costume supervisor 
Wardrobe supervisor 
Wardrobe master / mistress 
Wardrobe assistant 
Costume assistant 
Costume maker
Make-up & hair
Make-up and hair designer 
Chief make-up artist 
Make-up artist 
Assistant make-up artist 
Chief hairdresser 
Hairdresser 
Assistant hairdresser
Construction
Construction manager 
Assist construction manager 
Construction secretary 
Supervising carpenter 
Chargehand carpenter 
Carpenter 
Stand-by carpenter 
Chargehand machinist 
Machinist 
HOD Painter 
Supervising painter 
Chargehand painter 
Scenic painter 
Painter
Stand-by painter 
Painters' labourer 
HOD Rigger 
Supervising rigger 
Chargehand rigger 
HOD Stagehand 
Supervising stagehand 
Chargehand stagehand 
Stagehand 
Stand-by stagehand 
Scenic carpenter 
HOD Plasterer 
Plasterer
Post-production
Editor
Assistant Editor
Floor Production supervisor
Post-production supervisor
Editing trainee
Visual effects supervisor
Visual effects producer
Location
Location manager 
Assistant location manager 
Unit manager 
Location finder 
Locations assistant 
Location marshal
Accounts
Financial controller 
Supervising accountant 
Production accountant 
Assistant accountant 
Accounts assistant
Casting
Casting director 
Casting assistant
Publicity
Unit publicist 
Stills photographer
Special Effects (SFX)
SFX Supervisor
SFX Co-ordinator
SFX secretary
SFX workshop supervisor
Senior SFX technician
SFX technician
SFX trainee
Stunts & doubles
Stunt co-ordinator 
Assistant stunt co-ordinator 
Stunt secretary 
Stunt performer 
Stunt driver 
Stand in
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Catering
Catering Manager 
Chef
Catering assistant
Transport
Transport manager 
Actors’ / Director's driver 
Unit driver 
Minibus driver 
Driver
Music
Composer 
Music agent 
Music supervisor
Others
Dialect coach 
Armourer 
Animal wrangler 
Health & Safety advisor 
Aerial crew 
Divers 
Unit nurse 
Researcher / archive
Source: Skillset (2005:139-141)
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Appendix 2 An Example Call Sheet
I STEDHAV FLXX IQNDCM 1BU 
TELEPHONE 01 *»!(I42
C A L I  S H E E T
PRODUCT: CANON OFFICE EQUIPMENT
TITLE: BRAINS <1 x 50 second*}
PRODUCTION NO: B299
SHOOT DATES: TUESDAY, 2ND SEPTEMBER, 1986 PRE-LIGHT/TEST
WEDNESDAY, 3RD SEPTEMBER SHOOT
THURSDAY, 4TH SEPTEMBER SHOOT
FRIDAY, 5TH SEPTEMBER SHOOT BLUE SCREEN
AGENCY: WIGHT COLLINS RUTHERFORD SCOTT PLC
41/44 GREAT QUEEN STREET
LONDON
WC2B 5AR
TEL : 01 242 2800
AGENCY PERSONNEL: PRODUCER : DAVID TROLLOPE
COPY WRITER : PETER GAUSIS 
ART DIRECTOR : MIKE WHARTON
STUDIO: CANNON ELSTREe STUDIOS STAGE 1
SHENLEY ROAD 
BOREHAMWOOD 
HERTFORDSHIRE
TEL : 01 953 1600
UNIT CALL TIME: MAIN UNIT 8.00 b . i d .
Bbci-HURST FILM PRODUCTIONS UMFTED 
REGISTERED OFFICE. 9 MANSFIELD STREET LONDON WIN ?IL  REGISTERED NUMBER 12*95)9. REGISTERED VA1 NU 2«2W »L  
PETER LEVELLE. JACK BANKHEAD. IAIN RE CP, ELIZABETH BARNES. KAY LUCK W EIL
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unit
director:
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: 
PRODUCER:
1ST ASSISTANT: 
PRODUCTION RUNNER: 
LOCATION MANAGER:
PETER LEVELLE 
IAIN REID 
PATSI EDEN 
ROGER INMAN 
MURRAY ASHTON 
G1LLY CASE
385 7535 
828 8306 
580 8142 
B/E 81 52331 
221 4375 
WIZZO 749 6416
LIGHTING CAMERAMAN: 
OPERATOR:
FOCUS PULLER: 
CLAPPER LOADER: 
GRIP:
CAMERA TRAINEE: 
VIDEO OPERATOR:
MIKE CONNOR 
JOHN KEEN 
IAN SMITH 
MARE MORIARTY 
TONY ROWLAND 
JULIAN BUCKNALL 
JUSTIN MULLER
GAS
B/E
GAS
GAS
GAS
65 22851 
395 3902 
948 2746 
467 0098 
0753 681187 
979 3086 
821 8058
BLUE SCREEN CAMERAMAN: 
BLUE SCREEN ELECTRICIAN:
DENNIS BARTLETT 
GIL GATES
567 9478 
953 1600
SOUND AS PER: BILL BURGESS 
DAVE SUTTON
B/E 866 3540
GAFFER:
ELECTRICIANS:
PETER ARNOLD 
MR* LIGHTING
837 3061 
837 3061
ART DIRECTOR:
PROPS BUYER:
PROPS MEN:
CONSTRUCTION MANAGER:
ROD STRATFOLD 
LESLIE FULFORD 
JERRY BOURKE 
KIERON MACNAMARA 
PETER NODWBLL
RIZZO
8/E
979 2630 
0932 44406 
207 1473 
953 9657 
627 4704
SPECIAL FX: RICHARD JOHNSON 703 1026
MAKE-UP:
HAIR:
WARDROBE:
MARY HILLMAN 
JEFFREY HAINES 
HANDY SCOTT
C/B
C/B
568 7892 
289 3706 
734 4310
CAKERACAR DRIVER: JOHN MORRILL 673 6245
STAND-BY CREW Chippie:
Painter:
Stag:
Riffer:
JOHN ALLEN 
MICK EATON 
IAN TOWNSEND 
JOHN BARRY
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ARTISTES
BRAINS 
Steven Beard
BRAINS* ASSISTANT 
Christina Avar?
OFFICE DELIVERY MEN
Gary Beadle
Rally Thonaa 
Extras
Steven Jensen 
Peter Finn
AGENTS
Lou Coulson
734 9633
Libby Glen
735 4553
Anna Shear 
278 210!
Margery Abel 
499 1343
A c t io n  P e r s o n n e l
HOME PAYS REQUIRED
577 1556 Wednesday/Thursday
Call tiae: 8*00 a.a.
625 8730 Wednesday/Thursday
Call time: 8.00 a.a.
509 8214 Wed/Tburs/Friday
Call tiae; 7.30 a.a.
907 1510 Wednesday/Friday
Call tiae: 7.30 a.a.
392 1818 Friday only
Call tiae: 8.30 a.a.
531 3057 
0279 21052
CAMERA EQUIPMENT
BEECHURST FILMS Julian Bucknall 01 580 8142
Arriflex 35BL Mklll Camera 24FPS Crystal Locked 
Variable Speed Control 6*32 FPS 
3 x 400r/3 x 1000' Mags 
Cosplete Video Playback (colour)
Ground Glass/Extension Eyepiece/Sliding Base Plate 
Batteries, Leads, etc.
Zeiss Supaspeed 16m (T2.1)
Zelta Ultraspeed l&n* (T1.3)
Set of Zeiss Ultraspeed* (Tl-3) cosprising; 25anr 35mm, 50no and 85ma 
Zeiss Planar 135ma (T2.1)
Cooke Varotal 5-1 20ma to lOOaa T3.1 Varotol Zooa complete with 
6 x €  Mattebox, Zoos Control, etc.
4* Nattebox 
Follow Focus Set
6" Circ. Pola/41' Sq.Pola Anaaorphie adaptor DF961 ; Peerless
4** 81EF
4" 85 k 85B
6” fc 4* Supafrosts
4" Lowcons
4** ND’s
Technohead Mk2 with tall and short legs 
Satchler Fluid 15S with T/S Legs 
Arri Bowl Ad&ptor/Moy 3-way leveller 
Bazooka and base 
Unit Box
Beechurst/C&non Office Equipment 2nd/3rd/4tb Septesber 1986
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CAMERAS LIMITED Jasper Fforde 01 381 0676
Arrifinder (1 week)
40ma Zeiss Lens
Arri MkIV BL with BNC nount {body only)
Phasebar Adjuster
TECHNOVISION Richard 01 891 5961
Tuesday/Friday only
3-1 Anaaorphic Cooke Vsrotol 
4 Cham A 50mn Anaaorphic Priae Lenses
Wednesday - Friday
Hustler Dolly 
6 x 8x4 Tracking Boards 
6.6" Colour Grads 
6.6* Softline ND Grads
TO BE DELIVERED TO EL3TRES BY TECHNOVISION
FILM STOCK Julian Bucknall 01 590 8142
10 x 1000* KODAK 524? Emulsion 913
N.B. CAMERA EQUIPMENT AND FILM STOCK TO TRAVEL IN BEECHURST CAMERA VAN 
WITH JULIAN BUCKNALL
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT Mr* iiEhti-nK 01831 3061
2 x Brutes 
2 x lOKs 
2 x 6Ks 
2 x 2Ks 
4 x Misars
4 x Skypans 
16 x single dinos 
2 x Maxibrutes 
2 x Blondes 
1 x Spacelites
12 x 12 fraie 
Poly, gels, 
etc.
SOUND EQUIPMENT
To be supplied by Bill Burgess
BLUE SCREEN
16* x 12' Contact; Bill Kirkpatrick 01 953 1600
Eeechurst/Canon Office Equipaent 2nd/3rd/4th September 1936
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BOSHES INSTRUCTIONS
LABORATORY i TECHNICOLOR LIMITED 01 759 5432
P.O. BOX 7 
BATH ROAD
NEST DRAYTON, MDDX.
CONTACT : BOB CROVDEY
EDITORS : EDDY FRENCH ASSOCIATES 
181 WABDCHJB STREET 
LONDON, W.l.
01 734 3313
RUSHES VIEWING : THURSDAY 4TH/FBIDAY STB SEPTEMBER 
ft Cannon Admin. Theatre #8.30 a.m.
SATURDAY. 6TH SEPTEMBER • 9.30 a.m. ft Cherrills
RUSHES TO BE DELIVERED/COLLECTED TO/FROM KLSTREE HAIM GATE BY TECHNICOLOR 
1ST YAM CHERRILLS SATURDAY €TH A.M.
PRODUCT
All product will bo delivered by Cannon to Elstree studios on Monday 1st 
September ft 9.30 a.m.
PROPS/SPECIAL EFPECT3
ARIAD Van : To be advised 
Computer Effects : Richard Johnson 
Brains' tools : Leslie Fulford
CATERING Tim ft Location Centre 207 1295
For approx. 45 people
WABDROBE/MAKB-UP/HAIR FACILITIES
PRODUCTION OFFICES: 226 4 227
WARDROBE: 102 DRESSING ROOMS: 124/123/126
MAKE-UP/HAIR: 221/211
Beeehurst/Canon Office Equipment 2nd/3rd/4tb September 1986
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Appendix 3 Overseas Location ‘White C ard’
2 SOHO sot1AU. Londcw WIV 6DD
OVERSEAS LOCATION CLEARANCE
Til* undermentioned member is cleared for Ou 
location shown e v t / l« f  in compliance with 
Rule 19
NAME !a x < s  f t P j i d  ______
GRADE f l o c t O O g / ___________ _
DA IE OF ISSUE: «»?S &Z>
HEAD OFFIC
SIGNATURE
Rule 19 
Location Clearance:
No member wJI he alto wed to proceed on a 
film (quota or non quota) or television foreign 
location or reconnaissance abroad (with the 
exception of Urtrfll flfwWMi alignments) 
wirtiom informing Head Office of the fact 
Any mrmbcr failing to comply with thit 
requirement may be sobjoet to ditopfenar^ 
action. Clearance certificates will not be taoed 
to any member* whore Trade Union suhtcnp- 
liom are tn *rre*rt
STAMP:
 — - ■ ---------------------------
NAME OK COMPANY: f e g O L P P ?
IVPE OP PRODUCTION. ( G n ,\IV’0 £ l j O J  
INCLUDING TIT1F.:
LOCATION i)SA___________
DA IE  OF DEPARTURE: d -fo
DATE OF RETURN n a . g . & .
Thii card i* issued rubKct to the travel, 
in ru n  nee and aocomciodation requirements 
and all other term* and cODihboru of the 
F .P A  or F.SF.A., A C T T . Agreement
Iain Reid
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Appendix 4 Responsibilities of a camera operator
PREPRODUCTION
♦♦♦ Read and digest the script
❖ Discuss with the Director and Cinematographer/Director of Photography (DoP), 
all aspects of the script.
Discuss style of shooting.
*1* Recce all locations.
*1* Review all set plans.
♦♦♦ Determine technical details such as -  where tracks are to be laid, size of crane 
or dolly.
♦t* Determine type of heads -  remote, fluid, geared or hand-held and tripods, 
or Steadicam (usually by a specialist operator), 
or tracking vehicle.
♦t* Check on any new equipment available.
♦i* Discuss with the DoP choice of 1st AC, 2nd AC, Central Loader and Grip(s).
*1* Liaise with the DoP, Camera Crew and Grips on camera and grip equipment 
lists.
Walk all locations, sets and stages with the Director and DoP.
♦♦♦ Shoot camera and lens tests, especially checking the ground glass ratios and 
format by shooting a leader.
❖ Check Projection in rushes theatre for any discrepancies of framing. 
SHOOTING
♦♦♦ The camera operator will be closely involved at all times with the setting up of 
shots with the Director and DoP.
♦♦♦ Directors may have very strong ideas on photographic style and/or framing and 
lenses and impose these on the production.
♦♦♦ Alternatively, Directors are sometimes more concerned with their actors and 
performance and thus give the camera crew a freer hand in how the film looks.
♦♦♦ normally it’s somewhere between these two examples.
♦♦♦ Once the way a sequence to be filmed has been decided in the way of 
rehearsals, the Operator will be involved with the Director and DoP on the 
choice of lenses and the way the camera may move.
The Operator will then supervise the 1 st and 2nd ACs and the Grips to set up 
the shots while lighting and rehearsal of actors are in progress.
■ t '•t
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The Operator will check with the Script Supervisor that directions and eye lines 
(lefts and rights) are correct -  although for an Operator that should be 
instinctive.
Liaise with the 1st AD of the extent of the shot so that extras and background 
action can be set, and not wasted in non-photographed areas.
Check for any irregularities with make-up, hair and costume that may not have 
been spotted by their departments.
Work with the art and props departments with the setting of any dressing on the 
set, either in the foreground or background.
Check for any off-set items that may have crept onto the set such as lamp 
stands, cables and unwanted props or crew personal possessions.
Rehearse the scene and fine tune all camera moves.
Shooting involves the Operator looking through the eyepiece, panning and 
tilting the camera to follow the action.
After each take the Operator will be able to say or should say to the Director 
and/or DoP whether or not the shot was good technically.
With the almost universal use of video assist, many people can have an opinion 
about a shot, but the Operator should still have his say, as he knows what he’s 
looking at and what for.
ROUND-UP
As the Operator is the member of the crew who looks through and operates the 
camera he or she must be fully conversant with any type of head.
Also he or she should ideally have been a Clapper Loader and Focus Puller 
prior to becoming an Operator so that the skills and difficulties in these grades 
can be appreciated.
It is essential to know all crew members’ names. Standbys (carpenters, painters, 
riggers, plasterers and stage hands), Grips, Art department personnel, Props and 
Electricians are constantly working at the behest of the camera department.
Occasionally the Actors -  as well as the Director or DoP will ask the Operator 
for his or her opinion on some matter concerning a shot, at this time a certain 
amount of tact may be required.
The essence of film-making is team work and the Camera Operator is right in 
the middle of it all, so he should be a good communicator.
All departments ask the Operator questions and the answers should be 
forthcoming, or at least, fielded to the person who is better qualified to answer.
The expertise and hard work of every department is eventually telescoped into 
those images produced by the motion picture camera which is why the Operator 
is such a key member of the crew.
http://www.bscine.com 27 March 2005
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Appendix 5 Overtime Codes BECTU / AFVPA agreement
A list of the Overtime Codes used in the now defunct AFVPA/BECTU and AFVPA/ AEEU 
agreements (1st July 2000 to 30th June 2001)
Code Description □otes
VEC Very Early Call between 00:00 and 05:00 at start of day, Overtime at 3x
ECL Early Call between 05:00 and 07:00 at start of day, Overtime at SOR
MFD Monday to Friday Day 8 hours minimum
SOT Standard Overtime OT starts after 8 hours (GP3 after 10 hours) at Standard 
Overtime Rates for first 6 hours
XOT Excess Overtime more than 6 hours, all Groups at 3x
AMO After Midnight from 24:00 at end of day, all Groups at 3x
SWD Standard Working Day 8 hours minimum
□TC □ormal Time of Call from 07:00 to 10:00, see ETC and LTC
ETC Earliest Time of Call 07:00 but before this time, ECL or VEC rates apply
LTC Latest Time of Call 10:00
SOR Standard Overtime Rates GP1 at 1.5x, GP2 at 1.25x, GP3 at lx but only over 10 hours
GP1 Group (i) Rates up to and including £216, Overtime at 1.5x
GP2 Group (ii) Rates over £216, up to and including £362, Overtime at 1.25x
GP3 Group (iii) Rates over £362, Overtime at lx but only over 10 hours
CWD Continuous Working Day 7 hours minimum
COT CWD Overtime All Groups after 7 hours at SOR, for all hours
MF Monday to Friday ight All Groups at 1.5x for minimum 8 hours, all other hours at 3x, 
plus 1 or 2 Rest Days at 1 x
SS Saturday and Sunday ight All Groups at 2x for all hours, minimum 8 hours, plus 
1 or 2 Rest Days at 1 x
SAD Saturday Day GP1 and GP2 at 1.5x, GP3 at 1.25x for all hours, minimum 8 hrs
SUD Sunday Day GP1 and GP2 at 2x, GP3 at 1.5x for all hours, minimum 8hrs
HOL Statutory Holidays GP1 and GP2 at 2.5x, GP3 at 2x for all hours, minimum 8hrs
TRV Travel All Groups at lx  for all hours, less TRX
TRX Travel Exception Deduct 1 hour from TRV
TOC Time Off the Clock 11 hours, except last day
BRK Breakfast Meal Break 0.5 hour
LUD Lunch Meal Break 1 hour
SUP Supper Meal Break 0.5 hour, from 2 hours up to 4.5 hours
OMB Overtime Meal Break 1 hour over 4.5 hours, plus additional hour every 4 hours
□MB □ight Meal Break 1 hour
(http://www.macgregortech.com/MACBudgeting/Calculators/OTCodes.html 28 Apr 04)
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Appendix 6 Examples of Independent Television Tariffs
Channel 4 Tariff for 2003
6.2 Proposed Tariff
Channel 4 Hourly C ost fo r Core Rights (2003)
Genre Minimum Cost £‘000
Maximum Cost 
£'000
Drama seres (Peak) 350 600
Dramaseoals/events (Peak]' 300 900
Drama Documentary (Peak)' 250 400
Drama (Off Peak) 50 120
Entertainment Archive (Peak) 103 190
Entertainment Formatted Entertainment (Peak! 90 320
Entertanment Narrative Comedy (Peak: 353 560
Entertainment BrokenGcripted Corned/ (Peak! 150 450
Entedanment inoiudina Quizzes :Of*' Peak 15 80
=actual (includes)
Current Affairs (Peak)*
Docunnentaries (Peak)’ low. 70 low: 110
r  actual Arts.Cuiture (Peak) ’ mid: 110 mid 150
-actual History (Peak)' high' 150 high: 130
zactual Religion (Peal1.)'
-actual Science and Medical i'PeakT
F eatures/Uf ©style (Peak) 50 150
Other Factual (Off Peak) 15 60
Music Performance* 70 350
Exdudeo all programmes under X' minutes duration, Animation, Long-Running reality 
Breakfast, Long-Running Drama, News, 4 Learning and Sport
°eak is defined as 17:30 to 24:00
The tariffs represent Channel 4 b contribution for Core Rights- Tncce categories 
marked with an asterisk are those moot likely to require defist finance
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ITV Network -  “Indicative Tariffs” for 2004
ITV1 Network Indicative Tariff
Programme Tvpe Indicative Tariff
Daytime (09.30 -18.00 excluding 
Children’s)
Chat Show £20.000 -  £40,000 per hour slot
Lifestyle/Factual £15. 000 - £30.000 per half hour slot
Gameshowr £20.000 - £30,000 per half hour slot
Peak Time (18.00 -  23.59)
Drama £415.000 - £800.000 per hour slot
Soaps £ 110,000 - £ 150.000 per half hour slot
Entertainment (including Aits) £125.000 -  £500.000 per hour slot
Factual £150.000 to £250.000 per hour slot
Nighttime (00.00- 06.00)
Entertainment (including arts) £4,500 -  £25,000 per half hour slot
Factual £ 6.000 - £25.000 per half hour slot
Gameshow £8.000 - £20.000 per half horn slot
Children’s (15.20 -17.00)
Drama £65,000 - £145,000 per half hour slot
Preschool £7.500 -  £35.000 (10 and 20 minute slot)
Lons form animation £30.000 - £60,000 per half hour slot
Short form animation £5,000 -  £35,000 (5 and 15 minute slot)
Entertainment and gaineshowrs £35,000 - £70,000 per 25 minute slot
Factual £30,000 - £50,000 per 30 minute slot
Iain Reid >-■'1 •*(«”}»» I I  *C
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Channel Five Broadcasting Limited -  Tariffs for 2004
five
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 1
'Jhsnnfl Ftv* P rn gran m e Tairfts f a  O o m m tsa m a j Productions Taking PTm aiyBtghte
Crtv for 200*4
GENRE________________ SUB-GENFE TIME SLOT POST
Education & m  Dec 
Adlit Ed 
Social Atfion
Peak
CO - Peak 
CO - Peak
£20*. - £30k tor 30 mm 
t1k - 15k tot 30 mns 
£2Sk for £0 {Tin*
Arts Peak
Peak
£25k - 140k for 20 mfrs 
£5Ck - £?5k for <50 mns
Currant Alters Peak
COPfcd*.
EtOQk fcf 60 r nkia 
£101*. fur £0 rrins
GNfctrans Drama
Animation
Errlertarrmenl
Factual
FY»-schcol
CO-Paak
OO-Peak
Ofl-Psak
OH-Pwk
CO-Peak
£19< for 30 mirts 
£ 15k fur 30 mine 
£12,5k for 30 m r* 
£t 2.5k for 30 nine 
E4k fa 10 mhs
Dccurnenfoiy/F&ctual Single Doc 
Sing la Doc 
Singrie Doc 
Series
Peak. 
Peak 
CO Peak 
P»k
£4i>; - 050k for 30 mm 
EfiOk - £90k tor 00 whs 
E6Qk-£?5kfof60mr»5 
£70k - £$0k for 60mbs
Drara Seep
SrpietfSertefi
Peak
Peak
E45k - £5Gk for 30 mbs 
£1 50k - ESOOk for €0 mine
Entertainment General 
Gama Shaw 
O J a .
Peek 
Peak 
CO Peek
E3d< - £60k for 30 mm  
£20k - £40k fcfSOmbB 
£5k - CIQk tor 30 infos,
Factual Bttertanmerrt
Peek
Peak
£*<fc-£i1<*tare0mfos 
E3Gk - £60k for 30. fnlrn
N&rvS Notatxtlcabte
Ftetijon Peek
08-peek
Peak
£25k - £40k for 30 mm  
£1 Ok - £15k for 30 mm  
£65k - £33k for 60 mha
Socrt Nat scvicefcito
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